What’s in a Symbol? Emerging Parties and Anti-Corruption Symbols in Indonesia’s 2014 National Legislative Election Campaigns by Kramer, Elisabeth Anne
	
	 	
	
 
 
What’s in a Symbol? 
 
Emerging Parties and Anti-Corruption Symbols in 
Indonesia’s 2014 National Legislative Election 
Campaigns 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
Elisabeth Anne Kramer 
Department of Indonesian Studies 
The University of Sydney 
2015  
	
	 	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is my own original work. It contains no material previously published or written by 
another person except where due reference is made in the text. Clearance was obtained from the 
University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee for the project. 
 
 
 
Signed ……………………………………………………………………. 
	
	
	
Table	of	Contents	
Abbreviations	..............................................................................................................................................	ii	
A	note	on	currency	...................................................................................................................................	v	
A	note	on	Indonesian	terms	................................................................................................................	v	
Abstract	.........................................................................................................................................................	vi	
Acknowledgments	................................................................................................................................	viii	
Introduction	.................................................................................................................................................	x	
Indonesia’s	political	system	...................................................................................................	5	
Emerging	political	parties	.......................................................................................................	7	
Emerging	parties	and	the	2014	elections	......................................................................	10	
Methodology	..............................................................................................................................	14	
Limitations	.................................................................................................................................	19	
Outline	of	thesis	.......................................................................................................................	20	
1.	Political	symbols,	campaigns	and	corruption	...................................................................	25	
Symbols	.......................................................................................................................................	27	
Symbols	in	campaigns	.......................................................................................................	29	
Developing	a	narrative	......................................................................................................	32	
Symbol	diffusion	across	scales	...........................................................................................	36	
Why	(anti)corruption	symbols?	........................................................................................	40	
Conclusion	..................................................................................................................................	44	
2.	Tracing	the	history	of	anti‐corruption	..................................................................................	47	
After	Independence	................................................................................................................	48	
Defending	Guided	Democracy	.......................................................................................	54	
The	New	Order	.........................................................................................................................	56	
Corruption	and	the	fall	of	Suharto	...............................................................................	64	
Reformasi	....................................................................................................................................	70	
Presidential	pressures	......................................................................................................	71	
The	rise	of	Yudhoyono	......................................................................................................	76	
Conclusion	..................................................................................................................................	78	
3.	Politics	and	corruption,	2009–2014	.......................................................................................	81	
The	2004	and	2009	elections	.............................................................................................	81	
An	unstable	coalition	.........................................................................................................	85	
Corruption	and	anti‐corruption	as	political	themes	.................................................	86	
Attacks	on	the	KPK	.............................................................................................................	87	
Centurygate	...........................................................................................................................	90	
	
	
The	driving	simulator	procurement	case	..................................................................	93	
The	case	of	Gayus	.................................................................................................................	95	
The	travellers’	cheque	scandal	.......................................................................................	96	
Corruption	in	the	Directorate	General	of	Customs	and	Excise	.........................	97	
Corruption	in	local	government	....................................................................................	98	
The	fall	of	the	Democrats	..................................................................................................	99	
The	fall	of	PKS	.....................................................................................................................	102	
Corruption	in	the	Constitutional	Court	....................................................................	104	
Public	opinion	.........................................................................................................................	106	
Conclusion	................................................................................................................................	111	
4.	Emerging	parties	and	campaigning	on	corruption	......................................................	113	
The	anti‐corruption	strategy	............................................................................................	114	
Creating	and	mobilizing	the	symbol	..............................................................................	117	
Party	publications	.............................................................................................................	118	
Party	leaders	.......................................................................................................................	121	
Parties	in	the	media	.........................................................................................................	124	
Parties’	Online	Presence	................................................................................................	129	
Conclusion	................................................................................................................................	135	
5.	Candidates	on	the	campaign	trail	..........................................................................................	137	
Hanura,	East	Java	...................................................................................................................	139	
Nasdem,	South	Sulawesi	.....................................................................................................	151	
Gerindra,	North	Sumatra	....................................................................................................	158	
Intra‐party	relationships	....................................................................................................	166	
Conclusion	................................................................................................................................	169	
6.	A	successful	strategy?	...................................................................................................................	173	
Justifying	the	use	of	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	.......................................................	173	
Salient	and	primed	...........................................................................................................	175	
The	art	of	persuasion	......................................................................................................	176	
Candidates	matter	............................................................................................................	180	
Diffusion	of	symbols	.............................................................................................................	183	
Mixed	messages	.....................................................................................................................	188	
Conclusion	................................................................................................................................	193	
Conclusion	...............................................................................................................................................	195	
Appendices	................................................................................................................................................	200	
Bibliography	.............................................................................................................................................	203	
	
	
	
List	of	Figures	
Figure	6.1	..................................................................................................................................................	182	
 
List	of	Tables	
Table	3.1	......................................................................................................................................................	84	
Table	3.2	....................................................................................................................................................	108	
Table	3.3	....................................................................................................................................................	109	
Table	6.1	....................................................................................................................................................	184	
	
ii	
	
Abbreviations	
	 	
ABRI	
Bawaslu	
Angkatan	Bersenjata	Republik	Indonesia	(Armed	Forces	of	Indonesia)	
Badan	Pengawas	Pemilu	(Electoral	Supervisory	Board)	
BNN	 Badan	Narkotika	Nasional	(National	Narcotics	Agency)	
BPK	
Bulog	
CSIS	
Dapil	
Badan	Pemeriksa	Keuangan	(National	Audit	Agency)	
Badan	Urusan	Logistik	(State	Logistics	Agency)	
Centre	for	Strategic	and	International	Studies,	Indonesia	
Daerah	Pemilihan	(Constituency)	
DKI	Jakarta	 Daerah	Khusus	Ibukota	Jakarta	(Special	Capital	Region	of	Jakarta)	
DPD	
DPR	I	
	
DPR	II	
Dewan	Perwakilan	Daerah	(Regional	Representative	Council)	
Dewan	Perwakilan	Rakyat	Daerah	tingkat	propinsi,	(Regional	People’s	
Representative	Council,	provincial	level)	
Dewan	Perwakilan	Rakyat	Daerah	tingkat	kapubaten/kota,	(Regional	
People’s	Representative	Council,	regency	or	city	level)	
DPR‐RI		 Dewan	Perwakilan	Rakyat‐	Republic	Indonesia	(National	People’s	
Representative	Council)	
G30S	 Gerakan	30	September	(30	September	Movement)	
Gerindra	
	
Golkar	
Golput	
	
Hanura	
HKTI	
HMI	
Partai	Gerakan	Indonesia	Raya	(Great	Indonesia	Movement	Party)	
Golongan	Karya	(Party	of	Functional	Groups)	
Golongan	Putih	(‘White	Group’	or	people	who	chose	not	to	vote	in	
elections)	
Partai	Hati	Nurani	Rakyat	(People’s	Conscience	Party)	
Himpuan	Kerukunan	Tani	Indonesia	(Indonesian	Farmer’s	
Association)	
Himpuan	Mahasiswa	Islam	(Muslim	Students’	Association)	
ICMI	
	
ICS	
ICW	
Ikatan	Cendekiawan	Muslim	Indonesia	(Association	of	Indonesian	
Muslim	Intellectuals)		
Indonesia	Survey	Center	
Indonesian	Corruption	Watch	
IMF	 International	Monetary	Fund	
INES	 Indonesian	Network	Election	Survey	
KKN	 Korupsi,	Kolusi	dan	Nepotisme	(Corruption,	Collusion	and	Nepotism)	
Kopassus	 Komando	Pasukan	Khusus	(Indonesian	Special	Forces)	
KPK	 Komisi	Pemberantasan	Korupsi	(Corruption	Eradication	Commission)	
	
iii	
	
KPKPN	
	
KPU	
Komisi	Pemeriksa	Kekayaan	Penyelenggara	Negara	(Commission	to	
Examine	the	Wealth	of	State	Officials)		
Komisi	Pemilihan	Umum	(General	Election	Commission)	
LIPI	
	
LSI	
LSN	
Lembaga	Ilmu	Pengetahuan	Indonesia	(Indonesian	Institute	of	Social	
Science)	
Lembaga	Survey	Indonesia	(Indonesia	Survey	Institute)	
Lembaga	Survei	Nasional	(National	Survey	Institute)	
Malari	 Malapetaka	Limabelas	Januari	(15	January	Incident)	
MPR	 Majelis	Permusyawaratan	Rakyat	(People’s	Consultative	Assembly)	
MUI	
Nasdem	
Majelis	Ulama	Indonesia	(Indonesian	Council	of	Islamic	Scholars)	
Partai	Nasdem	(National	Democratic	Party)	
NGO	 Non‐Governmental	Organization	
NU	 Nahdlatul	Ulama		
OPSTIB	 Operasi	Tertib	(Operation	to	Improve	Order)	
PAN	 Partai	Amanat	Nasional	(National	Mandate	Party)	
PDI	 Partai	Demokrasi	Indonesia	(Indonesian	Democratic	Party)	
PDIP	
	
PEKUNEG	
	
Perludem	
	
Pemilu	
Pertamina	
Partai	Demokrasi	Indonesia	Perjuangan	(Indonesian	Democratic	
Party	of	Struggle)	
Tim	Penerbitan	Keuangan	Negara	(Team	to	Regularize	State	
Finances)	
Rumah	Pemilu	untuk	Demokrasi	(Election	House	for	Democracy)		
Pemilihan	Umum	(General	Election)	
Perusahaan	Pertambangan	Minyak	dan	Gas	Bumi	Negara	(State	Oil	
and	Natural	Gas	Mining	Company)	
PKB	 Partai	Kebangkitan	Bangsa	(National	Awakening	Party)	
PKI	
PKK	
Partai	Komunis	Indonesia	(Indonesian	Communist	Party)	
Pembinaan	Kesejahteraan	Keluarga	(Family	Welfare	Development)	
PKS	
PNI	
PPATK	
Partai	Keadilan	Sejahtera	(Prosperous	Justice	Party)	
Partai	Nasionalis	Indonesia	(Indonesian	Nationalist	Party)	
Pusat	Pelaporan	dan	Analisis	Transaksi	Keuangan	(Centre	for	
Financial	Transaction	Reports	and	Analysis)	
PPP	
PRD	
Partai	Persatuan	Pembangunan	(United	Development	Party)	
Partai	Rakyat	Demokratis	(Democratic	People’s	Party)	
PSI	 Partai	Sosialis	Indonesia	(Indonesian	Socialist	Party)	
PUKAT	 Universitas	Gadjah	Mada	Pusat	Kajian	Anti‐Korupsi	(University	of	
Gadjah	Mada	Center	for	Anti‐Corruption	Studies)	
	
iv	
	
Rp	
SMRC	
TGPTPK	
	
TII	
Tim	Tastipikor	
Rupiah	(Indonesian	currency)	
Saiful	Mujani	Research	and	Consulting	
Tim	Gabungan	Pemberantasan	Tindak	Pidana	Korupsi	(Joint	Team	to	
Eradicate	the	Crime	of	Corruption)	
Transparency	International	Indonesia	
Tim	Koordinasi	Pemberantasan	Tindak	Pidana	Korupsi,	(Coordination	
Team	for	the	Eradication	of	the	Crime	of	Corruption)	
Tipikor	
TPK	
Pengadilan	Tindak	Pidana	Korupsi	(Anti‐Corruption	Courts)	
Tim	Pemberantasan	Korupsi	(Anti‐Corruption	Team)	
UNDP	
USD	
	
	
United	Nations	Development	Programme	
United	States	Dollar	
	 	
	
	 	
	
v	
	
A	note	on	currency	
Monetary	amounts	throughout	this	thesis	have	been	given	in	Rupiah	(Rp.),	
Indonesia’s	national	currency.	There	are	some	exceptions	when	source	material	
provides	the	amount	in	US	dollars	(USD)	only,	especially	for	sources	written	during	
the	Old	Order	period	(1949–1965).	In	the	historical	sections	of	this	thesis,	this	
amount	is	given	in	Rupiah	and	US	dollars	(where	possible),	in	order	to	reflect	the	
real‐time	value	of	the	currency.		
	
For	sections	discussing	Indonesia	in	the	Reformasi	period	(1998–),	amounts	are	given	
in	Rupiah	only.	However,	this	thesis	acknowledges	that	there	was	currency	
fluctuation	during	this	time.	Between	1998	and	the	time	of	writing,	the	Rupiah	
peaked	at	Rp.6,758.42	to	USD1	in	July	1999	and	dipped	to	a	low	of	Rp.12,023.3	to	
USD1	in	January	2014.	Historical	conversions	can	be	made	using	foreign	exchange	
information	found	at	OANDA	(www.oanda.com).	All	monetary	conversions	in	this	
thesis	are	approximations.	
	
	
A	note	on	Indonesian	terms	
Where	appropriate,	key	Indonesian	terms	for	specific	phenomena	discussed	in	this	
thesis	are	given	both	in	English	and	Indonesian	language.	
	
Where	relevant,	the	short	names	for	individuals	used	throughout	the	thesis	are	based	
on	the	names	commonly	used	by	Indonesians	themselves.	This	can	be	the	person’s	
first	name,	family	name	or	a	portmanteau	(for	example	Joko	Widodo	is	commonly	
known	as	‘Jokowi’).		
	
Any	study	of	Indonesia	politics	or	history	is	sure	to	be	full	of	acronyms	and	
portmanteau,	which	are	commonly	used	in	Indonesia,	especially	(but	not	exclusively)	
in	spoken	language.	This	thesis	has	given	the	full	name	of	any	organization	or	term	
followed	by	any	common	acronym	or	portmanteau	in	brackets.	A	full	list	of	
Indonesian	acronyms	used	throughout	can	be	found	at	the	beginning	of	the	thesis.	
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Abstract	
This	thesis	explores	the	use	of	anti‐corruption	symbols	during	Indonesia’s	2014	
legislative	elections	from	a	national	party	and	individual	candidate	perspective.	Anti‐
corruption	has	long	been	a	political	issue	in	Indonesia,	and	the	entrenched	nature	of	
associated	rhetoric	facilitates	the	ongoing	emphasis	on	anti‐corruption	symbols.	
However,	recent	history	and	the	perceived	misuse	of	such	symbols	by	some	political	
parties	meant	that	mobilizing	them	carried	risks	in	2014.	This	study	addresses	two	
key	empirical	questions:	why	were	anti‐corruption	symbols	adopted	by	emerging	
parties	and	their	candidates,	and	how	were	these	symbols	used?	Examining	these	
questions	allows	us	to	consider	a	broader	paradox	in	Indonesia;	that	while	anti‐
corruption	rhetoric	is	prominent,	so	too	is	corruption—including	money	politics	and	
vote‐buying	during	political	campaigns.		
	
Theoretically,	the	thesis	speaks	to	the	literature	on	electoral	campaigns	and	the	
diffusion	of	ideas	across	scales,	drawing	on	Edelman’s	conceptualization	of	political	
symbols	as	signifiers	of	morality	and	aspiration	that	are	ultimately	intended	to	sway	
audiences	in	order	to	gain	power.	A	political	symbol	comes	into	being	when	parties	
attempt	to	bind	themselves	to	particular	discourses	or	ideas	in	order	to	win	favour	
with	voters.	The	concept	of	the	symbol,	whether	it	is	effective	or	weak,	is	based	on	
how	successful	parties	are	in	their	attempts	to	become	synonymous	with	a	particular	
cause,	with	this	analysis	focused	particularly	on	the	anti‐corruption	symbol.	The	
application	of	Edelman’s	theory	of	symbolic	politics	to	the	Indonesian	case	provides	
an	opportunity	to	extend	theoretical	discussions	of	the	use	of	symbols	as	tools	of	
persuasion	during	elections.	The	incorporation	of	diffusion	theory	to	interpret	the	
parameters	and	constraints	of	campaigning	represents	an	original	approach	to	the	
study	of	electoral	campaigns,	not	just	in	Indonesia	but	more	widely.	The	combination	
of	these	theoretical	frameworks	presents	an	innovative	way	of	understanding	
enduring	questions	regarding	coexisting,	yet	contradictory,	political	phenomena	in	
Indonesia.	
	
Focusing	on	case	studies	from	three	different	emerging	parties,	this	thesis	finds	that	
the	use	of	anti‐corruption	symbols	varied	considerably	between	the	national	level	
and	the	candidates,	even	if	the	symbols	adopted	were	ostensibly	the	same.	Parties’	
executive	committees	embraced	anti‐corruption	symbols	because	they	believed	
voters	would	respond	favourably	to	them,	in	spite	of	the	inherent	hazards	involved.	
However,	candidates	exercise	great	autonomy	in	the	construction	of	their	personal	
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campaigns,	and	could	choose	to	follow	or	ignore	their	party’s	anti‐corruption	
symbol.	In	the	cases	examined	here,	the	extent	to	which	the	symbol	was	adopted	
depended	heavily	on	a	candidate’s	personal	history,	through	which	
personal	‘ownership’	of	the	issue	was	established.	The	nature	of	intra‐party	relations	
and	traditional	campaign	techniques	in	Indonesia	reinforced	these	intrinsically	
different	campaign	arenas,	often	referred	to	colloquially	as	the	‘air	campaign’	
(national	level)	and	‘ground	campaign’	(candidate	level).	Given	the	different	
audiences	and	interactions	with	voters	in	each	arena,	there	was	scope	for	discrepancy	
even	though	national	party	committees	and	individual	candidates	essentially	shared	
the	same	goal	of	wanting	to	maximize	votes.		
	
The	thesis	argues	that	the	disconnect	that	exists	between	the	anti‐corruption	symbol	
constructed	in	national	campaigns	and	local	practice	is	inherently	linked	to	the	
simultaneous	prominence	of	anti‐corruption	rhetoric	and	money	politics	in	
campaigns.	At	the	same	time	that	parties	compete	to	be	seen	as	the	‘cleanest’,	
individual	candidates	are	pressured	to	buy	votes,	knowing	that	it	may	be	their	best	
chance	for	success.	The	incongruity	between	what	happens	in	different	campaign	
arenas	not	only	demonstrates	the	fragmented	nature	of	political	parties,	but	also	
confirms	that	the	values	and	decisions	of	candidates	play	a	crucial	role	in	the	
perpetuation	of	money	politics.	This	finding	challenges	the	normative	assumption	
that	political	parties	are	single,	coherent	entities	and	advances	a	new	way	of	
understanding	the	relationships	between	anti‐corruption	rhetoric	and	election	
campaign	outcomes	for	Indonesia’s	emerging	parties.		
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1	
	
Introduction	
	
A	positive	image	is	identified	as	paramount	for	winning	political	office,	especially	
when	party	loyalty	is	low	amongst	citizens	(Catterberg	and	Moreno	2006;	
Mainwaring	1998:	71;	Rose	1994),	as	it	often	is	in	young	democracies	such	as	
Indonesia.	Investigating	how	intra‐party	relations	and	local	context	affect	decision‐
making	in	political	campaigns	sheds	light	on	the	development	of	this	image	and	have	
been	identified	as	important	realms	for	research	(Farrell	2006:	130;	Rohrschneider	
2002).	To	further	explore	how	these	relationships	play	out	in	the	context	of	a	national	
election	and,	in	turn,	influence	party	image,	this	thesis	explores	the	use	of	anti‐
corruption	symbols	in	the	Indonesian	national	parliamentary	elections	of	2014.	
Focusing	on	the	political	campaigns	of	three	emerging	parties,	it	investigates	how	
these	parties	attempted	to	own	anti‐corruption	issues	and	develop	a	political	symbol	
that	could	be	disseminated	nationally	and	by	individual	candidates.	Emerging	parties	
provide	a	suitable	focus	as	their	pre‐existing	reputation	is	not	as	entrenched	as	those	
of	older	parties,	and	therefore	the	2014	campaigns	potentially	had	a	more	significant	
impact	in	shaping	public	opinion	towards	them.	
	
There	exists	a	paradox	in	Indonesia:	although	corruption	seems	a	normal	part	of	
political	dealings—both	for	government	decision‐making	processes	and	during	
electoral	campaigns—anti‐corruption	sentiment	is	also	pervasive.	Political	actors	in	
Indonesia	have	long	used	corruption	as	a	political	tool	in	their	attempts	to	compete	
for	and	preserve	power.	In	addition,	it	is	easier	to	campaign	on	issues	with	which	
voters	identify	as	part	of	their	daily	life,	rather	than	on	issues	that	must	be	supplied	
and	explained	(Popkin	1991:	101).	There	is	no	need	to	explain	that	corruption	is	a	
problem	in	Indonesia	as	there	is	already	a	widespread	public	perception	that	
corruption	is	rampant	and	needs	to	be	quelled.	As	a	result,	several	political	actors	
believe	that	creating	an	identity	which	is	synonymous	with	the	fight	against	
corruption	will	boost	their	popularity.	The	use	of	anti‐corruption	symbols	in	
Indonesian	election	campaigns,	including	in	the	national	legislative	elections	of	2014,	
is	therefore	predictable.		
	
Parties	do	not	need	to	convince	voters	that	combating	corruption	should	be	a	national	
priority;	this	is	seemingly	self‐evident.	However,	the	use	of	anti‐corruption	
symbolism	can	still	be	perilous.	If	a	party	promotes	itself	as	clean	and	corruption‐free,	
it	risks	being	branded	as	hypocritical	if	any	of	its	members	are	later	found	guilty	of	
	
2	
	
corruption.	During	the	2009‐2014	parliamentary	term,	several	parties	were	pilloried	
for	this	reason,	revealing	the	dangers	inherent	in	the	strategy.	But,	judging	by	the	
attempts	of	parties	to	align	themselves	with	the	anti‐corruption	agenda	that	was	
prominent	in	2014,	many	parties	did	not	deem	these	risks	to	be	serious	enough	to	shy	
away	from	exploiting	anti‐corruption	sentiment	.	The	aim	was	not	only	to	convince	
voters	that	they	were	committed	to	eradicating	corruption,	but		that	they	were	more	
committed	than	their	rivals.	
	
This	study	examines	the	use	of	anti‐corruption	symbols	for	campaign	purposes,	
drawing	upon	conceptualizations	first	pioneered	by	American	political	scientist	
Murray	Edelman.	Edelman	(1964;1971)	describes	political	interactions	as	symbolic	in	
terms	of	both	the	rituals	associated	with	public	procedures	and	in	the	use	of	rhetoric	
to	influence	the	public.1	Edelman	(1988:	12)	argues	that	social	problems	are	exploited	
by	politicians,	who	use	them	as	symbols	that	act	as:	
	
reinforcements	of	ideologies,	not	simply	because	they	are	there	or	because	
they	are	important	for	wellbeing.	They	signify	who	are	virtuous	and	useful	
and	who	are	dangerous	or	inadequate,	which	actions	will	be	rewarded	and	
which	penalized.	They	constitute	people	as	subjects	with	particular	kinds	of	
aspirations,	self‐concepts,	and	fears,	and	they	create	beliefs	about	the	relative	
importance	of	events	and	objects.	They	are	critical	in	determining	who	
exercises	authority	and	who	accepts	it.	
	
Well‐chosen	political	symbols	can	evoke	emotions	and	trigger	a	strong	personal	
response	in	favour	of	the	political	party	or	candidate	using	that	symbol	(Popkin	1991:	
102;	Rabinowitz	and	Macdonald	1989:	94).	Edelman’s	work	on	political	symbols	
inspired	a	range	of	subsequent	studies	theorizing	how	the	public	are	affected	by	the	
rituals	and	rhetoric	of	politics.	Edelman’s	framework	provided	a	foundation	for	
investigating	the	development	and	significance	of	symbols	in	electoral	campaigns.	In	
particular,	the	theory	of	political	symbolism	has	inspired	ideas	of	‘issue	ownership’—
that	is,	how	candidates	establish	a	positive	association	with	specific	political	issues	in	
the	minds	of	voters—	in	campaigns	(Bélanger	and	Meguid	2008;	Druckman	et	al.	
2004;	Petrocik	1996;	van	der	Brug	2004)	and	‘directional	voting’,	relating	to	how	
																																																													
1	For	example,	Edelman	(1964:	3)	argues	that	elections	themselves	can	be	understood	as	a	
symbolic	ritual	because	although	they	give	citizens	‘a	chance	to	express	discontents	and	
enthusiasms,	to	enjoy	a	sense	of	involvement…only	in	a	minor	degree	is	it	participation	in	
policy	formation’.		
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voters	decide	who	to	select	(Rabinowitz	and	Macdonald	1989).2	While	some	of	his	
conclusions	were	scorned	for	their	cynicism—particularly	claims	regarding	the	
futility	of	individual	actions	and	the	difficulties	citizens	face	in	avoiding	manipulation	
by	political	elites—the	fundamental	premise	of	his	work	continues	to	resonate	today.3	
	
Edelman’s	approach	to	political	symbolism	also	allow	us	to	understand	campaigning	
on	anti‐corruption	issues	as	an	attempt	to	align	with	the	symbol’s	broader	figurative	
implications:	to	be	‘anti‐corruption’	is	to	subscribe	to	a	whole	range	of	‘public‐service	
related’	values	such	as	trust,	honesty,	humanity,	equity	and	responsibility;	the	moral	
‘non‐negotiables’	(Collins	2012:	6).	Consequently,	establishing	an	anti‐corruption	
symbol	speaks	to	a	(declared)	commitment	to	eradicating	corruption	while	also	
portraying	the	party	as	a	representative	of	what	is	good	and	morally	right.	Morever,	
this	theory	also	posits	that	while	political	symbols	aim	to	conjure	positive	
associations	in	the	minds’	of	citizens,	they	are	essentially	constructed	for	the	purpose	
of	acquiring	and/or	maintaining	power.4	An	appreciation	of	the	context	in	which	
political	symbols	are	used	is	essential	to	realize	this	desire	for	power	as	‘even	the	
most	transcendental	images	occur	in	particular	social	and	ontological	spaces,	facing	
audiences,	making	use	of	performers	and	their	skills,	presupposing	certain	
assumptions	about	how	actions	occur	and	what	sorts	of	beings	inhabit	the	world,	and	
requiring	economic	and	social	resources’	(Keane	1997:	11).	Furthermore,	as	Keane	
(1997:	19)	argues,	the	mere	act	of	selecting	a	particular	symbol	reflects	our	own	
understanding	of	the	existing	context	because	the	ability	of	symbols	to	influence	
																																																													
2	Particularly	relevant	to	this	thesis	are	studies	that	examine	how	citizens	are	influenced	by	
political	campaigns,	which	will	be	elaborated	upon	in	Chapter	One.	Additionally,	there	are	a	
number	of	other	academic	realms	in	which	Edelman’s	work	has	played	a	crucial	role,	for	
example,	the	persuasive	role	of	the	media	(Chadwick	2001;	Cottle	2006;	Entman	and	Rojecki	
1993),	the	use	of	political	spectacle	in	the	American	education	system	(Smith	et	al.	2004),	the	
political	uses	of	symbolic	women	(Sapiro	1993)	and	the	rhetoric	of	moral	protests	and	public	
campaigns	(Lahusen	1996).	
3	Edelman	drew	largely	on	Marxist	ideas	and	was	consequently	out	of	favour	with	many	
academics	working	in	the	United	States	in	the	1960s	and	1970s	(Bennett	2005:	354;	DeCanio	
2005:	399).	His	work	was	accused	of	becoming	increasingly	pessimistic,	culminating	in	a	
sharply	cynical	argument	in	his	books,	Constructing	the	Political	Spectacle	(1988)	and	The	
Politics	of	Misinformation	(2001),	which	both	posited	that	existing	democratic	systems	had	
failed	because	citizens	were	in	the	grip	of	manipulative	political	elites	whose	primary	interest	
was	to	maintain	power	(Bennett	2005:	354).	His	work	has	also	been	criticized	for	being	overly	
deterministic	regarding	the	psychology	of	the	masses	as	he	makes	a	number	of	generalizations	
about	voter	behaviour	and	their	overall	interactions	with	political	ideas	(Fenster	2005).	Other	
critiques	of	Edelman’s	work	include:	Kraus	and	Giles	(1989),	Sapiro	(1993),	and	Ewick	and	
Sarat	(2004).	
4	For	the	purposes	of	this	thesis	it	is	important	to	note	that	Edelman’s	work	did	not	centre	on	
the	manipulation	of	symbols	by	elites,	but	rather	on	how	the	use	of	symbols	affects	the	
psychology	of	the	masses,	usually	to	the	extent	that	it	produces	quiescence	(Sapiro	1993:	
142).		
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stems	from	the	way	that	people	associate	them	with	actions	and	objects	in	their	own	
lives.		
	
This	thesis	also	uses	the	study	of	anti‐corruption	symbols	to	explore	deeper	issues	of	
scalar	influence,	diffusion	and	party	cohesion,	representing	a	starting	point	for	
understanding	how	political	campaigns	in	Indonesia	are	imagined	and	executed	at	
different	scales	and	the	intra‐party	interaction	and	synergy	(if	any)	that	occurs.	
Examining	the	scalar	dimensions	of	political	campaigns	challenges	a	tendency	in	the	
literature	to	talk	about	political	parties	as	monolithic	entities	when	in	fact	they	are	
complex	institutions	comprised	of	subunits,	internal	systems	and	conflicts	(Sartori	
1976:	71).5	Redressing	the	normative	construct	of	parties	as	more	or	less	singular	
units,	this	thesis	examines	the	relationship	between	national	discourse	and	individual	
campaign	strategy	in	emerging	political	parties,	noting	Hicken’s	(2009:	5)	assertion	
that	political	parties	offer	candidates	a	‘brand	name’	and	economies	of	scale	through	
intra‐party	coordination	under	the	common	goal	of	party	promotion.	This	study	
investigates	how	the	symbol	of	anti‐corruption	was	conceptualized	at	national	and	
local	levels,	how	national	level	discourse	influenced	what	was	said	and	done	in	the	
local	campaigns	of	particular	candidates,	and	what	other	influences	candidates	had	to	
consider.	
	
This	thesis	focuses	on	four	research	questions:		
1. How	did	emerging	political	parties	justify	using	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	in	
their	campaigns?	
2. How	did	they	construct	their	anti‐corruption	symbol?	
3. How	did	they	deliver	and	sell	the	symbol	to	voters?	
4. What	were	the	differences	between	the	conceptualization	and	the	delivery	of	
the	anti‐corruption	symbol	at	the	national	level	and	the	local	level?	
	
Each	of	these	questions	provides	a	basis	for	analysing	the	design	and	execution	of	the	
2014	electoral	campaign	and	understanding	the	prominent	use	of	this	particular	
symbol	by	emerging	parties.	In	addressing	these	questions,	this	study	found	that	the	
unique	features	of	a	country’s	history,	electoral	laws,	media	systems,	and	political	
parties	influence	how	campaigns	are	conceptualized	and	implemented	(Bowler	and	
																																																													
5	Kitschelt	(1989:	400‐401)	contends	that	academic	studies	often	conceptualize	political	
parties	as	‘highly	static’	in	terms	of	their	behaviour	and	that	there	is	a	lack	of	studies	
investigating	the	internal	working	of	parties.	More	recent	studies	that	make	a	similar	point	
include	Deschouwer	(2003)	and	Fabre	(2011).		
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Farrell	1992b:	7‐8).	Furthermore,	individual	candidates	had	a	great	deal	of	autonomy	
in	the	selection	and	development	of	their	personal	campaign	symbols.	As	a	result,	
while	their	personal	symbols	sometimes	aligned	with	those	of	the	party,	at	other	
times	party	symbols	were	reimagined	or	even	ignored,	depending	on	how	
determined	the	candidates	were	to	establish	an	anti‐corruption	symbol.	This	was,	in	
turn,	influenced	by	their	backgrounds,	local	circumstances	and	voters’	demands.	
Although	parties	and	their	candidates	ostensibly	shared	the	same	goals—to	win	the	
election—the	nature	of	the	Indonesian	party	system	and	candidate	recruitment	
accounted	for	much	of	the	incongruence	between	national	and	individual	campaigns.		
	
Indonesia’s	political	system	
The	Indonesian	national	parliament,	known	as	the	People’s	Consultative	Assembly	
(Majelis	Permusyawaratan	Rakyat,	MPR),	is	comprised	of	the	elected	representatives	
from	different	electorates,	forming	the	People’s	Representative	Council	(Dewan	
Perwakilan	Rakyat	Republik	Indonesia,	DPR‐RI),	and	provincial	representatives,	
which	comprise	the	Regional	Representative	Council	(Dewan	Perwakilan	Daerah,	
DPD).	The	DPR‐RI	has	560	seats	and	the	DPD	has	132	seats.	DPR‐RI	candidates	must	
be	nominated	by	an	approved	political	party,	while	DPD	candidates	are	not	required	
to	have	a	party	affiliation	(though	many	do).	In	addition	to	the	national	level	
parliament,	Indonesians	also	vote	for	legislative	representatives	for	the	provincial	
(Dewan	Perwakilan	Rakyat	Daerah	tingkat	propinsi,	DPRD	I)	and	district	(Dewan	
Perwakilan	Rakyat	Daerah	tingkat	kapubaten/kota,	DPRD	II)	legislatures.6	Elections	
for	all	these	positions	occurred	simultaneously	on	9	April	2014.	The	results	were	
verified	by	the	General	Election	Commission	(Komisi	Pemilihan	Umum,	KPU)	and	
official	tallies	were	released	on	9	May	2014.	
	
Electoral	systems	themselves	often	present	barriers	for	new	parties	(Berrington	
1985:	446),	and	this	holds	true	in	Indonesia.	Political	parties	must	meet	a	number	of	
eligibility	requirements	to	compete	in	Indonesia’s	national	elections.	They	must	have	
a	regional	office	in	each	province,	as	well	as	a	permanent	office	in	75	per	cent	of	
provinces,	districts	or	municipalities	and	a	chapter	in	at	least	half	of	each	of	the	sub‐
districts,	answering	to	a	permanent	office	(though	these	chapters	do	not	need	to	be	
permanent).	They	must	also	have	at	least	1000	official	members.7	The	KPU	makes	the	
																																																													
6	For	a	comprehensive	outline	of	the	national	parliamentary	structure	see	DPR‐RI	(2014a).	
7	The	province	of	Aceh	is	an	exception	to	these	requirements	as	local	parties	are	permitted	to	
compete	under	the	special	autonomy	agreement	with	the	central	government.	See	Hillman	
(2012)	for	further	details.	
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final	determination	as	to	whether	parties	have	met	these	requirements.	Parties	must	
also	pass	a	threshold	of	at	least	3.5	per	cent	of	votes	in	order	to	assume	their	place	in	
the	parliament.8	Forming	a	party	that	meets	all	these	requirements	takes	time,	money	
and	resources,	not	to	mention	ongoing	costs	once	the	party	has	been	validated.	
	
The	DPR‐RI	candidates	nominated	by	each	party	stand	for	election	in	a	specific	
electorate,	known	as	a	daerah	pemilihan	(dapil).	Each	electorate	is	allocated	between	
three	and	ten	seats,	so	parties	commonly	field	multiple	candidates.9	The	parties	rank	
each	candidate	and	this	corresponds	to	their	place	on	the	ballot.	For	example,	a	
candidate	may	be	assigned	the	number	‘3’,	signifying	that	their	name	will	appear	
third	on	the	ballot	sheet.	Until	2009,	party	list	ranking	was	crucial	because	parties	
determined	the	order	in	which	candidates	were	allocated	votes.	However,	voters	are	
now	able	to	direct	their	votes	to	specific	individuals.	Despite	its	lack	of	practical	
significance,	candidate	order	continues	to	incite	much	intra‐party	debate	because	the	
party	list	ranking	is	seen	as	a	reflection	of	the	candidate’s	status	within	the	party	and	
the	level	of	party	support	they	can	expect	to	receive.	
	
Once	parties	have	nominated	and	ranked	their	candidates,	the	individual	candidates	
organize	their	own	campaigns.	While	the	official	campaign	period	is	short	(in	2014	
from	16	March	to	5	April)	the	candidates	spend	a	much	longer	preparing	their	
strategy	and	organizing	their	campaigns.	This	study	defines	the	campaign	period	
broadly	to	include	all	activities	undertaken	to	advertise	the	party	and	candidates	to	
members	of	the	public	in	the	lead‐up	to	the	election,	a	process	which	began	far	earlier	
than	the	officially‐mandated	campaign	period.	In	the	lead	up	to	the	official	campaign	
period,	candidates	hold	consultations	with	community	groups,	business	people,	and	
																																																													
8	Law	No.	10/2008	on	the	General	Election	of	Members	of	the	People’s	Representative	Council,	
the	Regional	Representative	Council	and	the	Regional	People’s	Representative	Council	
originally	stated	that	the	threshold	for	participation	in	the	national	parliament	was	2.5	per	
cent.	This	was	amended	in	April	2012	to	3.5	per	cent.	
9	The	full	details	of	voting	procedure	and	vote	allocation	by	parties	is	detailed	in	Law	No.	
8/2012	on	the	General	Election	of	the	Members	of	the	House	of	Representatives,	People’s	
Representative	Council	and	Regional	House	of	representatives.	
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other	stakeholders	to	source	support	and	discuss	the	terms	of	this	support.10	Some	
candidates	also	negotiate	with	voters	and/or	vote	brokers,	particularly	if	they	plan	to	
offer	incentives	to	voters	in	return	for	support.11	This	thesis	takes	the	view,	in	line	
with	Bowler	and	Farrell	(1992b:	11),	that	an	‘election	campaign’	incorporates	these	
periods	of	preparation	and	planning.	
	
The	results	of	the	national	parliamentary	elections	are	important	not	only	because	
they	determine	the	influence	of	parties	in	the	legislature,	but	also	because	they	affect	
their	ability	to	nominate	a	presidential	candidates.	Under	Law	No.	42/2008	on	the	
General	Election	of	the	President	and	Vice‐President,	parties	must	have	over	20	per	
cent	of	seats	in	the	DPR‐RI	or	25	per	cent	of	the	popular	vote	to	nominate	a	
presidential	candidate.	In	2014	no	party	achieved	either	of	these	targets,	and	
coalitions	with	other	parties	had	to	be	formed	in	order	to	nominate	a	presidential	
candidate.	Given	that	many	parties	in	Indonesia	are	vehicles	for	presidential	hopefuls,	
the	national	legislative	elections	take	on	an	additional	significance	because	a	poor	
result	can	thwart	aspirations.	
	
Emerging	political	parties	
Institutionalized	political	parties	provide	a	mechanism	for	channelling	social	
demands	and	ensuring	effective	democratic	governance	(Hicken	and	Kuhonta	2011:	
2).	Political	parties	are	here	defined	as	formal	political	organizations	that	aim	to	
influence	the	political	nature	of	the	state	by	participating	in	elections	and	gaining	
power	through	their	outcomes.	During	an	election	parties	also	play	a	role	in	
aggregating,	organizing	and	coordinating	candidates,	political	donations	and	voters	
(Hicken	2009:	5).	While	some	definitions	of	political	parties	are	narrower,	this	
definition	provides	a	useful	theoretical	label	without	inadvertently	limiting	its	
																																																													
10	Under	Law	No.	01/2013	Guidelines	for	the	Implementation	of	Election	Campaigns	by	
Members	for	the	DPR‐RI,	DPD	and	DPRD),	Article	13,	campaigns	activities	include:	(a)	closed	
meetings	with	voters,	(b)	face‐to‐face	meetings,	(c)disseminating	campaign	material	to	the	
public,	(d)	installing	advertising	material	in	public	places,	(e)	advertising	in	print	and	
electronic	media,	(f)	general	meetings	and	(g)	any	other	campaign	activity	not	mentioned	here	
that	are	not	prohibited	by	other	existing	laws.	Article	25	of	the	laws	states	that	activities	(a),	
(b),	(c)	and	(d)	are	permissible	from	three	days	after	the	party	has	officially	nominated	the	
candidate	up	until	the	‘quiet	period’	(masa	tenang)	(which	is	mandated	by	the	KPU)	while	(e)	
and	(f)	are	only	allowed	during	the	official	campaign	period.	The	law,	in	Article	26,	also	states	
that	the	official	campaign	period	is	determined	by	the	KPU.	
11	Some	examples	of	common	incentives	used	to	garner	support	include	paraphernalia	such	as	
t‐shirts,	calendars	and	clocks	that	are	often	distributed	in	the	months	leading	up	to	the	
elections,	as	well	as	the	display	of	promotional	posters.	More	costly	incentives	include	
donations	to	religious	institutions	or	community	organizations,	assistance	with	small	
infrastructure	projects,	prize	giveaways,	and	distributing	cash	payments.		
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applicability.12	A	broad	definition	is	particularly	valuable	as	new	parties	may	be	yet	to	
contest	an	election	or	establish	themselves	in	accordance	with	legislative	
requirements.	Similarly,	measurements	of	public	support	or	percentages	of	votes	in	
previous	elections	cannot	be	applied	to	parties	competing	in	elections	for	the	first	
time.	Defining	‘new’	political	parties	also	presents	a	challenge	given	that	many	parties	
arise	from	splits	with	older	parties	or	the	merging	of	parties,	while	others	view	a	new	
name	as	a	sufficient	qualification	to	be	considered	new	(Barnea	and	Rahat	2011:	
305).	Janda	(1980:	22)	asserts	that	if	a	‘new’	party	retains	an	old	name,	then	it	can	be	
deemed	an	old	party;	however,	if	a	party	adopts	a	new	name	then	it	is	attempting	to	
dissociate	itself	from	its	past,	marking	itself	as	a	novel	alternative.	Other	ways	to	
identify	new	parties	include	their	use	of	strikingly	different	ideologies	to	existing	
parties	and/or	their	bringing	together	of	a	new	‘coalition	of	voters’.	Some	theorists	
argue,	for	example,	that	the	people	who	vote	for	the	party	are	what	define	it,	and	the	
more	new	voters	a	party	has	attracted,	the	more	its	newness	has	resonated	(Barnea	
and	Rahat	2011:	307).	
	
When	referring	to	parties	as	‘new’	or	‘emerging’	this	thesis	adopts	the	definition	
presented	by	Harmel	(1985:	405‐406)	that	posits	‘new’	as	both	a	reference	to	the	age	
of	the	party	and	as	a	commentary	on	their	impact	in	the	political	sphere.	Emerging	
parties	may	be	‘contender	parties’,	which	genuinely	believe	that	they	have	an	
opportunity	for	electoral	success,	or	‘promoter	parties’,	which	recognize	that	
electoral	success	is	unlikely	but	exist	to	channel	attention	to	particular	causes	
(Harmel	and	Robertson	1985:	517).	Whatever	the	motivation,	these	parties	present	
themselves	as	a	break	from	the	political	norm,	even	if	in	reality	they	share	many	
similarities	with	older	parties.	Reflecting	this	conceptualization,	this	thesis	also	takes	
into	account	the	party’s	own	self‐identification	as	being	new.13	By	definition,	
emerging	parties	are	also	oppositional,	vying	for	power	against	more	entrenched	
parties.	As	their	political	history	grows	longer,	their	identification	as	an	emerging	
party	necessarily	wanes.	
	
																																																													
12	For	example,	some	definitions	limit	political	parties	to	organizations	that	nominate	
candidates	in	state	elections	or	impose	a	minimum	level	of	representation	to	denote	the	
significance	of	a	party	(Harmel	1985:	405).		
13	This	is	important	given	that	the	emerging	parties	in	this	study	were	formed	by	figures	who	
had	previously	been	members	of	other	political	parties.	While,	in	reality,	the	parties	continue	
to	espouse	many	of	the	values	that	these	figures	held	during	their	tenure	in	their	former	
parties,	they	nevertheless	attempt	to	present	themselves	as	being	new	and	different.	
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Studying	new	parties	offers	an	opportunity	to	‘observe	the	formation	of	a	new	type	of	
political	organization’	(Harmel	1985:	411),	as	well	as	offering	a	lens	for	exploring	
change	and	continuity	within	a	political	system.	The	popularity	of	new	parties	may	
reflect	deep	discontent	with	older	parties	or	with	the	political	system	in	general.	
Many	new	parties	arise	as	‘protest	parties’,	seizing	upon	dissatisfaction	with	the	
political	status	quo	(Harmel	and	Robertson	1985:	502),	sometimes	even	with	no	real	
expectation	of	taking	power	(Harmel	and	Robertson	1985:	517;	Powell	1982:	94).	
There	may	also	be	cases	where	new	parties	do	not	actually	represent	any	genuine	
differences	from	other	existing	parties,	provoking	questions	as	to	why	a	new	party	
was	formed	at	all	(Berrington	1985:	442).	As	previously	mentioned,	several	parties	in	
Indonesia	are	considered	vehicles	for	elites	seeking	to	gain	power,	suggesting	that	
new	parties	may	be	mediums	for	acquiring	power,	rather	than	issue‐focused.14	The	
leaders	of	the	emerging	parties	examined	in	this	study	had	all,	at	one	time	or	another,	
attempted	to	take	over	the	leadership	of	an	‘old’	party	before	leaving	to	form	their	
own	(Sherlock	2013:	4;	Tomsa	2009),	implying	this	to	be	the	case.		
	
Emerging	parties	face	a	number	of	challenges	in	their	bid	for	power.	These	include	
establishing	legitimacy,	building	recognition	among	voters—referred	to	in	Indonesia	
as	‘socialization’	(sosialisasi)—and	boosting	their	competitiveness	against	better‐
established	rivals.	They	must	balance	promoting	themselves	as	a	new	hope	for	the	
country	with	the	fact	that	they	have	little	or	no	track	record	in	government.	How	can	
political	parties	prove	that	they	offer	voters	new	hope	and	represent	a	break	from	the	
past?	One	way	that	emerging	parties	do	this	is	by	portraying	themselves	as	forces	of	
change,	what	Sikk	(2012:	478)	describes	as	a	‘project	of	newness’.	To	argue	that	
change,	in	itself,	is	a	desirable	political	outcome	is	a	popular	strategy	because	it	does	
not	rely	on	clear	policies	or	practical	solutions.	New	leaders,	as	distinct	from	old‐
guard	political	elites,	become	a	rallying	point	for	the	project	of	newness,	even	if	the	
party’s	ideas	are	not	novel	(Edelman	1988:	51).	As	long	as	a	party	can	convince	voters	
that	they	represent	something	‘better’	than	what	currently	exists,	it	has	the	
opportunity	to	appeal	to	disillusioned	voters.	New	parties	also	have	the	prospect	of	
constructing	a	‘political	enemy’	on	the	grounds	that	the	old	parties	have	failed	to	meet	
public	aspirations	(Edelman	1988:	66).	When	constructing	their	position	in	relation	
																																																													
14	The	terms	‘elites’	can	be	used	to	describe	‘ruling	elites’,	who	have	control	over	the	day‐to‐
day	running	of	the	state;	‘opposition	elites’,	who	control	opposition	parties,	movements	or	
NGOs	that	place	pressure	on	the	regime	to	meet	their	demands;	and	‘economic	elites’,	who	
control	the	vast	majority	of	business	interests	in	the	country	(Tolstrup	2014:	127).	While	this	
thesis	focuses	on	ruling	and	opposition	elites,	they	often	intertwine	with	economic	interests	
making	it	difficult	to	discretely	categorize	elite.	
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to	older	parties,	emerging	parties	benefit	from	having	had	little	negative	publicity	in	
the	past	and	can	make	accusations	against	rivals	without	fear	of	being	branded	
hypocrites.	For	example,	they	can	accuse	other	parties	or	politicians	of	corruption	
without	having	suffered	from	any	major	scandals	themselves.	They	can	also,	in	other	
cases,	criticize	economic,	religious	and	social	policy	stances	without	ever	having	been	
responsible	for	any	unpopular	decisions	in	the	past.		
	
Voter	tendencies	also	present	an	obstacle	for	emerging	parties.	In	most	contexts,	
when	competing	against	older,	more	established	parties,	new	parties	are	generally	
seen	to	be	at	a	disadvantage.	A	study	by	Dalton	and	Weldon	(2005:	942)	concludes	
that	even	in	situations	where	citizens	are	generally	distrustful	of	political	parties,	they	
tend	to	remain	loyal	to	more	established	parties.15	Emerging	parties	must	therefore	
battle	natural	tendencies	to	vote	for	the	familiar,	as	well	as	the	temptation	for	citizens	
to	forfeit	their	vote	as	a	form	of	protest—a	practice	commonly	referred	to	in	
Indonesian	as	belonging	to	the	‘white	group’	(golongan	putih,	golput).16	This	means	
new	parties	face	the	additional	challenge	of	presenting	themselves	as	a	viable,	
preferable	alternative	to	pre‐existing	parties	to	which	the	public	have	already	grown	
accustomed.	This	is	all	the	more	difficult	in	the	Indonesia,	where	voter	cynicism	
towards	political	parties	is	high.17		
	
Emerging	parties	and	the	2014	elections	
Three	emerging	political	parties	competed	in	the	2014	Indonesian	national	legislative	
elections:	the	People’s	Conscience	Party	(Partai	Hati	Nurani	Rakyat,	Hanura);	the	
Great	Indonesia	Movement	Party	(Partai	Gerakan	Indonesia	Raya,	Gerindra);	and	the	
National	Democratic	Party	(Partai	Nasdem).	All	three	were	born	out	of	the	political	
ambitions	of	prominent,	wealthy	individuals	who	had	tried	but	were	unable	to	take	
																																																													
15	In	related	studies,	Mainwaring	(1998:	71‐72)	asserts	that	the	more	institutionalized	
political	party	systems	are,	the	less	opportunities	there	are	for	new	parties.	Dalton	(2002:	32)	
contends	that	even	in	countries	where	partisan	ties	are	declining,	voters	continue	to	use	party	
identifications	to	help	them	determine	which	party	best	aligns	with	their	own	political	beliefs.	
Popkin	(1991:	96‐98)	argues	that	voters	search	for	‘connections’	and	the	longer	a	party’s	
history,	the	easier	it	is	to	make	connections	between	future	results	and	past	actions.	Thus,	
common	decision	making	strategies	favour	older	political	parties.	
16	This	phrase	originates	from	the	fact	that	voters	chose	not	to	vote	for	any	party,	thus	leaving	
their	ballot	‘white’.	The	meaning	has	also	been	extended	to	include	people	who	also	do	not	
physically	vote,	either	as	a	political	statement	or	out	of	apathy.	Official	estimates	in	2014	
showed	that	voter	turnout	was	approximately	75.11	per	cent,	an	increase	of	4.12	per	cent	
from	2009,	while	7.86	per	cent	of	those	votes	were	deemed	spoilt	or	null	(Pemilu	2014).	
17	Further	discussion	of	voter	attitudes	towards	political	parties,	particularly	those	found	in	
surveys	between	2013	and	2014,	can	be	found	in	Chapter	Three.	
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over	the	leadership	of	an	existing	party	(Sherlock	2003:	4).	To	realize	their	political	
ambitions,	they	formed	new	parties—a	practical	necessity	to	achieve	their	
presidential	aspirations.	In	terms	of	ideology,	these	new	parties	have	many	
similarities.	They	all	proclaim	strong	nationalistic	ideals,	with	a	fervent	allegiance	to	
the	national	ethos	of	Pancasila	and	Indonesia’s	1945	Constitution.18	The	differences	
between	the	parties	are	more	difficult	to	discern,	thus	the	role	of	leadership	figures	as	
a	basis	for	differentiation	was	vital.	
	
Hanura	is	the	political	vehicle	of	Wiranto,	a	former	high‐ranking	military	officer	with	
considerable	influence	during	the	late	New	Order.	He	served	as	Suharto’s	aide	de	
camp	and	as	commander	of	the	army	during	1998,	a	critical	period	in	the	transition	to	
Reformasi	(1998–).	After	1998,	he	served	as	Coordinating	Minister	of	Politics	and	
Security	under	President	Abdurrahman	Wahid.	This	appointment	lasted	only	three	
months	as	President	Wahid	faced	pressure	to	dismiss	Wiranto	following	his	
indictment	by	the	National	Human	Rights	Commission	for	failing	to	effectively	
safeguard	human	rights	following	East	Timor’s	independence	referendum	in	August	
1999	(Crouch	2010:	138),	although	ultimately	not	charged	by	the	Attorney‐General’s	
office.	In	2004	Wiranto	contested	the	Presidential	election	as	the	candidate	for	the	
Golkar	Party,	the	electoral	vehicle	of	former	President	Suharto.19	He	finished	third	in	
the	presidential	race,	blaming	his	failure	on	a	lack	of	support	from	within	his	own	
party	(Kawamura	2013:	16).	Seeing	no	future	for	himself	in	Golkar,	he	established	
Hanura	in	preparation	for	the	2009	elections	(Tomsa	2009).	In	his	party	launch	
speech,	Wiranto	criticized	the	current	leadership	for	not	having	the	nation’s	best	
interest	at	heart	(Hanura	2008),	but	played	down	his	political	ambitions,	instead	
describing	the	formation	of	Hanura	as	a	direct	response	to	the	government’s	failure	to	
																																																													
18	Pancasila	is	Indonesia’s	national	philosophy.	It	includes	five	tenets:	belief	in	the	one	and	
only	God,	a	just	and	civilized	humanity,	the	unity	of	Indonesia,	democracy	guided	by	the	inner	
wisdom	and	unanimity	arising	from	consensus	amongst	representatives,	and	social	justice	for	
all	of	the	people	of	Indonesia.	Several	of	the	tenets	were	born	out	of	the	goals	of	the	pre‐
independence	nationalist	movement.	These	were:	humanity,	unity,	sovereignty	of	the	people	
and	social	justice.	Sukarno	first	introduced	his	political	philosophy	of	Pancasila	in	1945	in	a	
speech	on	1	June	1945.	The	philosophy	continues	to	be	the	ideological	basis	for	the	Indonesian	
State	and	of	several	political	parties.	For	further	details	on	the	history	and	political	and	
cultural	significance	of	Pancasila	see:	Feith	and	Castles	(1970);	Liddle	(1992);	Schwarz	
(2004);	Sundhaussen	(1981).	
19	Golkar	was	established	by	Suharto	for	the	1971	elections.	Liddle	(1985:	72)	described	the	
party	as:	‘the	government's	party,	an	electoral	vehicle	…	to	deny	a	parliamentary	majority	to	
the	other	parties.	Its	seats	are	filled	with	men	and	women	who	have	or	have	had	bureaucratic	
careers	or	are	in	other	ways	connected	to	the	bureaucracy.	In	Parliament	and	the	Assembly,	
the	Golkar	delegations	have	never	taken	an	autonomous	initiative,	but	serve	instead	as	the	
sponsors	of	policies	arrived	at	elsewhere	in	the	government.’	
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fulfil	the	aspirations	of	the	1945	National	Constitution.20	Hanura	describes	itself	as	a	
’nationalist‐religious’	party,	which	draws	its	moral	influence	both	from	national	
doctrines	such	as	Pancasila	and	religion	(Wiranto	2009a).	The	party	purported	to	
accept	moral	input	from	all	nationally‐recognized	religions,	claiming	that	equality	is	a	
fundamental	goal,	that	people	should	be	treated	equally	regardless	of	tribe,	religion,	
race,	political	belief,	social	status	and	gender.		
	
The	establishment	of	Gerindra	was	comparable	to	that	of	Hanura	in	several	ways.	It	
was	also	established	by	a	former	military	leader,	Prabowo	Subianto,	the	former	son‐
in‐law	of	President	Suharto,	who	is	best‐known	for	leading	the	Indonesian	Special	
Forces	(Kopassus).21	While	Prabowo’s	political	career	floundered	after	1998,	he	
returned	to	politics	in	2004,	hoping	to	gain	presidential	pre‐selection	with	Golkar	but	
was	defeated	by	Wiranto.	After	securing	control	of	the	National	Farmer’s	Association	
(Himpuan	Kerukunan	Tani	Indonesia,	HKTI)	in	2004,	Prabowo	established	Gerindra	
in	order	to	realize	his	presidential	ambitions	(Tomsa	2009).	Gerindra’s	official	
declaration	also	argued	that	the	government	had	failed	its	citizens	(Gerindra	2008).	
Gerindra	presented	itself	as	a	people’s	party	that	would	work	to	‘build	Indonesia’s	
spirit	and	body,’	and	would	fight	for	prosperity	and	justice.	Like	Hanura,	the	party	
also	pledged	a	commitment	to	Pancasila	and	the	Constitution	of	1945	(Gerindra	
2012c).	But	Prabowo’s	controversial	military	past	proved	difficult	to	overcome,	even	
though	he	was	a	popular	candidate	in	some	circles	(Mietzner	2010:	188).	This	
controversy	included	allegations	that	he	oversaw	and	condoned	human	rights	
violations	in	East	Timor	and	in	Jakarta	during	the	riots	in	1998.	His	presidential	
prospects	improved	from	2009	to	2014,	accompanied	by	an	elaborate	and	expensive	
political	campaign	(Tempo	2014;	Timur	and	Priamarizki	2014).	In	the	end,	he	failed	to	
win	the	presidential	election,	receiving	46.85	per	cent	of	overall	votes	compared	to	
53.15	per	cent	of	votes	garnered	by	rival	Joko	Widodo	(popularly	known	as	‘Jokowi’)	
(Komisi	Pemilihan	Umum	2014b).	
	
																																																													
20	Also	referred	to	as	the	Revolutionary	Constitution	of	1945,	which	included	the	tenets	of	the	
Pancasila	doctrine	in	its	preamble	as	well	as	chapters	addressing	the	unitary	nature	of	the	
Indonesian	state,	the	powers	of	various	levels	of	government	(namely	the	legislature	and	
executive),	the	human	rights	and	religious	freedoms	guaranteed	to	all	citizens,	the	obligation	
that	the	government	must	spend	20	per	cent	of	its	budget	on	education,	state	ownership	of	the	
major	means	of	production,	and	the	state’s	social	welfare	responsibilities	(Republic	of	
Indonesia	1945).		
21	Prabowo	and	Suharto’s	daughter,	Siti	Hediati	Hariyadi	(commonly	known	by	her	nickname,	
‘Titiek’)	divorced	in	1998	after	Suharto	resigned	from	the	presidency	(Winarno	2014).	
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Unlike	Hanura	and	Gerindra,	Nasdem	did	not	have	a	former	military	person	at	its	
helm,	though	there	were	a	number	of	ex‐officers	amongst	its	leadership.	Nasdem	was	
regarded	as	the	political	vehicle	of	media	magnate	Surya	Paloh,	who	was	defeated	in	
his	bid	for	Golkar	Party	leadership	by	business	tycoon	Aburizal	Bakrie	in	2011.	The	
support	structure	for	a	political	party	pre‐dated	the	official	launch	of	the	Nasdem	
party	in	July	2011	in	the	form	of	a	mass	organization	called	the	National	Democrats	
established	in	2010.	2014	marked	Nasdem’s	first	national	parliamentary	election	and	
it	was	the	only	party	that	had	never	contested	a	national	election	before.	In	
rationalising	the	need	to	form	a	new	party,	Nasdem	leadership	claimed	that	
Reformasi	had	failed	and	that	there	was	a	need	to	return	to	basics,	a	restoration	of	
Indonesia	based	on	the	goals	of	the	1945	Constitution	(Nasdem	2011a).	In	its	party	
manifesto,	Nasdem	pledged	its	commitment	to	a	democracy	that	served	all	
Indonesian	citizens,	not	only	elites,	and	fundamentally	rejected	the	current	trend	of	
‘routinely	recirculating	power	[amongst	elites]	without	the	emergence	of	a	leader	of	
quality	or	worth’	(Nasdem	2011b).	
	
Forming	a	new	party	was	a	necessary	condition	to	achieve	the	presidential	
aspirations	of	these	individuals,	given	the	requirement	that	a	party	hold	a	minimum	
of	20	per	cent	of	seats	in	order	to	nominate	a	presidential	candidate	without	being	
obliged	to	form	a	coalition.	Both	Hanura	and	Gerindra	actively	promoted	their	leaders	
as	presidential	candidates	in	the	lead	up	to	the	legislative	elections.	Nasdem	declined	
to	do	this,	primarily	because	it	did	not	actually	believe	that	they	would	gain	over	20	
per	cent	of	seats	in	the	election.22	Finally,	only	Gerindra’s	leader,	Prabowo	Subianto,	
went	on	to	contest	the	presidential	elections,	as	Hanura	fell	short	of	the	threshold	and	
subsequently	opted	to	form	a	coalition	with	the	Indonesian	Democratic	Party	of	
Struggle	(Partai	Demokrasi	Indonesia	Perjuangan,	PDIP).	Supporting	the	presidential	
bid	of	the	eventual	winner,	Jokowi,	Hanura	used	its	campaign	machines	to	promote	
him.	A	number	of	party	members	were	subsequently	selected	for	Jokowi’s	cabinet	
and	there	has	been	discussion	about	the	influence	that	these	party	leaders,	
particularly	Surya	Paloh	from	Nasdem,	have	had	on	Jokowi’s	decisions.23		
																																																													
22	Interview	with	Nasdem	party	official,	11	April	2014.	
23	Discussion	of	this	influence	can	be	found	in	numerous	media	report	following	Jokowi’s	
election.	For	example,	respected	news	magazine	Tempo	published	an	article	in	November	
2014	on	Paloh’s	strong	influence	over	President	Jokowi’s	decisions	and	has	unparalleled	
access	to	the	president	(Tempo	English	2014;	Widiarsi	et	al.	2014).	Other	examples	of	media	
reports	positing	that	Surya	Paloh	holds	significant	sway	with	Jokowi	include:	Fakhruddin	
(2014);	Kiswondari	(2014);	Sutrisno	(2014).	Politicians	associated	with	Nasdem	were	three	
granted	ministerial	positions	in	Jokowi’s	October	2014	cabinet	as	well	as	the	position	of	
attorney‐general,	while	Hanura‐affiliated	member	received	two	positions.		
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Equally	important	in	the	presidential	election	was	the	prominence	of	Gerindra,	who	
fielded	the	only	other	presidential	candidate	in	the	2014	race.	While	Gerindra’s	
national	legislative	outcome	did	not	qualify	them	to	nominate	Prabowo	without	a	
coalition	of	parties,	their	campaign	machine	was	so	effective	that	the	what	originally	
seemed	like	a	clear‐cut	race	became	a	closely	contested	battle—Prabowo	lost	by	only	
46.85	per	cent	of	votes	to	the	53.15	per	cent	garnered	by	Jokowi	and	his	running	mate	
Jusuf	Kalla.	These	new	parties	have	proven	that	they	are	not	merely	a	footnote	in	
Indonesia’s	political	history,	but	have	established	themselves	as	principal	actors	in	
the	political	game.	While	they	cannot	yet	claim	the	long	history	or	popularity	of	some	
other	parties,	their	respective	leaderships	are	playing	a	strategic	game	which	will	
continue	to	influence	Indonesia’s	political	sphere	into	the	future.		
	
Methodology	
In	studying	these	parties	and	individual	candidates,	I	have	adopted	a	mixed‐methods	
approach.	First,	I	drew	from	‘grounded	theory’,	which	emphasizes	that	researchers	
‘set	aside	theoretical	ideas’	when	collating	data	to	‘let	the	substantive	theory	emerge’	
(Urquhart	2013:	5).	Data	for	this	project	was	collected	over	three	separate	periods	of	
field	work:	December	2011‐February	2012,	July	2012‐July	2013	and	March	2014‐
April	2014.24	In	the	initial	proposal	for	this	study	I	set	out	to	research	
conceptualizations	of	corruption	in	Indonesia.	Early	reading	focused	generally	on	the	
history	of	corruption	in	Indonesia	and	debates	about	its	impact.	My	thesis	topic	
narrowed	as	a	consequence	of	observations	made	during	my	first	period	of	fieldwork	
to	focus	on	emerging	parties	and	the	2014	election.	It	was	at	this	stage	that	I	
identified	the	case	study	method,	an	intensive	study	of	specific	instances	of	the	
phenomenon	(Swanborn	2010),	as	the	most	useful	means	for	gathering	and	analysing	
further	data.	
	
I	subsequently	refined	my	conceptual	framework	through	a	comprehensive	overview	
of	relevant	literature,	providing	a	basis	for	theoretical	propositions	and	analytic	
generalization.25	An	important	part	of	this	process	was	to	deepen	my	understanding	
of	the	term	‘corruption’	and	to	identify	a	way	to	step	back	from	the	ethical	problem	of	
corrupt	practices	and	analyse	how	discourses	around	corruption	are	used	in	
																																																													
24	Approval	for	this	field	work	was	received	from	the	University	of	Sydney	Human	Research	
Ethics	Committee	(HREC)	on	22	August	2011.	
25	Yin	(2014:	41)	asserts	that	in	case	studies,	analytical	generalization	is	based	on	
corroborating,	modifying,	rejecting	or	advancing	new	concepts	as	a	result	of	the	study.	The	
ensuing	generalizations	made	are	thus	at	a	conceptual	level	which	is	higher	than	that	of	the	
specific	case.	
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campaigns.	The	term	‘corruption’	is	regularly	used	as	a	catch‐all	for	a	range	of	distinct	
social	pathologies	including	mismanagement	of	public	resources,	weak	government	
institutions,	and	complex	relationships	between	political	actors	and	public	economic	
assets	(Cheng	and	Zaum	2008:	302).	One	widely	used	definition	of	corruption	
describes	it	as	the	abuse	of	public	roles	for	private	gain	(Johnston	2005),	while	
another	prevalent	definition	is	proposed	by	Nye	(1967:	965‐966),	identifying	
corruption	as	behaviour	that	deviates	from	the	formal	practice	of	a	public	role	due	to	
personal	(‘private‐regarding’)	gains,	or	that	violate	the	rules	of	exercising	influence.	
These	definitions,	however,	are	criticized	for	over‐generalizing	the	problem,	failing	to	
adequately	define	what	exactly	constitutes	‘abuse’	or	‘personal	gain’	(Philp	2008:	
311‐312).26	Broadly	speaking,	corruption	is	normatively	accepted	as	involving	some	
form	of	deceit	with	‘the	pretence	of	being	absolutely	loyal	to	the	principal	whilst	in	
actual	fact	being	intent	on	benefiting	oneself	and/or	third	parties’	(Brasz	1963:	112).	
Whatever	form	corruption	takes	it	is	commonly	understood	as	having	a	negative	
political	and	economic	effect	on	ordinary	citizens.	Such	understandings	consequently	
lead	citizens	to	regard	corruption	as	a	form	of	injustice	(Anduiza	et	al.	2013:	1665).	
	
Despite	the	general	attitude	that	corruption	is	bad,	conceptualizations	of	corruption	
based	on	the	law,	morality	and	social	norms	are	not	necessarily	congruent.	Legal	
definitions	of	corruption	are	those	found	in	state	legislation	whereas	moral	
definitions	are	determined	by	social	context.27	Moral	interpretations	of	corruption	are	
often	(but	not	exclusively)	drawn	from	religion	and	culture,	and	identify	corrupt	
actions	as	those	which	are	evil	(Marquette	2012:	14)	whereas	sociological	definitions	
are	derived	from	the	social	norms	of	acceptable	and	unacceptable	behaviour	within	a	
society	(Leys	1990:	55).	The	contrast	between	these	different	perspectives	is	
apparent	when	considering	Ley’s	(1990:	54)	assertion	that	for	every	corrupt	act	
deemed	bad	by	one	person,	there	is	at	least	one	other	person	who	regards	it	as	good.	
In	Indonesia,	this	incongruence	is	visible	in	the	fact	that	corruption	is	widely	
																																																													
26	There	is	extensive	debate	over	the	definition	of	corruption	in	academic	literature.	For	
examples	see	Bull	and	Newell	(1997);	Cheng	and	Zaum	(2008);	Friedrich	(1990);	
Heidenheimer	et	al.	(1990);	Heywood	(1997);	Johnston	(2005);	Mény	(1996);	Rose‐Ackerman	
(1999);	Warren	(2004).	
27	The	Indonesian	state	has	implemented	a	number	of	initiatives	in	its	efforts	to	combat	
corruption,	such	as	the	Corruption	Eradication	Commission	(Komisi	Pemberantasan	Korupsi,	
KPK)	and	the	Anti‐Corruption	Courts	(Pengadilan	Tindak	Pidana	Korupsi,	Tipikor),	designed	
to	implement	a	number	of	anti‐corruption	laws	including:	Law	No.	28/1999	on	State	
Organizers	Who	Are	Free	from	Corruption,	Collusion	and	Nepotism,	Law	No.	31/1999	on	the	
Eradication	of	the	Criminal	Act	of	Corruption,	Law	No.	71/2000	on	Procedures	for	
Implementation	of	Public	Participation	and	Provision	of	Appreciation	in	the	Prevention	and	
Eradication	of	the	Criminal	Act	of	Corruption,	and	Law	No.	8/2010	on	the	Criminal	Act	of	
Money	Laundering.	
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condemned,	yet	prevalent.	What	is	regarded	as	corruption	under	the	law	may	clash	
with	social	norms,	for	example,	what	King	(2000:	618)	describes	as	rifts	between	
legal	norms	and	‘folk	norms’	such	as	social	networks,	kinship	ties,	friendships,	
patron‐client	relations	and	family	loyalty.	The	difficulty	in	establishing	a	workable	
definition	for	corruption	lends	it	a	malleability	and	propensity	for	manipulation	that	
make	it	an	attractive	issue	for	political	parties	in	Indonesia.	
	
In	seeking	to	explain	how	understandings	of	what	does	and	does	not	constitute	
corruption	play	into	broader	narratives	of	morality	within	political	campaigns,	it	
became	evident	that	the	ways	in	which	political	parties	and	individual	candidates	
define	corruption	are	important.	In	the	discourses	adopted	by	parties	and	candidates	
during	electoral	campaigns,	one	of	the	principal	interpretations	of	corruption	
revolves	around	the	use	of	incentives	to	attract	voters.	This	is	often	described	as	
‘money	politics’	and	‘vote‐buying’,	terms	used	to	describe	the	distribution	of	money	
(or	goods)	in	order	to	gain	or	maintain	office	(Goodpaster	2002:	100;	Mietzner	2007).	
In	Indonesia,	these	practices	are	illegal	under	Law	No.	10/2008	on	the	General	
Election	of	Members	for	the	DPR,	DPD	and	DPRD,	which	states	in	article	87(1)	that	
candidates	will	be	sanctioned	if	it	is	proven	that	a	campaigner	has	promised	or	given	
money	or	other	goods,	directly	or	indirectly,	in	return	for	participants	to	(a)	not	use	
their	right	to	vote,	(b)	use	their	right	to	vote	in	such	a	way	that	they	select	a	candidate	
in	a	way	that	invalidates	their	vote,	(c)	vote	for	a	specific	political	party	participating	
in	the	election,	(d)	select	a	specific	candidate	for	DPR,	DPRD	I,	DPRD	II	or	(e)	select	a	
specific	candidate	for	the	DPD.	Money	politics	is	a	‘household	phrase’	in	Indonesia	
due	to	its	normalcy	during	electoral	campaigns	(Mietzner	2007:	239).	However,	as	
Aspinall	and	Sukmajati	(Forthcoming‐b:	7)	argue,	the	term	‘money	politics’	is	
imprecise.28	Recognizing	this	shortcoming,	this	terminology	is	nevertheless	adopted	
because,	despite	its	fluidity,	it	is	commonly	used	in	Indonesia	by	parties	and	
candidates	themselves.	Identifying	how	these	terms	are	used	to	conceptualize	
corruption	is	important	for	understanding	how	symbols	are	imagined	and	anti‐
corruption	images	are	incorporated	into	campaigns.	
	
In	studying	the	use	of	anti‐corruption	symbols	by	emerging	parties,	I	decided	to	adopt	
a	multi‐scalar	approach	within	each	case	study,	examining	two	different	‘units’	of	
																																																													
28	Instead,	Aspinall	and	Sukmajati	(Forthcoming‐b)	adopt	the	terms	‘patronage’	and	
‘clientelism’	as	more	specific	descriptions	of	the	phenomena	observed.		
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analysis.29	First,	the	three	case	study	parties	are	examined	at	the	national	level	(the	
first	unit	of	analysis),	looking	at	both	materials	produced	by	the	party	head	office—
including,	but	not	limited	to,	information	on	each	parties’	‘vision	and	mission’	and	
other	documentation	regarding	the	parties’	objectives	and	raison	d’etre,	postings	on	
the	official	website	and	social	media	posts	made	by	those	in	the	central	party	
committee	(Dewan	Perwakilan	Partai,	DPP)	and	public	statements	made	by	party	
leaders	and	official	spokespersons—and	interviews	with	members	of	the	DPP.	
Second,	I	conducted	detailed	observations	of	three	parliamentary	candidates	(the	
second	unit	of	analysis),	one	representing	each	party.	By	observing	campaign	
planning	and	execution,	as	well	as	having	direct,	personal,	access	to	the	candidates,	
the	case	studies	developed	reflect	how	these	individuals	formulated	the	anti‐
corruption	symbol	in	their	own	campaigns	(i.e.	how	they	linked	themselves	to	the	
symbol)	and	why	they	chose	to	deliver	the	symbol	in	the	way	they	did.		
	
In	the	initial	stages	of	this	project,	the	question	of	access	to	interview	subjects	caused	
some	consternation	as	I	did	not	have	any	direct	relationships	with	members	from	the	
political	parties	I	wished	to	research.	However,	basing	myself	in	Jakarta	and	drawing	
upon	contacts	provided	through	my	pre‐existing	networks	there,	I	was	eventually	
able	to	organize	interviews	with	party	members	from	almost	all	political	parties	that	
competed	in	the	2014	national	elections.	These	interviews,	in	turn,	allowed	access	to	
other	party	officials	for	interviews.	It	was	during	this	time	that	the	feasibility	of	a	
study	of	emerging	parties	was	confirmed,	as	I	felt	I	had	a	workable	level	of	access	to	
senior	party	members	for	the	purposes	of	this	research.30	The	fact	that	I	speak	
Indonesian	also	enabled	me	to	develop	closer	relationships	with	interviewees	
(although	some	did	speak	English)	that	would	not	have	been	possible	using	an	
interpreter.	This	experience	resonates	with	theories	about	participant	observation,	
which	encourage	researchers	to	use	the	local	language	and	engage	through	informal	
interaction	(DeWalt	and	DeWalt	2010:	4).	
	
The	second	round	of	fieldwork	provided	an	opportunity	to	conduct	more	targeted	
interviews	with	members	from	the	selected	cases.	These	interviews	initially	focused	
upon	senior	party	members	based	in	Jakarta,	with	a	view	to	establish	how	national	
party	leadership	conceptualize	anti‐corruption	issues	and	the	importance	of	anti‐
corruption	symbols	for	their	respective	parties.	In	March	2013	I	approached	five	
																																																													
29	‘Embedded	case	study	design’	refers	to	case	studies	that	‘involve	units	of	analysis	at	more	
than	one	level’	(Yin	2014:	53).	
30	Further	details	of	the	fieldwork	conducted	can	be	found	in	Kramer	(2014b).	
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different	parliamentary	candidates	(all	of	whom	I	had	already	interviewed)	to	ask	if	
they	would	allow	me	to	accompany	them	as	an	embedded	observer	while	in	their	
local	electorates	for	parts	of	their	campaign.	Three	candidates	agreed	and	permitted	
me	to	travel	with	them	in	their	electorates,	in	the	provinces	of	East	Java,	South	
Sulawesi	and	North	Sumatra	as	they	organized	and	executed	their	electoral	
campaigns.		
	
A	third	period	of	fieldwork	provided	an	opportunity	to	gather	more	specific	data	
during	the	official	campaign	period	between	16	March	2014	and	6	April	2014.	Access	
afforded	during	time	spent	in	the	electorates	included:	attendance	at	strategy	
meetings,	logistical	planning	and	procurement	discussions,	attendance	at	community	
meetings	and	rallies,	as	well	as	the	‘off’	time	of	travel,	lunch	and	resting	after	the	day’s	
activities.	The	latter	provided	an	opportunity	to	ask	questions	and	reflect	on	the	days’	
events.31	Visits	to	the	local	electorate	were	interspersed	with	interviews	conducted	in	
Jakarta,	where	each	of	the	candidates	usually	resided.	In	total,	the	candidates	were	
formally	interviewed	a	minimum	of	six	times	over	the	course	of	campaign	planning	
and	execution,	in	addition	to	time	spent	together	in	their	electorate.	During	these	
periods	I	took	detailed	field	notes	in	order	to	build	a	narrative	surrounding	how	the	
candidate	behaved,	what	their	priorities	were	and	whether	corruption	remained	a	
focus	of	their	campaign.	In	the	interim,	I	communicated	with	the	candidates	face‐to‐
face	in	Jakarta,	and	via	email	and	text	messages.	The	narrative	development	drew	
upon	an	ethnographic	methodology	in	which	I,	as	the	researcher,	established	a	
physical	presence	at	my	site	designed	to	help	me	understand	the	‘around	chains,	
paths,	threads,	conjunctions,	or	juxtapositions	of	locations’	(Marcus	1995:	105).	In	
addition,	using	non‐physical	communication	to	discuss	progress,	targets	and	
campaign	issues	also	allowed	me	to	develop	a	full	picture	of	candidates	and	their	
strategies	over	the	year	preceding	the	election.	Having	amassed	first‐hand	data,	I	then	
returned	to	the	literature	(primary	and	secondary)	to	examine	historical	events	more	
closely	in	order	to	trace	changes	and	continuities	in	anti‐corruption	symbolism,	with	
an	eye	to	understanding	its	prominence	in	contemporary	Indonesia.		
	
	 	
																																																													
31	The	level	of	interaction	during	these	periods	depended	on	the	candidate	and	circumstances.	
Sometimes	the	candidates	would	invite	me	for	dinner	and	we	would	stay	in	the	same	
hotel/house	overnight.	Other	times	this	was	not	possible.	I	left	it	to	the	candidate	to	determine	
the	level	of	interaction	they	were	comfortable	with	during	these	‘off’	times.	
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Analysis	of	data	gathered	from	interviews	and	observations	was	done	first	through	a	
bottom‐up	coding	process,	which	was	used	to	identify	themes	suggested	by	the	data	
rather	than	the	literature.32	The	thematic	coding	was	built	upon	common	phrases	and	
ideas	embedded	in	the	interview	texts.	For	interviews	with	party	officials	(not	the	
case	study	subjects),	interviews	were	coded	to	see	if	there	were	similarities	and	
disparities	in	how	the	individuals	understood	their	party’s	anti‐corruption	symbol.	
The	coded	material	was	then	cross‐referenced	to	the	themes	and	rhetoric	found	in	
the	party’s	official	documents,	media	reporting	and	online	presence	in	order	to	gain	a	
holistic	idea	of	how	the	party	constructed	its	anti‐corruption	symbol.	For	the	three	
case	study	candidates	interviews	were	also	coded	thematically,	but	the	initial	analysis	
compared	the	prominence	of	themes	over	time	within	each	case	and	then	compared	
the	three	cases	against	each	other.	In	this	way,	the	analysis	tracked	changes	within	
the	individual	candidate’s	own	campaign	and	attitude	toward	the	anti‐corruption	
symbol	over	time,	as	well	as	contextualizing	it	against	the	other	cases.		
	
Limitations	
This	study	focuses	on	how	the	symbol	of	corruption	as	identified,	developed	and	used	
by	an	individual	parliamentary	candidate	from	each	of	three	emerging	political	
parties.	As	a	consequence,	there	are	limitations	in	its	scope.	While	Indonesian	
political	parties	share	many	similarities,	the	results	of	this	thesis	are	not	intended	to	
be	generalized.	It	also	is	impossible	to	draw	universal	conclusions	about	the	
relationship	between	national	rhetoric	and	individual	candidates	based	on	these	
three	cases.	Furthermore,	given	the	cultural,	ethnic	and	religious	diversity	within	
Indonesia,	each	of	the	case	studies	reflects	the	particularities	of	its	geographic	
location.	The	individual	case	studies	for	this	research	were	taken	from	North	
Sumatra,	South	Sulawesi	and	East	Java	—	three	very	different	contexts.	At	times	
during	the	research	I	heard	anecdotal	evidence	explaining	why	certain	candidates	
had	advantages	or	disadvantages	according	to	religion,	gender	and	family	
background.	While	the	analysis	of	candidate	behaviour	accounts	for	these	differences,	
it	does	not	attempt	an	in‐depth	background	study	on	the	cultural	differences	between	
the	regions	and	how	this	affected	candidate	behaviour	or	constituents’	reaction	to	
them.		
	
																																																													
32	For	further	details	on	bottom‐up	coding	see	Urquhart	(2013:	38).	Other	relevant	discussion	
is	found	in	Yin	(2014:	136‐137)	detailing	the	process	of	‘working	your	data	from	the	“ground	
up”’.	
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Another	limitation	of	this	study	is	that	it	does	not	include	any	assessment	of	how	the	
parties’	anti‐corruption	symbols	are	understood	and	interpreted	by	the	voters,	
although	relevant	literature	has	been	cited	where	applicable.	Because	the	focus	of	this	
thesis	is	to	understand	the	rationale	and	relationships	within	the	party,	it	has	not	set	
out	to	assess	the	impact	of	these	symbols	on	the	public.	The	information	gathered	is	
based	mainly	on	interviews	with	members	of	parties,	rather	than	those	deciding	their	
fate.	However,	while	the	citizen	perspective	of	anti‐corruption	symbols	is	outside	the	
bounds	of	this	particular	project,	it	would	be	a	potential	topic	for	future	research.	
	
When	discussing	issues	of	corruption	and	elections	in	Indonesia,	the	topic	of	‘money	
politics’	invariably	emerges.	Understanding	the	circumstances	that	promote	the	use	
of	cash,	goods,	or	favours	in	exchange	for	votes	is	an	important	area	of	research	that	
has	been	taken	up	by	other	academic	researchers.	This	work	is	referenced	throughout	
this	thesis.33	But	while	this	study	does	not	shy	away	from	observations	relating	to	the	
use	of	money	politics,	these	observations	are	described	in	order	to	understand	the	
rationale	behind	certain	campaign	strategies	adopted	by	individual	candidates,	rather	
than	to	assess	the	prevalence	of	money	politics	itself.	Moreover,	this	thesis	does	not	
attempt	to	explain	in	any	detail	why	voters	seek	material	goods	or	financial	benefits.	
While	this	question	is	pertinent	to	electoral	politics	in	Indonesia,	it	falls	outside	the	
parameters	of	this	study.	Any	direct	observations	on	this	topic	included	in	this	study	
are	significant	in	the	context	of	the	three	case	studies,	but	are	not	intended	to	capture	
the	extent	of	vote‐buying	in	Indonesia	as	a	whole.		
	
Outline	of	thesis	
This	thesis	begins	with	a	discussion	of	relevant	theoretical	literature	pertaining	to	the	
development	of	a	political	symbol	and	how	it	is	communicated	across	scales	to	the	
intended	audience	(i.e.	voters)	within	the	context	of	election	campaigns.	This	
literature	underscores	the	instrumental	significance	of	campaigns	and	that	the	
construction	of	political	symbols	is	a	deliberate	process	shaped	through	language	and	
driven	by	the	desire	to	maximize	votes.	Electoral	campaigns	are	designed	to	influence	
voters	to	act	in	a	certain	way	and	the	effective	use	of	symbols	is	crucial	during	this	
process.	If	parties	or	candidates	miss	the	mark	in	their	framing	of	symbols	they	risk	
experiencing	voter	backlash.	This	chapter	also	explores	the	appeal	of	using	anti‐
corruption	symbols	in	political	campaigns	more	generally	arguing	that,	while	
																																																													
33	In	particular	see	Electoral	Dynamics	in	Indonesia:	Money	Politics,	Patronage	and	Clientelism	
at	the	Grassroots,	edited	by	Aspinall	and	Sukmajati	and	due	for	publication	in	2015.	
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appealing	to	moral	panics	can	be	useful	for	parties,	there	are	also	hazards	in	
convincing	the	public	that	their	anti‐corruption	intentions	are	genuine.		
	
Chapter	Two	takes	up	this	point,	charting	the	political	history	of	corruption	in	
Indonesia	since	the	late	colonial	period	up	until	the	national	elections	in	2004,	and	in	
doing	so	pays	close	attention	to	how	it	has	been	co‐opted	by	political	actors	over	time.	
Indonesia’s	government	has,	thus	far,	been	characterized	by	three	very	different	
regimes—the	Old	Order	under	Sukarno	(1945–65),	Suharto’s	New	Order	(1966–98),	
and	the	era	of	democratization	that	has	come	to	be	known	as	Reformasi	(1998–).	
There	are	common	threads	in	the	use	of	anti‐corruption	rhetoric	throughout	these	
regimes.	It	was	routinely	used	by	governments	to	denounce	their	detractors	during	
both	the	Old	and	New	Orders,	and	it	has	been	openly	used	in	political	jostling	
between	parties	since	the	end	of	the	New	Order.	Thus,	while	the	governments	may	
have	changed	markedly,	the	mobilization	of	anti‐corruption	issues	has	been	a	
continuous	theme.		
	
Chapter	Three	provides	a	more	detailed	overview	of	the	Indonesian	state	from	2004	
to	2014,	covering	two	terms	of	government	under	former	Indonesian	president	Susilo	
Bambang	Yudhoyono.	In	understanding	this	period	more	deeply,	the	scene	is	set	for	
an	analysis	of	the	electoral	campaigns	that	took	place	in	2014.	In	particular,	the	
prominence	of	corruption	scandals,	affecting	several	parties	but	most	notably	
Yudhoyono’s	own	Democratic	Party	(Partai	Demokrat),	were	of	major	significance	for	
the	ruling	elite.	They	fostered	the	scepticism	of	citizens	toward	politicians,	
demonstrated	by	very	low	levels	of	public	satisfaction	with	the	government,	and	
provided	an	opportunity	for	emerging	parties	to	portray	themselves	as	a	clean	
alternative	to	the	corrupt	and	self‐interested	elites	in	power.	It	was	in	this	context	
that	emerging	parties	moved	to	attach	themselves	to	anti‐corruption	symbols.		
	
Building	upon	this	contextual	analysis,	Chapter	Four	explores	how	emerging	parties	
constructed	their	anti‐corruption	image	at	the	national	level,	particularly	in	terms	of	
rhetoric	and	the	means	they	used	to	publicize	this	image.	Analysing	party	documents,	
the	use	of	leadership	figures	and	the	media,	this	chapter	compares	and	contrasts	the	
techniques	employed	to	project	anti‐corruption	symbols	from	the	national	level.	
While	there	were	differences	in	how	the	symbol	was	constructed,	there	is	no	doubt	
that	all	three	parties	wanted	to	portray	a	public	image	of	being	clean	and	vehemently	
against	corruption.	Each	party	employed	a	variety	of	channels	for	broadcasting	this	
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image	across	the	Indonesian	archipelago,	including	official	websites,	traditional	and	
social	media	and	rallies	by	national	level	figures.	These	efforts,	however,	fell	short	
and	none	of	the	parties	performed	as	well	as	they	had	hoped.		
	
So	how	did	these	national	campaigns	influence	campaigning	by	individual	
candidates?	How	were	these	national	anti‐corruption	symbols	incorporated,	if	at	all,	
in	the	campaigns	of	particular	parliamentary	hopefuls?	These	questions	are	
addressed	in	Chapter	Five,	which	describes	how	one	candidate	from	each	of	the	three	
emerging	parties	chose	to	use	the	anti‐corruption	symbol	that	their	parties	had	
promoted	so	strongly	at	the	national	level.	In	analysing	their	experiences,	decisions,	
and	rationales,	the	chapter	concludes	that	the	adoption	and	preservation	of	national	
level	symbols	is	highly	dependent	upon	the	mentality	and	personal	convictions	of	the	
individual	candidate.		
	
The	analysis	is	continued	in	Chapter	Six,	which	draws	the	study’s	findings	together	in	
order	to	assess	the	success	and	significance	of	using	anti‐corruption	symbols.	It	
concludes	that	political	symbols	are	chosen	because	they	reflect	the	important	
political	issues	of	the	time,	as	identified	by	political	parties.	But	their	use	also	reflects	
the	candidate’s	personal	ideals	and	their	local	context.	Tensions	arise	when	the	
actions	of	candidates,	especially	the	use	of	money	politics	and	vote‐buying,	
undermine	the	anti‐corruption	symbol	that	parties	have	worked	so	hard	to	establish	
on	the	national	scale.	If	election	candidates	wish	to	present	a	credible	image	that	is	
persuasive,	they	must	consider	how	voters	will	view	the	use	of	the	symbol	vis‐à‐vis	
their	use	of	money	and	goods.	The	fact	that	money	politics	and	vote‐buying	remains	
so	rife	in	Indonesia	can	be	interpreted	not	only	as	a	perpetuation	of	ingrained	
political	customs,	but	also	as	evidence	that	political	candidates	either	fail	to	
effectively	‘own’	the	anti‐corruption	symbol	or	that	they	are	unable	to	persuade	
voters	that	eradicating	corruption	is	a	priority.	Thus,	they	are	forced	to	resort	to	
other	forms	of	persuasion.	
	
The	thesis	concludes	by	underscoring	that	political	symbol‐creation	is	influenced	by	
the	scale	it	is	constructed	at	and	type	of	diffusion	used	to	broadcast	it.	The	diffusion	of	
symbols	in	national	election	campaigns,	conceptualized	by	the	DPP,	is	a	relatively	uni‐
directional	and	top‐down	process	in	which	parties	use	propaganda	to	influence	
voters.	However,	individual	candidates	adopt	and	reconstitute	the	symbol	in	the	way	
that	they	believe	will	be	most	influential	for	gaining	votes.	It	imbued	with	the	
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candidate’s	own	personal	history	and	ideals.	The	incongruence	between	national	and	
individual	symbols	can	be	explained	by	the	different	factors	shaping	campaigns	at	
these	two	separate	scales.	The	fragmented	nature	of	Indonesian	political	parties	is	
amplified	by	the	lack	of	party	coordination	and	control	over	the	actions	of	individual	
candidates	who,	while	representing	the	party,	have	a	lot	of	autonomy	in	choosing	
how	they	campaign	and	face	immense	pressure	to	engage	in	money	politics.	
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Chapter	One	
Political	symbols,	campaigns	and	
corruption	
The	use	of	political	symbols,	created	when	parties	attempt	to	bind	themselves	to	
particular	social,	political	or	economic	issues	in	order	to	shape	their	public	image	
and	mobilize	support,	is	intended	to	create	a	bond	between	voter	and	party.	
Through	the	use	of	these	symbols,	political	actors	seek	to	boost	their	‘validity	and	
legitimacy’	and	‘symbolic	capital’	in	order	to	garner	popularity	(Lahusen	1996:	48),	
and	with	the	ever‐increasing	reach	of	the	media,	political	parties	and	candidates	
face	more	scrutiny	than	ever	(Balkin	1999:	395‐402;	Rosenberg	et	al.	1991:	345;	
Street	2001).	Indeed,	a	number	of	studies	have	argued	that	image	is	more	important	
in	determining	voter	preferences	than	other	factors	such	as	policy	(Dalton	2000:	
923‐924;	Edelman	1988;	Kraus	and	Giles	1989;	Rosenberg	et	al.	1991;	Smith	2001;	
Trilling	1975).	Due	to	their	age,	emerging	parties	face	additional	challenges	in	
demonstrating	their	legitimacy	and	credentials,	as	well	as	marketing	their	image,	in	
their	bid	to	seize	power	from	more	established	political	rivals.1	
	
People	derive	impressions	of	politics	from	their	everyday	experiences,	and	political	
campaigns	represent	a	conscious	attempt	to	exploit	these	daily	inputs	in	order	to	
influence	voters	(Schmitt‐Beck	and	Farrell	2002:	183‐184).	Downs	(1957)	asserts	
that	because	most	people	are	unable	or	unwilling	to	invest	large	amounts	of	time	in	
gathering	information	in	order	to	make	electoral	decisions,	voters	use	‘information	
shortcuts’	in	order	to	make	sense	of	politics.2	In	addition,	the	‘mental	picture’	of	a	
political	party	held	by	most	voters	is	often	vague	and	contradictory	and	therefore	
prone	to	manipulation	(Trilling	1975:	285).	As	such,	targeted	campaigns	can	play	a	
role	in	influencing	people,	especially	those	with	no	firm	political	allegiance.	For	
																																																													
1	Bowler	and	Farrell	(1992b:	4)	argue	that,	in	its	most	rational	form,	an	electoral	campaign	
aims	to	win,	almost	at	any	cost.	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	electoral	triumph	is	not	
necessarily	the	end	goal	for	all	parties.	For	example,	some	may	be	considered	‘promoter	
parties’,	which	exist	namely	to	highlight	particular	issues.	These	parties	may	not	have	
sufficient	appeal	or	resources	to	actually	win	an	election	but	use	the	campaign	process	to	
focus	attention	on	specific	concerns	(Barnea	and	Rahat	2011:	310;	Berrington	1985:	457;	
Harmel	and	Robertson	1985:	517).	
2	Downs’	1957	work	The	Economic	Theory	of	Democracy	is	recognized	as	a	seminal	text	in	
studying	how	voters	and	government	make	rational	decisions	in	the	democratic	context.	
Numerous	studies	draw	upon	this	early	work	in	their	own	research,	for	example:	Bowler	and	
Farrell	(1992b);	Capelos	(2010);	Conover	and	Feldman	(1989);	Green	and	Hobolt	(2008);	
Kitschelt	(2000);	Rohrschneider	(2002)	and	van	der	Brug	(2004).	
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newer	parties,	voter	uncertainties	about	what	parties	actually	stand	for	offers	an	
opportunity	to	connect	with	voters;	to	put	down	‘political	roots’.3	Basinger	and	
Lavine	(2005:	181‐182)	contend	that	while	not	all	voters	will	be	swayed	by	
campaigns,	they	provide	an	opportunity	to	‘inform	and	persuade’	those	who	are	
ambivalent.	By	choosing	symbols	that	resonate	with	voters,	parties	endeavour	to	
garner	enough	public	support	to	achieve	electoral	victory	(Gibson	and	Römmele	
2001;	Graber	1976:	19‐21;	Kaufmann	2004;	Smith	2001).4	Moreover,	even	in	defeat,	
campaigns	serve	to	build	the	party’s	profile,	with	a	view	to	future	elections.		
	
The	creation,	transmission	and	mutation	of	political	symbols	are	core	aspects	of	
campaigning	(Howard	2003:	213).	Campaigns	can	be	understood	as	comprising	four	
basic	elements:	the	messages	that	the	campaign	wishes	to	communicate;	the	
channel(s)	of	communication	employed	to	relay	these	messages;	the	impact	of	these	
messages	upon	target	audiences;	and	the	feedback	loop	from	the	audience	back	to	
the	campaigning	organization	(Norris	2002:	128).	While	selecting	pertinent	political	
symbols	is	important,	framing	these	symbols	effectively	is	also	paramount.5	Once	a	
party	has	decided	which	symbols	it	wishes	to	project,	campaign	strategies	and	
propaganda	must	construct	them	in	meaningful	ways	that	are	attractive	to	voters	
(Herrnson	1988:	14‐15).	Without	an	effective	communication	strategy	that	takes	
into	account	the	socio‐political	context	of	the	campaign,	parties	will	fail	to	maximize	
the	influence	of	their	message	(Grofman	1985).	Finally,	the	‘feedback	loop’	allows	
for	the	ongoing	adaptation	of	messages	and	communication	mechanisms	as	the	
campaign	progresses,	in	response	to	audience	input.	
	
The	prominence	of	corruption	as	a	moral	and	political	problem	in	Indonesia	makes	
the	anti‐corruption	symbol	attractive	to	parties	and	candidates.	Corruption—and	
																																																													
3	For	further	discussion	on	the	concept	of	‘political	roots’	see	Mainwaring	(1998:	72).	
4	Farrell	(2006:	129)	argues	that	parties	have	shifted	from	‘selling’	to	‘marketing’	
themselves,	gathering	information	about	voter	wants	and	attitudes,	and	framing	their	
symbol	within	these	narratives	in	order	to	pursue	votes.	As	a	consequence,	campaigns	
involve	much	more	planning	than	they	once	did	and	preparation	times	are	longer	(Farrell	
2006;	Iyengar	and	Simon	2000).	
5	Framing	is	the	process	by	which	actors	are	‘actively	engaged	in	the	production	and	
maintenance	of	meaning	for	constituents,	antagonists,	and	bystanders	or	observers’	
(Benford	and	Snow	2000:	613).	In	imbuing	symbols	with	meaning,	actors	use	them	to	
generate	frames	that	support	their	viewpoint,	while	possibly	challenging	existing	frames.	
For	further	discussions	on	framing	see	Benford	and	Snow	(2000);	Cappella	and	Jamieson	
(1996);	Chong	and	Druckman	(2007);	Fischer	(2003).		
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efforts	to	combat	it—date	back	to	the	colonial	era.6	At	the	same	time,	the	perceived	
lack	of	progress	in	eradicating	corruption	and	public	belief	that	it	is	an	entrenched	
facet	of	politics	renders	the	issue	a	sensitive	one.7	Politicians	must	balance	their	
attempts	to	mobilize	the	issue	in	a	way	that	fosters	their	credibility	while	also	
allaying	public	cynicism.	Individual	politicians	may	shy	away	from	the	anti‐
corruption	issue	altogether,	even	when	combating	corruption	is	a	party	priority,	
fearing	that	sceptical	voters	will	scorn	them	for	it.	They	may	even	directly	contradict	
their	own	party’s	attempts	to	build	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	by	trying	to	assure	
their	victory	by	engaging	in	corrupt	practices.	Incongruent	rhetoric	and	actions	
within	a	political	party’s	election	campaign	may	undermine	the	united	front	of	the	
party,	subsequently	fuelling	further	scepticism	and	public	backlash	from	voters.		
	
This	chapter	discusses	theories	on	symbol	use	in	campaigns	and	why	corruption,	in	
particular,	may	be	a	popular	political	issue	for	emerging	parties	to	discuss.	It	begins	
with	an	examination	of	why	symbols	are	important	for	parties	and	the	
considerations	required	to	effectively	promote	them.	It	also	discusses	how	a	party	
invokes	symbols	across	different	scales	and	the	different	types	of	influence	exerted	
by	the	party’s	national	executive	and	by	individual	candidates.	It	then	reflects	upon	
the	abstract	benefits	and	disadvantages	of	using	corruption	as	a	political	symbol,	
which	are	particularly	pertinent	given	its	history	in	the	Indonesian	context.	The	
chapter	argues	that	even	in	theoretical	terms	there	are	dangers	in	using	corruption	
as	a	campaign	issue,	especially	given	that,	in	the	minds	of	many,	the	government	and	
corruption	go	hand‐in‐hand.	
	
Symbols	
Symbols	constitute	‘carefully	executed	attempts	to	influence	the	public	agenda	in	
order	to	shape	election	outcomes’	(Green	and	Hobolt	2008:	473).	Parties	attempt	to	
frame	their	image	in	terms	that	correspond	with	public	‘patterns	of	perception,	
interpretation	and	evaluation’,	mobilizing	and	interpreting	grievances	in	order	to	
appeal	to	voters	(Lahusen	1996:	46).	They	may	‘mobilize’	voters	by	appealing	to	
ideological	priorities,	or	‘chase’	them	by	focusing	on	polls	and	crafting	rhetoric	in	
line	with	what	they	believe	the	public	wants	to	hear	(Rohrschneider	2002:	368‐
																																																													
6	Corruption	was	already	considered	an	entrenched	aspect	of	the	government	bureaucracy	
during	the	Dutch	colonial	period	(Wertheim	1963).	The	history	of	corruption	and	anti‐
corruption	efforts	in	modern	Indonesia	will	be	discussed	at	length	in	Chapter	Two.		
7	Citizens’	attitudes	towards	parties	and	politicians	in	the	Indonesian	context	are	discussed	
in	Chapter	Three.	
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369).8	As	symbols	are	intended	to	persuade,	parties	tend	towards	mainstream	
issues	that	lack	fine	detail,	affording	voters	the	opportunity	to	interpret	them	in	
accordance	with	their	own	world	views.	
	
Bowler	and	Farrell	(1992b:	15)	contend	that	electoral	success	hinges	on	a	well‐
conceived	and	well‐executed	campaign	built	on	three	foundations:	party	image,	
leader	image	and	the	party’s	manifesto	proposals.9	Political	symbols	aim	to	generate	
positive	associations	across	these	elements.	Harrop	(1990:	278)	likens	the	
campaign	process	to	‘services	sold	on	trust’,	in	which	voters	choose	the	supplier	
(the	party	and/or	the	candidate)	that	they	believe	will	most	likely	offer	‘future	
satisfaction’.	As	such,	parties	must	convince	voters	that	they	are	competent,	reliable	
and	consistent.	Furthermore,	voters	are	generally	sceptical	of	grand	promises,	and	
therefore	parties	must	be	careful	to	build	symbols	that	are	appealing	and	credible	
(Tomz	and	Van	Houweling	2008:	303).	Settling	on	the	best	symbols	to	adopt	is	also	
difficult	because	they	must	appeal	to	swing	voters	without	alienating	the	existing	
support	base	(Herrnson	1988:	12).10	
	
Against	the	backdrop	of	a	party’s	nation‐wide	campaign,	the	political	image	of	its	
leaders	and	of	individual	candidates	is	crucial.	This	image	can	be	influenced	by	
physical	elements,	including	candidates’	appearance	and	presentation	skills,	as	well	
as	a	successful	use	of	rhetoric	to	frame	symbols.11	The	creation	of	a	positive	
personal	image	promotes	the	‘validity	and	legitimacy’	of	an	actor	and	his/her	goals,	
																																																													
8	Jowett	and	O'Donnell	(2006:	33)	identify	two	means	through	which	people	seek	to	
persuade:	either	by	confirming	existing	beliefs	or	by	challenging	them.	Challenging	existing	
beliefs	often	faces	resistance.	Consequently	many	political	strategies,	particularly	during	
election	campaigns,	focus	upon	concerns	that	will	easily	gain	traction	rather	than	attempting	
to	change	what	people	already	think.	
9	These	three	key	tenants	are	of	varying	significance	during	an	election	campaign.		
10	Swing	voters	are	often	identified	as	the	core	audience	for	political	campaigns,	as	it	is	the	
undecided,	‘centre‐ground,	floating	voters’	that	are	believed	to	hold	the	key	to	electoral	
triumph	(Evans	2004:	137).	
11	According	to	Druckman	et	al.	(2004:	1184),	political	psychologists	highlight	four	images	or	
personality	characteristics	that	the	public	finds	appealing	and	may	be	strategically	attractive	
to	campaigns:	competence,	strength,	warmth,	and	trust.	They	argue	that	competence	is	
generally	identified	by	voters	as	the	most	important	trait,	giving	candidates	an	incentive	‘to	
boost	voters’	perceptions	of	their	competence	and	strength	to	handle	tough	problems’.	
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known	as	‘symbolic	capital’	(Lahusen	1996:	48).12	Harrop	(1990:	279)	contends	that	
since	voters	like	to	put	a	human	face	to	the	party,	it	is	up	to	individual	members	to	
establish	the	new	party’s	credibility,	then	engender	trust	from	the	community.	For	
some	voters,	leaders	come	to	embody	the	symbols	and	rhetoric	of	their	party,	so	
much	so	that	party	credibility	comes	to	depend	on	a	close	alignment	between	
personal	and	party	image	(Capelos	2010;	Harrop	1990).	
	
The	success	that	parties	have	in	aligning	themselves	with	certain	political	symbols	is	
also	important	in	establishing	‘cues’	for	voters.	Recalling	Downs’	(1957)	assertion	
that	voters	use	‘information	shortcuts’	to	understand	politics,	cues	are	one	such	
shortcut	that	assist	voters	to	make	inferences	about	parties	and	candidates	
(Conover	and	Feldman	1989:	914;	Hicken	2009:	5).	For	example,	it	may	be	desirable	
to	build	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	because	of	its	links	to	a	whole	range	of	‘public‐
service	related’	values	such	as	trust,	honesty,	humanity,	equity	and	responsibility	
that	feed	into	matters	of	social	justice	and	equality	before	the	law	(Collins	2012:	6).	
If	a	party	is	able	to	create	a	popular	symbol,	individual	candidates	may	benefit	from	
being	linked	to	the	party’s	‘brand’	(Geys	and	Vermeir	2014:	1030;	Popkin	1991:	
100).	In	building	their	brand,	parties	hope	to	achieve	‘issue	ownership’—when	a	
party	or	candidate	has	so	successfully	bound	themselves	to	a	particular	symbol	that	
they	become	directly	equated	with	it—and	the	more	salient	the	issue,	the	more	
appealing	it	is	to	be	associated	with	it.13	
	
Symbols	in	campaigns	
Petrocik’s	theory	of	‘issue	ownership’	(1996)	is	a	useful	conceptual	tool	for	
examining	how	parties	try	to	attach	themselves	to	salient	issues.	Petrocik	(1996:	
826)	contends	that	electoral	outcomes	are,	to	some	extent,	based	on	a	candidate’s	
ability	to	convince	voters	that	they	are	better	positioned	to	handle	certain	issues	
																																																													
12	There	are	different	forms	of	capital.	In	addition	to	symbolic	capital,	these	include	
economic	capital	(cash,	saving,	property,	etc.),	which	fund	the	campaign;	cultural	capital	
(knowledge	and	know‐how	assembled	by	political	actors);	and	social	capital	(because	
networks	can	compel	people	to	vote	a	certain	way)	(Lahusen	1996:	48).	The	higher	these	
levels	of	capital,	the	more	likely	a	candidate	is	to	succeed.	In	his	study	of	the	legitimacy	of	aid	
organizations	using	celebrity	endorsement	for	political	mobilization,	Lahusen	(1996:	48‐49)	
contends	that	symbolic	capital	plays	an	essential	role	in	‘capital	transformation’	because	it	
spurs	the	conversion	of	other	forms	of	capital	into	active	support.		
13	‘Salience’	is	a	term	frequently	used	to	denote	the	importance	assigned	to	a	particular	issue,	
designating	the	weight	that	individuals	attach	to	political	information.	Issue	salience	can	be	
increased	through	‘elite	communication’	with	an	agenda‐setting	function,	amplified	by	the	
media	and	by	international	commentary	(McCann	and	Domıńguez	1998:	485;	Zaller	1992:	
268).	However,	there	is	some	debate	around	the	exact	meaning	of	the	word	(Wlezien	2005).	
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than	their	opponents—in	other	words,	they	come	to	‘own’	that	issue.14	According	to	
this	theory,	the	most	straightforward	way	for	a	party	to	gain	ownership	of	an	issue	
is	via	a	'history	of	attention,	initiative,	and	innovation	towards	these	problems,	
which	leads	voters	to	believe	that	one	of	the	parties	(and	its	candidates)	is	more	
sincere	and	committed	to	doing	something	about	them’	(Petrocik	1996:	826).15	For	
example,	in	the	United	States	the	Democrats	are	traditionally	associated	with	issues	
of	education	and	welfare,	whereas	Republicans	are	more	closely	associated	with	
social	issues	such	as	fighting	crime	and	protecting	moral	values.	This	ownership	has	
become	entrenched	over	years	of	political	discourse	and	rivalry	between	the	parties	
and	these	associations	would	be	difficult	to	reverse	(Petrocik	1996).	Ownership	can	
also	be	‘performance	based’,	such	as	in	the	fields	of	economic	management,	national	
security	and	bureaucratic	performance,	which	are	not	automatically	owned	by	a	
particular	party	but,	rather,	are	attributed	based	on	policy	successes	and	failures	
(Petrocik	et	al.	2003:	599).	Thus	there	are	both	‘associative’	and	‘competence’	
dimensions	to	issue	ownership,	whereby	voters	associate	a	party	with	an	issue,	as	
well	as	judge	its	capability	to	address	it	(Druckman	et	al.	2004:	1182;	Walgrave	et	al.	
2012:	772‐773).16		
	
																																																													
14	Petrocik’s	theory	has	been	further	developed	by	a	number	of	studies,	for	example:	
Bélanger	and	Meguid	(2008);	Green	and	Hobolt	(2008);	Kaufmann	(2004);	Sellers	(1998)	
and	van	der	Brug	(2004).	He	acknowledges	that	his	work	draws	heavily	from	Rabinowitz	
and	Macdonald’s	(1989)	‘directional	theory’	of	issue	voting,	which	posited	that	the	salience	
of	issues	for	voters	could	be	measured	by	whether	they	conjured	positive	or	negative	
feelings	(marking	direction)	and	whether	those	feeling	were	strong	or	weak	(marking	
intensity).	Rabinowitz	and	Macdonald,	in	turn,	drew	their	analysis	from	observations	by	
Edelman	(1964)	that	most	citizens	operate	with	low	levels	of	information	and	therefore	
most	political	decision	are	based	on	emotional	responses	(Rabinowitz	and	Macdonald	1989:	
94).	Another	related	theory	was	put	forward	by	Cox	and	McCubbins	(1986),	who	argue	that	
it	is	not	so	much	issues,	but	rather	the	promise	to	redistribute	favours	and	benefits	once	
elected,	that	drives	support	for	certain	candidates.	This	theory	is	based	on	the	premise	that	
voters	are	primarily	driven	by	self‐interest	and	will	support	the	candidate	that	promises	to	
channel	the	most	benefits	to	them.	While	this	argument	holds	a	different	theoretical	basis	to	
Petrocik’s	concept	of	‘issue	ownership’,	it	does	not	negate	the	importance	of	issue	ownership	
as	a	means	for	promoting	a	candidate’s	promises.	
15	This	is	not	the	sole	theory	advanced	to	explain	voter	decisions.	Tomz	and	Van	Houweling	
(2008)	outline	three	different	theories	on	how	voters	judge	political	candidates:	proximity	
theory,	which	holds	that	citizens	prefer	candidates	whose	position	is	closest	to	their	own;	
discounting,	which	posits	that	voters	realize	that	candidates	rarely	deliver	fully	on	their	
campaign	promises	and	therefore	voter	select	the	candidate	they	believe	will	fall	closest	to	
their	own	views	once	compromises	have	been	made;	and	directional	theory,	which	has	
already	been	discussed.	These	theories	argue	for	different	decision‐making	processes	but	all	
agree	on	the	importance	of	gaining	issue	ownership.		
16	Studies	have	found	that	while	the	competence	dimension	tends	to	have	a	direct	impact	on	
voter	preferences,	the	associative	dimension	is	only	important	if	the	voter	already	deems	an	
issue	to	be	important	(Green	and	Hobolt	2008;	Walgrave	et	al.	2012).		
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Petrocik	(1996:	828)	argues	that	the	ownership	of	issues	is	changeable	as	
‘reputations	…	[are]	regularly	tested	and	reinforced’.	This	is	pertinent	to	emerging	
parties	that	may	not	have	had	the	opportunity	to	entrench,	or	even	demonstrate,	
their	performance	credentials.	Issue	ownership	by	a	party	may	also	come	by	virtue	
of	being	untainted	by	the	problems	facing	other	parties.	Corruption	is	one	political	
concern	over	which	parties	can	seize	ownership	from	rivals.	For	instance,	if	a	party	
suffers	a	corruption	scandal	and	lose	public	confidence,	rivals	have	the	opportunity	
to	appropriate	ownership	of	the	issue	(Pujas	2006:	36).	However,	ownership	gained	
under	such	circumstances	is	likely	to	be	short‐term	less	(or	‘leased’)	and	less	
entrenched	than	that	which	is	based	on	history.	In	addition,	particular	candidates	
can	come	to	‘own’	issues	that	are	not	traditionally	linked	to	their	parties	if	they	have	
an	individual	history	which	affords	them	credibility	on	certain	issues	(Kaufmann	
2004;	Sellers	1998).	In	the	Indonesian	case,	several	emerging	party	politicians—
including	the	leaders	of	all	three	parties	examined	here—previously	belonged	to	
other	parties,	and	bring	with	them	the	reputations	that	they	established	to	their	
new	roles.	Those	entering	politics	from	other	fields,	such	as	activists	or	business	
people,	may	also	‘own’	an	issue	by	virtue	of	their	past	professional	experience.	
	
Issue	ownership	is	significant	because	it	promotes	the	belief	that	certain	parties	
and/or	candidates	are	better	able	to	handle	particular	political	concerns,	allowing	
voters	to	select	parties	that	they	believe	will	best	address	the	issues	they	prioritize	
(Bélanger	and	Meguid	2008).	Not	only	are	parties	actively	advertising	themselves	
and	their	symbols	to	the	masses	(Gibson	and	Römmele	2001:	32;	Smith	2001),	but	
the	masses	are	searching	for	hints	as	to	who	will	best	meet	their	political	
expectations.	However,	advertising	is	not	a	straightforward	process	as	campaigns	
need	to	account	for	citizens’	prior	knowledge	and	long‐held	beliefs	about	parties	
and	candidates	(Ansolabehere	and	Iyengar	1994:	335;	Dalton	and	Weldon	2005).	
Campaigns	do	not	occur	in	a	vacuum	and	effective	issue	ownership	needs	to	have	
some	basis,	either	in	the	history	of	the	party	(or	lack	thereof	in	the	case	of	emerging	
parties)	and/or	the	candidate,	and	symbols	must	be	developed	through	effective	
narratives.	Otherwise,	campaigns	run	the	risk	of	being	unconvincing,	or	even	
appearing	hypocritical,	if	they	try	to	gain	ownership	over	an	issue	on	which	the	
party	or	candidate	has	a	poor	track	record.		
	
In	attaching	themselves	to	a	symbol,	political	parties	and	candidates	must	ensure	
not	only	that	their	message	is	being	relayed	effectively,	but	also	that	the	audience	is	
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as	receptive	as	possible	to	the	message.	One	strategy	used	to	improve	the	salience	of	
symbols	is	‘issue	priming’	whereby	‘extensive	media	coverage	or	candidate	
discussion	of	specific	policy	areas	…	prime	votes	to	give	more	weight	to	those	areas	
assessing	candidates’	(Druckman	et	al.	2004:	1180).17	In	an	attempt	to	nurture	
discussion	focused	on	issues	related	to	their	chosen	political	symbols,	parties	and	
candidates	repeatedly	underscore	the	issue	in	public	forums,	hoping	to	convince	
voters	that	it	should	be	their	priority	too.	Through	successful	issue	priming,	the	
salience	of	the	chosen	issue	is	increased,	hopefully	leading	to	public	support	for	the	
party’s	(or	candidate’s)	stance	and/or	recognition	of	the	issue	as	being	of	national	
importance	(Jacobs	and	Shapiro	2000;	Traugott	and	Lavrakas	2000).	
	
Issue	priming	may	be	influenced	by	the	candidate’s	own	views	but	must	also	take	
into	account	existing	public	discourse	and	external	events	that	may	limit	or	broaden	
the	public	agenda.	Voter	decisions	may	be	influenced,	in	part,	by	the	political	
campaign,	but	the	impact	of	issue	priming	will	also	depend	upon	a	person’s	
individual	beliefs,	religion,	ideology	and	personal	history.18	Some	voters	are	staunch	
supporters	of	a	particular	political	party	or	faction	(Reid	1988:	42).	These	people	
are	generally	not	the	targets	of	political	campaigns,	which	are	aimed	at	swing	voters	
who	are	more	likely	to	respond	to	discussions	on	contemporary	issues.	Conversely,	
as	(Capelos	2010)	contends,	if	a	voter	is	sympathetic	to	a	particular	candidate,	they	
may	also	tend	to	agree	with	them	in	their	evaluation	of	policy	issues.	Amongst	these	
voters,	the	candidate	represents	the	primary	vehicle	of	debate,	providing	a	
justification	for	candidate‐centric	campaigns	(Reid	1988:	38).	
	
Developing	a	narrative	
Political	symbols	can	be	constructed	in	two	main	ways.	The	first,	as	discussed	in	the	
work	of	Petrocik,	is	through	long‐term	attention	towards	a	particular	issue	or	some	
other	demonstration	of	commitment	through	performance.	The	second	is	through	
persuasion.	Persuasive	narratives	represent	a	key	method	of	constructing,	
preserving	and	selling	political	symbols.	If	a	party	cannot	demonstrate	an	ongoing	
historical	commitment	to	the	issue	it	wishes	to	use	as	a	symbol,	it	must	develop	a	
																																																													
17	Issue	priming	is	also	referred	to	as	‘agenda	setting’	(Iyengar	and	Simon	2000:	157).	
18	Huckfeldt	and	Sprague	(1992:	83)	note	that	individuals’	political	preferences	are	
influenced	not	just	by	parties	as	organizations,	but	also	by	factors	such	as	education,	age,	
gender,	religion	and	ethnic	attachment.	In	addition,	a	number	of	studies	investigate	voters’	
perceptions	and	reactions	to	political	candidates.	This	research	was	primarily	pioneered	by	
political	scientists	in	the	United	States,	such	as	Lazarsfeld	et	al.	(1948).	For	other	examples	
see	Huckfeldt	and	Sprague	(1992);	Lodge	et	al.	(1995);	Rahn	et	al.	(1994).	
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coherent	and	convincing	narrative	that	positions	the	party	in	relation	to	that	
symbol.	Bennett	and	Edelman	(1985:	159)	define	narratives	as	‘socially	existent,	
patterned	interpretations	of	the	world	…	that	frame	people’s	views	of	situations,	of	
“rationality,	of	objectivity,	of	morality,	and	of	their	conceptions	of	themselves	and	
others”’.	Political	communication	is	based	on	the	creation	of	‘stock	political	plots’:	
formulaic	stories	that	dissolve	ambiguity	by	creating	‘black	and	white	replays	of	
political	dramas’	which	are	designed	to	pacify	the	public.19	Apter	(2006:	223)	
describes	such	discourses	as	‘master	narratives’,	in	which	politicians	take	issues	of	
everyday	concern,	playing	upon	moral	discontent,	to	create	‘expressions	of	good	and	
evil	as	the	ultimate	political	divide’.	
	
Political	symbols	are	primarily	broadcast	through	language	and	actions	that	are	
deliberately	fashioned	to	persuade	voters.20	In	his	treatise	on	rhetoric,	Burke	(1969:	
41)	describes	it	as	the	art	of	persuasion	itself	with	the	basic	intention	of	inducing	
actions	in	human	agents.21	Rhetoric	can	take	a	number	of	forms,	but	is	broadly	
defined	by	the	intention	to	persuade	observers,	to	organize	their	attitudes	and	alter	
their	views	of	objects	and	issues	(Gusfield	1986:	170).	It	is	a	behaviour	that	is	both	
instrumental	and	symbolic:	instrumental	because	it	is	intended	to	provoke	a	
particular	action	and	symbolic	because	it	draws	upon	examples/words	in	order	to	
elicit	much	broader	ideas	or	emotions	within	the	audience	(Bowers	and	Ochs	1971:	
2).	Specific	vocabularies	are	developed	to	deliver	these	narratives,	resulting	in	‘a	
particular	mode	or	ethos	of	moral	reasoning	…	that	includes	not	only	particular	
forms	of	moral	argumentation,	but	also	particular	symbols,	signs,	code	words,	and	
other	moral	resources	[emphasis	in	the	original]’	(Lowe	2002:	108).	In	terms	of	
																																																													
19	Pioneered	by	Bennett	and	Edelman,	the	‘narrative	approach’	to	political	communication	
views	it	as	the	adaptation	of	facts,	news	and	events	to	create	“stock	political	plots”	intended	
to	persuade	voters	(Lahusen	1996:	21).	It	should	be	noted,	though,	that	the	fact	that	a	
political	plot	is	considered	‘stock’,	does	not	mean	that	it	is	not	controversial—indeed,	a	
controversial	plot	may	be	more	useful	because	it	garners	more	attention.	What	parties	must	
do	with	such	issues	is	ensure	that	they	fall	on	the	‘right’	side	of	the	controversial	debate	in	
order	to	appeal	to	their	target	audience	(Edelman	1988:	14).	
20	This	‘art	of	persuasion’	refers	both	to	the	act	of	communication	(from	the	listener’s	
perspective),	and	persuasion	being	the	intention/successful	outcome	of	that	communication	
(from	the	speaker’s	perspective)	(Chateris‐Black	2005:	8).	
21	Burke	(1952:	x‐xvi;	1969;1989),	a	pioneer	in	the	study	of	political	language,	argues	that	
language	and	symbols	are	quintessentially	significant	to	political	and	social	processes.	
Moreover,	the	function	of	language	is	‘wholly	realistic,	and	is	continually	born	anew;	the	use	
of	language	as	a	symbolic	means	of	inducing	cooperation	in	beings	that	by	nature	respond	to	
symbols’	(Burke	1969:	43).	Burke	proposed	a	‘dramatism	pentad’,	in	which	motive	is	
attributed	to	language	based	on	an	analysis	of	act	(what	happened),	scene	(where	it	was	
done),	agent	(who	did	it),	agency	(how	they	did	it	and	what	methods	or	techniques	they	
used)	and	purpose	(why	it	happened)	(Burke	1989:14‐15).	He	contends	that	textual	analysis	
using	this	technique	allows	observers	to	discern	the	motives	behind	rhetoric.	
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political	marketing,	words	also	matter;	they	create	a	‘positive	residual	stimulus’	
while	also	attracting	attention	via	sound‐bites	(Reid	1988:	37).	
	
The	classical	notion	of	successful	rhetoric	was	first	defined	by	Aristotle	as	the	
demonstration	of	ethos,	logos	and	pathos—to	have	moral	‘worthiness’	or	credibility	
(ethos),	proof	to	support	argument	(logos),	and	the	capacity	to	arouse	feelings	in	the	
audience	(pathos)	(cited	in	Chateris‐Black	2005:	11).	Investigating	these	three	
elements	provides	a	valuable	starting	point	for	assessing	why	rhetoric	may	succeed	
or	fail	in	its	aims.	For	example,	a	speech	by	a	politician	may	evoke	a	sense	of	moral	
worthiness,	but	if	the	orator	fails	to	provide	proof	to	support	the	argument,	or	
deliver	it	persuadingly,	then	the	rhetoric	will	fail	to	move	the	audience.		
	
Aristotle’s	theory	does	not	clarify	the	relative	importance	of	each	of	these	elements,	
but	with	the	significance	of	image	and	personality	in	politics,	the	method	of	
communicating	has	become	increasingly	meaningful.	With	regard	to	pathos,	the	
impact	of	charisma	and	rhetoric	on	emotions	such	as	fear,	weakness	and	
ignorance—or	what	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	demagoguery—can	be	particularly	
influential,	depending	on	the	context	and	audience.22	Charisma	can	never	be	entirely	
divorced	from	actions	(Keane	1997:	12),	but	what	a	leader	lacks	in	moral	credibility	
and	proof	may	be	compensated	for	by	his	or	her	ability	to	stir	the	emotions	of	the	
audience,	using	both	an	arresting	style	of	delivery	and	symbols.	Drawing	from	
Weber’s	theory	of	charismatic	leadership,	the	benefits	of	this	charisma	can	be	
transferred	to	other	members	of	the	party	through	the	coordinated	adoption	of	
matching	symbols,	linking	others	in	the	group	with	the	image	of	its	charismatic	
leader	(Starratt	1993:	12).23	In	other	words,	if	communicated	effectively,	the	
symbols	with	which	the	leader	is	associated	may	come	to	be	associated	with	the	
party	as	a	whole.	In	the	absence	of	charisma	or	demagoguery,	a	narrative	must	
demonstrate	a	logical	and	meaningful	relationship	between	the	facts,	events,	objects	
and	persons	involved	if	it	is	to	be	credible	to	an	audience	(Lahusen	1996:	24).	
Without	such	a	relationship,	the	narrative	becomes	unintelligible	and	incoherent.	
																																																													
22	Lindholm	(1990:	7)	defines	charisma	as	a	relationship	between	leader	and	followers	in	
which	the	leader	is	imbued	with	extraordinary	qualities.	For	example,	people	who	are	
‘downtrodden	and	oppressed	by	a	system	they	consider	illegitimate’	may	look	to	a	
‘charismatic	saviour’	to	address	their	concerns	(Lindholm	1990:	175).		
23	Weber	(1947:	328)	defines	three	‘pure’	types	of	legitimate	authority:	rational	grounds,	
traditional	grounds	and	charismatic	grounds.	Charismatic	legitimacy	is	based	on	‘devotion	to	
the	specific	and	exceptional	sanctity,	heroism	or	exemplary	character	of	an	individual	
person,	and	of	the	normative	patterns	or	order	revealed	or	ordained	by	him’.	
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Returning	to	Aristotle’s	facets	of	successful	rhetoric,	rhetoric	cannot	succeed	if	the	
linguistic	choices	of	the	speaker	(the	logos)	do	not	match	the	listener’s	evaluation	of	
the	speaker’s	ethos.24		
	
The	notion	that	the	desire	to	influence	opinion	determines	language	choice	is	also	
the	foundation	for	the	concept	of	‘dramatism’	(Burke	1952;1989;	Gusfield	1986).	
Dramatism	represents	the	distinction	between	political	action	as	‘significant	per	se’	
and	‘as	a	means	to	an	ends’	(Gusfield	1986:	166).25	Language,	here,	is	dramatic	
because	its	primary	motive	is	to	inspire	a	certain	action	in	the	audience.	The	concept	
of	dramatism,	or	‘politics‐as‐theatre’,	also	provides	a	framework	for	understanding	
the	motivations	behind	certain	promises	or	tokenistic	actions	that	may	be	very	
visible	but	yield	little	in	the	form	of	actual	change.26	Apter	(2006:	222)	claims	that	
decisions	made	by	politicians	should	be	viewed	as	instrumental,	as	their	ultimate	
intention	is	to	manipulate	public	opinion	in	order	to	generate	or	maintain	power.27	
The	influence	of	political	theatre	should	not	be	underestimated	because:		
	
It	offers	opportunities	to	beguile,	entice,	or	entrap	audience,	a	public,	or	a	
citizen.	It	is	also	a	way	of	encouraging	a	preference	for	passion	over	reason	
…	In	short	it	is,	among	other	things,	a	method	of	instrumental	gulling	…	It	
can	be	simply	fun,	entertaining,	but	not	when	that	prevents	citizens	from	
taking	a	more	proper	measure	of	truth	(Apter	2006:	247).	
																																																													
24	The	failure	to	understand	the	relationship	between	these	two	facets	has	led	to	a	negative	
view	of	rhetoric	as	merely	an	‘over‐decorative	use	of	language’	(Chateris‐Black	2005:	9).	
Rhetoric	is	often	negatively	equated	with	style	over	substance,	though	this	understanding	
ignores	the	notion	that	credibility	is,	in	fact,	an	intrinsic	facet	of	successful	rhetoric.	
25	Burke’s	theory	of	dramatism	was	expanded	in	the	political	context	by	Gusfield	(1986)	in	
his	seminal	work	on	the	American	temperance	movement.	Through	this	study,	Gusfield	
elaborated	the	idea	of	dramatism	in	politics	and	the	‘state‐as‐theatre’,	arguing	that	the	use	of	
symbols	is	of	crucial	significance	for	shaping	public	opinion.	
26	Blackbourn	(1987:	149),	in	his	study	of	German	politics	from	1848–1933,	contends	that	
the	concept	of	politics	as	theatre	first	emerged	in	1848	when	a	loosely	coordinated	
revolution	erupted	in	the	German	states	agitating	for	the	unification	of	all	German‐speaking	
states.	The	revolution	was	unsuccessful,	but	this	period	became	renowned	for	the	charisma	
and	public	image	developed	by	revolutionaries:	‘Few	who	have	written	on	the	events	of	that	
year	have	failed	to	note	in	passing	the	self‐consciousness	of	the	revolutionaries,	their	verbal,	
gestural	and	sartorial	theatricality.’	
27	Anderson	(1990:	152‐193)	outlines	several	forms	of	political	communication	in	Indonesia	
that	can	be	viewed	through	the	lens	of	dramatism,	including	the	building	of	monuments.	
Aiming	to	rouse	nationalist	sentiment	amongst	the	masses,	several	monuments	were	built	in	
Jakarta	during	the	Sukarno	Period,	each	with	its	own	associated	narrative.	The	act	of	
building	these	monuments	was	a	dramatic	gesture	intended	to	demonstrate	Sukarno’s	own	
commitment	to	the	nation	whilst	also	encouraging	an	impassioned	response	from	citizens	to	
support	his	regime,	even	while	it	was	failing	politically	and	economically.	The	political	and	
economic	history	of	Sukarno’s	Old	Order	rule	is	discussed	further	in	Chapter	Two.		
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There	is	nothing	banal	about	politics‐as‐theatre	since	the	purpose	of	dramatism	lies	
in	the	manipulation	of	public	sentiment,	which	is	in	turn	used	to	seize,	retain	and	
exercise	power	(Apter	1992).28	Because	people	are	generally	distrustful	of	political	
rhetoric,	a	politician’s	success	lies	not	only	in	their	ability	to	select	pertinent	
political	symbols	but	also	to	portray	them	in	a	way	that	convinces	voters	that	their	
‘dramatic’	self	is	a	true	reflection	of	their	‘authentic’	self	(Giesen	2006:	354‐355).	
	
Symbol	diffusion	across	scales	
As	Sartori	(1976:	71)	argues,	far	from	being	a	single	unit,	parties	are	in	fact	
miniature	political	systems.29	Within	these	systems,	symbols	are	defined	and	
communicated	differently	at	different	levels.	Theories	of	diffusion,	which	seek	to	
explain	how	ideas	spread,	provide	a	way	of	understanding	these	differences	in	
terms	of	the	types	of	interactions	that	varying	levels	of	a	party	may	have	with	
voters.30	Classical	diffusion	theory	holds	that	ideas	can	travel	through	relational,	
non‐relational	or	mediated	channels	(Givan	et	al.	2010:	2;	Tarrow	2011:	192).	
Relational	channels	rely	on	direct	contact	between	people,	most	often	those	who	
trust	each	other.	Non‐relational	diffusion	occurs	directly	between	people	who	do	
not	have	a	relationship	or	indirectly	through	the	sharing	of	ideas	via	the	media.	
Mediated	diffusion	occurs	through	‘brokers’	who	talk	about	the	ideas	of	others,	
acting	as	a	bridge	between	people	who	might	not	otherwise	have	known	each	
other.31	More	recent	discussions	of	diffusion	assert	that	the	process	is	fluid	and	
often	the	idea	being	diffused	is	neither	clear	nor	even	a	finished	product.	Attention	
																																																													
28	For	example,	Rauer	(2006)	describes	the	outpouring	of	national	and	international	support	
garnered	through	the	symbolic	action	of	German	Chancellor	Willy	Brandt	kneeling	at	the	
Warsaw	Memorial	in	1971,	which	honoured	members	of	the	Jewish	Ghetto	Uprising	of	1943.	
Treisman	(1998:	15),	in	another	academic	discussion	of	the	power	of	political	symbols,	
contends	that	in	Russia’s	democratic	transition	during	the	1990s,	the	use	of	controversial	
issues,	language	that	flattered	voters	and	sexual	imagery	led	to	an	election	that	focused	less	
on	the	‘credibility	and	attractiveness	of	policies	than	on	entertainment	value	and	the	
cathartic	release	of	the	political	spectacle	itself’.		
29	Sartori’s	analysis	focuses	upon	the	units	that	comprise	a	party	and	intra‐party	relations.	
He	does	not	seek	to	explain	how	the	different	elements	of	parties’	internal	political	systems	
affect	the	flow	of	political	symbols	and	the	product	finally	presented	to	voters.	
30	Predominantly	associated	with	studies	of	social	movements,	the	theory	of	diffusion	was	
adopted	by	academics	during	the	1990s	to	understand	how	ideas	spread	within,	and	
between,	social	movements	(Chabot	and	Duyvendak	2002).	Early	studies	focused	upon	how	
innovations	spread	from	transmitter	to	adopter	communities	(Strang	and	Soule	1998).	The	
concept	later	expanded	to	include	the	transmission	of	ideas(Baybeck	and	Huckfeldt	2002:	
197).	
31	While	there	is	a	general	consensus	in	the	literature	that	these	three	channels,	either	alone	
or	in	combination,	are	a	means	for	the	transfer	of	ideas,	for	examples	see	McAdam	and	Rucht	
(1993);	Strang	and	Meyer	(1993),	there	has	also	been	debate	over	the	essentialist	nature	of	
diffusion	theory	in	its	classical	form	(Chabot	and	Duyvendak	2002).	
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must	be	paid	to	how	a	group	receiving	an	outside	idea	makes	it	their	own.	Also,	
diffusion	does	not	necessarily	occur	in	lineal	progressive	stages	but	is	rather	a	
dynamic	process	that	is	multidirectional	in	its	movements	across	scales	and	can	skip	
steps	(Chabot	and	Duyvendak	2002).32	
	
The	notion	of	diffusion	as	a	process	that	occurs	across	scales,	but	not	necessarily	in	
a	unidirectional	manner,	provides	a	framework	for	analysing	how	political	symbols	
are	both	influenced	and	transmitted.	In	a	political	campaign,	the	diffusion	of	
symbols	works	primarily	in	two	different	ways.	First,	there	are	national	campaigns	
that	reach‐out	voters	via	non‐relational	channels,	such	as	advertising	and	reporting	
in	the	national	media.	In	a	sense,	these	‘skip’	a	level	because	the	message	is	
broadcast	directly	from	party	headquarters	to	individuals,	by‐passing	party	officials	
at	the	local	level.	In	a	centrally‐organized	election	campaign,	the	central	party	
leadership	selects	what	it	believes	to	be	the	most	pertinent	symbols,	then	creates	a	
campaign	that	presents	them	as	being	representative	of	the	party	as	a	whole.	It	
decides	upon	narrative	and	campaign	techniques.	Discussions	amongst	senior	party	
members	determine	the	overall	campaign	priorities	of	the	party	and	the	use	of	
resources	at	the	national	level.	Centralized	funds	earmarked	for	publicity	are	used	
to	disseminate	the	symbols	through	various	advertising	methods.	With	the	
‘professionalization’	of	election	campaigns,	the	central	party	office	also	has	an	
increased	importance	as	a	site	of	coordination	for	the	different	facets	of	a	
professional	campaign,	including	traditional	communications	and	events,	television,	
and	new	technologies	(Farrell	and	Webb	1998:	4‐6;	Gibson	and	Römmele	2001).33	
Parties	hire	media	and	marketing	professionals	as	campaign	consultants	to	develop	
targeted	messages,	which	are	then	broadcast	to	voters	across	the	country	using	
various	non‐relational	channels.	The	marketing	team	are	generally	charged	with	
lobbying	national	media	outlets,	as	well	as	using	them	for	paid	advertising	
(Hopmann	et	al.	2012),	further	consolidating	the	role	of	symbol	development	at	the	
national	scale.	
		
																																																													
32	In	his	study	of	the	Indonesian	pro‐democracy	movement,	Uhlin	(1995)	employs	diffusion	
theory	to	explain	the	spread	of	democratic	ideas	from	foreign	countries	to	Indonesia.	While	
this	thesis	focuses	on	the	transfer	of	ideas	domestically,	it	draws	from	similar	
understandings	of	diffusion	theory.	
33	Farrell	and	Webb	(1998:	4)	define	traditional	means	of	campaigning	as	communication	
through	party	press,	posters,	mass	rallies	and	canvassing	as	well	as	events	centred	around	
party	leaders,	such	as	‘whistlestop	tours’	and	mass	rallies.	
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Second,	the	candidates	themselves	can	be	viewed	as	conduits	that	transmit	the	
symbol	via	relational	diffusion.	Party	symbols	are	conceptualized	and	recorded	in	
manifestos,	‘vision	and	mission’	documents,	and	action	plans,	it	is	shared	with	the	
individual	candidates.	Once	in	the	field,	it	is	the	candidates	who	are	singing	the	
praises	of	the	party	and	trying	to	persuade	voters	that	their	group	is	the	best.	
However,	once	candidates	are	‘released’	into	the	election	wild,	so	to	speak,	they	
decide,	based	on	their	own	ideas	and	experiences,	how	best	to	exhibit	the	symbol	in	
order	to	optimize	results	(i.e.	gain	the	most	votes).	In	reality	then,	candidates	are	
not	only	a	channel	for	the	party’s	ideas,	but	also	a	symbol	creator	themselves,	
instilling	their	own	values,	history	and	personality	into	the	symbols	as	they	
translate	them	into	their	local	context.	Indonesia’s	democratic	system	requires	that	
parties	nominate	candidates	to	represent	them	in	each	electorate	and	to	compete	in	
national	elections,	but	the	campaign	focus	of	most	candidates	is	at	the	local	level	(a	
few,	though	not	many,	may	be	active	on	the	national	scale).	The	lack	of	oversight	of	
local	campaigns	by	the	central	party	office	fosters	an	environment	in	which	
candidates	have	a	great	deal	of	autonomy	over	the	image	they	project	and	the	
campaign	strategies	they	use.	As	a	consequence,	candidates	feel	entitled	to	adopt	
their	own	symbols,	regardless	of	what	has	been	decided	at	the	national	level.	
	
Given	that	voters	are	already	exposed	to	party	symbols	via	non‐relational	means,	it	
would	appear	to	make	sense	for	individual	candidates	to	appropriate	these	symbols	
into	their	own	electioneering,	building	upon	the	efforts	of	the	national	level	
campaign.34	However,	candidates	do	not	always	use	symbols	identified	by	decision‐
makers	at	the	national	level	in	the	same	way,	if	at	all.	They	may	hold	very	different	
ideas	about	voter	interests	from	professional	advisors	based	in	Jakarta,	or	the	
attitudes,	habits	and	beliefs	of	voters	may	force	them	to	adapt	their	campaign	
(Fionna	2014:	12‐13).35	The	political	symbol	is	thus	(re)constituted	with	the	
priorities	of	local	voters	in	mind.36	The	social	context	is	significant	here:	for	
example,	if	a	community	is	mostly	pessimistic	in	its	view	of	politics	or	a	particular	
																																																													
34	Hicken	(2009:	5)	refers	to	this	in	terms	of	‘economies	of	scale’,	noting	that	there	are	
advantages	to	cooperating	with	other	candidates	under	a	common	party	banner	because	all	
candidates	can	benefit	from	party	investment	in	voter	education	or	efforts	to	increase	
turnout.	
35	Results	of	an	Indikator	(an	Indonesian	polling	company)	poll	conducted	in	December	2013	
suggest	that	voter	education	and	income	play	a	significant	role	in	attitudes	towards	vote‐
buying	in	Indonesia,	with	more	affluent	and	better	educated	voters	more	likely	to	shun	such	
practices	(Halim	2013).	This	may	account	for	disparities	in	the	acceptance	of	vote‐buying	
between	different	regions	in	Indonesia,	further	underscoring	the	importance	of	local	context.		
36	These	points	are	addressed	in	further	detail	in	Chapters	Five	and	Six.	
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candidate,	then	social	networks	will	ensure	that	this	view	spreads.	In	these	cases,	
candidates	may	find	that	political	symbols	have	no	effect	on	voters	that	may	in	turn	
lead	them	to	vote‐buying,	which,	although	illegal,	is	common	in	the	Indonesian	
context.	37	
	
Candidates	themselves	also	carry	their	own	ideas,	views,	histories	and	narratives,	
which	influence	how	they	construct	their	symbols.	For	example,	a	long‐time	anti‐
corruption	campaigner	is	likely	to	use	this	anti‐corruption	symbol	regardless	of	
whether	it	resonates	with	the	local	voters,	whereas	a	businessperson‐turned‐
candidate	may	avoid	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	because	s/he	has	paid	bribes	to	
officials	in	the	past	and	fears	exposure	as	a	hypocrite.	Some	candidates	may	identify	
very	strongly	with	the	narrative	of	being	a	‘clean’	candidate,	while	others	may	have	
no	qualms	about	offering	cash	in	return	for	votes.	Moreover,	since	‘one	person’s	
bribe	is	another	person’s	gift’	(Rose‐Ackerman	1999:	5),	candidates	may	understand	
different	types	of	practices	in	various	ways.	For	some	candidates,	giving	gifts,	money	
or	favours	to	voters	does	not	constitute	bribery,	but	is	instead	framed	as	part	of	
socially‐embedded	and	expected	practices	of	clientelism	which	demonstrate	respect	
or	gratitude,	or	are	intended	as	a	reimbursement	for	the	time	and	effort	of	voters.38	
Furthermore,	candidates	will	not	necessarily	adhere	to	one	particular	strategy.	
Randall	(1988:	177)	refers	to	this	‘schizophrenic	blend’	of	corruption/clientelism	
and	ideology,	that	‘ambitious’	politicians	may	use	to	diversify	their	strategy,	to	
demonstrate	that	symbols	may	be	considered	one	of	many	campaign	tools	available	
to	candidates,	and	a	total	commitment	to	the	symbol	is	by	no	means	a	prerequisite	
for	its	attempted	use.	
	
																																																													
37	Law	No.	10/2008	on	the	General	Election	of	members	for	the	DPR,	DPD	and	DPRD	states	
in	article	87(1)	that	candidates	will	be	sanctioned	if	it	is	proven	that	a	campaigner	has	
promised	or	given	money	or	other	goods,	directly	or	indirectly,	in	return	for	participants	to	
(a)	not	use	their	right	to	vote,	(b)	use	their	right	to	vote	in	such	a	way	that	they	select	a	
candidate	in	a	way	that	invalidates	their	vote,	(c)	vote	for	a	specific	political	party	
participating	in	the	election,	(d)	select	a	specific	candidate	for	DPR,	DPRD	I,	DPRD	II	or	(e)	
select	a	specific	candidate	for	the	DPD.	
38	Clientelism,	defined	by	Hicken	(2011:	289‐290)	as	‘the	combination	of	particularistic	
targeting	and	contingency‐based	exchange’	within	a	dyadic	relationship	between	patron	and	
client,	can	also	be	viewed	simply	as	a	normal	and	necessary	component	of	securing	support	
for	elections	rather	than	a	form	of	iniquity.	Kitschelt	and	Wilkinson	(2007)	also	distinguish	
between	clientelistic	and	programmatic	linkages	in	terms	of	the	target	of	benefits.	For	
example,	clientelistic	linkages	target	individuals	and	small	groups	while	programmatic	
linkages	deliver	benefits	to	large	groups	or	represent	a	collective	good.	For	further	
discussion	on	the	definition	of	clientelism	see	Hicken	(2011);	Hutchcroft	(2000:	214‐216);	
Kitschelt	and	Wilkinson	(2007);	Randall	(2001:	249‐251).	
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Why	(anti)corruption	symbols?	
Selecting	symbols	that	draw	heavily	upon	ideas	of	what	constitutes	right	and	wrong	
is	a	popular	strategy	amongst	political	parties.	Contextual	understandings	of	
morality—	the	criteria	used	to	evaluate	social	behaviour	and	goals	as	good	or	bad,	
desirable	or	undesirable	(Lidz	and	Walker	1980),	orienting	and	directing	social	
action	within	boundaries	of	cultural	acceptability	(Ben‐Yehuda	1986:	495)—	play	a	
role	in	determining	what	symbols	a	party	may	choose.	According	to	Ben‐Yehuda	
(1986),	the	use	of	moral	arguments—specifically	‘moral	panics’	in	politics—can	be	
viewed	in	two	ways:	from	a	moral	perspective	they	reflect	struggles	within	society	
itself.	From	an	interest	perspective,	moral	arguments	are	used	to	advance	the	
political	interests	of	certain	people/groups	and	challenge	existing	power	relations.	
While	the	two	approaches	are	not	mutually	exclusive,	the	interest	perspective	
explains	the	motivation	for	political	parties	to	latch	onto	a	particular	moral	issue	
during	campaigning	and	to	use	it	as	a	symbol	in	the	contest	against	other	parties.	
	
As	Becker	(1973:	2)	asserts,	there	is	a	sense	of	communitas	for	those	who	identify	
with	these	ideas	of	morality	that	promotes	the	social	attachment	that	parties	seek	
from	voters.39	Those	who	exploit	morality,	using	the	fear	generated	by	moral	panics	
for	their	own	benefit,	are	described	as	‘moral	entrepreneurs’	(Becker	1973).	Their	
manipulation	of	morality	suggests	that	they	are	driven	by	functionalism	rather	than	
an	actual	sense	of	injustice,	‘imply[ing]	that	morality	may	be	used	for	nonmoral	
issues’	(Ben‐Yehuda	1986:	496).	In	a	context	where	corruption	is	seen	as	
ubiquitous,	the	identification	of	corruption	as	a	form	of	deviance	from	acceptable	
social	behaviour	serves	a	particular	political	function.	Since	the	behaviour	is	not	out	
of	the	ordinary,	anti‐corruption	discourses	must	draw	on	moral	(and	sometimes	
legal)	understandings	of	corruption	rather	than	on	sociological	understandings.	The	
ease	with	which	the	idea	can	be	engineered,	and	who	can	be	deemed	corrupt,	is	
																																																													
39	Lahusen	(1996:	51)	identifies	Bourdieu’s	concept	of	the	‘class	habitus’	in	relation	to	this	
point.	A	community	may	be	united	by	a	'specific	pattern	of	perception,	judgements	and	
evaluations	that	determines	what	particular	individuals	and	clusters	of	individuals	judge	as	
being	moral	or	immoral,	as	making	sense	or	no	sense,	being	meaningful	or	meaningless,	
tasteful	or	tasteless'.	
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appealing	to	political	campaigners	aiming	to	attract	support,	inspire	trust,	represent	
‘good’	and	attack	enemies	in	one	fell	swoop.40	
	
While	corruption	is	normatively	understood	as	having	a	negative	impact,	
intensifying	societal	inequalities	and	undermining	democratic	systems	(Mény	1996:	
309‐310;	Sampson	2010;	United	Nations	Development	Programme	1997),	it	is	
inextricably	linked	to	the	practicalities	of	holding	political	office.41	As	Gronbeck	
(1978:	156)	contends:		
	
We	are	dealing…	with	a	range	of	political	offences	which	perhaps	
characterize	any	government	at	any	time—graft,	kickbacks,	overzealous	
promotion	through	the	meritocracy,	slush	funds	which	have	public	effects	
without	public	accountability,	favors	which	bypass	normal	channels.	We	are	
dealing,	in	sum,	with	those	behaviors	which	many	people	take	as	part	of	the	
everyday	cost	of	government.	Indeed	it	is	the	very	routineness	of	political	
corruption	which	makes	its	public	airing	and	treatment	so	fascinating	
rhetorically.	Its	routineness	and	ubiquity…	make	it	at	once	farcical	and	
tragic.		
	
Yet	while	some	Indonesians	may	view	corruption	as	normal	(or	even	necessary),	
this	does	not	mean	that	anti‐corruption	symbols	must	be	avoided.	As	noted	earlier,	
there	are	politically	‘safe’	symbols	that	people	are	so	accustomed	to	the	ideological	
formulation	of	these	stock	plots	that	they	seem	to	be	‘natural	and	adequate	
characterizations	of	reality’	(Bennett	and	Edelman	1985:	185).	The	simplification	of	
corruption	within	a	moral	framework	of	good	versus	evil	means	that	politicians	are	
only	required	to	elaborate	on	the	issue	in	order	to	affirm	that	they	fall	on	the	
virtuous	side	of	the	divide.	As	a	topic	that	is	neither	radical	nor	polarizing,	
																																																													
40	Highlighting	corruption	as	a	political	concern	is	not	unique	to	Indonesia.	McCoy	and	
Heckel	(2001)	argue	that	a	global	anti‐corruption	norm	emerged	in	the	1990s.	Examples	of	
country‐specific	studies	include:	McCann	and	Domı́nguez	(1998),	who	discuss	the	role	of	
anti‐corruption	discourse	in	mobilizing	voters	in	Mexico	between	1986	and	1995,	
concluding	that	longstanding	corruption	issues	did	not	necessarily	lead	to	support	for	
opposition	parties;	Lawson	(2009),	who	researched	the	anti‐corruption	symbols	used	in	
Kenya	and	Nigeria,	where	such	campaigns	have	suffered	from	issues	of	legitimacy;	and	
Costas‐Pérez	et	al.	(2012),	who	studied	the	impact	of	corruption	scandals	on	incumbents	in	
Spain,	finding	that	a	candidate	can	lose	up	to	14	per	cent	of	their	vote	if	media	coverage	is	
extensive,	but	may	lose	very	few	votes	if	the	scandal	is	not	widely	publicized.	
41	Functionalist	arguments	portray	corruption	as	playing	an	important	role	in	facilitating	
government	processes	because	it	can	promote	flexibility	and	‘unblock	systems’	in	order	to	
get	things	done,	particularly	in	states	with	bureaucracies	that	are	difficult	to	navigate	
(Becquart‐Leclerq	1990:	193).	
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corruption	is	a	broad	and	malleable	issue	which	can	be	used	to	influence	undecided	
voters	without	alienating	existing	supporters.	Moreover,	since	corruption	is	
notorious	in	Indonesia,	the	issue	has	already	been	primed	and	parties	do	not	need	
to	spend	time	convincing	voters	of	its	significance.	The	strong,	almost	universal,	
identification	of	corruption	as	a	grave	political,	economic	and	social	problem	has	led	
to	a	general	consensus,	at	least	publicly,	that	it	needs	to	be	eradicated.		
	
Campaigning	on	an	anti‐corruption	platform	presents	an	opportunity	for	politicians	
to	position	themselves	within	a	moral	framework	which	has	broader	implications	
than	just	the	eradication	of	corruption.	To	build	an	image	of	being	staunchly	against	
corruption	speaks	not	only	to	a	(declared)	commitment	to	fighting	corruption,	but	
also	paints	the	party	in	a	positive	light	overall.	Cultivating	a	‘persona’	is	an	integral	
part	of	the	political	campaign	process,	and	being	‘anti‐corruption’	is	not	only	
publicly	palatable	but	brands	the	party	by	associating	it	with	key	political	values	like	
ensuring	rule	of	law	and	equal	access	to	goods	and	services	from	the	government.	
An	image	of	being	corruption‐free	also	plays	into	the	electability	of	a	
party/candidate.	Parties	that	have	not	suffered	from	corruption	scandals	(like	new	
parties)	are	well‐placed	to	adopt	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	given	their	(relatively)	
‘clean’	histories.	This	provides	them	a	comparative	advantage	which	facilitates	issue	
ownership	(Iyengar	and	Simon	2000:	157)	and	thus	increases	their	symbolic	capital.	
If	a	party	can	convince	the	public	that	their	dedication	to	combating	corruption	is	
stronger	than	that	of	their	rivals,	it	will	boost	their	support	amongst	voters	who	
agree	that	eradicating	corruption	should	be	prioritized.		
	
Opposition	parties	and	candidates	may	have	a	number	of	other	motivations	to	use	
anti‐corruption	symbols.	First,	drawing	attention	to	corruption	issues	during	the	
early	stages	of	campaigning,	particularly	aspects	related	to	electoral	fraud,	allows	
them	a	basis	to	question	unfavourable	results	(McCann	et	al.	1998:	485).	Second,	
using	such	symbols	assists	in	attacking	opponents,	especially	incumbents,	levying	
charges	of	impropriety	or	corruption	against	them,	promoting	campaigns	focused	
on	moral	character,	personal	finances,	family	life	and	daily	habits	(Welch	and	
Hibbing	1997:	228).	Opposition	parties	often	appeal	to	voters	for	support	on	the	
grounds	that	they	are	best	placed	to	‘banish	electoral	fraud	and	corruption	forever’	
in	situations	where	the	incumbent	government	has	failed	in	this	regard	(McCann	et	
al.	1998:	485).	Third,	anti‐corruption	rhetoric	may	also	provide	a	means	for	
conveying	veiled	criticisms	of	other	parties,	cloaking	unpalatable	power	struggles.	
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As	an	instrumental	symbol,	it	does	not	openly	insult	opponents,	but	provides	what	
Graber	(1976:	25)	terms	a	‘coded	message’	of	criticism.	
	
However,	adoption	of	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	may	also	be	perilous.	Corruption	
reinforces	asymmetrical	power	relations	and	thus	benefits	those	with	a	vested	
interest	in	maintaining	the	system.	Moreover,	because	corruption	and	power	are	so	
closely	associated,	candidates’	attempts	to	portray	themselves	or	their	parties	as	
‘anti‐corruption’	may	be	greeted	with	scepticism.	Becquart‐Leclerq	(1990:	191)	
argues	that	the	public	can	easily	become	deaf	to	politicians	claiming	that	they	are	
not	or	will	never	be	corrupt,	because	they	believe	politics	is	an	inherently	dirty	
game:	
	
Feelings	of	dislike,	even	disgust,	for	politics	are	quite	frequent	and	translate	
into	apathy,	or	cynicism,	or	a	rejection	of	politics.	These	sentiments	are	
ambivalent,	because	corruption	seems	inherent	to	the	exercise	of	power.	
The	link	can	be	fatal:	could	one	do	better	in	the	place	of	those	who	govern?	
Is	it	possible	to	play	politics	without	dirtying	one’s	hand?	
	
If	corruption	is	considered	an	inherent	aspect	of	wielding	power,	then	an	anti‐
corruption	symbol	may	not	have	the	desired	effect	on	voters	because	they	expect	
politicians	to	be	corrupt,	and	therefore	the	exposure	of	corrupt	activities	is	just	the	
confirmation	of	something	already	suspected	(Welch	and	Hibbing	1997:	238).	Voter	
sympathies	can	also	lead	them	to	rationalize	corruption	scandals	involving	parties	
that	they	have	previously	supported.	A	study	by	Anduiza	et	al.	(2013)	in	Spain	found	
that	voters	are	more	lenient	towards	corruption	if	it	affects	a	party	to	which	they	
are	sympathetic.42	The	argument	here	is	that	cognitive	dissonance	between	a	
preferred	party	and	a	corrupt	candidate	is	addressed	by	modifying	one	of	the	
cognitions,	such	that	voters	are	more	likely	to	downplay	the	importance	of	
corruption	rather	than	change	their	political	predisposition.	Research	suggests	that	
citizens	are	still	likely	to	vote	for	corrupt	politicians	if	they	perceive	that	it	will	bring	
material	benefit	to	their	district	(Konstantinidis	and	Xezonakis	2013).	An	anti‐
																																																													
42	In	a	related	study,	Mullainathan	and	Washington	(2006)	assert	that	voters	are	likely	to	be	
more	forgiving	of	politicians	that	they	have	voted	for	because	of	their	internal	need	for	
consistency,	resulting	in	cognitive	dissonance	rationalizing	between	their	actions	and	their	
morals.	The	argument	is	that	voters	do	not	wish	to	believe	that	they	have	done	a	bad	thing	in	
voting	for	a	particular	candidate	and	are	therefore	more	likely	to	justify	the	candidate’s	
actions.	
	
44	
	
corruption	symbol,	therefore,	hold	no	guarantees	for	those	who	choose	to	adopt	it	
and	adoptees	should	understand	the	priorities	and	attitudes	of	their	audience	if	they	
wish	to	maximize	the	benefits	of	aligning	themselves	with	an	anti‐corruption	cause.	
	
Conclusion	
This	thesis	draws	upon	these	theories	of	symbolic	politics	as	a	starting	point	for	
examining	how	Indonesia’s	political	parties	construct	their	identity.	The	desire	to	
win	votes	compels	parties	and	candidates	to	identify	and	shape	salient	symbols	that	
elicit	support	from	voters.	In	the	case	of	political	parties	in	Indonesia,	official	
symbols	are	developed	at	the	national	level.	The	centralized	structure	of	Indonesian	
political	parties	means	that	they	are	devised	almost	exclusively	by	parties’	central	
management,	usually	with	little	feedback	from	local	branch	offices.	Their	
manifestos,	platforms	and	media	images	are	controlled	from	Jakarta,	where	their	
central	committees	are	based.	But	while	decision‐making	over	core	party	ideas	are	
the	domain	of	these	committees,	it	is	individual	parliamentary	candidates	who	are	
charged	with	promoting	the	party	to	constituents	at	the	local	level.	The	central	
committee	have	little	control	once	the	campaign	is	in	the	hands	of	local	candidates,	
lacking	the	resources,	and	arguably	interest,	to	monitor	how	candidates	construct	
their	individual	campaigns	or	how	they	use	symbols.43		
	
All	the	emerging	parties	discussed	in	this	study	adopted	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	
during	their	2014	legislative	campaigns.	There	was	a	widespread	perception—
confirmed	by	a	number	of	surveys	conducted	between	2012	and	2014	that	found	
that	the	Indonesian	public	had	low	levels	of	trust	in	their	representatives44—that	
incumbent	parliamentarians	and	political	parties	were	overwhelmingly	corrupt	and	
driven	by	elite	ambition	rather	than	the	aspirations	of	the	people.	At	the	national	
level,	Hanura,	Gerindra	and	Nasdem	adopted	rhetoric	and	dramatism	intended	to	
persuade	voters	that	they	were	the	anti‐corruption	party	to	support.	At	the	same	
time,	individual	candidates	were	afforded	the	opportunity	to	establish	their	own	
																																																													
43	As	Gantan	and	Busrya	(2014)	note,	political	parties	do	very	little	to	ensure	that	political	
candidates	do	not	buy	votes	or	to	establish	a	better	political	culture	in	Indonesia.	
Furthermore,	as	Mietzner	(2013:	83)	argues,	candidates	are	rarely	party	cadres	and	are	
more	likely	to	be	individuals	seeking	party	endorsement	for	their	electoral	bid.	In	this	
context,	he	quotes	a	central	party	official	who	stated	that	the	primary	criteria	for	selecting	
candidates	were	popularity	in	surveys,	their	ability	to	fund	their	own	campaign	and	
government	experience.	While	they	should	not	contradict	party	ideology,	there	is	no	
compulsion	for	them	to	be	party	cadres.	
44	These	surveys	are	discussed	further	in	Chapter	Three.	
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symbols	and	campaign	strategies.	The	prevalence	of	money	politics	and	vote‐
buying,	combined	with	the	lack	of	party	oversight,	meant	that	candidates	faced	a	
difficult	decision	of	whether	to	market	themselves	as	‘clean’	and	anti‐corruption,	to	
buy	votes	or	to—somewhat	precariously—	do	both.	
	
In	order	to	understand	how	corruption	became	such	an	entrenched	aspect	of	
Indonesia’s	political	discourse	and,	as	a	consequence,	such	a	popular	political	
symbol,	it	is	imperative	to	understand	the	historical	context	of	corruption.	
Indonesia’s	deep	political	history	regarding	anti‐corruption	discourse	goes	some	
way	to	explaining	its	contemporary	popularity	as	a	political	symbol.	Immortalized	in	
the	early	years	of	the	republic	as	a	problem	of	moral	imperative,	anti‐corruption	
discourse	came	to	represent	the	myriad	ills	facing	Indonesia;	it	was	the	reason	why	
the	elites	maintained	power;	it	was	the	reason	for	bureaucratic	inefficiency;	and	it	
explained	the	increasing	disparity	between	the	rich	and	the	poor.	The	need	to	
eradicate	corruption	became	a	rallying	point	both	for	those	in	government,	who	
used	it	to	denounce	adversaries,	and	opposition	forces,	who	used	it	to	attack	the	
status	quo	and	call	for	change.	Yet,	all	the	while,	none	of	the	rhetoric	or	steps	taken	
to	combat	corruption	seemed	to	successfully	put	an	end	to	its	(perceived)	endemic	
nature,	and	it	remains	a	prevalent	concern	in	Indonesia	today.	
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Chapter	Two	
Tracing	the	history	of	anti‐corruption	
	
Precise	definitions	and	interpretations	of	corruption	are	elusive;	however,	the	
embedded	nature	of	anti‐corruption	symbolism	in	Indonesian	politics	is	apparent,	as	
evidenced	by	its	recurring	prominence	since	independence.	Following	independence,	
Indonesia,	like	many	fledgling	post‐colonial	states,	faced	the	problem	of	entrenched	
government	corruption	(Khan	1998:	17‐19;	Myrdal	1968:	948;	Smith	1971:	23‐24).	
Several	scholars	argue	that	the	social	norms	of	pre‐colonial	Indonesian	society,	such	
as	strong	patronage	networks	and	a	focus	on	family	that	encouraged	nepotism,	
provided	a	basis	for	corrupt	practices	(Anderson	1990:	59‐62;	Smith	1971;	Soedarso	
1969).1	Deep‐seated	corruption	in	the	bureaucracy	is	also	attributed	to	the	
continuation	of	many	colonial	institutions	following	independence	(Cribb	1994:	1).2		
	
While	anti‐corruption	efforts	in	Indonesia	have	been	visible	(though	inconsistent)	
since	independence,	it	was	during	colonialism	that	the	first	concerted	attempts	to	
address	the	problem	were	made.	Dutch	colonial	leadership	identified	corruption	as	a	
prominent	issue	during	the	1920s,	when	Governor‐General	Dirk	Fock,	who	presided	
over	the	Netherlands	East	Indies	from	1921–1926,	commissioned	investigations	into	
corrupt	officials	who	had	accepted	kickbacks	or	embezzled	from	the	treasury.	The	
Governor‐General	appeared	intent	on	tackling	corruption	within	the	colonial	
administration	and	a	number	of	convictions	and	several	dismissals	ensued	
(Wertheim	1963:	144).	Fock’s	actions	highlighted	changing	perceptions	in	the	
																																																													
1	In	particular,	Anderson	(1990:	58‐60)	argues	that	Javanese	ideas	of	power,	based	around	
patron‐client	relationships	and	a	culturally	embedded	patrimonial	model,	fostered	systems	of	
dependency	evident	in	the	morphology	of	corruption	in	modern	Indonesia.	
2	The	mechanisms	of	Dutch	bureaucracy	during	the	colonial	period	institutionalized	
corruption	in	the	everyday	dealings	of	the	state	(Kahin	2003:	10;	Smith	1971:	23;	
Sundhaussen	1978:	54).	At	first,	the	Dutch	did	little	to	develop	state	institutions	within	their	
colony,	the	Netherlands	East	Indies,	instead	attaching	themselves	to	pre‐existing	feudalistic	
systems	with	the	Javanese	elite	overseeing	agricultural	production	(Kahin	2003:	2;	McCarthy	
2011:	95).	The	complicated	administrative	functions	of	the	Dutch	East	Indies	Company	
(Vereenigde	Oost‐Indische	Compagnie,	VOC),	established	in	1602,	as	both	a	company	and	an	
administrator,	shaped	the	behaviour	of	bureaucrats	(Day	1904;	Smith	1971;	Wertheim	1963:	
142).	While	the	VOC’s	profits	were	high,	the	administrators	that	oversaw	the	valuable	
shipments	of	goods	received	low	wages,	encouraging	illicit	conduct.	Later,	around	1830,	the	
Dutch	introduced	the	Cultivation	System	which	involved	the	production	of	cash	crops	
overseen	by	local	regents	and	sold	to	the	administration	at	fixed,	low,	prices	(Kahin	2003:	11).	
The	system	introduced	Indonesian	elites	to	a	cash	economy.	Meanwhile,	Dutch	administrators	
were	discouraged	from	reprimanding	local	regents	who	abused	their	subjects	in	order	to	
maximize	personal	profits	from	cash	crop	production,	fostering	an	environment	where	elites	
could	exploit	villagers	with	relative	impunity	(Fasseur	1994:	52‐53;	Ricklefs	2001:	157).	
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acceptability	of	such	practices	within	the	state,	but	these	measures	did	not	assume	a	
symbolic	significance	because	they	were	primarily	aimed	at	securing	government	
revenue	rather	than	boosting	the	administration’s	popularity.	
	
Changing	attitudes	towards	corruption	were	also	linked	to	the	rise	of	Indonesian	
nationalism	and	the	desire	for	independence	(Smith	1971:	25).	As	conceptualizations	
of	‘acceptable’	and	‘non‐acceptable’	behaviour	amongst	government	officials	altered,	
ideologies	of	equality	and	social	justice	also	came	to	the	fore,	driving	the	nationalist	
movement.3	Corruption	became	yet	another	source	of	grievance	against	the	Dutch,	
viewed	as	undermining	the	values	of	democracy	and	justice	that	the	independence	
movement	was	fighting	for	(Kahin	2003:	52).	From	the	1920s–1930s,	such	ideals	
were	largely	confined	to	the	educated	elite	(McVey	1996:	13)	and,	as	Wertheim	
(1963:	149)	argues,	the	revolution	reflected	a	burgeoning	national	solidarity,	but	‘this	
sense	of	unity	has	not	penetrated	deeply	enough	to	guarantee	strict	loyalty	from	civil	
servants	and	citizens	in	times	of	peaceful	construction’.	Nationalists	identified	
corruption	as	a	colonial	problem,	but	there	was	worse	to	come	following	
independence.	
	
This	chapter	outlines	a	brief	history	of	the	manner	in	which	anti‐corruption	symbols	
were	mobilized	in	Indonesia	from	independence	up	to	2009,	establishing	that	anti‐
corruption	has	been	a	persistent	political	symbol.	However,	the	long	history	of	anti‐
corruption	rhetoric	is	not	necessarily	reflective	of	a	genuine	desire	to	eradicate	
corruption.	This	history	demonstrates	that	although	corruption	has	long	been	an	
issue	of	public	concern,	anti‐corruption	symbols	emerge	predominantly	when	they	
offer	political	leverage.	Conceptualizing	anti‐corruption	as	a	political	symbol	allows	
for	the	further	analysis	of	an	apparent	paradox	within	Indonesian	politics:	while	
many	politicians	and	parties	have	talked	with	great	fanfare	about	combating	
corruption,	general	public	sentiment	is	that	very	little	progress	has	been	made	on	the	
issue	since	1998.		
	
After	Independence	
Sukarno	and	Hatta,	Indonesia’s	first	president	and	vice‐president,	declared	Indonesia	
an	independent	state	on	17	August	1945,	two	days	after	the	surrender	of	the	Japanese	
																																																													
3	These	ideologies	of	equality	and	social	justice	were	later	enshrined	in	Indonesia’s	national	
ideology,	Pancasila,	as	discussed	in	the	Introduction.	
	
49	
	
during	World	War	Two.4	Following	a	war	for	independence	against	the	Dutch,	which	
ended	in	1949,	a	fledgling	parliamentary	democracy	was	established.	The	early	
period	of	parliamentary	democracy	was	marked	by	intense	battles	between	a	range	
of	actors,	including	political	parties,	figures	in	the	Army	and	Sukarno	himself	(Lev	
1994:	41).	Political	parties	competed	for	power,	the	most	significant	being	the	
Nationalist	Party	(Partai	Nasionalis	Indonesia,	PNI);	Masyumi,	which	represented	
Islamic	political	interests;	the	Socialist	Party	(Partai	Sosialis	Indonesia,	PSI);	and	the	
Communist	Party	(Partai	Kommunis	Indonesia,	PKI).5	Most	cabinets	were	based	on	
precarious	coalitions,	with	parties	focused	upon	securing	their	political	survival	
rather	than	addressing	policy	concerns	(Cribb	and	Brown	1995:	64;	Feith	1962:	
165).6		
	
Parties	began	to	play	an	important	patronage	function	soon	after	parliament	was	
established.	Several	ministers	used	their	position	to	help	family	members,	repay	
personal	debts	and	create	lucrative	business	opportunities	(Feith	1962:	147;	Vickers	
2013:	137).	Recognizing	potential	career	benefits,	many	bureaucrats	also	joined	
political	parties	and	by	the	end	of	1950	most	civil	servants	were	also	party	members	
(Feith	1962:	125).	Party	leaders	were	obliged	to	distribute	favours	and	material	
rewards	to	loyal	supporters	through	cabinet	posts,	business	opportunities,	overseas	
junkets,	houses	and	cars	(Cribb	and	Brown	1995:	59‐60;	Feith	1962:	123),	which	also	
led	to	factionalism	and	the	rise	of	intra‐party	competition	(Feith	1962:	126).	
Politicians	who	refused	to	distribute	patronage	risked	facing	opposition	in	parliament	
and	limiting	their	careers.7		
	
																																																													
4	Japan	surrendered	unconditionally	on	15	August	1945,	presenting	the	Indonesian	leadership	
an	opportunity	to	declare	independence	before	the	Dutch	could	restore	their	authority	
(Ricklefs	2001:	259).	However,	this	status	was	not	internationally	recognized	until	1949	when	
Indonesia	prevailed	in	the	revolution	against	the	Dutch.	For	further	details	on	the	Indonesian	
struggle	for	independence	from	1945–1949	see	Reid	(1974)	and	Kahin	(2003).	
5	Different	ideologies	supported	specific	parties	and	this	phenomenon	came	to	be	known	as	
aliran	(literally	‘stream’).	Aliran	tendancies	gained	traction	during	the	Old	Order	and	
remained	prominent	throughout	the	New	Order	regime	as	people	identified	with	particular	
‘streams’	of	politics	(Ufen	2008).The	concept	of	aliran	has	a	long	political	history	that,	in	fact,	
pre‐dates	the	Old	Order.	For	further	discussion	of	the	influence	of	aliran	on	Indonesian	politics	
see	Crouch	(1980);	Feith	(1962);	Feith	and	Castles	(1970:	13‐18).	For	further	information	on	
these	political	parties,	their	backgrounds	and	ideologies	see	Feith	(1962),	McVey	(1994)	and	
Ricklefs	(2001:	292‐294).	
6	From	September	1950	to	April	1957	there	were	six	separate	cabinets,	lasting,	on	average,	a	
year	each	(Brown	2003:	181).		
7	For	example,	Feith	(1962:	169)	asserts	that	the	Natsir	cabinet	(September	1950–April	1951),	
led	by	Masyumi	politician	Mohammad	Natsir,	faced	opposition	because	the	Finance	Minister,	
Sjafruddin	Prawiranegara	(also	from	Masyumi),	refused	to	distribute	patronage.	
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Ingrained	corruption	in	the	bureaucracy	is	often	attributed	to	the	low	remuneration	
of	civil	servants	(Legge	1972:	331;	McLeod	2008;	Smith	1971;	Wertheim	1963).	After	
the	struggle	for	independence,	the	government	slashed	the	salaries	of	high‐ranking	
bureaucrats	who	had	served	under	the	Dutch,	placing	them	on	similar	pay‐grades	to	
newer	civil	servants.	Benefits	to	bureaucrats	were	again	cut	in	1952	when	the	
government	was	unable	to	afford	wage	increases,	provide	Idul	Fitri	bonuses	or	rice	
allowances	(Feith	1962:	256‐247).8	The	disparity	between	salary	and	status	fostered	
discontent,	as	many	civil	servants	perceived	that	their	earnings	did	not	befit	the	
importance	of	their	positions.9	Dissatisfaction	with	pay	led	civil	servants	to	seek	other	
sources	of	income,	often	using	their	authority	as	leverage	(Legge	1972:	331).	With	the	
government	incapable	of	implementing	strict	sanctions	against	corruption,	such	
practices	flourished.	
	
Military	involvement	in	economic	activities,	which	also	encouraged	corruption,	
became	normalized	during	the	war	for	independence	and	continued	into	the	1950s	
(Crouch	1975;	1980:	38‐41;	Ricklefs	2001:	306).	High‐ranking	officers	launched	
businesses,	collecting	profits	for	both	themselves	and	the	military	(Cribb	and	Brown	
1995:	75;	Crouch	1975;	Penders	1974).	Army	leaders	rationalized	these	practices	as	
subsidizing	the	inadequate	budget	received	from	the	state	(Cribb	and	Brown	1995:	
75;	Crouch	1980:	39;	Ricklefs	2001).	In	addition,	military	officers	turned	a	personal	
profit	from	their	business	dealings	and	subsequently	distributed	patronage	to	
subordinates,	fostering	networks	of	loyal	supporters	within	army	ranks	(Crouch	
1979;	McLeod	2011a:	56).	While	such	practices	were	generally	tolerated	by	army	
leaders,	their	existence	was,	nevertheless,	sometimes	used	when	officers	wished	to	
publicly	defame	rivals.	For	example,	one	of	the	earliest	public	accusations	of	
corruption	in	the	new	republic	was	made	in	1952,	stemming	from	a	conflict	between	
the	Chief	of	Staff,	Colonel	Nasution,	and	staunch	Sukarno	supporter,	Colonel	Bambang	
Supeno,	resulting	in	a	flurry	of	accusations	between	different	factions	in	the	
																																																													
8	Idul	Fitri	is	the	Islamic	holiday	following	the	fasting	month	of	Ramadan.	It	is	traditionally	
marked	by	the	giving	of	gifts,	including	employee	bonuses.	
9A	literary	example	from	this	period	(1954)	detailing	this	dilemma	is	the	novel	Korupsi	
(Corruption)	by	renowned	Indonesian	author	Pramoedya	Anata	Toer.	The	book	details	the	
moral	struggle	of	a	civil	servant	who	is	unable	to	provide	his	family	with	a	‘respectable	
standard	of	living’	on	his	meagre	government	salary	(Foulcher	1995:	167).	The	rationalization	
used	by	the	book’s	protagonist,	Basir,	is	based	upon	a	sense	of	financial	entitlement,	which	is	
at	odds	with	his	current	standard	of	living.	Basir	turns	to	corruption,	a	decision	he	agonizes	
over,	on	the	one	hand	knowing	it	is	‘immoral’	but	on	the	other	hand	feeling	he	has	the	right	to	
a	better	standard	of	living	by	virtue	of	his	position	(Toer	1954:	12).	
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military.10	While	the	charges	yielded	no	convictions,	they	intensified	factional	schisms	
within	both	the	army	and	the	government.	
	
Mirroring	the	internal	allegations	in	the	military,	accusations	of	corruption	became	
common	amongst	parliamentarians.	The	need	to	eradicate	it	became	a	government	
catch‐cry	in	the	lead‐up	to	Indonesia’s	first	democratic	election,	held	on	29	
September	1955.	Keen	to	establish	their	anti‐corruption	credentials,	the	caretaker	
cabinet	led	by	Burhanuddin	Harahap,	based	on	a	coalition	between	Masyumi,	PSI	and	
Nahdlatul	Ulama	(NU),	claimed	it	wanted	to	reinstate	the	moral	authority	of	the	
government	in	the	lead	up	to	the	election.11	Adopting	a	public	anti‐corruption	
campaign,	it	set	out	to	clean	up	the	administrative	and	executive	branches	of	the	
government	(Penders	1974:	151;	van	der	Kroef	1956:	131).	While	there	was	little	to	
suggest	that	the	new	cabinet	was	any	less	corrupt	than	its	predecessors,	the	Harahap	
cabinet	accused	previous	cabinets	of	several	counts	of	corruption	and	worked	with	
the	army	to	arrest	individuals	(Penders	1974:	151;	Ricklefs	2001:	303;	Teik	1972).12	
Though	the	government	stated	that	the	arrests	were	not	politically	driven,	most	
arrested	were	members	of	rival	party	PNI.		
	
The	prosecution	of	those	arrested	proved	difficult.	The	caretaker	government	had	
trouble	building	cases	against	the	accused,	claiming	they	had	been	careful	to	cover	
their	tracks.	The	mooted	solution	to	this	was	the	passing	of	an	emergency	law,	which	
allowed	for	separate	tribunals	to	hear	corruption	cases,	compelling	defendants	to	
answer	questions	put	to	them	(Feith	1962:	438‐439).	This	bill	was	passed	in	the	
																																																													
10	Several	leaders,	all	deemed	to	be	sympathizers	of	the	Indonesian	Socialist	Party,	were	
accused	of	corruption	(Feith	1962:	252).	In	response,	a	motion	was	called	in	October	1952	for	
a	special	parliamentary	investigation	into	administrative	and	financial	fraud	in	the	Ministry	of	
Defence	and	Armed	Forces.	The	Minister	for	Defence,	Sultan	Hamengku	Buwono	IX,	saw	this	
as	a	personal	attack.	As	a	well‐respected,	independent	member	of	the	cabinet,	the	Sultan	had	
support	from	a	number	of	smaller	parties	who	rejected	the	motion,	claiming	it	would	
destabilize	the	government.	PSI	also	countered	the	motion,	stating	that	most	parliamentarians	
were	hypocrites	who	lived	‘luxuriously	and	irresponsibly’	and	were	essentially	in	no	position	
to	judge	others	(Feith	1962:	256).	
11	Nahdlatul	Ulama	(NU)	is	another	Islam‐based	group	which	split	from	the	Masyumi	political	
party	on	6	April	1952.	The	two	had	had	an	uneasy	alliance	up	to	this	point	and	disagreed	over	
the	leadership	of	the	party	and	representations	in	the	cabinet,	which	tended	to	be	given	to	
Western	educated,	modernist	Muslims.	For	further	details	see	Feith	(1962:	233‐237).	
12	The	day	of	the	Harahap	cabinet’s	formal	installation	the	military	arrested	the	former	
Minister	of	Justice,	Djody	Gondokusomo,	for	corruption.	Although	the	new	cabinet	claimed	no	
knowledge	of	the	arrest,	the	public	supported	the	measures,	glad	that	steps	were	being	taken	
to	punish	corrupt	officials.	Following	this	the	former	Minister	for	Economic	Affairs,	Iskaq	
Tjokroadisurjo,	was	also	arrested,	as	were	employees	from	the	Central	Import	Office	and	a	
number	of	bureaucrats	from	the	Ministry	of	Justice.	See	Feith	(1962:	422‐424)	for	a	detailed	
discussion	of	these	events.	
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cabinet,	but	there	was	opposition	from	NU,	whose	ranks	included	some	individuals	
accused	of	corruption.	Moreover,	Sukarno	refused	to	sign	the	bill,	meaning	it	could	
not	become	law	and	putting	him	at	odds	with	the	Harahap	cabinet.	The	alternative	
was	to	present	the	bill	directly	to	the	parliament,	which	would	be	time	consuming	
and	potentially	damaging	to	the	government’s	reputation	if	it	was	not	passed.	
Harahap	did	in	fact	present	the	bill	to	the	agenda	committee	of	the	parliament	to	be	
presented	during	a	parliamentary	sitting,	but	it	was	never	handed	down	(Feith	1962:	
440).	
	
Corruption	was	identified	as	a	campaign	issue	in	the	1955	election.	Vice‐President	
Mohammad	Hatta,	who	was	linked	to	PSI,	expressed	his	concerns	about	corruption	in	
the	lead‐up	to	polling.	During	his	annual	national	co‐operatives	day	address	on	11	
July	1955,	he	observed	that:	
	
A	moral	crisis	has	blurred	the	distinction	between	good	and	bad,	between	
legal	and	illegal,	between	decency	and	moral	obnoxiousness,	between	right	
and	wrong.	Corruption	runs	riot	through	our	society;	corruption	has	also	
infected	a	great	many	government	departments,	and	unless	drastic	measures	
are	taken	very	soon,	this	evil	may	become	firmly	rooted	in	the	organization	of	
our	society	and	our	country.	Bribery	and	graft	have	become	increasingly	
common,	to	the	detriment	of	our	community	and	our	country	(Hatta	1957:	
84).	
	
Political	parties	also	competed	to	discredit	rivals,	especially	evident	in	the	
accusations	between	PNI	and	Islamic	opposition	party	Masyumi.	Masyumi	criticized	
previous	PNI‐led	cabinets	for	‘inflation,	the	shortages	of	essential	imports	and	the	
abundance	of	luxury	automobiles,	“arbitrary”	political	appointments	and	dismissals	…	
and	the	“special	licenses”	for	national	importers’	(Feith	1962:	354).	Masyumi’s	
newspaper	Abadi	and	other	pro‐government	media	outlets	also	gave	significant	
coverage	to	the	corruption	charges	of	former	ministers	(Feith	1962:	424).	Indeed,	it	
was	in	the	media,	not	parliament,	that	many	of	the	most	heated	clashes	of	ideology	
and	scathing	attacks	on	rivals	occurred	(Hill	2010:	3).13	Several	accusations	of	
corruption	against	rivals	were	mooted	through	the	press,	requiring	a	lower	threshold	
for	evidence	and	greater	scope	to	sensationalize	charges	(Feith	1962:	424).	For	
																																																													
13	During	the	period	of	constitutional	democracy,	almost	all	newspapers	were	attached	to	a	
political	party	(or	the	military)	(Sen	and	Hill	2000).		
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example,	in	the	lead‐up	to	the	elections	of	September	1955,	PSI’s	newspaper	Pedoman	
published	a	scathing,	anonymous	letter	to	the	editor	claiming	that	Sukarno	was	a	
lackey	of	the	‘Co‐operative	Organization	for	Corruption’,	the	Masyumi‐PSI	nickname	
for	those	who	supported	the	first	Ali	Sastroamidjojo	cabinet	(Feith	1962:	427).	
	
In	spite	of	pre‐election	tensions,	PNI,	Masyumi	and	NU	formed	a	ruling	coalition	
(without	PKI	or	PSI)	under	previous	Prime	Minister	Ali	Sastroamidjojo	in	March	
1956.14	Shortly	after	the	cabinet’s	formation,	conflict	within	the	military	spilled	over	
into	parliamentary	affairs,	signalling	the	beginning	of	the	most	high‐profile	
corruption	cases	of	the	Old	Order.	The	army	had	suffered	internal	power	struggles	
since	the	revolution	and	legacies	of	these	rifts	emerged	during	1956	(Reid	1974).15	
Cleavages	widened	when	army	Chief	of	Staff,	Nasution,	who	had	recently	allied	
himself	with	Sukarno	and	PNI,	began	to	order	personnel	transfers	in	an	effort	to	
combat	smuggling	activities	and	regionalism	that	had	taken	hold	within	the	military	
(Teik	1972:	238).	One	of	the	major	actors	aggrieved	by	these	transfers	was	Deputy	
Chief	of	Staff,	Colonel	Zulkifli	Lubis,	an	officer	aligned	to	PSI	and	Masyumi,	who	was	
also	resentful	that	Nasution	had	been	promoted	over	him,	which	he	perceived	to	be	a	
political	appointment	rather	than	one	based	on	merit.16		
	
The	resulting	power	struggle	eventually	led	to	the	indictment	of	Roeslan	Abdulgani,	a	
PNI	member	and	the	then‐Minister	for	Foreign	Affairs.	The	‘Roeslan	Affair’	was	a	clear	
example	of	the	use	of	corruption	allegations	for	political	gain	(Ricklefs	2001:	307;	
Teik	1972).	On	13	August	1956,	one	of	Nasution’s	rivals	issued	an	arrest	warrant	for	
Roeslan	in	connection	with	corruption	in	the	disbursement	of	state	printing	contracts.	
Roeslan	was	accused	of	conspiring	with	Lie	Hok	Thay,	the	former	director	of	the	
national	printing	plant,	and	of	accepting	Rp.	1.5	million	in	bribes	(van	der	Kroef	1957:	
49).	The	arrest	warrant	was	quickly	revoked	by	Nasution,	and	Roeslan	subsequently	
left	Indonesia	for	London	on	a	diplomatic	visit.	Anti‐Nasution	officers	then	accused	
Nasution	of	condoning	corruption	by	allowing	Roeslan	to	leave	the	country	without	
proper	investigation	into	the	allegations	(Teik	1972:	238).	
	
																																																													
14	This	came	to	be	known	as	‘the	second	Ali	cabinet’.	
15	This	was	not	unexpected,	given	that	the	military	had	become	heavily	politicized	during	the	
early	Old	Order.	With	the	fragile	nature	of	parliamentary	cabinets	following	independence,	the	
army	had	come	to	see	itself	as	‘the	guardian	of	national	interest	with	the	responsibility	to	
intervene	in	political	affairs	whenever	the	weaknesses	of	civilian	government	made	it	
necessary’	(Crouch	1980:	30).		
16	For	further	discussion	of	internal	military	discord	during	this	period	see	Teik	(1972).	
	
54	
	
Upon	Roeslan’s	return,	a	special	commission	composed	mostly	of	other	cabinet	
members	cleared	him	of	complicity,	but	this	failed	to	end	speculation	about	his	guilt.	
The	cabinet’s	‘whitewash’	of	the	affair	generated	intense	media	scrutiny,	primarily	
from	Mochtar	Lubis,	the	respected	editor	of	Indonesia	Raya	and	also	a	distant	relative	
of	Zulkifli	Lubis	(Hill	2010:	64‐65).	Mochtar	Lubis	lambasted	the	government,	
running	a	sensational	headline	stating	that	Roeslan	had	engaged	in	corrupt	activities	
with	Lie	Hok	Thay	and	must	be	prosecuted.	The	newspaper	quoted	Zulkifli	Lubis	as	
saying	that	‘the	Prime	Minister	and	the	Chief	of	Staff	had	defended	evil	by	releasing	
Roeslan	from	the	hands	of	his	would‐be	arresters’	(Feith	1962:	503).	Indonesia	Raya	
and	PSI’s	newspaper	Pedoman	continued	the	attack	(Feith	1962:	504).	After	the	affair	
died	down,	Mochtar	Lubis	was	charged	with	defaming	cabinet	members,	but	was	
acquitted	in	December	1956.	In	the	meantime,	tensions	continued	to	mount	within	
the	army.	When	it	became	clear	that	the	plan	to	destabilize	the	government	had	
failed,	Zulkifli	Lubis	instigated	a	failed	coup	in	November	1956	(van	der	Kroef	1957:	
50).	Later,	in	April	1957,	the	Supreme	Court	fined	Roeslan	for	unintentionally	
breaching	foreign	exchange	regulations;	however,	he	was	never	tried	for	corruption	
(Hill	2010:	48;	Ricklefs	2001:	307).	The	accusations	against	him	remained	
unsubstantiated	(Setiyono	et	al.	2012:	42‐45).	
	
Defending	Guided	Democracy	
Parliamentary	democracy	collapsed	in	December	1956	when	officers	from	the	army	
regional	command	seized	the	governments	of	West,	North	and	South	Sumatra,	
declaring	themselves	to	be	the	‘Revolutionary	Government	of	the	Republic	of	
Indonesia’	(Pemerintah	Revolusioner	Republik	Indonesia,	PRRI)	and	prompting	
Sukarno	to	declare	martial	law.17	Sukarno	appointed	an	emergency	cabinet	under	
Djuanda	Kartawidjaja	(April	1957–July	1959),	which	managed	government	affairs	
until	he	could	officially	reinstate	the	1945	Constitution	and	dissolve	parliament	in	
July	1959,	paving	the	way	for	Guided	Democracy	(Lev	1966;	Penders	1974:	157).18	
	
Charges	of	corruption	were	used	by	Sukarno	to	emphasize	the	flawed	nature	of	the	
party	system	and	to	justify	his	growing	alignment	with	the	PKI	(Ricklefs	2001:	308‐
309).	Eager	to	justify	his	new	regime,	Sukarno	blamed	greedy	and	immoral	
individuals	for	many	of	the	failings	of	the	period	of	constitutional	democracy.	For	
																																																													
17	For	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	PRRI	rebellion	and	its	consequences	see	Feith	(1962:	578‐
608)	and	Legge	(1972:	281‐284).		
18	For	a	detailed	exploration	of	the	transition	from	constitutional	democracy	to	Guided	
Democracy	see	Lev	(1966).	
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example,	in	his	Independence	Day	address	in	1959	he	admonished	those	who	had	
used	their	positions	in	state	enterprises	for	personal	gain	noting	that:	
	
those	bodies	[have	become]	the	nest	of	people	who	filled	their	own	pockets	
till	they	bulged,	people	who	became	wealthy,	people	who	became	millionaires.	
There	must	be	an	end	to	this!	Such	a	situation	must	be	changed!	...	It	may	not	
be	allowed	to	happen	again	that	...	a	few	speculators	or	a	few	profiteers	can	
shake	our	whole	national	economy	(Sukarno	1964:	52).	
	
In	the	same	speech,	Sukarno	asserted	that	‘Whoever	scoops	up	wealth	at	the	expense	
of	the	public,	whoever	disrupts	the	public	economy,	will	be	arrested,	will	be	
sentenced	to	death!’	(Sukarno	1964:	55).	In	his	1961	Independence	Day	Address,	
Sukarno	also	referred	to	the	prominence	of	corruption	within	the	government,	
classifying	it	as	one	of	the	‘three	si’s—tjari	promosi,	birokrasi,	korupsi	[emphasis	
in	original]’	—	the	seeking	of	promotion,	bureaucracy	and	corruption.	He	went	on	to	
proclaim	it	would	be	better	if	‘such	people	were	pushed	aside!’	(Sukarno	1964:	153).	
Sukarno	defended	his	new	regime,	even	as	it	became	increasingly	evident	that	it	had	
many	of	the	same	flaws	as	the	previous	establishment.	He	maintained	that	corruption	
in	government	was	the	result	of	individual	greed,	rather	than	institutionalized	
practices	driven	by	the	system	itself.	
	
Sukarno	also	boosted	his	own	anti‐corruption	reputation	by	achieving	what	none	of	
the	previous	cabinets	had	been	able	to	do:	actually	pass	anti‐corruption	laws.	Prior	to	
this,	corruption	arrests	had	been	facilitated	by	a	military	mandate	to	act	in	the	
interests	of	the	people	(Crouch	1980:	40).	It	was	not	until	1960	that	an	official	
government	definition	of	corruption	was	codified	and	punishments	for	related	crimes	
institutionalized	through	Law	No.	24/1960	on	the	Determination,	Prosecution	and	
Inspection	of	the	Criminal	Act	of	Corruption.	In	the	first	paragraph	of	this	law,	
corruption	was	broadly	defined	as	having	two	facets.	First,	it	involved	a	violation	of	
the	law	causing	an	economic	loss	for	the	state,	an	area	or	any	other	legal	body	which	
uses	state	funding	and	concessions.	Second,	corruption	was	also	the	abuse	of	position	
or	authority	for	self‐enrichment,	or	that	of	another	person	or	body.	In	reality,	the	
passing	of	such	legislation	was	hardly	a	feat	given	that	Sukarno	held	close	to	
dictatorial	power	over	the	government.	However,	its	enactment	demonstrated	that,	at	
the	very	least,	Sukarno	believed	such	a	law	to	be	necessary.	
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However,	it	was	difficult	to	focus	public	attention	on	corruption	when	Sukarno’s	poor	
economic	management	was	plunging	the	country	into	economic	and	social	chaos.	
Calls	for	change	mounted	as	the	PKI	and	the	military	both	competed	for	power	
(Brown	2003;	Crouch	1980:	69‐96).	The	events	of	30	September	1965,	in	which	PKI	
supporters	attempted	a	coup	and	assassinated	six	army	generals,	brought	this	rivalry	
to	a	head	(Anderson	and	McVey	1971).	While	the	coup	failed,	it	unleashed	a	chain	of	
events	culminating	in	the	rise	of	Suharto,	Indonesia’s	second	president.19	On	11	
March	1966	Sukarno	signed	an	order	granting	Suharto	full	authority	to	restore	the	
peace	(Ricklefs	2001:	349).20	Between	June	and	July	1966	the	Parliament	ratified	
Suharto’s	position,	banned	the	PKI,	outlawed	Marxism	as	a	political	ideology	and	
called	for	elections	to	be	held	in	1968	(Ricklefs	2001:	351).	
	
The	New	Order	
In	the	early	days	of	the	New	Order,	Suharto	was	eager	to	build	an	image	that	would	
set	him	apart	from	earlier	politicians	(Elson	2001:	140).	Along	with	promises	of	
development	and	prosperity,	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	was	an	important	part	of	this	
effort.	Suharto	promised	that	he	would	address	corruption	and	support	‘not	only	
good	government	but	also	clean	government’	(Robertson‐Snape	1999:	589).	Even	the	
regime’s	name—the	‘New	Order’—was	intended	to	distance	it	from	the	previous	era,	
which	had	become	synonymous	with	the	extravagances	of	the	elite	and	the	
corruption	of	bureaucrats	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	suffering	of	the	poor	on	the	other	
(Feith	1994:	16;	Ricklefs	2001:	342).		
	
An	anti‐corruption	symbol	became	a	core	part	of	the	image	of	the	new	regime.	In	
April	1966	Suharto	established	the	Team	to	Regularize	State	Finances	(Tim	
Penerbitan	Keuangan	Negara,	Pekuneg)	to	collect	‘incriminating	material’	as	evidence	
of	corrupt	activities	undertaken	by	members	of	the	Old	Order	government	(Crouch	
																																																													
19	This	coup	was	a	watershed	moment	in	Indonesian	history.	The	events	of	the	failed	coup	
remain	mysterious,	with	speculation	that	the	United	States	Secret	Service	were	involved	and	
continued	questions	about	what	role	Suharto	played	in	the	events.	The	mass	killings	that	
followed	the	coup	have	continued	to	draw	academic	inquiry	due	to	the	complex	nature	of	the	
massacres—who	killed,	who	was	killed	and	why	they	were	killed.	The	New	Order	regime	used	
the	coup	extensively	in	its	anti‐Communist	propaganda	and	to	promote	Suharto’s	role	in	
protecting	the	nation.	For	a	detailed	analyses	of	the	coup	and	its	fallout	see	Anderson	and	
McVey	(1971),	Cribb	(1990),	Roosa	(2006)	and	Kammen	and	McGregor	(2012).	
20	During	this	period	of	uncertainty,	Suharto’s	efforts	to	discredit	Sukarno	were	subtle,	fearing	
retaliation	from	die‐hard	Sukarnoists,	but	it	did	not	take	long	for	him	to	manoeuvre	him	out	of	
politics	altogether	(Cribb	and	Brown	1995:	111;	van	der	Kroef	1971:	38‐40).	Before	long,	
Suharto	had	removed	enough	of	his	detractors	from	the	government	to	be	confident	that	the	
People’s	Consultative	Assembly	would	support	him	(Ricklefs	2001:	351).	
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1980:	296).	Show	trials	were	conducted	against	former	Old	Order	ministers,	
highlighting	their	economic	mismanagement,	corruption	and	general	disregard	for	
public	welfare	(Cribb	and	Brown	1995:	111;	Pauker	1967:	145‐146).	Public	attention	
was	also	drawn	to	ongoing	military	and	bureaucratic	corruption	(Dahm	1971:	262;	
Feith	1968:	95).21	In	response,	Suharto	mounted	a	concerted	public	campaign	against	
corruption,	making	a	number	of	public	statements	in	the	latter	half	of	1967.	Suharto’s	
efforts	reflected	his	desire	to	project	a	reformist	image,	with	actions	and	speeches	
used	as	rhetorical	tools	designed	to	paint	Suharto	as	the	leader	that	Indonesians	
wanted.	
	
Yet,	despite	this	public	anti‐corruption	campaign,	progress	was	slow.	Suharto	was	in	a	
difficult	position,	needing	to	build	an	anti‐corruption	image	to	appeal	to	the	masses	
but	also	requiring	the	support	of	military,	parliamentary	and	business	leaders	who	
benefited	from	the	status	quo	(Mackie	1970:	88).	Pekuneg	and	the	Anti‐Corruption	
Investigation	Team	(Tim	Pemberantasan	Korupsi,	TPK),	launched	in	August	1967,	
were	charged	with	investigating	corruption	cases	and	referring	suspects	for	arrest	
and	trial;	however,	these	bodies	had	little	impact	(Crouch	1980:	296).	In	December	
1967	Suharto	issued	an	instruction	to	the	Attorney‐General,	with	assistance	from	the	
Minister	for	Justice	and	commanders	of	the	armed	forces,	to	‘take	firm	measures	
against	all	forms	of	corruption’	(cited	in	Pauker	1968:	137).	However,	Attorney‐
General	Soegih	Arto	complained	in	April	1968	that	the	TPK	was	unable	to	do	its	job	
effectively	because	the	definition	of	‘corrupt	conduct’	in	existing	laws	was	too	vague.	
At	the	same	time,	TPK	employees	complained	that	the	relatively	short	time	within	
which	alleged	‘corruptors’	had	to	be	charged	and	brought	to	trial	(six	months)	made	
convictions	difficult	(van	der	Kroef	1971:	76).	Corruption	suspects	were	regularly	
released	due	to	a	proclaimed	lack	of	evidence	(Crouch	1980:	296;	van	der	Kroef	1971:	
77).22		
	
																																																													
21	One	example	of	a	corruption	scandal	reported	in	the	media	was	the	‘Holden	Affair’	of	
November	1967,	in	which	the	planned	tax‐free	import	of	Australian‐made	Holden	cars	for	the	
benefit	of	MPs	‘erupted	into	a	black	market	scandal	in	November	1967,	at	the	very	time	when	
demands	for	a	more	intensified	tax	collection	procedure	and	for	a	general	austerity	were	
being	heard	in	Parliament	itself’	(van	der	Kroef	1971:	76).		
22	In	February	1969	the	police	announced	that	over	159	officials	and	private	banking	
enterprises	had	been	found	guilty	of	fraud	and	85	per	cent	had	been	tried	(van	der	Kroef	
1971:	77).	Two	generals	were	also	tried	and	convicted	for	corruption	in	1969	(Crouch	1980:	
293).	There	was	a	flurry	of	announcements,	with	the	government	hopeful	it	would	be	seen	to	
be	taking	action.	Detractors	noted	that	the	arrests	were	mostly	of	insignificant	individuals	or	
people	who	had	fallen	out	of	favour	with	Suharto,	such	as	the	two	military	officials	indicted,	
and	no	parliamentarians	were	arrested.	
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By	mid‐November	1968,	the	anti‐corruption	movement	was	gaining	momentum.	
Between	1965	and	1970,	as	Mackie	(1970:	88)	asserts,	‘there	[were]	few	burning	
issues	of	comparable	horse‐power	for	opponents	or	critics	of	the	regime’.	Student	
groups	rallied	around	the	issue	and	threatened	vigilante	action	against	‘corruptors’.	A	
number	of	newspapers	fuelled	student	concerns,	including	Mochtar	Lubis’	Indonesia	
Raya	and	Nusantara,	as	well	as	other	student	publications	such	as	Harian	Kami	and	
Mahasiswa	Indonesia	(Crouch	1980:	294‐295).	Concerned	about	public	order,	the	
government	banned	all	non‐approved	demonstrations	in	January	1970.	Subsequent	
meetings	between	student	leaders	and	cabinet	ministers	led	to	promises	that	anti‐
corruption	measures	would	be	a	government	priority	(Dahm	1971:	263;	van	der	
Kroef	1971:	232).	
	
A	renewed	anti‐corruption	offensive	began	on	31	January	1970	when	Suharto	
announced	the	formation	of	the	‘Commission	of	Four’	led	by	former	Prime	Minister	
Wilopo,	working	with	former	Vice‐President	Hatta.	The	Commission	was	charged	
with	investigating	the	extent	of	the	corruption	in	the	government	and	providing	
recommendations	for	its	eradication	(Elson	2001:	195;	Mackie	1970;	van	der	Kroef	
1971:	78).	Suharto	also	released	a	public	statement	printed	in	the	newspaper	Kompas	
on	2	February	1970;	in	which	he	stated:	
	
Corruption	and	deviant	actions	in	the	economic	field	in	general	not	only	
conflict	with	the	law	and	with	security,	but	are	clearly	incompatible	with	
morals,	and	puncture	the	feeling	of	justice	[sic].	Corruption	blocks	the	
implementation	of	the	state’s	programs,	damages	the	principles	and	reduces	
the	authority	of	the	government	apparatus,	if	it	is	not	curbed,	lessened	and	
supressed	as	much	as	possible	(cited	in	Elson	2001:	195).	
	
Suharto	highlighted	corruption	again	in	his	Independence	Day	speech	of	August	1970,	
asserting	that	‘there	should	no	longer	be	any	doubts	about	it.	I	myself	will	lead	the	
fight	against	corruption’	(cited	in	Elson	2001:	196).	In	the	same	year,	Attorney‐
General	Soegih	Arto	introduced	a	new,	more	detailed	anti‐corruption	bill	to	the	
parliament	(van	der	Kroef	1971:	233).	The	bill,	passed	as	Law	No.	3/1971	on	the	
Eradication	of	Criminal	Acts	of	Corruption,	was	welcomed	by	activists	(Brata	2009:	
136).23	
																																																													
23	Suharto	also	agreed	to	regular	weekly	meetings	in	which	student	activists	could	present	
evidence	of	official	corruption	to	him.	While	this	seemed	a	positive	development	for	activists,	
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	Attempts	by	Suharto	to	consolidate	an	anti‐corruption	image	were,	however,	
undermined	by	lack	of	action.	The	new	anti‐corruption	legislation	was	not	
retroactive,	much	to	the	disappointment	of	activists	(van	der	Kroef	1971:	233).	
Suharto	also	refused	to	publicly	release	the	Commission	of	Four’s	findings	(Crouch	
1980:	297),	although	they	were	subsequently	leaked	to	the	media	(Crouch	1980:	297;	
Elson	2001:	196;	Mackie	1970:	87).	The	Commission	submitted	reports	on	the	
Attorney‐General’s	Office;	the	national	oil	company,	Pertamina;	the	state	
procurement	agency;	the	state	forestry	enterprise;	as	well	as	two	reports	advising	the	
government	on	ways	to	address	corruption.	The	findings	suggested	that	the	lack	of	
transparency	in	budget	spending	contributed	to	corruption	and	recommended	
structural	reforms	for	the	Attorney‐General’s	office	and	Pertamina.	The	Commission	
also	advocated	the	arrests	of	some	of	Suharto’s	key	supporters,	including	his	cousin	
Sudikatmono	(Elson	2001:	196).	The	Commission’s	efforts	led	to	the	punishment	of	
some	minor	officials,	but	recommendations	that	officials	must	declare	their	private	
assets	and	the	implementation	of	a	law	regulating	the	oversight	of	Pertamina	were	
never	executed	(Elson	2001:	196).		
	
The	Commission	was	accused	of	being	a	‘whitewash’	by	student	groups,	who	stepped	
up	their	campaigning	to	highlight	the	ongoing	negative	impacts	of	corruption.	
Newspapers,	such	as	Indonesia	Raya	and	Harian	Kami,	continued	to	report	on	corrupt	
dealings	between	prominent	business	and	political	figures	(van	der	Kroef	1971:	78).	
Pamphlets	accusing	top	military	officials	of	corruption	were	also	circulated	in	the	
main	cities	of	Java	(van	der	Kroef	1971:	78).	Suharto’s	personal	aides,	who	were	also	
military	officers,	were	singled	out	for	peddling	influence	on	behalf	of	parties	or	
businesses	(van	der	Kroef	1971:	82).	In	response,	the	government	expedited	the	trial	
of	nine	state	electricity	company	officials,	facing	charges	of	embezzling	between	Rp.	
150	(USD0.40)	and	Rp.	34,000	(approximately	USD90)	(Crouch	1980:	298).	This	
episode	demonstrated	discrepancies	in	how	the	public	and	the	government	viewed	
corruption—the	government	focus	on	small‐scale	corruption	was	seen	to	gloss	over	
the	larger	issue.	Meanwhile,	Suharto	had	formalized	his	power	through	an	election	
deemed	to	be	‘heavy‐handed’	and	undemocratic	(Elson	2001:	194;	Jackson	1978),	and	
																																																																																																																																																																									
the	agreement	was	short‐lived,	with	Suharto	dismissing	much	of	the	evidence	presented	
(Brata	2009:	136).	
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activists	remained	troubled	by	the	abuse	of	position	by	the	president’s	inner	circle	
(Aspinall	2005b:	23;	Crouch	1980:	299).24		
	
From	the	beginning	of	the	1970s,	the	government	began	attempting	to	curb	public	
anti‐corruption	sentiment.	The	New	Order	government’s	anti‐corruption	symbol	
suffered	a	number	of	blows	during	this	period.	In	September	1971,	respected	Police	
Commissioner‐General	Hugeng	Imam	Santoso	was	dismissed	from	his	position	after	
he	announced	that	his	team	had	broken	a	smuggling	ring	which	imported	luxury	cars	
for	resale	(Elson	2001:	198;	Jenkins	1984:	330‐331).	The	smuggling	ring	reportedly	
had	military	backing	as	well	as	involving	Suharto’s	wife,	Ibu	Tien.	From	1971,	Tien	
was	also	heavily	criticized	for	her	plan	to	develop	a	cultural	theme	park	(Taman	Mini	
Indonesia	Indah,	Beautiful	Indonesia	Miniature	Park),	funded	by	‘donations’	from	
business	leaders	and	government	officials.	Protests	around	the	Taman	Mini	project	
became	violent,	prompting	presidential	aides	to	request	military	intervention	(Elson	
2001:	199;	Samson	1973:	128).	A	further	example	of	anti‐corruption	activism	during	
this	period	was	the	‘Petition	of	October	24’,	signed	in	October	1973	by	a	group	of	
students	from	the	University	of	Indonesia.	It	outlined	government	criticisms	including	
rising	prices,	corruption,	abuse	of	power,	unemployment	and	the	lack	of	effective	
public	participation	in	government	decision‐making	(Hansen	1975:	148).		
	
There	were	ongoing	protests	up	to	the	mid‐1970s,	foreshadowing	more	serious	
demonstrations	against	the	government.	In	January	1974,	mass	student	protests	were	
sparked	by	an	official	visit	by	the	Japanese	Prime	Minister	to	Indonesia.	The	Malari	
Affair,	as	it	is	known,	was	motivated	primarily	by	anger	at	the	state’s	economic	
policies	which	many	saw	as	favouring	foreign	investors.	However,	it	also	touched	
upon	corruption	and	the	undue	influence	of	senior	members	in	Suharto’s	government	
(Elson	2001:	207;	Liddle	1996:	188).25	The	riots	turned	violent,	leaving	11	dead,	200	
																																																													
24	For	further	details	on	the	1971	elections	see	Jackson	(1978:	31‐32).	Following	the	1971	
elections	there	were	further	restrictions	against	rival	parties,	pressuring	the	remaining	
political	parties	to	form	two	groups,	the	United	Development	Party,	representing	Islamic	
groups	(Partai	Persatuan	Pembangunan,	PPP)	and	the	Indonesian	Democratic	Party,	
representing	nationalist	and	non‐Islamic	political	parties	(Partai	Demokrasi	Indonesia,	PDI)	in	
1972.	
25	The	riots	themselves	were	largely	the	result	of	power	struggles	within	the	army,	with	the	
military	commander	in	charge	of	the	area,	General	Sumitro,	hoping	to	destabilize	Suharto’s	
government	by	allowing	students	to	protest	freely	and	embarrass	the	government	in	front	of	
its	international	guest.	The	gamble	backfired,	though,	when	the	demonstrations	became	
violent.	Suharto	himself	acknowledged	the	riots	as	the	outcome	of	a	‘power	struggle’	between	
sections	of	the	Army	and	his	advisers	(Elson	2001:	207).	
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seriously	injured	and	over	800	arrested.26	The	outcome	of	the	Malari	affair	was	a	
heightened	vigilance	towards	dissent	and	a	move	towards	stronger	political	
repression	and	the	suppression	of	public	protest	(Elson	2001:	209;	Liddle	1996:	189).	
Suharto	did	try	to	pacify	the	movement	by	amending	foreign	ownership	laws	to	
facilitate	more	business	opportunities	for	Indonesians	and	asked	that	friends	‘tone	
down	excessive	displays	of	wealth’	(Vatikiotis	1993:	38).	Furthermore,	the	regime	
embarked	on	a	new	development	focus,	leading	to	increased	spending	on	local	level	
projects	including	school,	health	centres,	roads	and	other	endeavours,	seen	as	
coercive	measures	to	boost	satisfaction	with	the	government	(Liddle	1996:	189).		
	
These	measures	and	the	crackdown	on	protesting	dampened,	but	did	not	eradicate,	
student	activism.	While	most	students	still	saw	themselves	the	moral	guardians	of	the	
nation,	protests	also	began	to	take	on	a	more	‘anti‐government’	tone	(Aspinall	2005b:	
119;	Glassburner	1978:	164).	The	discontent	generated	by	the	New	Order’s	failure	to	
deliver	high‐levels	of	development	to	ordinary	people	while	elites	prospered	due	to	
corruption	led	to	anger	targeted	at	Suharto,	his	wife	and	his	cronies	(Vatikiotis	1993:	
38).	This	was	evidenced	by	the	interest	surrounding	the	Sawito	Affair,	named	after	
the	Javanese	mystic	and	former	employee	of	the	Department	of	Agriculture	who	
denounced	Suharto	as	the	source	of	‘moral	decay’	in	the	state	and	asserted	that	he	
had	been	divinely	chosen	to	rule	Java	(Bourchier	1984;	Grant	1979:	143‐144;	Liddle	
1977:	103).	He	was	arrested	after	writing	a	number	of	inflammatory	documents,	
which	were	supported	by	a	number	of	prominent	Indonesians,	including	former	Vice‐
President	Hatta	(Bourchier	1984:	1).	The	Sawito	Affair	is	noteworthy	for	the	harsh	
reaction	it	provoked	from	Suharto:	Sawito	was	tried	for	involvement	in	an	illegal	
movement	and	sentenced	to	eight	years	imprisonment.	Suharto	even	took	the	step	of	
responding	to	Sawito’s	allegations	in	a	public	statement,	claiming	that	‘neither	he	nor	
any	member	of	his	family	had	used	his	position	for	personal	financial	gain’	(Liddle	
1977:	103).	The	trial	itself	became	a	forum	for	dissent,	with	witnesses	using	it	as	an	
opportunity	to	condemn	the	corruption	and	weak	leadership	of	Suharto’s	regime	
(Bourchier	1984;	Grant	1979:	143‐144).27		
	
Questions	surrounding	Suharto’s	anti‐corruption	agenda	also	stemmed	from	his	
reluctance	to	address	glaring	problems	within	the	state	bureaucracy.	For	example,	in	
																																																													
26	Several	prominent	student	leaders	were	arrested	including	Syahrir	(Liddle	1996:	148),	who	
became	a	prominent	economist	and	was	later	an	economic	advisor	to	President	Susilo	
Bambang	Yudhoyono	from	April	2007	until	his	death	in	July	2008.	
27	For	a	detailed	account	of	the	Sawito	Affair	see	Bourchier	(1984).	
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1975,	a	serious	corruption	scandal	erupted	involving	the	state‐owned	oil	company,	
Pertamina,	which	had	amassed	approximately	USD10	billion	worth	of	debts,	
apparently	through	mismanagement	and	embezzlement	by	its	manager,	Ibnu	Sutowo	
(Chalmers	2006:	222;	Liddle	1977:	96‐99;	Vatikiotis	1993:	37).	Despite	the	earlier	
misgivings	of	the	Commission	of	Four,	Pertamina	had	been	hailed	as	a	New	Order	
‘success	story’	and	an	‘icon’	of	the	regime’s	economic	performance	(Elson	2001:	215).	
The	Pertamina	scandal	threatened	to	undermine	the	regime’s	legitimacy,	which	was	
premised	upon	steady	economic	development,	while	also	challenging	its	financial	
credentials	(Suryadinata	1998:	123).	Sutowo	was	eventually	dismissed	but	was	never	
charged	with	any	crime,	even	though	the	subsequent	investigation	revealed	both	
gross	mismanagement	and	lavish	behaviour	(McCawley	1978:	5‐6).	Dick	and	
Mulholland	(2011:	71)	argue	that	Sutowo	had,	in	fact,	loyally	served	as	a	trusted	
subordinate	who	Suharto	could	call	upon	for	credit	at	short	notice.	Suharto’s	
reluctance	to	approve	prosecution	against	Sutowo	reflected	an	aversion	to	punishing	
corruption	if	it	undermined	his	own	interests.	
	
It	was	in	this	climate	that	a	group	of	Bandung	students	issued	a	‘White	Book’	(Buku	
Putih)	in	January	1978—a	manifesto	demanding	that	Suharto	step	down	as	president	
(Indonesia	1978:	165).28	The	White	Book	was	a	direct	attack	on	Suharto	and	his	
government,	detailing	a	number	of	corruption	scandals	to	argue	they	were	‘self‐
serving’	and	‘greedy’	(Indonesia	1978:	181).	The	government	reacted	immediately,	
banning	the	book,	shutting	down	four	newspapers,	including	Kompas	and	Sinar	
Harapan,	and	rounding	up	student	activists	(Elson	2001:	224).	Later,	a	total	of	seven	
daily	newspapers	and	seven	student	publications	were	banned	as	part	of	the	
crackdown	on	intellectuals	and	students	(Sen	and	Hill	2000:	57).	The	government	
temporarily	closed	many	prominent	universities,	and	university	leadership	were	
directed	to	‘depoliticise’	campuses	(Aspinall	2005b;	Jackson	2005:	185‐187).	
Students	involved	in	writing	the	White	Book	were	arrested	and	tried	in	January	1979	
under	the	anti‐subversion	laws.29	These	acts	of	repression	and	legal	retribution	
marked	the	government’s	decreasing	tolerance	for	public	criticism	and	that	silencing	
																																																													
28	The	journal	Indonesia	published	the	defence	statements	from	students	on	trial	in	April	1979.	
The	accompanying	editorial	content	was	written	anonymously,	presumably	to	avoid	
ramifications	from	the	New	Order	regime.		
29	Anti‐subversion	legislation	was	first	enacted	in	1963	via	Presidential	Decision	No.	11/1963	
and	was	later	ratified	by	parliament	in	1969	as	Law	No.	5/1969.	This	outlawed	public	displays	
of	hostility	or	contempt	towards	the	government	and	other	population	groups	in	Indonesia.	In	
1971	the	Supreme	Court	ruled	that	subversion	included	acts	that	did	not	have	subversive	
intent	but	resulted	in	subversive	outcomes	(Pompe	1992:	398).	
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and/or	discrediting	critics	was	now	a	common	method	of	dealing	with	corruption	
allegations	against	those	in	power.30		
	
The	White	Book	was	one	of	the	final	public	critiques	of	the	government	during	the	
New	Order.	The	subsequent	trials	and	crackdown	on	campus	activism	quashed	the	
student	movement,	which	had	been	one	of	the	last	bastions	of	censure	against	the	
prevalence	of	corruption.	Moreover,	the	banning	of	some	newspapers	and	a	new	
emphasis	on	the	responsibility	of	the	press	to	promote	national	stability	(Brown	
2003:	224;	Sen	and	Hill	2000:	53)	curtailed	the	freedom	of	the	media	and	reporting	of	
corruption	scandals.31	Anti‐corruption	protests	were	not	completely	silenced	and	the	
issue	remained	one	of	public	concern.32	There	were	periodic	attempts	to	‘defuse’	the	
issue	using	the	arrests	and	trials	of	individuals,	but	those	found	guilty	were	mostly	
low	or	mid‐ranked	bureaucrats	(Cribb	and	Brown	1995:	154;	Liddle	1996:	87).	In	an	
attempt	to	re‐establish	a	firm	anti‐corruption	image,	the	government	created	a	new	
anti‐corruption	campaign	(Operasi	Tertib,	OPSTIB)	in	1980,	aimed	at	eradicating	
corruption	and	smuggling.	However,	OPSTIB	was	criticized	for	selectively	taking	up	
cases	and	avoiding	investigation	against	high‐level	officials	(Palmier	1982:	5;	Pauker	
1981:	236).33	Liddle	(1996:	24)	suggests	that	‘these	periodic	
crackdowns…encourage[d]	the	public	to	believe	that	the	government	[was]	at	least	
well‐intentioned’.		
	
																																																													
30	In	another	example,	in	May	1980	a	group	of	50	prominent	Indonesians,	including	retired	
army	generals	and	former	prime	ministers,	signed	a	petition	known	as	‘The	Petition	of	50’	
which	was	critical	of	Suharto	and	his	manipulation	of	Pancasila,	which	they	believed	he	was	
using	to	threaten	political	enemies.	In	order	to	discredit	the	petition,	some	of	Suharto’s	aides	
doctored	a	document	which	they	released	to	the	press,	claiming	that	those	who	had	signed	the	
petition	were	secretly	calling	for	a	coup.	Those	who	had	signed	the	petition	were	punished	
with	various	arbitrary	restrictions,	such	as	restricting	their	ability	to	access	credit,	restricting	
their	travel	and	denial	of	government	contracts.	See	Elson	(2001:	231‐232)	and	Ricklefs	
(2001:	374‐375)	for	further	details.		
31	The	regime	was	also	sensitive	to	reporting	on	corruption	by	international	media	outlets.	For	
example,	in	1986	an	article	in	the	Australian	daily,	The	Sydney	Morning	Herald,	which	
investigated	the	business	holdings	of	Suharto’s	family,	led	to	a	‘brief	crisis	in	Australia‐
Indonesian	relations’	(Ricklefs	2001:	381).		
32	A	1980	Tempo	survey	found	that	42.8	per	cent	of	respondents,	which	was	the	highest	
number,	singled	out	‘corruption	and	abuses	of	power’	as	the	greatest	internal	threat	facing	
Indonesia	(Pauker	1981:	237).		
33	(Tanter	1989)	contends	that	the	abolition	of	OPSTIB	in	1988	was	driven	by	high‐level	
military	officers	involved	in	smuggling	who	had	lobbied	for	the	closure	of	the	operation.	
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Corruption	and	the	fall	of	Suharto	
While	vocal	anti‐corruption	protests	were	quashed	in	the	public	sphere,	corruption	
remained	an	‘open	secret’	(rahasia	umum).34	The	institutionalized	nature	of	
corruption	in	the	bureaucracy	led	to	what	McLeod	(2011a:	52)	calls	a	‘parasitic’	
relationship	between	the	public	sector	and	its	clients	in	which	public	servants,	police	
and	the	military	extorted	citizens	to	supplement	their	low	wages.35	From	the	1980s,	
the	business	dealings	of	Suharto’s	family	and	his	cronies	became	increasingly	
brazen.36	The	Suharto	family	and	its	cronies	established	a	complex	network	of	
‘foundations’	(yayasan)	to	mask	corruption	and	launder	money.	Bribes	could	be	paid	
into	a	foundation	owned	by	a	member	of	the	family	to	escape	detection	and	without	
subject	to	oversight	(Vatikiotis	1993,	51).	Donations	by	state‐owned	enterprises	were	
also	made	into	foundations	as	a	means	for	siphoning	funds	from	the	government	
(Aspinall	2005b:	93;	Elson	2001:	281).	Meanwhile,	corruption	that	threatened	the	
interests	of	Suharto’s	allies	was	curbed,	either	through	law	enforcement	or	more	
sinister	means	(Widoyoko	2011).37	
	
The	1980s	to	the	early	1990s	was	a	profitable	period	for	Suharto’s	children	and	
cronies	(Chalmers	2006:	233;	Winters	2014:	19).38	The	emphasis	on	economic	
development	and	market	deregulation	created	opportunities	for	business	people	
																																																													
34	Aspinall	(1995:	28)	argues	that	there	had	been	a	‘tradition	of	dissent’	amongst	urban	elites	
throughout	the	New	Order	and	this	thesis	does	not	dispute	this.	Anti‐corruption	discourse	was	
used,	albeit	superficially,	by	PPP	and	PDI	during	election	campaigns,	highlighting	the	openness	
of	corrupt	practices.		
35	McLeod	(2008;2011a)	identifies	low	public	servant	wages	as	a	key	driver	of	corruption	
amongst	government	officials.	As	a	result,	much	of	his	research	in	combating	corruption	in	the	
government	focuses	on	paying	civil	servants	a	liveable	wage.	
36	As	Ricklefs	(2001:	366)	argues,	the	economic	successes	of	the	New	Order	did	much	to	
mollify	Indonesians,	particularly	the	middle	class,	who	enjoyed	the	advantages	of	a	booming	
economy.	At	the	same	time,	villagers	in	rural	areas	were	also	benefiting	from	targeted	
development	programs	(Suryadinata	1998:	120‐121).	
37	For	example,	Widoyoko	(2011:	168)	argues	that	the	privatization	of	the	customs	office	in	
the	mid‐1980s	was	a	response	against	smuggling	which	threatened	the	Indonesian	economy	
and,	therefore,	Suharto’s	interests.	
38	Much	has	been	written	on	Suharto’s	use	of	patronage	as	being	linked	to	his	Javanese	roots,	
that	he	essentially	saw	himself	as	a	monarch	who	distributed	favour	in	return	for	financial	
benefit	and	support	(Anderson	1990:	187;	Elson	2001:	301‐302;	Vatikiotis	1993:	111‐114).	
Counter‐arguments	to	this	have	also	been	made,	for	example	Robinson	(1981;1982)	who	
describes	the	relationships	as	less	driven	by	culture	and	more	by	political	functionalism	and	
as	necessary	to	garner	and	cement	support	for	his	leadership.	Similarly,	Ascher	(1998)	
contends	that	patronage	is	more	closely	linked	to	the	need	to	unify	a	disunited	government	
under	mutually	beneficial	circumstances	than	cultural	traditions.	
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interested	in	new	ventures.39	Suharto	publicly	endorsed	policies	such	as	financial	
deregulation,	but	he	ensured	that	his	children	and	cronies	enjoyed	privileged	access	
to	loans	from	state	banks,	government	funding	and	concessions	(Elson	2001:	279).	
Suharto’s	wife	had	already	been	nicknamed	‘Madame	Tien	Percent’,	referring	to	the	
alleged	share	of	profits	she	demanded	from	those	granted	business	favours	by	her	
husband	(Cribb	and	Brown	1995:	126).40	Suharto’s	youngest	son,	Hutomo	Mandala	
Putra	(commonly	known	as	‘Tommy’),	was	awarded	a	contract	in	1996	to	produce	
Indonesia’s	national	car—in	reality,	a	one‐year	license	to	import	cars	from	South	
Korea	without	paying	duties	or	luxury	tax,	allowing	him	to	undercut	competitors	
(Hale	2001:	631).	The	project	was	established	against	the	advice	of	both	the	ministers	
for	trade	and	finance.41	Similar	opportunities	were	afforded	to	Suharto’s	other	
children.42	By	the	early	1990s	the	Suharto	family	assets	were	estimated	at	USD2–3	
billion	(Vatikiotis	1993:	50)	and	Suharto	had	created	a	network	of	supporters	around	
him	who	were	extremely	wealthy,	but	also	heavily	dependent	on	the	President	for	
business	favours	(Liddle	1996:	88,	188;	Vatikiotis	1993:	50).		
	
While	Suharto’s	patronage	networks	in	the	business	sphere	were	strong,	his	support	
from	the	military	began	to	wane.	From	the	late	1980s,	military	leaders	were	
particularly	concerned	with	Suharto’s	succession	plan,	pressuring	Suharto	to	resign	
at	the	upcoming	elections	to	make	way	for	new	leadership	(Jenkins	1984;	Liddle	
1992:	545).	Military	leaders	also	felt	marginalized	as	Suharto	expanded	his	influence	
amongst	civilians	and	senior	bureaucrats	but	seemed	to	neglect	them	(Aspinall	1995:	
23).	At	the	same	time,	international	support	for	the	regime	weakened	with	the	end	of	
the	Cold	War	(Crouch	1993:	91;	Ford	2011)	and	student	pressure	on	the	government	
to	address	inequality,	human	rights	and	corruption	mounted,	as	did	condemnation	
																																																													
39	Falling	oil	prices	in	the	early	1980s	meant	Indonesia	could	no	longer	ride	the	coat‐tails	of	oil	
profits	(Liddle	1987:	206;	Ricklefs	2001:	374).	Robertson‐Snape	(1999:	595)	also	argues	that	
deregularization	impacted	bureaucrats	as	the	number	of	licenses,	permits	and	fees	were	
reduced	so	they	‘lost	their	opportunity	to	benefit	from	'gratuities'	frequently	conferred	for	
performing	such	services’.	
40	Liddle	(1977:	104)	states	she	was	also	nicknamed	‘Madame	Fifty‐Fifty’.		
41	The	Timor	car	project	faced	problems	from	the	start.	Shortly	after	it	began	there	was	a	
sharp	decrease	in	automobile	purchases	in	Indonesia.	Kia,	the	manufacturer,	also	faced	
financial	troubles	in	its	homeland	of	South	Korea,	and	the	Asian	Economic	Crisis	followed	soon	
after	in	1997.	In	1998	Indonesia	signed	a	request	for	financial	assistance	from	the	
International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	which	demanded	an	end	to	concessions	for	the	project	as	
part	of	the	structural	adjustment	plan	and	there	was	the	threat	of	sanctions	from	the	World	
Trade	Organization	(WTO)	if	they	did	not	comply.	For	further	information	about	the	Timor	
project	see	Hale	(2001).	
42	For	more	examples	of	the	concessions	granted	to	Suharto’s	children	see	Vatikiotis	(1993:	
152‐153)	and	Robertson‐Snape	(1999).	
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from	Islamic	leaders.43	In	the	political	sphere,	the	Democratic	Party	of	Indonesia	
(Partai	Demokrasi	Indonesia,	PDI)	and	the	People’s	Democratic	Union	(Persatuan	
Rakyat	Demokratis,	PRD),	formed	from	radical	elements	of	the	student	activist	
movement,	also	became	more	outspoken	in	their	reproaches	of	the	regime.		
	
It	was	these	challenges	that	prompted	Suharto	to	broaden	the	political	space	in	
Indonesia	in	the	late	1980s	that	came	to	be	known	as	the	period	of	‘openness’	
(keterbukaan).44	Keterbukaan	saw	censorship	of	the	press	relaxed,	the	establishment	
of	a	commission	for	human	rights	and	some	toleration	of	political	protests,	
demonstrations	and	government	critiques	(Bertrand	1996:	325).	In	1990,	Suharto	
also	announced	the	creation	of	the	Association	of	Muslim	Intellectuals	(Ikatan	
Cendekiawan	Muslim	Indonesia,	ICMI)	which—while	not	universally	accepted	by	
Islamic	intellectuals—appealed	to	many	urban,	educated	and	modernist	Muslims,	
presenting	them	a	means	to	influence	state	decision‐making	and	advance	the	cause	of	
Islam	within	the	government	(Aspinall	2005b:	40).	45	Suharto	also	reorganized	the	
armed	forces	(Angkatan	Bersenjata	Republik	Indonesia,	ABRI)	removing	perceived	
threats	including	former	protégé	Benny	Murdani	(Bertrand	1996).46	However,	
Keterbukaan	ended	in	1994,	with	the	sudden	closure	of	three	major	media	
publications,	Tempo,	Detik	and	Editor,	after	they	published	a	series	of	negative	reports	
about	a	decision	by	then‐Minister	for	Research	and	Technology,	B.J.	Habibie,	to	
purchase	East	German	warships	(Bertrand	1996:	336;	Eklof	2003:	230;	Ricklefs	2001:	
399).	The	press	had	also	begun	to	investigate	a	number	of	potentially	embarrassing	
corruption	scandals	linked	to	Suharto’s	inner	circle,	providing	an	additional	impetus	
for	the	bans	(Bertrand	1996:	336).		
	
																																																													
43	Aspinall	(2005b:	128),	describing	the	nature	of	student	protests	in	the	mid‐1990s,	writes:	
‘students	increasingly	raised	what	they	sometimes	referred	to	as	“elite”	issues	concerning	
national	level	corruption	and	political	leadership.	This	was	highlighted	by	a	series	of	protests	
directed	against	Suharto	in	1993…	their	typical	modus	operandi	was	relatively	small	
demonstrations	which	involved	considerable	risk.’		
44	Eklof	(2003:	107)	argues	that	the	exact	period	is	difficult	to	define	as	by	March	1988	MPR	
parliamentary	sessions	were	already	engaging	in	lively	debate	on	issues	regarding	the	vice‐
presidency,	electoral	reform	and	education.	However,	the	term	keterbukaan	first	gained	
popularity	in	1989,	following	an	article	in	the	Far	Eastern	Economic	Review	written	by	Suharto	
detractor	(retired)	General	Sumitro	calling	for	greater	political	openness	in	Indonesia.	
45	One	prominent	critic	was	Abdurrahman	Wahid,	from	NU,	who	believed	ICMI	would	foster	
divisions	within	Indonesian	society	and	so	established	a	rival	group,	the	Democracy	Forum	
(Barton	2002:	184‐185).	
46	Suharto	also	went	on	the	Haj	pilgrimage	and	selected	a	devout	Muslim,	Feisal	Tanjung,	as	
ABRI	Chief,	which	was	seen	as	a	move	to	appeal	to	the	Islamic	community	as	a	counterbalance	
to	the	military	(Aspinall	2005b:	40‐41;	Bertrand	1996:	331;	Ricklefs	2001:	401).	
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Alongside	increasingly	prominent	media	criticism,	political	rivals	also	began	to	
challenge	Suharto	and	his	regime,	especially	members	of	PDI	and	PRD	(Aspinall	
2005b).47	From	the	late	1980s,	PDI	became	a	‘semiopposition’	(Aspinall	2005b:	168)	
and	its	attempts	to	assert	its	own	anti‐corruption	symbol	also	highlighted	the	
government’s	lack	of	action.	For	example,	in	1987,	PDI	pointedly	proposed	new	anti‐
corruption	and	anti‐monopoly	legislation	directed	at	the	President’s	nepotistic	
policies	(Eklof	2003:	109).	The	proposal	was	rejected	by	Golkar	and	the	military	
faction	within	the	MPR.	PDI’s	campaigns	leading	up	to	the	1992	elections	also	focused	
on	corruption,	collusion	and	nepotism	(korupsi,	kolusi,	nepotisme,	KKN)	and	
monopolies	(Aspinall	2005b:	175).	Furthermore,	outspoken	PDI	politician,	Kwik	Kian	
Gie,	released	a	report	in	1991	claiming	there	was	an	‘alarming	mental	and	moral	
erosion	in	almost	all	of	the	nation’s	elite	circles,’	and	in	1992	presented	draft	
legislation	for	a	new	economic	competition	law	promoting	transparency	and	a	review	
on	monopoly	rights.	However,	no	other	faction	in	parliament	supported	the	bill	and	it	
was	never	formally	introduced	(Eklof	2003:	121).		
	
In	1993,	PDI	elected	Sukarno’s	daughter,	Megawati	Sukarnoputri,	as	its	chairperson.48	
Megawati’s	appointment	was	recognized	as	an	opportunity	to	unite	opposition	
against	the	New	Order	(Liddle	and	Mallarangeng	1997:	170).49	The	appointment	
emboldened	PDI	members.	For	example,	outspoken	PDI	legislators	sometimes	grilled,	
or	even	boycotted,	government	ministers	during	parliamentary	commission	hearings	
and	PDI	was	the	only	faction	in	the	DPR	to	condemn	the	1994	press	bans	(Aspinall	
2005b:	167).	During	this	period,	PRD	was	also	organizing	protests	and	producing	
publications	targeting	Suharto	and	his	family,	claiming	that	all	social	and	political	
problems	in	Indonesia	could	be	traced	back	to	him	(Aspinall	2005b:	138).50	The	
growing,	and	increasingly	coordinated,	opposition	movement	prompted	a	
government	effort	to	sabotage	Megawati’s	re‐election	as	PDI	chairperson	in	1996	
(Aspinall	2005b:	178;	Eklof	2003:	251).	The	government	supported	former	PDI	
chairperson	Soerjadi	for	the	position,	intimidating	party	members	and	using	fraud	to	
																																																													
47	The	People’s	Democratic	Party	(Partai	Rakyat	Demokratik),	that	was	born	out	of	the	PRD	
student	movement,	publicly	declared	itself	a	political	party	in	July	1996	(Aspinall	2005b).	
48	Eklof	(2003:	207‐216)	argues	that	Megawati’s	rise	to	the	PDI	leadership	was	a	complicated	
affair	involving	deals	with	the	government	and	military	in	return	for	support,	mobilizing	her	
father’s	reputation,	as	well	as	out‐manoeuvring	other	contenders	and	was,	therefore,	based	on	
more	than	outright	popularity.	
49	Wanting	to	build	a	coalition,	PRD	members	assisted	PDI	activists	via	informal	channels,	
sharing	with	them	their	mobilization	techniques	(Aspinall	2005b:	186).	
50	Aspinall	(2005b:	138‐139)	writes	that	this	was	denoted	by	the	phrase	‘ujung‐ujungnya	
Suharto’	(UUS),	roughly	translating	to	“something	that	can	be	traced	back	to	Suharto”.	
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secure	his	nomination	and	subsequent	appointment	at	an	extraordinary	party	
congress	in	Medan	during	June	1996	(Aspinall	2005b:	177‐184).	
	
While	Soerjadi	was	officially	being	selected	as	PDI	Chairperson	in	Medan,	Megawati	
was	addressing	supporters	in	Jakarta.	Pro‐democracy	demonstrators	that	marched	
through	the	city	following	the	speech	were	met	by	government	troops,	who	assaulted	
protestors.	More	than	100	people	were	injured	and	over	50	people	were	detained,	
sparking	more	protests	throughout	the	country	(Aspinall	2005b:	178).	Meanwhile,	
Megawati’s	supporters	refused	to	acknowledge	Soerjadi’s	new	position,	prompting	
legal	action	which	also	spilled	over	into	protests	and	public	rallies	(Aspinall	2005b:	
188;	Ricklefs	2001:	403).	The	tension	came	to	a	head	on	27	July	1996,	when	
Megawati’s	Jakarta	PDI	office	was	attacked	by	thugs	said	to	represent	the	opposing	
faction	of	PDI	(but	were	also	found	to	include	military	officers	out	of	uniform)	and	
two	days	of	rioting	ensued,	in	which	five	people	died,	149	were	wounded	and	74	
people	went	‘missing’	(Ricklefs	2001:	403).	The	government	later	blamed	these	
attacks	on	the	left‐wing	PRD,	with	ABRI	members	claiming	it	was	a	reincarnation	of	
the	outlawed	PKI	(Aspinall	2005b:	192).	Several	PRD	leaders	were	arrested	for	
subversion,	however,	these	arrests	were	more	likely	a	result	of	the	party’s	recent	
success	in	mobilizing	workers’	strikes	in	a	number	of	cities	rather	than	any	actual	
involvement	in	the	riots	(Liddle	and	Mallarangeng	1997:	170).	The	crackdown	on	
PRD	spurred	raids	on	other	NGO	offices	and	the	detention	of	activists	(Aspinall	
2005b:	192;	Bird	1998:	169).		
	
The	final	years	of	the	New	Order	were	characterized	by	growing	dissatisfaction	with	
the	regime,	including	a	growing	concern	over	the	government’s	brutality	towards	its	
own	citizens.51	Government	corruption	also	attracted	significant	public	discontent	
(Liddle	1996:	88;	Schütte	2009:	83),	as	the	blatant	wealth	of	Suharto’s	family	and	
cronies	grew	increasingly	obvious.52	The	issue	was	racialized	as	many	of	Suharto’s	
cronies	were	Chinese‐Indonesian,	leading	to	anger	amongst	‘native’	(pribumi)	
																																																													
51	The	situation	in	East	Timor	fuelled	growing	discontent	towards	the	NewOrder	amongst	
human	rights	activists	(Anderson	1999;	Ricklefs	2001:	395).	Workers’	rights	also	came	under	
scrutiny	as	the	international	community	developed	a	tougher	stance	on	working	conditions	
and	the	brutal	death	of	prominent	activist	and	female	worker,	Marsinah,	highlighted	the	use	of	
violence	to	suppress	dissent	(Ford	2003:	93‐94;	MacIntyre	1994:	117).		
52	Ricklefs	(2001:	402)	discusses	speculation	that	after	the	death	of	Suharto’s	wife,	Ibu	Tien,	
there	were	no	remaining	checks	on	the	money‐hungry	behaviour	of	his	children,	which	in	turn	
led	to	even	more	flagrant	examples	of	corruption.	
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entrepreneurs	(Crouch	1993:	80).53	Discontent	was	intensified	by	the	Asian	Financial	
Crisis.54	Indonesia’s	economy	had	experienced	highs	and	lows	in	the	1990s,	but	
nothing	of	the	scale	of	the	currency	crisis	of	1997.55	Prior	to	the	crisis,	the	US	dollar	
had	been	worth	approximately	Rp.	2,500.	By	October	1997	it	had	increased	to	Rp.	
4,000,	then	Rp.	17,000	in	January	1998	(Ricklefs	2001:	404).	The	dramatic	
devaluation	of	the	rupiah	caused	the	stock	market	to	plummet,	leading	numerous	
businesses	to	declare	bankruptcy,	wiping	out	the	savings	of	the	middle	class	and	
causing	mass	unemployment	(Wade	1998;	Wie	2003:	186‐187).	The	Central	Bank	
provided	liquidity	injections	to	flailing	banks	whose	owners	borrowed	heavily	to	
manage	their	global	portfolios	instead	of	using	the	funds	to	stabilize	savings	and	
reserves	(McLeod	and	Duncan	2007:	79‐80).	In	another	example	of	growing	
frustration	with	the	country’s	leadership,	Bird	(1998:	174)	asserts	the	credibility	of	
the	government	sank	to	new	lows	after	it	was	revealed	that	the	Minister	of	Manpower	
had	used	USD1.3	million	from	the	workers’	social	insurance	fund	to	pay	for	
parliamentarians’	accommodation	and	expenses	while	they	were	deliberating	a	new	
bill	on	manpower	in	1997.	
	
When	it	became	clear	that	the	Rupiah	would	continue	to	plummet,	the	government	
sought	the	assistance	of	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	and	the	World	Bank,	
who	responded	with	a	USD38	billion	rescue	package	in	October	1997	(Bird	1998:	
173‐174;	MacIntyre	1999:	157).	However,	in	spite	of	agreeing	to	a	number	of	
conditions	that	required	Indonesia	to	adopt	austerity	measures,	strengthen	its	
financial	sector	and	overhaul	the	government’s	role	in	the	economy,	Suharto	still	
attempted	to	block	reforms	that	interfered	with	the	projects	of	his	cronies	(Bird	
1999:	28;	Ricklefs	2001:	404;	Sherlock	1998).	Nepotism	continued,	illustrated	by	the	
appointment	of	B.J.	Habibie,	widely	regarded	as	Suharto’s	heir	apparent,	as	Vice‐
President,	his	daughter,	Siti	Hardiyanti	Rukmana	(commonly	known	as	‘Tutut’),	and	
several	close	friends,	as	cabinet	ministers	when	he	was	re‐elected	President	in	March	
																																																													
53	For	example,	in	1994,	a	number	of	students	from	the	Muslim	Students’	Association	
(Himpunan	Mahasiswa	Islam,	HMI)	and	ICMI	staged	protests	against	corruption	in	the	
Indonesian	Development	Bank	(Bank	Pembangunan	Indonesia,	Bapindo)	after	a	scandal	
erupted	involving	Chinese‐Indonesian	elites	(Aspinall	2005b:	135).	
54	While	there	were	several	factors	leading	to	the	Asian	financial	crisis,	the	immediate	cause	
was	the	floating	of	the	Baht	by	the	Thai	government	after	it	could	no	longer	support	the	
currency’s	exchange	rate.	As	the	value	of	the	Baht	dropped	significantly,	so	too	did	the	
currencies	of	neighbouring	countries.	For	further	details	on	the	Asian	financial	crisis	and	the	
implications	for	Indonesia,	see	Wie	(2003)	and	Hill	and	Shiraishi	(2007).	
55	According	to	Liddle	(1992:	542)	the	early	1990s	witnessed	impressive	growth	and	an	
increase	in	the	annual	national	budget.	In	contrast,	MacIntyre	(1993:	208)	argues	that	there	
had	been	some	alarm	in	1992	at	the	high	levels	of	national	foreign	debt	and	offshore	
borrowing.	
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1998.	Dissatisfied	with	Suharto’s	reforms	so	far,	the	IMF	mooted	a	new	agreement	in	
April	1998,	requiring	a	raft	of	new	policy	reforms	accompanied	by	close	monitoring.	
Soon	after,	on	4	May	1998,	Suharto	approved	a	70	per	cent	increase	in	fuel	prices,	
sparking	riots	across	the	country	(Bird	1999:	29).	Demonstrations	against	the	
subsequent	price	increases	led	to	calls	for	Reformation	(Reformasi)	(Siegel	1998:	74).		
	
While	Suharto	attempted	to	manoeuvre	his	way	through	the	crisis,	soldiers	opened	
fire	on	protesters	on	12	May	1998,	killing	four	student	protesters	from	Trisakti	
University	and	injuring	several	others	(Bird	1998:	29).	Public	outrage	at	the	deaths	
sparked	riots	in	Jakarta	and	several	other	major	cities.	Suharto	family	enterprises	and	
those	of	Chinese‐Indonesians	became	prime	targets	for	arson	and	looting,	with	
hundreds	perishing	in	shopping	mall	fires	(Aspinall	2005b:	232;	Siegel	1998).56	The	
riots	confirmed	the	government	was	unable	to	maintain	rule	of	law	(Aspinall	2005b:	
232).	Suharto	lost	not	only	the	support	of	everyday	citizens	but	also	that	of	the	
business	elite,	many	of	whom	fled	the	country.	Political	elites	also	rebelled	with	14	
cabinet	members	who	had	been	appointed	by	Suharto	refusing	to	serve	under	him.	In	
addition,	the	military,	under	Wiranto,	withdrew	its	support	for	the	president	and	
Islamic	leaders	advised	him	to	resign	(Aspinall	2005b:	234‐237;	Ricklefs	2001:	406‐
407).57	Suharto	stepped	down	on	21	May	1998	and	was	replaced	by	Vice‐President	
Habibie	until	new	elections	could	be	conducted.		
	
Reformasi	
The	relatively	swift	collapse	of	the	New	Order	regime	threw	Indonesia	into	chaos.	
Recognizing	the	need	to	address	public	demands	for	increased	transparency	and	
accountability,	Habibie	signed	two	bills	in	the	immediate	post‐Suharto	period.	In	May	
1998	he	signed	Law	No.28/1999	on	the	Establishment	of	a	Commission	to	Examine	
the	Wealth	of	State	Officials	(Komisi	Pemeriksa	Kekayaan	Penyelenggara	Negara,	
KPKPN)	and	in	August	1998	he	signed	Law	No.31/1999	on	the	Eradication	of	the	
Crime	of	Corruption	(Butt	2011b:	15;	King	2000:	621).	These	laws	authorized	
investigations	into	the	dealings	of	politicians	and	bureaucrats	who	could	be	
reasonably	suspected	of	corruption,	as	well	as	the	formation	of	an	anti‐corruption	
commission	within	two	years	(Butt	2011b:	15;	Crouch	2010:	212‐213).	The	laws	
																																																													
56	Chinese‐Indonesians,	who	had	been	suspected	of	profiteering	from	the	crisis,	were	
particularly	victimized	(Elson	2001:	288;	Purdey	2006:	Chapter	4;	Siegel	1998:	76).	For	a	
detailed	account	of	anti‐Chinese	violence	in	Indonesia	between	1996	and	1999,	see	Purdey	
(2006).	
57	For	further	discussion	of	the	fracturing	of	the	elite	in	the	final	days	of	Suharto’s	presidency,	
see	Aspinall	(2005b:	234‐238).	
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were	well‐received,	but	the	upheaval	of	the	early	Reformasi	period	and	the	upcoming	
elections	in	1999	soon	overshadowed	these	anti‐corruption	efforts.	As	a	result,	the	
commission	for	investigating	the	wealth	of	state	officials	was	not	set	up	until	January	
2001	(Crouch	2010:	213).		
	
Later,	in	November	1998,	the	MPR	also	passed	a	resolution	committing	to	the	
investigation	of	all	corruption	during	the	New	Order,	including	Suharto	and	his	family	
(Bird	1999:	31;	Crouch	2010:	200).	Although	Suharto	claimed	to	have	few	savings	and	
denied	owning	offshore	bank	accounts,	in	1995	four	of	the	foundations	he	controlled	
were	valued	at	Rp.	2.5	trillion	(over	USD310	million).	In	December	1998,	seven	more	
foundations	were	found	to	be	holding	‘quintillions	of	rupiah’	(Ricklefs	2001:	409).	
Subsequent	investigations	conducted	under	Habibie’s	presidency	found	no	evidence	
to	suggest	that	Suharto’s	wealth	had	been	gained	through	inappropriate	means	(Elson	
2001:	295).	The	‘show’	of	the	investigation	was	unconvincing,	leading	to	public	
demand	for	a	more	thorough	inquiry	(Hadiz	2000:	27).	
	
Presidential	pressures	
Habibie	opted	not	to	run	as	a	presidential	candidate	in	the	1999	general	elections.58	
As	the	field	narrowed,	Abdurrahman	Wahid	and	Megawati	Sukarnoputri,	who	formed	
her	own	party	called	the	Indonesia	Democratic	Party	of	Struggle	(Partai	Demokrasi	
Indonesia	Perjuangan,	PDIP)	following	Suharto’s	resignation,	emerged	as	the	two	
main	contenders	for	the	presidency.	Although	Megawati’s	party	won	the	largest	share	
of	seats	in	the	national	legislature,	the	MPR	chose	Wahid	as	president	(Liddle	2000:	
33).	Wahid	benefited	from	an	initial	reputation	of	being	‘clean’	and	recognized,	at	
least	rhetorically,	that	combating	KKN	should	be	a	government	priority	(King	2000:	
604).	He	also	supported	increased	public	space	for	media	outlets,	which	could	now	
report	openly	on	corruption	scandals	in	ways	that	were	not	possible	during	the	New	
Order	(Hara	2001:	314).		
	
Acknowledging	the	public	pressure	to	institute	reforms	across	the	police	force,	
judiciary	and	the	public	prosecutor’s	office,	Wahid	sought	to	portray	corruption	
eradication	as	a	‘central	plank’	of	his	administration	(Hadiz	and	Robinson	2014:	49).	
																																																													
58	These	were	the	first	elections	since	1955	in	which	party	representation	was	not	restricted.	
Several	parties	participated,	the	major	ones	being	(in	order	of	votes	garnered):	PDIP,	Golkar,	
the	National	Awakening	Party	(Partai	Kebangkitan	Bangsa,	PKB),	PPP	and	the	National	
Mandate	Party	(Partai	Amanat	Nasional,	PAN).	For	a	full	overview	of	the	electoral	outcomes,	
see	Liddle	(2000).	
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Accordingly,	Wahid	established	the	Joint	Team	to	Eradicate	the	Crime	of	Corruption	
(Tim	Gabungan	Pemberantasan	Tindak	Pidana	Korupsi,	TGPTPK)	as	a	stop‐gap	
measure	while	provisions	could	be	made	for	the	establishment	of	a	Corruption	
Eradication	Commission	(Komisi	Pemberantasan	Korupsi,	KPK).	Wahid	also	
established	the	National	Ombudsman’s	Commission	in	2000,	with	Presidential	Decree	
No.44/2000,	tasked	with	receiving	complaints	from	the	public	regarding	the	conduct	
and	decisions	of	public	officials	(Sherlock	2002:	367).	Moreover,	there	were	attempts	
to	reinvigorate	the	state	audit	institutions	and	improve	oversight	of	government	
spending	(Hamilton‐Hart	2001:	73).		
	
These	early	attempts	to	combat	corruption	were	met	with	resistance,	particularly	as	
members	of	the	judiciary	were	a	primary	target	of	the	TGPTPK.	Those	seeking	to	
uncover	the	corrupt	activities	of	the	elite	were	often	met	with	counter‐claims	of	
defamation	by	those	they	had	accused.	For	example,	the	case	of	women’s	rights	
activist,	Yeni	Roslaini,	who,	after	providing	legal	assistance	to	a	victim	of	rape,	was	
prosecuted	for	libel	by	the	accused.	During	the	case,	Roslaini	contended	that	the	trial	
had	been	unfair	and	the	defence	had	bribed	the	judges	for	a	favourable	ruling.59	In	
another	example,	Endin	Wahyudin	was	sentenced	to	three	months	in	prison	and	six	
months’	probation	in	2003	after	reporting	bribery	involving	three	judges	in	Malang.	
The	judges,	who	were	found	not	guilty,	later	sued	Wahyuddin	for	defamation	(Butt	
and	Lindsay	2011;	Liputan6	2003:	199‐204).	
	
While	Wahid	himself	appeared	committed	to	fighting	corruption,	he	was	not	above	
using	corruption	accusation	for	personal	political	interests.	In	July	1999,	a	Golkar	
election	funding	scandal	came	to	light	involving	financial	misdealing	between	Bank	
Bali	and	a	company	named	PT	Era	Giat	Prima	(EGP).60	EGP	had	struck	a	deal	to	
channel	funds	from	Bank	Bali	to	members	of	Golkar.	The	Governor	of	Bank	Indonesia,	
Syahril	Sabarin,	who	had	been	appointed	by	Suharto	in	1998,	was	accused	of	having	
knowledge	of	the	dealings.	Wahid	wanted	to	appoint	his	own	Bank	Indonesia	
Governor	and	gave	Sabarin	the	option	to	either	resign	or	face	corruption	charges.	
Refusing	to	resign,	Sabarin	was	arrested	in	June	2000	and	convicted	of	corruption	in	
March	2002.61	Wahid	also	charged	key	members	of	his	coalition	of	corruption	so	that	
he	could	replace	them.	Hamzah	Haz	from	the	United	Development	Party	(Partai	
																																																													
59	See	Collins	(2007:	125‐126)	for	further	details	of	the	Roslaini	case.		
60	For	further	explanation	of	the	Bank	Bali	corruption	scandal	see	Crouch	(2010:	207‐209),	
Goodpaster	(2002:	95‐96)	and	Hamilton‐Hart	(2001:	76‐77).	
61	This	conviction	was	overturned	by	the	Jakarta	High	Court	in	August	2002	(Crouch	2010:	
209).	
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Persatuan	Pembangunan,	PPP),	Laksamana	Sukardi	from	PDIP	and	Jusuf	Kalla	from	
Golkar,	were	all	accused	of	corruption,	although	the	cases	were	not	investigated	and	
no	charges	were	laid	(Liddle	2001:	209).62	Despite	the	fact	that	the	accusations	
remained	unsubstantiated,	Wahid	used	them	as	a	basis	for	dismissal.	This	strategy	
backfired	with	Wahid	losing	the	confidence	of	his	coalition	government	and	
subsequently	being	asked	by	parliament	to	account	for	his	actions	(Liddle	2001:	209).	
	
Wahid’s	anti‐corruption	rhetoric	was	inconsistent	with	the	ongoing	leniency	shown	
towards	New	Order	elites	(Barton	2006:	345‐346).63	With	a	new	leadership	installed,	
the	public	had	high	hopes	that	Suharto	and	his	associates	would	finally	be	punished	
for	their	corruption.	Hamilton‐Hart	(2001:	66)	argues	that	public	perceptions	were	
that	the	financial	crisis	was	intensified	by	government	corruption	and	that	KKN	had	
come	to	‘symbolise	the	social	costs,	inequities	and	abuses	of	the	Soeharto	regime’.	
Pressure	mounted	to	re‐open	the	investigation	into	Suharto—legal	charges	were	
finally	laid	against	the	former	president	in	August	2000	(Elson	2001:	295‐296)—but,	
the	charges	were	dropped	in	February	2001	as	defence	lawyers	and	the	ruling	judges	
agreed	Suharto	was	too	ill	to	face	trial	(Aditjondro	2002;	Brown	2003:	243).	It	was	
widely	known	that	Wahid	always	intended	to	pardon	Suharto	if	he	was	found	guilty,	
undermining	his	anti‐corruption	credentials	(Brown	2003:	243;	King	2000:	624).		
	
The	only	child	of	Suharto’s	to	be	tried	was	Tommy	Suharto.	As	progress	in	Suharto’s	
case	stalled	on	grounds	of	illness,	Tommy	came	to	represent	the	excesses	of	the	New	
Order,	with	his	‘playboy	lifestyle’	and	penchant	for	luxury	vehicles	(Tupai	2005).	
Tommy	was	sentenced	to	18	months	imprisonment	in	late	2000	for	swindling	the	
State	Logistics	Agency	(Badan	Urusan	Logistik,	Bulog)	out	of	Rp.	95	billion	
(approximately	USD11	million)	(Crouch	2010:	202).	The	18	month	sentence	for	
corruption	was	seen	as	being	inadequate.	He	went	into	hiding	after	his	appeal	was	
rejected	and	was	subsequently	implicated	in	the	murder	of	the	chief	judge	involved	in	
his	conviction,	Syafiuddin	Kartasasmita	(Brown	2003:	243;	Crouch	2010:	202).	
Reports	of	special	treatment	while	in	prison	and	outings	to	nightclubs	continued	to	
																																																													
62	Kalla	went	on	to	become	vice‐president	in	2004,	contest	the	presidency	(unsuccessfully)	in	
2009	and	become	vice‐president	again	in	2014.	
63	Another	example	of	this	was	the	case	of	Akbar	Tandjung,	State	Secretary	in	1999	and	
General	Chairman	of	Golkar,	who	was	accused	of	using	government	funding	intended	for	
social	welfare	programs	to	bankroll	Golkar’s	1999	election	campaign	(Crouch	2010:	209).	
Tandjung	was	accused	of	diverting	Rp.	40	billion	(USD4	million)	for	the	party’s	electoral	effort.	
He	was	tried	in	March	2002	and	sentenced	to	three	years	in	prison,	however,	the	conviction	
was	overturned	in	February	2004	and	Tandjung	served	only	a	month	of	his	sentence.	
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feed	popular	suspicions	that	the	rich	remained	‘above	the	law’	(Hainsworth	2007).64	
The	only	other	member	of	the	Suharto	clan	to	be	charged	and	jailed	for	corruption	
was	Suharto’s	half‐brother,	Probosutedjo,	who	was	convicted	in	2003	for	
misappropriating	Rp.	49	billion	(approximately	USD5	million)	from	a	government	
reforestation	project	(Kompas	2001).	
	
Tommy’s	trial	put	Wahid	in	a	difficult	position.	While	the	president	had	no	control	
over	judicial	processes,	the	lenient	sentences	were	interpreted	as	further	evidence	
that	the	new	leadership	was	unwilling	to	be	tough	on	corruption.	Wahid’s	reluctance	
to	condemn	Suharto	(and	his	family)	had	already	disappointed	those	who	believed	
that	bringing	New	Order	corruptors	to	justice	would	reflect	broader	government	
reform	(Liddle	2000:	42).	Having	already	lost	the	support	of	most	coalition	members,	
Wahid	faced	increased	scrutiny	that	eventually	led	to	his	impeachment.	In	2000,	
allegations	of	corruption	were	levelled	at	Wahid	when	it	appeared	that	funding	given	
to	Bulog	by	the	Sultan	of	Brunei,	which	was	to	be	spent	in	Aceh	in	order	to	gain	the	
support	of	religious	leaders	in	order	to	halt	civil	unrest,	had	been	misused	(Barton	
2006;	Liddle	2001:	210).	The	lack	of	transparency	in	Bulog’s	projects	in	Aceh	cast	
doubt	over	how	much	had	actually	been	spent	in	the	province	(Collins	2007:	163;	
Crouch	2010:	30).	Crouch	(2010:	30)	describes	Wahid’s	use	of	funding	as	‘casual’	and	
the	use	of	his	personal	masseuse	as	a	go‐between	with	Bulog	as	‘bizarre’,	leaving	him	
vulnerable	to	attacks	from	a	parliament	that	no	longer	supported	his	rule.65	The	
impeachment	process	began	in	February	2001	and	Wahid	was	dismissed	from	the	
presidency	and	replaced	by	Megawati	Sukarnoputri	in	July	2001.	
	
When	Megawati	became	president	twenty	months	after	the	1999	election,	she	too	
spoke	about	the	importance	of	eradicating	corruption.	She	suggested	that	individuals	
needed	to	exercise	better	moral	judgement	and	resist	their	greed,	rather	than	
implementing	institutional	changes	to	address	an	entrenched	problem	(Sherlock	
																																																													
64	Tommy	was	later	convicted	to	15	years	in	prison	for	hiring	hit	men	to	murder	Kartasasmita	
(Brown	2003:	243).	Crouch	(2010:	202)	outlines	the	details	of	the	trial,	noting	that	although	
Tommy	Suharto	was	convicted	for	ordering	the	murder	he	served	only	four	years	of	his	
sentence,	while	the	two	men	found	guilty	of	the	actual	shooting	were	sentenced	to	life	in	
prison	and	remain	in	custody.	After	a	number	of	remissions	Tommy	was	released	in	2006,	
having	served	just	four	out	of	the	fifteen	years	of	his	prison	term	(Kingsbury	2007:	157).	
65	It	is	difficult	to	ascertain	whether	these	acts	were	deliberate.	Ricklefs	(2001:	421)	argues	
that	Wahid	was	in	fact	the	victim	of	rich	corruptors	who	‘circled	around	the	Abdurrahman	
regime’,	while	Brown	(2003:	244)	concurs	that	it	was	unlikely	that	Wahid	had	intentionally	
embezzled	state	funds:	‘the	evidence	for	Wahid’s	malfeasance	in	these	two	cases	is	thin;	what	
does	seem	beyond	doubt,	though,	is	that	he	has	proved	to	be	a	poor	judge	of	his	personal	
assistants’.	Barton	(2006),	author	of	Wahid’s	official	biography,	is	also	sympathetic	to	the	
leader,	portraying	his	downfall	as	a	‘tragedy’.	
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2002:	379).	Like	Wahid,	she	needed	to	appease	Golkar	and	the	military	in	order	to	
gain	parliamentary	support	for	her	leadership.66	Unlike	Wahid,	though,	she	pacified	
her	reluctant	supporters	rather	than	confronting	them,	resulting	in	the	‘stonewalling’	
of	reform	efforts	(Brown	2003:	272;	Sherlock	2002).67	She	also	seemed	reluctant	to	
openly	support	TGPTPK	investigations.68	Alongside	Megawati’s	reluctance	to	act,	
PDIP	gained	a	reputation	for	corruption,	with	members	using	their	new‐found	
authority	for	their	own	benefit	(Crouch	2010:	32;	na	Thalang	2005:	330),	which	may	
have	contributed	to	this	reluctance.	Wanandi	(2004:	124)	contends	that	members	of	
Megawati’s	own	family	were	also	under	suspicion	of	being	involved	in	corruption	
(although	no	arrests	have	ever	occurred).	Some	in	the	judiciary	and	law	enforcement	
agencies	also	seemed	determined	to	undermine	anti‐corruption	efforts.	In	March	
2001	a	team	of	three	Supreme	Court	judges	annulled	the	law	allowing	for	the	TGPTPK	
altogether.69	Progress	of	the	Commission	to	Examine	the	Wealth	of	State	Officials	
(Komisi	Permeriksa	Kekayaan	Penyelenggara	Negara,	KPKPN)	was	similarly	stifled	as	
it	required	support	from	the	Police	and	the	Attorney‐General’s	office	to	mount	
prosecution	against	corruption	suspects	and	cooperation	between	the	two	was	poor	
(Butt	2011b:	19).	The	KPKPN	only	reported	eight	officials	to	the	police	on	suspicions	
of	corruption	throughout	its	lifetime.	It	was	subsumed	into	the	KPK	in	2003.	The	lack	
of	progress	on	issues	of	corruption	across	all	levels	of	government	was	symptomatic	
of	more	general	criticisms	of	the	Megawati	regime	as	she	was	derided	for	lacking	
vision	in	guiding	the	country	(Crouch	2010:	32).70		
																																																													
66	This	also	included	the	installation	of	Hamzah	Haz	as	vice‐president,	despite	previously	
being	dismissed	from	Wahid’s	cabinet	on	suspicion	of	corruption	and	even	though	he	had	
rejected	her	presidency	in	1999	on	the	basis	that	she	was	a	woman	(Crouch	2010,	32).	
67	Crouch	(2010:	210)	contends	that	Megawati	purposefully	did	not	push	for	the	conviction	of	
Akbar	Tandjung,	leader	of	Golkar	charged	with	diverting	funds	from	Bulog	for	Golkar’s	
election	campaign	in	1999,	as	allowing	him	to	maintain	his	position	in	spite	of	controversial	
corruption	charges	was	of	political	benefit	to	PDIP.	Furthermore,	when	Megawati’s	
government	passed	new	anti‐corruption	legislation,	which	provided	for	a	new	commission	
and	courts,	several	amendments	were	made	to	the	bills	in	the	parliament,	watering	them	
down	before	they	were	enacted	(Crouch	2010:	34).	The	court	systems	were	reputed	to	be	run	
by	a	‘legal	mafia’	(mafia	hukum),	who	accepted	bribes	in	return	for	favourable	court	rulings	
(Lindsey	1998),	and	the	government	had	done	little	to	reign	them	in.	
68	The	TGPTPK	needed	official	presidential	approval	before	questioning	senior	officials,	which	
Megawati	rarely	granted	(Crouch	2010:	215).		
69	Members	of	the	TGPTPK	believed	there	was	a	conspiracy	against	the	team,	later	confirmed	
when	a	petition	was	submitted	to	the	Supreme	Court	to	review	the	statute	under	which	the	
team	had	been	established.	The	case	led	the	Supreme	Court	to	annul	Law	No.31/1999,	which	
was	the	legal	basis	for	the	TGPTPK	(Butt	and	Lindsay	2011:	202‐203)	.	The	annulment	was	
viewed	as	an	attempt	by	Supreme	Court	judges	to	protect	their	colleagues	(Crouch	2010:	214).	
70	Despite	a	disinclination	to	openly	support	anti‐corruption	efforts,	Megawati	signed	the	Law	
for	the	Commission	to	Eradicate	the	Crime	of	Corruption	(Law	No.	30/2002)	in	December	
2002,	paving	the	way	for	a	new	anti‐corruption	investigative	body	with	broader‐ranging	
powers.	The	Anti‐Corruption	Courts	(Pengadilan	Tindak	Pidana	Korupsi,	Tipikor),	however,	
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The	rise	of	Yudhoyono	
In	2004,	Susilo	Bambang	Yudhoyono	(often	referred	to	as	‘SBY’)	bested	Megawati	in	
Indonesia’s	first	direct	presidential	election.71	Yudhoyono	had	served	as	a	cabinet	
minister	for	both	Wahid	and	Megawati,	but	was	dismissed	by	Megawati	after	she	
realized	that	he	intended	to	challenge	her	for	the	presidency.	As	early	as	2001	
Yudhoyono	was	involved	in	the	Democratic	Party,	which	later	became	the	electoral	
vehicle	to	support	his	presidential	nomination	(Crouch	2010:	35;	Slater	2004:	64).	In	
the	final	run‐off,	which	pitted	Yudhoyono	against	Megawati,	both	candidates	pledged	
that	they	would	combat	corruption	(Ananta	et	al.	2005).72	With	a	poor	track	record	
on	the	issue,	Megawati’s	credibility	regarding	this	promise	was	questionable.	The	lack	
of	reforms	implemented	during	her	presidency	fuelled	perceptions	that	corruption	
had	worsened	under	her	rule	(Slater	2004:	64;	Wanandi	2004:	116).	By	contrast,	
Yudhoyono	was	able	to	paint	himself	as	being	committed	to	combating	corruption	
(Ananta	et	al.	2005:	117;	Hadiz	2003:	596).73	With	surveys	illustrating	that	the	
economy,	social	welfare	and	corruption	eradication	were	the	highest	priorities	of	
Indonesian	citizens	(Aspinall	2005a:	124),	support	emerged	for	a	new	leadership	that	
could	reverse	the	stagnation	of	earlier	years.	Reflecting	this	sentiment,	Yudhoyono’s	
Democratic	Party	gained	7.5	per	cent	of	votes,	while	PDIP’s	vote	declined	from	39	per	
cent	in	1999	to	19	per	cent	in	2004	(Wanandi	2004:	117).		
	
Yudhoyono	won	a	decisive	victory	over	Megawati	in	the	presidential	election’s	
second	round	run‐off,	winning	60.6	per	cent	of	the	popular	vote	(Liddle	and	Mujani	
2005:	122).	After	becoming	president,	Yudhoyono	embarked	on	a	much‐lauded	anti‐
corruption	drive.	He	authorized	the	KPK	to	investigate	senior	officials	and	
parliamentarians	and	in	2004	announced	new	measures	to	‘accelerate’	the	
eradication	of	corruption	(Crouch	2010:	217).	By	2006,	Yudhoyono’s	anti‐corruption	
drive	led	to	the	investigation	and/or	arrest	of	at	least	seven	governors,	63	district	
heads	and	13	national	parliamentarians	(McGibbon	2006:	325).	During	his	first	year	
as	president,	Yudhoyono	signed	off	on	investigations	into	57	officials	(Crouch	2010:	
218).	The	first	Tipikor	trial	involving	former	Acehnese	governor	Abdul	Saleh,	who	
																																																																																																																																																																									
were	not	established	until	October	2004	(Butt	2011b:	32),	largely	indicative	of	a	general	lack	
of	enthusiasm	for	the	body,	not	least	from	Megawati	and	the	parliament.	
71	Up	until	1999,	the	president	was	chosen	by	the	MPR.	For	a	discussion	on	the	transition	to	
direct	presidential	elections,	first	held	in	2004,	see	Tan	(2006).	
72	Aspinall	(2005a:	118)	asserts	that	while	the	‘dominant	discourse	of	the	elections	was	
democratic,	against	corruption	and	even	pro‐‘change’	(perubahan),	this	was	merely	an	empty	
rhetorical	device	intended	to	mask	continued	elite	dominance’.	
73	A	focus	group	study	conducted	by	Ananta	et	al.	(2005:	91)	found	that	Yudhoyono	was	seen	
as	‘firm’	(tegas)	and	participants	felt	he	would	be	firm	in	dealing	with	corruption	in	Indonesia.	
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was	sentenced	to	ten	years	imprisonment	in	April	2005,	was	seen	as	a	landmark	trial	
(Crouch	2010:	218).	Following	this,	a	slew	of	high‐profile	corruption	cases	were	
mounted,	including	some	that	Megawati	had	previously	refused	to	approve.	
Acknowledging	the	limited	resources	of	the	KPK	and	the	anti‐corruption	courts,	
Yudhoyono	approved	the	formation	of	an	additional	body	called	the	Coordination	
Team	for	the	Eradication	of	the	Crime	of	Corruption	(Tim	Koordinasi	Pemberantasan	
Tindak	Pidana	Korupsi,	Tim	Tastipikor).	Drawn	from	the	Attorney‐General’s	office,	
the	police	and	the	Finance	and	Development	Board,	the	team	answered	directly	to	the	
president	and	brought	cases	to	the	ordinary	courts	instead	of	the	anti‐corruption	
courts.	It,	too,	led	some	high‐profile	prosecutions	including	the	case	against	
Megawati’s	Minister	of	Religion,	Said	Agil	Husin	Al	Munawar,	who	was	charged	and	
convicted	of	embezzling	funds	designated	to	assist	Indonesian	citizens	in	their	
pilgrimage	to	Mecca	(Crouch	2010:	219).		
	
Yudhoyono	steadfastly	supported	the	KPK	and	anti‐corruption	efforts	throughout	his	
first	term	in	office	(2004–2009).	However,	as	convictions	began	to	mount,	critics	
accused	him	of	focusing	on	rival	parties.	Moreover,	the	investigations	did	not	reach	
the	highest	echelons	of	power	in	the	government	and	business	(Crouch	2010:	38).74	
Nevertheless,	with	his	relatively	clean	background	and	less	involvement	in	patronage	
politics	than	his	predecessors,	Yudhoyono	was	able	to	capitalize	on	these	convictions	
in	order	to	boost	his	popularity.	There	was	much	praise	for	his	leadership	as	he	was	
seen	as	having	stabilized	the	nation’s	economy	after	several	years	of	poor	economic	
growth	(Sukma	2009:	350),	while	the	country’s	continued	economic	growth	appeared	
to	spare	Indonesia	from	the	worst	of	the	global	financial	crisis	in	2008	(Aspinall	2010:	
105).	Meanwhile,	Yudhoyono’s	deputy,	Jusuf	Kalla	from	Golkar,	had	brokered	a	peace	
																																																													
74	For	example,	Yudhoyono	faced	criticism	for	granting	clemency	to	Tommy	Suharto	and	
reducing	his	sentence	and	failing	to	prosecute	him	for	other	crimes	as	new	evidence	came	to	
light.	Anti‐corruption	and	human	rights	activists	voiced	strong	opposition	to	Tommy’s	parole	
early	in	2006,	claiming	he	had	received	special	treatment	due	to	his	position	and	influence	
(Cochrane	2006).	Tommy	has	been	linked	to	a	number	of	other	corruption	scandals,	including	
a	court	case	brought	by	the	state	logistics	agency	against	him	for	USD70	million	over	a	land	
scam	in	1995	in	which	he	used	government	connections	to	swap	swamp	lands	in	North	
Jakarta	for	prime	real	estate	in	the	heart	of	Jakarta.	The	case	was	dismissed	and	Tommy	was	
awarded	USD630,000	in	a	counter	claim,	a	decision	that	angered	anti‐corruption	activists	
(Quarrata	2008;	Thompson	2008).	In	2012	allegations	came	to	light	that	Tommy	had	received	
a	USD20	million	bribe	from	Rolls	Royce	in	1990	for	the	contract	to	provide	airplanes	to	
Indonesia’s	national	carrier	Garuda,	but	he	did	not	face	further	prosecution	(Aditjondro	2002:	
14).		
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agreement	in	Aceh	province	after	decades	of	civil	unrest	dating	back	to	the	Darul	
Islam	rebellion	of	the	1950s.75		
	
Mobilizing	his	clean	image	and	commitment	to	fighting	corruption,	Yudhoyono	and	
the	Democratic	Party	repeatedly	used	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	in	campaign	
advertisements	leading	up	to	the	2009	elections.	Recontesting	the	presidency,	
Yudhoyono	spoke	of	his	ongoing	commitment	to	eradicating	corruption,	while	
members	of	his	party	appeared	in	a	(now	infamous)	‘say	“no”	to	corruption’	campaign	
on	national	television	campaign.76	In	2009,	with	a	positive	reputation	and	track	
record,	the	Democratic	Party	increased	its	number	of	seats	within	the	national	
legislature,	gaining	93	seats,	with	a	resounding	victory	for	Yudhoyono	in	the	
presidential	election.	
	
Conclusion	
This	chapter	has	outlined	how	a	number	of	political	figures	in	Indonesia	attempted	to	
use	corruption	issues	for	their	own	political	advantage.	The	prevalence	of	corruption	
reinforced	perceived	inequalities	between	privileged	elites	with	access	to	patronage	
networks	on	the	one	hand	and	ordinary	folk	on	the	other.	Leveraging	citizens’	
discontent	with	political	leadership,	anti‐corruption	rhetoric	drew	upon	these	
prevailing	images	of	corrupt	officials	and	politicians.	The	perceptions	of	injustice	
associated	with	corruption	have	been	a	consistent	rallying	point	for	anti‐government	
sentiment,	while	promises	to	seriously	address	it	remain	a	popular	catch‐cry	for	
politicians.	
	
Corruption	has	been	a	constant	part	of	Indonesia’s	political	landscape	since	Dutch	
colonization	Following	Indonesia’s	triumph	in	its	battle	for	independence,	the	new	
government	that	was	established	seemed	to	be	perpetuating	rather	than	combating	
corruption.	This	was	true	both	for	the	parliamentarians	and	cabinet	members	as	well	
as	public	servants	whose	remuneration	was	often	viewed	as	disproportionate	to	their	
social	standing.	Corruption	in	all	branches	of	government	seemed	ubiquitous	and	
there	was	a	general	perception	that	those	in	government	were	more	intent	on	
protecting	their	own	interests	than	serving	the	Indonesian	people.		
																																																													
75	The	Darul	Islam	rebellion	began	in	1953	and	aimed	to	create	an	autonomous	Aceh	within	a	
Federal	Islamic	Indonesian	state.	For	an	overview	of	the	long‐standing	conflict	between	
Acehnese	separatists	and	the	Indonesian	government,	which	effectively	ended	with	the	
signing	of	the	Helsinki	Memorandum	of	Understanding	in	2005,	see	Aspinall	(2009);	Kramer	
(2009).	
76	Further	details	of	this	specific	advertising	campaign	can	be	found	in	Chapter	Four.	
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As	the	public	came	to	see	corruption	as	a	pervasive	political	evil,	the	use	of	anti‐
corruption	symbols	gained	traction.	From	as	early	as	the	Sukarno	years,	purporting	to	
stand	against	corruption	was	a	popular	way	for	politicians	to	gain	public	support	
from	the	many	people	who	did	not	benefit	from	corruption.	The	New	Order	regime	
attempted	to	win	public	support	with	an	early	and	highly	visible	anti‐corruption	drive	
in	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s,	but	the	lack	of	meaningful	transparency	and	
accountability	reforms	led	to	even	more	public	outcry.	Though	this	sentiment	
dissipated	with	increased	economic	development,	corruption	remained	a	source	of	
public	discontent,	at	times	becoming	a	rallying	point	for	anti‐government	protests.	
Public	cynicism	towards	Suharto	reached	fever	pitch	in	1998,	when	his	assertions	of	
being	open	to	reforms	promoting	accountability	and	transparency,	and	that	his	own	
family	had	not	benefitted	from	his	position,	fell	on	deaf	ears.	Indonesians	could	no	
longer	be	persuaded,	even	with	threats	of	violence	and/or	imprisonment,	to	support	
the	regime.	After	Suharto	resigned,	new	leaders	sought	to	demonstrate	that	they	had	
broken	from	the	legacies	of	the	New	Order.	Being	‘anti‐corruption’	was	a	desirable	
image.	But,	in	reality,	as	evidenced	by	Presidents	Wahid,	Megawati	and	Yudhoyono,	it	
proved	difficult	to	maintain.	
	
Of	course,	anti‐corruption	rhetoric	is	not	always	divorced	from	action.	There	are	
several	examples	of	concrete	steps	taken	by	successive	governments,	particularly	
during	Reformasi,	to	combat	corruption.	Laws	allowing	for	the	establishment	of	the	
KPK	and	Tipikor,	coupled	with	the	efforts	of	these	institutions,	led	to	the	arrest	and	
prosecution	of	a	number	of	suspects,	both	within	the	government	and	the	private	
sector.	However,	even	the	most	successful	rhetoric	and	anti‐corruptions	steps	can	be	
undone	by	scandals	that	contradict	the	declared	values	of	the	party	or	person.	After	
the	disappointments	of	the	early	Reformasi,	such	as	the	failure	to	prosecute	Suharto	
and	his	family	satisfactorily,	allegations	of	corruption	against	President	Wahid	and	
Megawati’s	reluctance	to	counter	the	interests	of	old‐school	elites,	Yudhoyono	
represented	a	new	hope.	The	Democratic	Party’s	tough	stance	on	corruption	was	
supported	by	not	only	Yudhoyono’s	words,	but	also	his	actions—at	least,	as	far	as	the	
public	could	see—marking	this	as	the	pinnacle	of	the	party’s	popularity.	His	
continued	success	in	2009	demonstrated	a	successful	maintenance	of	the	anti‐
corruption	symbol.	However,	corruption	issues	would	surface	for	the	party	following	
its	2009	victory	and	the	significant	number	of	corruption	scandals	arising	throughout	
Yudhoyono’s	second	term	would	set	the	agenda	for	the	2014	electoral	campaigns.	
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Chapter	Three	
Politics	and	corruption,	2009–2014	
	
The	outcome	of	the	2009	election	reflected	continuing	support	for	the	incumbent	
administration,	with	Golkar	and	PDIP	losing	seats	to	President	Yudhoyono’s	
Democratic	Party	in	the	national	legislature	and	the	Prosperous	Justice	Party	(Partai	
Keadilan	Sejahtera,	PKS)	becoming	the	most	dominant	Islamic	party	in	the	
parliament.	Gerindra	and	Hanura,	competing	in	their	first	national	elections,	obtained	
a	small	proportion	of	the	vote,	but	enough	to	meet	the	threshold	required	to	secure	a	
presence	in	the	national	parliament.	While	these	power	shifts	gave	the	Democratic	
Party‐led	coalition	control	of	both	parliament	and	the	executive,	the	ensuing	five	
years	were	far	from	smooth	sailing.	Approaching	the	2014	election,	the	Yudhoyono	
administration	had	lost	much	of	its	popularity,	with	approval	ratings	falling	steadily	
from	2011.	Many	felt	that	Yudhoyono	failed	to	maintain	the	vigour	with	which	he	had	
addressed	corruption	during	his	first	term,	contributing	to	voter	disenchantment	
(Burke	and	Resosudarmo	2012:	300;	Mietzner	2012).	
	
This	chapter	briefly	discusses	Indonesia’s	national	legislative	elections	in	2004	and	
2009	before	highlighting	various	corruption‐related	cases	that	affected	public	
sentiment	towards	the	government	during	this	period.	The	chapter	underscores	the	
dominance	of	corruption	themes	in	the	public	sphere,	outlining	some	of	the	
prominent	anti‐corruption	efforts	and	corruption	scandals	during	this	period.	The	
chapter	concludes	that	the	volume	of	corruption	cases	and	media	attention	on	
scandals	damaged	not	only	the	reputation	of	particular	parties	and	individuals,	but	
also	that	of	the	political	system	as	a	whole.	This	afforded	emerging	parties	the	
opportunity	to	present	themselves	as	a	newer,	cleaner	and	better	alternative	in	their	
2014	electoral	campaigns.	
	
The	2004	and	2009	elections	
The	2004	national	legislative	elections	were	contested	by	24	parties.	Indonesia’s	four	
major	parties—Golkar,	PDIP,	the	National	Awakening	Party	(Partai	Kebangkitan	
Bangsa,	PKB)	and	the	United	Development	Party	(Partai	Persatuan	Pembangunan,	
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PPP)—won	the	most	seats	in	parliament	(Sebastian	2004:	274).1	However,	some	
minor	parties	surfaced	as	serious	political	contenders,	particularly	the	Democratic	
Party,	led	by	(soon	to	be	president)	Yudhoyono,	and	PKS.	This	success	was	all	the	
more	unexpected	given	the	relatively	low	profiles	of	both	parties	prior	to	the	election	
(Aspinall	2005a).	Yudhoyono’s	Democratic	Party	received	7.5	per	cent	of	the	popular	
vote	in	the	parliamentary	election	while	PKS	garnered	7.34	per	cent	of	the	popular	
vote,	a	sharp	increase	from	the	1.36	per	cent	it	obtained	when	it	ran	as	the	Justice	
Party	(Partai	Keadilan,	PK)	in	1999.		
	
The	emergence	of	both	Yudhoyono	and	PKS	in	the	2004	elections	reflected	a	general	
dissatisfaction	with	Megawati’s	presidency	and	the	parliament	more	broadly	(Liddle	
and	Mujani	2005:	125;	Sebastian	2004;	Wanandi	2004:	117).	Drawing	upon	this	
discontent,	Yudhoyono	presented	himself	as	a	viable	presidential	alternative	to	
Megawati,	even	though	his	party	was	significantly	less	popular	than	PDIP.	By	
contrast,	PKS’	success	was	attributed	to	a	two‐fold	strategy.	On	the	one	hand	it	
focused	on	grassroots	campaigning	and	targeting	new	recruits,	often	by	appealing	to	
religious	sentiment	(Permata	2008).	On	the	other	hand,	it	drew	secular	appeal	by	
demanding	more	transparency	and	accountability	in	government	(Collins	and	Fauzi	
2005;	Machmudi	2006).	PKS	was	thus	able	to	exploit	growing	anti‐corruption	
sentiment	amongst	the	broader	population	while	maintaining	an	aura	of	being	a	
conservative	Islamic	party.	
	
Parties	that	had	not	fared	well	in	2004	faced	additional	difficulties	in	2009.	Law	No.	
3/1999	on	General	Elections	had	already	precluded	parties	garnering	less	than	2.5	
per	cent	of	parliamentary	seats	in	the	previous	election	from	running	in	subsequent	
elections.	Law	No.	10/2008	on	General	Elections	for	the	People's	Representative	
Assembly,	the	Regional	Representative	Assembly	and	the	Regional	House	of	
Representatives	put	in	place	stricter	eligibility	rules	for	participating	in	national	
parliamentary	elections	(Mietzner	2009;	Sherlock	2009a:	11;	Sukma	2009).	Changes	
were	also	made	to	the	way	voters	could	select	their	representatives.	In	December	
2008	the	Constitutional	Court	ruled	that	the	seats	obtained	by	each	party	were	to	be	
allocated	to	individuals	based	on	the	number	of	personal	votes	they	garnered,	as	
opposed	to	the	order	of	candidates’	names	on	the	parties’	candidate	list	(Sherlock	
																																																													
1	See	the	Electoral	Commission	website	for	full	details	of	the	2004	national	legislative	election	
results	(Komisi	Pemilihan	Umum	2009a).	The	results	were	contested	by	some	of	the	smaller	
parties,	with	14	parties	refusing	to	endorse	the	election	results,	citing	‘election	irregularities’	
(Sebastian	2004:	264).	
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2009a:	8).	This	increased	competition	within	parties	and	led	to	a	number	of	
incumbent	DPR‐RI	members	losing	their	positions	to	celebrity	candidates	or	other	
contenders	with	legitimate	local	support	(Sukma	2009:	321).	In	addition,	Law	No.	
42/2008	also	limited	the	ability	of	parties	to	nominate	presidential	and	vice‐
presidential	candidates.	In	2004,	all	parties	that	received	over	3	per	cent	of	the	
popular	vote	or	held	5	per	cent	of	DPR‐RI	seats	were	allowed	to	nominate	a	
presidential	candidate	(na	Thalang	2005:	332;	Tan	2006).	However,	in	2009,	parties	
needed	over	20	per	cent	of	the	popular	vote	or	25	per	cent	of	DPR‐RI	seats	in	order	to	
nominate	a	candidate.	Party	success	in	the	DPR‐RI	elections	became	more	important	
than	ever,	as	those	failing	to	pass	this	threshold	were	forced	to	form	strategic	
coalitions	with	other	parties	if	they	wished	to	put	forward	a	presidential	team.	
	
The	Democratic	Party	acquired	an	additional	93	seats	in	the	DPR‐RI	in	2009,	gaining	
over	20	per	cent	of	the	popular	vote.	This	allowed	the	party	to	advance	Yudhoyono	as	
their	presidential	candidate,	and	Boediono	as	vice‐presidential	candidate,	without	
needing	to	negotiate	with	other	parties.	Golkar	and	PDIP,	previously	the	two	most	
popular	parties,	both	lost	several	seats	compared	to	their	2004	results,	falling	to	
second	and	third	respectively	(Aspinall	2005a;	Wanandi	2004)	(see	Table	3.1).2	While	
the	election	saw	a	general	decline	in	support	for	Islamic	parties,	PKS	increased	its	
parliamentary	share	by	12	seats,	making	it	the	most	influential	Islamic	party	in	the	
national	parliament.	PKS’	success	arguably	reflected	the	strong	commitment	of	
cadres,	providing	PKS	with	consistent	support	that	other	Islamic	parties	simply	did	
not	have	(Tomsa	2012).3		
	
	 	
																																																													
2	Electoral	problems	faced	during	the	2009	election	included	issues	such	as:	incorrect	voter	
registry,	ballots	printed	incorrectly,	a	lack	of	ballots	at	certain	polling	booths,	ballot	papers	
sent	to	the	wrong	provinces	and	districts	and	a	lack	of	experienced	staff	overseeing	operations	
on	the	ground.	For	a	comprehensive	overview	of	the	electoral	management	problems	faced	by	
the	KPU	see	Sukma	(2009;2010).	
3	While	2009	saw	PKS	become	the	most	powerful	Islamic	party	in	the	national	parliament,	the	
result	was	only	marginally	better	than	in	2004.	Despite	extensive	campaigning,	in	a	similar	
vein	to	the	strategies	used	for	the	2004	elections,	the	party	was	unable	to	pick	up	votes	lost	by	
other	Islamic	parties	(Pepinsky	et	al.	2012;	Sukma	2009:	321).	This	was	indicative	of	an	
overall	shift	in	votes	away	from	Islamic	parties	to	secular	parties.	Mietzner	(2010:	187)	
asserts	that	this	was	the	result	of	a	trend	towards	‘political	centrism,’	from	both	sides	of	the	
political	spectrum,	with	secular	parties	increasingly	embracing	Islamic	values	and	Islamic	
parties	presenting	a	more	pluralist	image.	
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Table	3.1	Outcome	of	national	legislative	elections,	2009.	
Party	
%	of	
popular	
vote	
+/‐	change	in	
popular	vote	
from	2004	
No.	of	seats	in	
parliament	
+/‐	no.	of	seats	
from	2004	
election	
Democratic	
Party	 20.81	 +13.4	 148	 +93	
Golkar	 14.45	 ‐7.13	 106	 ‐22	
PDIP	 14.01	 ‐4.5	 94	 ‐15	
PKS	 7.89	 +0.54	 57	 +12	
PAN	 6.03	 ‐0.43	 46	 ‐7	
PPP	 5.33	 ‐2.83	 38	 ‐20	
PKB	 4.95	 ‐5.63	 28	 ‐24	
Gerindra	 4.46	 —	 26	 —	
Hanura	 3.77	 —	 17	 —	
Source:	Komisi	Pemilihan	Umum	(2009b).	
	
Sukma	(2009:	320)	contends	that	the	increased	support	for	the	Democratic	Party	was	
more	a	reflection	of	Yudhoyono’s	popularity	and	the	general	satisfaction	with	his	
performance,	rather	than	an	increase	in	public	affinity	for	the	party	itself.	His	
successes	provided	the	party	with	the	grounds	to	campaign	with	the	party	slogan	
‘lanjutkan!’	or	‘continue	[as	before]’	(Aspinall	2010:	106).	Voters	evidently	supported	
a	second	Yudhoyono	administration,	with	Yudhoyono	and	Boediono	subsequently	
receiving	over	60	per	cent	of	votes	in	the	first	round	of	the	presidential	election,	
easily	defeating	the	pairings	of	Megawati–Prabowo	Subianto	and	Jusuf	Kalla–Wiranto.	
Though	both	Megawati	and	Kalla	disputed	the	outcome	of	the	elections	in	the	
Constitutional	Court,	they	were	unsuccessful.	Yudhoyono’s	decisive	win	meant	that	
there	was	no	need	for	a	second	round	run‐off	between	the	first	and	second‐placed	
candidates	as	there	had	been	in	2004	(Aspinall	2010:	111).	
	
Hanura	and	Gerindra	also	performed	well,	competing	for	the	first	time	in	the	national	
elections.	Although	the	number	of	votes	received	was	relatively	low—Hanura	only	
gained	3.77	per	cent	and	Gerindra	gained	4.46	per	cent—both	passed	the	3.5	per	cent	
threshold	required	to	take	up	seats	in	the	DPR‐RI.	Their	performance	was	impressive	
when	compared	to	that	of	established	Islamic	parties,	which	did	not	fare	much	better	
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despite	having	more	prominent	public	profiles.4	With	a	foot	in	the	door	of	the	DPR‐RI,	
these	two	new	parties	could	work	towards	improving	their	results	in	the	2014	
elections.	
	
An	unstable	coalition	
Several	scholars	have	argued	that	the	elections	of	2009	demonstrated	the	on‐going	
success	of	democratic	consolidation	in	Indonesia	(see,	for	example,	Mietzner	2010;	
Sukma	2009;	von	Luebke	2010).	However,	in	the	following	years,	some	suggested	
that	the	reform	process	had	stagnated	(Mietzner	2012;	Tomsa	2010).5	One	
explanation	for	this	was	the	diversity	of	the	ruling	coalition	in	the	national	legislature	
formed	by	the	president.	Following	the	parliamentary	elections,	Yudhoyono	
convinced	Golkar,	PKS	and	most	other	minor	parties	to	form	a	coalition	government	
(often	dubbed	the	‘Rainbow	Coalition’)	with	the	Democratic	Party,	leaving	PDIP,	
Gerindra	and	Hanura	in	opposition	(Aspinall	2010;	Tomsa	2010).	The	President	
assigned	most	of	the	34	ministerial	cabinet	positions	along	coalition	lines,	with	six	
going	to	the	Democrats,	four	to	PKS	and	three	to	Golkar	(Aspinall	2010:	110).	Non‐
party	members	were	assigned	to	the	remaining	positions	(Jakarta	Post	2009b).	
Concerns	about	the	efficacy	of	such	a	grand	coalition,	given	the	disparate	interests	of	
the	parties	involved,	turned	out	to	be	well‐founded	(Sherlock	2009b).	Divergent	
political	interests	of	coalition	partners	began	to	manifest	themselves	through	visible	
disagreements.	Less	than	a	year	into	Yudhoyono’s	second	term	there	was	a	cabinet	
																																																													
4	The	results	for	these	new	parties	as	seemingly	at	the	expense	of	the	more	established	parties	
of	Golkar	and	PDIP	(Ufen	2010:	284).	However,	as	Tomsa	(2009)	argues,	the	results	of	the	
election	were	probably	disappointing	for	Hanura	and	Gerindra	in	light	of	the	large	financial	
investment	allegedly	made	by	each	party.	Gerindra’s	leader,	Prabowo,	was	rumoured	to	have	
spent	over	USD100	million	on	his	media	campaign	(Tomsa	2009),	while	Hanura	certainly	
had	enough	financial	backing	to	ensure	it	was	highly	visible	(Ufen	2010:	282).	KPU	audits	
from	2009	report	that	Hanura’s	campaign	budget	was	Rp.	19	billion	and	Gerindra’s	was	
approximately	Rp.	308	billion	(Komisi	Pemilihan	Umum	2009c).	However,	there	were	
suspicions	that	these	figures	did	not	reflect	the	true	amount	invested	in	campaigns	(Mietzner	
2007:	258;	Siswanto	and	Susila	2009).		
5	For	example,	arguing	that	local	elections	were	expensive	and	prone	to	money	politics,	
Yudhoyono,	supported	legislation	to	end	the	direct	elections	of	government	leaders	and	for	
them	to	be	chosen	by	local	legislative	councils	instead	of	voters,	reversing	legislation	passed	in	
2004	(Mietzner	2012:	122).	Mietzner	(2012:	123)	argues	that	these	plans	defied	popular	
opinion,	with	2011	polling	suggesting	that	66	per	cent	of	respondents	were	in	favour	of	direct	
elections	at	the	provincial	level.	Furthermore,	the	proposal	was	lambasted	by	a	number	of	
provincial	heads	(Buehler	2012).	The	unpopular	bid	was	temporarily	shelved	in	2012,	only	to	
be	revived	in	July	2013,	when	the	Minister	of	Interior	reiterated	the	disadvantages	of	direct	
gubernatorial	elections.	It	was	raised	again	in	2014,	just	prior	to	the	end	of	Yudhoyono’s	term,	
though	by	this	time	the	political	landscape	had	changed	and	the	president’s	attitude	to	the	
changes	was	unclear.	The	Democratic	Party	boycotted	the	parliamentary	vote	but	the	bill	to	
end	direct	elections	for	provincial	leadership	passed,	supported	by	the	new	Merah	Putih	(Red	
and	White)	Coalition,	which	had	formed	after	the	2014	legislative	election	and	included	Golkar	
and	Gerindra	(Asril	2014b;	Puspita	2014).	
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reshuffle	in	response	to	decreasing	public	approval	(Kimura	2012:	188‐189).	
Although	there	was	speculation	that	the	reshuffle	was	a	form	of	revenge	against	
Golkar	and	PKS	for	voting	against	the	Democratic	Party	in	parliament,	the	cabinet	
representation	of	both	these	parties	remained	relatively	unchanged,	with	only	PKS	
losing	a	ministerial	position	(Mietzner	2012:	121).	Some	postulated	that	the	reshuffle	
represented	the	President’s	own	form	of	patronage	politics,	with	a	number	of	
controversial	appointees	appearing	to	have	been	rewarded	for	personal	loyalty	to	
Yudhoyono	(Kimura	2012:	189).6		
	
Corruption	and	anti‐corruption	as	political	themes	
Scandal,	especially	corruption	cases,	dominated	Indonesian	politics	between	2009	
and	2014	(Amiruddin	2012;	Kramer	2013).	A	sense	of	disappointment	was	evident	in	
public	and	media	discourse,	driven	by	the	failure	of	political	parties	to	address	
corruption	effectively	and	improve	transparency,	even	within	their	own	parties.7	Yet,	
even	when	facing	allegations	of	corruption,	parties	used	corruption	scandals	
involving	their	rivals	to	their	political	advantage.	Several	members	of	the	political	
elite	owned	media	franchises	(Tapsell	2010;	Winters	2014)	and	used	their	
newspapers,	radio,	television	and	internet	vehicles	to	deride	political	opponents	and	
underscore	the	government’s	lack	of	progress	in	eradicating	corruption.	The	media	
highlighted	many	corruption	cases	during	the	period,	illustrating	that	corruption	was	
wide‐reaching	and	concerned	all	arms	of	government.	These	cases	reflected	not	only	
continuing	problems	with	governance	and	the	rule	of	law,	but	also	the	absence	of	
generational	change	that	had	been	anticipated	with	the	new	wave	of	post‐Reformasi	
civil	servant	recruits.8	Political	commentators	and	anti‐corruption	activists	alike	had	
																																																													
6	Intra‐coalition	clashes	over	the	cessation	of	fuel	subsidies	were	also	divisive.	In	January	
2012,	parliament	voted	against	a	proposal	to	make	subsidized	fuel	available	only	for	public	
transport,	motorcycles	and	fishing	vessels	and	a	motion	to	end	subsidies	for	fuel	sale	to	
private	cars	in	Greater	Jakarta	(Mahi	and	Nazara	2012).	When	the	bill	was	reintroduced	in	
2013,	the	most	controversial	opposition	came	from	the	PKS,	which	not	only	refused	to	back	its	
coalition	partners,	but	began	a	counter‐campaign,	urging	citizens	to	attend	demonstrations	
against	the	fuel	price	increases.	PKS’	rejection	of	the	bill	was	seen	as	a	populist	move	and	the	
party	was	accused	of	trying	to	appeal	to	voters	in	the	face	of	damaging	publicity	related	to	
corruption	scandals	(Chen	and	Priamarizki	2013).	
7	This	was	reflected	by	a	number	of	articles	that	highlighted	how	ongoing	corruption	and	a	
lack	of	transparency	continue	to	impact	democratic	change	in	Indonesia.	See	Kimura	(2012)	
for	further	details.	
8	For	example,	an	editorial	in	Kompas	laments	the	focus	on	materialism	and	wealth	amongst	
young	Indonesians	that	was	leading	them	to	follow	the	corrupt	practices	of	the	previous	
generations	(Kompas	2011).	Another	article	highlights	that	the	Centre	for	Reporting	and	
Analysing	Monetary	Transactions	(Pusat	Pelaporan	dan	Analisis	Transaksi	Keuangan,	PPATK)	
had	found	at	least	10	young	civil	servants	(under	the	age	of	35)	with	assets	worth	billions	of	
rupiah	and	suspected	that	there	were	many	more	(Seputar	Indonesia	2011).	
	
87	
	
hoped	that	post‐Reformasi	youth	taking	over	from	old	guard	civil	servants	would	
bring	with	them	new	ideals	that	would	discourage	involvement	in	corruption.	
However,	these	hopes	faded	when	young	politicians	indicted	for	corruption	were	
joined	by	young	public	servants	also	charged	with	graft‐related	crimes.	A	rash	of	
corruption	cases	within	the	bureaucracy	confirmed	that	anti‐corruption	measures	
had	failed	to	rein	in	civil	servants,	police	officers	and	judges.		
	
This	section	discusses	some	of	the	most	prominent	corruption	cases	of	this	period,	
demonstrating	that	corruption	remained	a	prominent	political	theme	from	2009	to	
2014.	The	incessant	media	coverage	of	these	cases	saw	that	corruption	remained	
squarely	in	the	public	eye	and	scrutiny	of	the	characters	involved	in	these	cases	
fostered	negative	sentiments	towards	those	in	parliament	who	had	previously	
promised	to	fight	corruption	wholeheartedly.	Conversely,	the	conviction	of	several	
defendants	promoted	public	support	for	the	KPK’s	work	as	an	institution	committed	
to	combating	corruption	regardless	of	ambivalent	government	support	and	in	spite	of	
the	(perceived)	light	sentences	handed	down	by	judges,	which	were	often	less	than	
requested	by	prosecutors.	As	such,	attacks	on	the	much‐lauded	KPK	by	some	
parliamentarians	and	members	of	the	police	force	sparked	outrage	from	citizens.	
	
Attacks	on	the	KPK	
Following	its	establishment	in	2003,	the	KPK	developed	a	reputation	for	tenacity	after	
several	successful	convictions	for	corruption.9	It	became	one	of	Indonesia’s	most	
respected	institutions,	enjoying	strong	support	from	citizens	(Butt	2011a:	384;	
Schütte	2013).	However,	this	success	also	made	it	a	target	for	elites	who	were	intent	
on	maintaining	the	status	quo.	From	2009,	there	were	concerted	attempts	to	
undermine	the	legitimacy	of	the	KPK,	primarily	by	attacking	its	leadership.	In	May	
2009	the	Chief	of	the	KPK,	Antasari	Azhar,	was	arrested	for	murder,	accused	of	
ordering	the	assassination	of	a	prominent	businessman,	Nasruddin	Zulkarnaen,	who	
was	shot	in	the	head	on	14	March	2009	(Aspinall	2010:	114;	Butt	2011b:	72).	It	was	
alleged	that	Antasari	had	become	romantically	involved	with	Nasruddin’s	third	wife,	
																																																													
9	It	was	estimated	that,	in	2001	alone,	the	commission	recovered	Rp.	139.8	billion	as	a	result	
of	successfully	prosecuting	31	cases	(Aspinall	2010:	114).	After	the	KPK’s	inception,	
Indonesia’s	ranking	on	Transparency	International’s	Corruption	Perception	Index	improved	
dramatically	(Aspinall	2010:	114).	In	2001,	Indonesia	ranked	poorly	in	the	Index	as	the	third‐
most	corrupt	country	in	the	world,	whereas	in	2009	it	was	ranked	111	out	of	180	countries.	In	
2013	it	fell	slightly	to	number	114	out	of	177	countries,	ranking	better	than	62	other	countries	
(Transparency	International	2013).	The	fall,	possibly	a	reflection	of	diminishing	confidence	as	
a	slew	of	corruption	cases	came	to	light	after	2009,	still	reflected	an	improvement	from	its	
position	in	2001.	
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who,	in	turn,	had	decided	to	blackmail	Antasari	with	this	information.	Butt	(2011b:	
88‐89)	contends	that	the	case	against	Antasari	was	far	from	iron‐clad	and	that	his	
involvement	in	the	murder	remains	unclear,	with	the	evidence	put	forward	during	
the	trial	being	‘weak,	unreliable	or	contradictory’.	Nevertheless,	the	South	Jakarta	
District	Court	found	Antasari	guilty	and	he	was	sentenced	to	18	years’	
imprisonment.10	The	case	led	to	calls	from	some	political	elites	to	reduce	the	KPK’s	
powers,	or	to	abolish	it	altogether	(Aspinall	2010:	115).11		
	
Towards	the	end	of	2009,	in	the	wake	of	the	Antasari	controversy,	the	KPK	became	a	
battleground	for	anti‐corruption	activists	who	accused	other	government	bodies,	
including	the	national	police	and	public	prosecutor’s	office,	of	a	high‐level	conspiracy	
to	weaken	the	KPK	(Aspinall	2010:	113;	Sukma	2009:	332‐333).	The	conflict	allegedly	
stemmed	from	the	Bank	Century	case.12	The	head	of	the	police	force’s	criminal	
investigations	unit,	Susno	Duadji,	(who	was	later	jailed	for	corruption)	was	suspected	
of	intervening	in	the	bailout	of	Bank	Century	on	behalf	of	businessman	Budi	
Sampoerna,	in	return	for	a	USD	1	million	kickback	(Kurniadi	2009).	The	KPK	acted	
upon	these	suspicions,	tapping	the	telephone	of	Susno	to	investigate	his	involvement.	
The	inquiry	into	a	top‐level	police	officer	presented	a	threat	to	the	power	of	the	police	
elites,	prompting	an	alleged	plot	to	undermine	the	KPK.	
	
In	September	2009,	Yudhoyono	formally	suspended	two	KPK	Deputy	Commissioners,	
Bibit	Samad	Rianto	and	Chandra	M.	Hamzah,	from	the	KPK	after	the	police	named	
them	as	suspects	in	their	own	corruption	investigation.	Subsequently,	the	pair	were	
arrested	and	charged	with	abuse	of	power	and	extortion	in	relation	to	Anggoro	
Widjojo,	a	businessman	who	was	being	investigated	by	the	KPK	for	bribing	the	head	
of	the	DPR‐RI’s	Forestry	Commission	in	October	2009	(Butt	2011b:	91;	Jakarta	Post	
																																																													
10	In	2011,	Antasari	filed	an	appeal	with	the	Supreme	Court	which	was	rejected	due	to	lack	of	
new	evidence.	However,	in	March	2013	Antasari	lodged	a	second	judicial	review	with	the	
Constitutional	Court	which	ruled	in	his	favour	in	March	2014,	stating	that	he	could	mount	a	
second	appeal	to	his	conviction.	As	of	November	2014,	Antasari	had	an	appeal	in	the	
Tangerang	District	Court,	claiming	that	evidence	in	the	case	had	been	tampered	with.	For	
more	details	see	Saragih	(2014).	
11	While	it	is	difficult	to	identify	exactly	which	individuals	wanted	to	weaken	the	KPK,	some	
members	of	the	DPR‐RI	were	described	as	‘understandably	keen	to	curtail	[the	KPK’s]	power	
given	that	the	KPK	arrested	some	of	their	colleagues	on	corruption	charges’	(Sukma	2009:	
137).	As	an	independent	body,	detractors	argued	that	the	KPK	was	a	power	unto	itself	that	did	
not	have	to	report	to	other	law	enforcement	agencies.	There	was	also	speculation	that	the	KPK	
would	be	stripped	of	the	capacity	to	prosecute	and	wire‐tap	suspects.	While	this	did	not	
eventuate,	the	debate	surrounding	its	powers	and	its	lack	of	accountability	drew	further	
attention	to	the	commission	and	its	leadership.	See	Butt	(2011a)	for	further	details.	
12	‘Centurygate’	will	be	discussed	later	in	this	chapter.	
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2009a).	A	recording	was	later	produced	in	which	Widjojo	admitted	that	he	had	bribed	
members	of	the	KPK	to	halt	the	investigation	into	his	personal	finances.	There	was	no	
evidence	that	these	accusations	referred	to	Bibit	or	Chandra,	but	the	police	used	
them,	alongside	other	circumstantial	evidence,	to	charge	the	pair	with	extortion	(Butt	
2011b:	90‐91).13	Meanwhile,	Bibit	and	Chandra	challenged	their	suspension	on	
constitutional	grounds,	arguing	they	had	the	right	to	be	presumed	innocent	until	
proven	guilty.	An	injunction	to	the	suspension	was	granted	and,	while	the	legality	of	
this	was	debateable,	the	hearing	allowed	a	number	of	KPK	wire‐tapped	recordings	to	
be	played	during	the	proceedings	(Butt	2011b:	99‐102).	These	recordings	included	
conversations	between	some	of	Indonesia’s	most	senior	law	enforcement	officials	
disclosing	plans	to	frame	the	pair,	aiming	to	ruin	the	KPK’s	reputation	(Jansen	2010).	
Upon	hearing	the	recordings,	the	Constitutional	Court	declared	Bibit	and	Chandra	the	
victims	of	a	set‐up	and	ordered	their	reinstatement	(Butt	2011b:	102).		
	
Prior	to	the	Constitutional	Court’s	ruling,	there	was	an	enormous	public	outcry	at	the	
arrest	of	the	two	deputy	commissioners,	particularly	after	Susno	Duadji	likened	the	
KPK’s	conflict	with	the	police	to	a	gecko	trying	to	fight	a	crocodile,	an	image	
subsequently	adopted	by	civil	society	activists	and	the	media	in	their	support	for	the	
KPK	(Aspinall	2010:	116).14	Public	commentary	via	social	media	outlets	such	as	
Facebook,	YouTube	and	Twitter	helped	rally	support	and	raise	public	awareness	of	
the	case	(Lim	2013).	For	example,	Indonesian	Corruption	Watch	(ICW)	used	
Facebook	to	organize	a	march	in	Jakarta,	attracting	over	5000	people.	Though	the	
media	reduced	the	narrative	of	the	case	to	a	simplistic	battle	of	‘good’	(KPK)	versus	
‘evil’	(old	elites)	(Lim	2013:	644),	the	on‐going	public	support	enhanced	the	standing	
of	the	KPK,	now	one	of	the	most	trusted	institutions	in	the	country	(Agustia	and	
Manggiasih	2010).	As	the	movement	to	defend	the	KPK	grew,	the	anti‐corruption	
commitment	of	Indonesia’s	leaders	and	law	enforcement	bodies	was	tested.	The	
government’s	response,	particularly	that	of	Yudhoyono,	was	lambasted	on	social	
media,	with	public	assertions	that	the	government	was	complicit	in	weakening	the	
KPK.	With	mounting	criticism,	Yudhoyono	was	forced	to	act	and	established	an	
independent	team,	known	as	the	‘Team	of	Eight’,	to	investigate	the	allegations	against	
Bibit	and	Chandra	and	the	handling	of	the	case	by	the	police.	The	team	produced	
																																																													
13	A	detailed	description	and	analysis	of	the	case	against	Bibit	and	Chandra	and	the	
subsequent	events	of	the	indictment	can	be	found	in	Butt	(2011)	Corruption	and	Law	in	
Indonesia,	Chapter	Five.		
14	The	gecko	(cicak)	versus	crocodile	(buaya)	analogy	is	an	Indonesian	equivalent	of	the	
Biblical	tale	of	David	and	Goliath.	Aspinall	(2010:	113)	asserts	that	the	movement	drew	public	
support	at	the	level	of	the	protests	that	saw	the	resignation	of	Suharto	in	1998.	
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findings	and	recommendations	for	the	President,	suggesting	that	several	senior	police	
officers	be	dismissed	(including	Susno)	and	that	the	charges	against	Bibit	and	
Chandra	be	dropped.		
	
Although	there	were	far	more	arrests	for	corruption	under	Yudhoyono’s	leadership	
than	any	other	president,	the	gecko	versus	crocodile	case	exposed	Yudhoyono’s	own	
concerns	over	the	powers	of	the	KPK	(Sukma	2009:	332).	The	President	even	
commented	that	the	KPK	seemed	accountable	only	to	God	and	such	power	should	not	
go	unchecked	(Butt	2011b:	93).	There	were	also	criticisms	that	Yudhoyono	had	only	
become	involved	in	the	case	when	his	own	reputation	was	jeopardized	by	rising	
public	dissatisfaction	(Aspinall	2010:	117).	As	a	consequence,	while	the	KPK	may	
have	emerged	unscathed,	Yudhoyono’s	reluctance	to	defend	the	KPK	weakened	his	
anti‐corruption	symbol	in	the	eyes	of	Indonesian	citizens	(Fealy	2011;	Kimura	2012;	
Mietzner	2012;	Tomsa	2010).	
	
Centurygate	
Early	tensions	within	the	coalition	parliament	were	brought	to	the	fore	by	the	Bank	
Century	bailout	scandal,	which	implicated	Vice‐President	Boediono	and	the	Minister	
for	Finance,	Sri	Mulyani,	one	of	Yudhoyono’s	closest	aides.	Also	known	as	
‘Centurygate’,	the	case	involved	a	government‐approved	bailout	of	Rp.	6.7	trillion	for	
the	privately‐owned	Bank	Century,	under	what	Golkar	claimed	were	suspicious	
circumstances.	The	bailout	package	was	allegedly	far	larger	than	required	and	there	
were	indications	that	a	substantial	proportion	was	siphoned	off	and	used	for	political	
purposes,	including	electoral	campaigns	(Soesatyo	2012).	Several	Golkar	and	PKS	
members	successfully	lobbied	for	a	parliamentary	inquiry	into	the	bailout,	even	
though	adverse	findings	would	reflect	poorly	on	the	Democratic	Party.	Regardless	of	
the	legitimacy	of	the	inquiry,	it	appeared	that	the	case	was	being	employed	by	Golkar	
and	PKS	who	were	keen	to	‘settle	old	scores’,	especially	with	Mulyani,	who	was	a	
known	reformist	and	a	‘thorn	in	the	side’	of	Golkar	(Tomsa	2010:	311).15	Patunru	and	
von	Luebke	(2010:	11‐12)	surmise	that	many	parties,	both	opposition	and	those	in	
the	coalition,	stood	to	benefit	from	the	Bank	Century	case.	For	Islamic	coalition	
																																																													
15	Mulyani	had	repeatedly	clashed	with	Golkar	chairman	Aburizal	Bakrie,	a	prominent	
business	tycoon,	over	tax	evasion	and	his	company’s	involvement	in	the	Lapindo	mudflow	
disaster	(Kimura	2011:	187;	Tomsa	2010:	312).	The	Lapindo	mudflow	disaster	occurred	in	
Sidoarjo,	East	Java,	allegedly	as	a	result	of	drilling	by	the	company	PT	Lapindo	Brantas,	in	
which	the	Bakrie	family	owned	a	controlling	stake.	The	disaster	had	grave	environmental	and	
economic	impacts	upon	local	residents	and	efforts	to	deal	with	the	disaster	and	compensate	
victims	were	heavily	criticized.	For	further	discussion	see	McMichael	(2009).	
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partners,	it	was	an	opportunity	to	attack	Vice‐President	Boediono	and	press	for	a	
more	‘Islam‐friendly’	replacement.	The	case	also	gave	opposition	parties	an	
opportunity	to	undermine	the	anti‐corruption	image	that	Yudhoyono	had	spent	so	
many	years	fostering.	
	
On	3	March	2010,	the	parliamentary	inquiry	found	that	there	had	been	an	abuse	of	
power	in	the	bailout	and	recommended	that	Mulyani	and	Boediono	be	investigated	by	
the	KPK.	The	KPK	took	up	the	case,	but	Mulyani	and	Boediono	were	not	identified	as	
primary	suspects,	with	Mulyani	only	being	questioned	in	May	2013	(Setuningsih	
2013c).	While	calls	to	‘solve’	Centurygate	continued	to	resound	amongst	anti‐
corruption	activists	and	other	parties	up	to	the	2014	elections,	Golkar’s	interest	
waned	after	Mulyani	resigned	from	her	position	as	Finance	Minister	in	May	2010	to	
become	Managing	Director	of	the	World	Bank	in	Washington	D.C.	(Kimura	2011:	188;	
Tomsa	2010:	313).	Days	after	Mulyani	resigned,	Golkar	chairman,	Aburizal	Bakrie,	
was	appointed	chair	of	a	new	joint	secretariat	aimed	at	improving	the	coherence	and	
cooperation	between	coalition	members.	The	move	was	regarded	as	a	triumph	for	
Bakrie	and	a	demonstration	of	his	political	clout	in	the	wake	of	Mulyani’s	departure	
(Kimura	2011:	188;	Tomsa	2010:	314).16	DPR‐RI	representatives	from	most	of	the	
Rainbow	Coalition	partners	stopped	pursuing	the	case	once	Sri	Mulyani	resigned	as	
Finance	Minister	in	May	2010.	The	scandal	died	down	between	2010	and	2011,	but	
the	case	remained	an	ongoing	irritant	for	Yudhoyono	during	his	second	term.	
	
A	vocal	minority	of	opposition	parliamentarians,	however,	continued	attacking	
Yudhoyono	and	his	government	for	their	lack	of	action	on	Centurygate	(Aritonang	
2013;	McBeth	2013;	Patunru	and	von	Luebke	2010:	12).	In	response,	the	new	
Chairperson	of	the	KPK,	Abraham	Samad,	vowed	in	2011	to	prioritize	the	resolution	
																																																													
16	However,	while	aiming	to	improve	communication	and	unity	amongst	coalition	members,	
the	joint	secretariat	was	unable	to	prevent	ongoing	public	disagreements	within	the	coalition.	
For	example,	in	2010,	Golkar	proposed	to	confer	Rp.	15	billion	on	each	DPR‐RI	member	to	be	
spent	on	development	projects	in	their	constituencies	(Tomsa	2010:	315).	Although	the	
proposal	was	conditionally	supported	by	PDIP,	Golkar’s	partners	in	the	ruling	coalition	
rejected	the	proposal.	Islamic	parties,	in	particular,	argued	that	the	money	would	likely	be	
used	for	money	politics	and	vote‐buying	and	that	it	blurred	the	lines	between	legislative	and	
executive	power	(Maulia	2010).	Surprised	by	this	opposition,	in	September	2010	Golkar	
threatened	to	block	the	government’s	planned	state	budget	for	2011	if	the	‘aspiration	fund’	
was	not	accepted.	Golkar	legislator	and	House	Deputy	Speaker,	Priyo	Budi	Santoso,	was	
quoted	as	saying:	‘The	government	is	being	very	mean	by	not	giving	us	a	chance	to	discuss	it.	
Don’t	forget	that	just	as	they	can	tear	down	our	proposal,	Golkar	can	also	tear	down	their	
proposal	for	the	state	budget’	(Jakarta	Globe	2010).	However,	following	public	outcry	against	
the	proposal,	including	campaigns	on	Twitter	and	Facebook,	the	proposal	was	dropped	
(Kimura	2011:	189).		
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of	the	case	(Jakarta	Post	2011;	Suhartono	2012).	Media	coverage	of	Centurygate	
intensified	again	in	August	2012	when	former	KPK	chief	Antasari	Azhar,	by	then	in	
prison	for	murder,	alleged	that	Yudhoyono	had	met	a	number	of	other	high	profile	
officials	in	October	2008	to	discuss	the	legal	ramifications	of	the	Bank	Century	
bailout.	Antasari	accused	the	President	of	personally	approving	the	bailout	plan,	
contradicting	statements	from	the	President	himself,	who	claimed	that	he	had	left	the	
approval	to	the	Finance	Ministry	(Gunn	2013:	120).	Antasari’s	allegations	were	
denied	by	several	high‐ranking	people,	including	Hatta	Rajasa,	then‐Coordinating	
Minister	for	the	Economy	and	leader	of	the	National	Mandate	Party	(Partai	Amanat	
Nasional,	PAN),	and	Denny	Indrayana,	the	Deputy	Minister	for	Law	and	Human	
Rights.17	The	revival	in	media	attention	created	renewed	pressure	for	convictions	in	
the	case.		
	
In	December	2012,	the	KPK	named	former	Bank	Indonesia	Deputy	Governor	Budi	
Mulya	as	a	criminal	suspect	for	abusing	his	power	in	approving	a	short	term	loan	to	
Bank	Century	even	though	it	was	not	technically	eligible	for	one.18	But,	even	with	a	
potential	conviction	to	be	had,	opposition	groups	in	the	DPR‐RI	continued	to	voice	
disappointment.	Some	politicians,	particularly	from	the	Coalition,	accused	the	KPK’s	
Asset	Recovery	Team	of	being	a	waste	of	government	money	because	it	had	not	been	
able	to	recoup	much	of	the	losses	to	the	state	from	this	case	(Waskita	2013a).	In	July	
2014,	Mulya	was	convicted	of	causing	losses	to	the	State	and	receiving	a	Rp.	1	billion	
in	kickbacks.	However,	while	the	prosecution	had	requested	a	17	year	sentence	and	a	
Rp.	800	million	fine,	he	was	sentenced	to	ten	years	imprisonment	and	fined	Rp.	500	
million	(BBC	Indonesia	2014;	Mahmudah	2014).	The	sentence	was	criticized	by	many	
in	the	government,	including	the	existing	Bank	Indonesia	leadership	and	the	Minister	
for	Finance,	who	claimed	that	Budi	had	acted	within	the	law	and	that	his	superiors,	if	
anyone,	should	be	prosecuted	(Galih	2014a;b).19	Investigations	by	the	KPK	
recommenced	in	Yudhoyono’s	final	year	in	office	(2014),	particularly	into	the	role	of	
																																																													
17	For	examples	of	media	coverage	see	Berita	Satu	(2012)	and	Sundari	(2012).	Speculation	
about	Yudhoyono’s	denial	was	typified	in	a	Tempo	(2012)	editorial,	which	ventured	that	the	
President’s	swift	denial	was	indicative	of	deeper	concerns:	‘Oddly	enough,	the	President	
seemed	to	feel	the	need	to	reinforce	the	denial.	It	created	the	sense	that	the	issue	is	very	
worrying	for	the	President’,	such	that	even	issuing	a	denial	of	involvement	spurred	further	
speculation	of	his	role	in	Centurygate.	
18Antara	News	(2013b)	reports:	‘Budi	Mulya	was	named	a	suspect	in	December,	2012	on	
charge	of	abusing	his	power	by	approving	a	short	term	loan	facility	(FPJP)	for	the	ailing	Bank	
Century	although	it	was	not	eligible	for	it.	The	Supreme	Audit	Board	said	Bank	Indonesia	
changed	a	regulation	it	made	itself	to	allow	Bank	Century	to	get	the	loan	facility’.	
19	The	election	in	2014	of	a	new	president	(Jokowi)	sparked	renewed	public	calls	for	
investigation	into	Centurygate	(Akuntono	2014;	Faizal	2014).	However,	at	the	time	of	writing	
there	had	been	no	further	developments	in	the	investigation.	
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Vice‐President	Boediono	in	Cenutrygate	(Asril	2014c;	Setuningsih	et	al.	2014),	but	no	
charges	were	laid.20		
	
The	driving	simulator	procurement	case	
Between	2009	and	2014,	several	corruption	scandals,	in	addition	to	Centurygate,	
undermined	the	reputation	of	the	police	force	(Schütte	2012:	39‐40).	One	particularly	
prominent	case	involved	alleged	graft	in	the	procurement	of	driving	simulators	for	
the	traffic	police	in	2011.	At	the	centre	of	the	case	was	former	traffic	police	chief,	
Djoko	Susilo,	who	was	accused	of	accepting	bribes	in	return	for	contracts	to	provide	
the	simulators.	When	irregularities	in	the	procurement	process	were	detected	in	
2012,	both	the	police	and	the	KPK	launched	investigations.	In	late	July	2012,	the	KPK	
raided	the	former	headquarters	of	the	traffic	police,	sparking	outrage	from	some	
police	leaders	(Aritonang	and	Dewi	2012).	Then	in	August	2012,	the	KPK	announced	
that	it	had	interviewed	dozens	of	witnesses	in	connection	with	the	case.	At	the	same	
time,	the	police	criminal	investigation	team	also	claimed	they	were	interrogating	
witnesses,	focusing	their	suspicions	on	two	of	Susilo’s	personal	assistants	(Paraqbueq	
and	Rosarians	2012).	The	police	named	Susilo	as	a	witness	in	the	case	rather	than	a	
suspect,	while	the	KPK	believed	he	had	masterminded	the	plot	(Rosarians	2012).	The	
case	evolved	into	another	conflict	between	the	KPK	and	the	police	force,	with	the	two	
institutions	attempting	to	assert	their	authority	to	investigate	the	case.	
	
Three	months	later,	the	police	filed	a	civil	lawsuit	against	the	KPK	relating	to	a	raid	it	
had	conducted	on	police	offices,	contending	that	the	KPK	had	caused	Rp.	425	billion	
worth	of	material	losses	and	Rp.	6	billion	worth	of	non‐material	damages.	They	
argued	that	their	own	investigation	had	been	undermined	by	the	KPK	seizing	crucial	
documents	(Jakarta	Post	2012b).21	In	the	same	month,	the	police	recalled	
investigators	seconded	to	the	KPK.	This	strategy	backfired	when	some	investigators	
refused	to	comply	with	the	order.	One	investigator,	Novel	Baswedan,	was	the	victim	
of	a	police	smear	campaign,	with	the	police	trying	to	arrest	him	at	the	KPK	offices	for	
																																																													
20	As	quoted	from	The	Jakarta	Globe,	13	September	2013:	‘A	widely	held	belief	among	
legislators	and	critics	of	the	Rp.	6.7	trillion	bailout	of	Bank	Century	is	that	the	decision	was	
made	to	protect	depositors	with	close	links	to	President	Susilo	Bambang	Yudhoyono,	the	
Democrats’	chief	patron.’	(Sihaloho	2013a).	The	Jakarta	Globe	also	wrote	that	‘critics	contend	
[the	bailout]	was	far	too	costly	and	politically	manipulated	to	rescue	depositors	linked	to	
President	Susilo	Bambang	Yudhoyono’s	Democratic	Party’	(Amelia	2013a).	It	was	also	alleged	
that	Yudhoyono’s	parents‐in‐law	were	beneficiaries	of	the	deal	along	with	a	number	of	other	
wealthy	Indonesians	(Guntensperger	2009).	
21	The	civil	suit	subsequently	seemed	to	‘disappear’,	with	no	outcomes	having	been	made	
public.	
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his	alleged	involvement	in	shooting	suspects	in	2004	while	serving	in	Bengkulu	
(Pramudatama	et	al.	2012).	Instead	of	providing	police	with	leverage	over	the	KPK,	
Baswedan	was	depicted	in	the	media	as	a	hero	who	had	chosen	to	defy	the	corrupt	
police	leadership.	Following	an	attempt	by	police	to	storm	the	KPK	building	and	
arrest	Baswedan,	anti‐corruption	activists	staged	a	vigil	around	the	KPK	office	to	
prevent	further	attempts	by	the	police	to	raid	the	premises	(Jakarta	Globe	2012a).		
	
The	police	further	thwarted	KPK’s	investigation	by	refusing	to	submit	evidence	
relating	to	the	purchase	of	driving	simulator	equipment	to	the	KPK,	claiming	the	
investigation	was	their	jurisdiction.	The	legislation	that	had	established	the	KPK	shed	
little	light	on	the	delineation	of	responsibilities	between	the	two	institutions	and	
neither	looked	set	to	acquiesce	to	the	other,	even	though	public	support	lay	squarely	
with	the	KPK	(McRae	2013:	299).	After	being	criticized	for	his	silence,	Yudhoyono	
was	forced	to	intervene,	declaring	the	KPK	responsible	for	the	investigation,	but	also	
stressing	the	importance	of	cooperation	between	the	two	bodies	(Gunn	2013:	120;	
Jakarta	Post	2012c).	On	8	October	2012,	the	President	ordered	the	police	to	hand	the	
investigation	over	to	the	KPK	and	refrain	from	interfering	with	the	progress	of	the	
case	(Jakarta	Globe	2012b).	The	police	chose	not	to	comply	immediately,	continuing	
to	pursue	the	case	against	Baswedan	and	refusing	to	hand	over	documents	relating	to	
the	investigation.	In	response,	the	KPK	signed	a	memorandum	of	understanding	with	
the	Army	for	on‐going	support	in	investigating	corruption	within	the	police	force,	
compelling	the	police	to	respect	the	president’s	directive	(Rastika	2012).		
	
Acting	on	its	authority,	the	KPK	named	Susilo	as	a	suspect	and	he	was	arrested	on	4	
December	2012	(Febriyan	2012).22	Following	an	investigation,	the	KPK	identified	
over	Rp.	200	billion	worth	of	graft	related	assets	linked	to	Susilo	(Setuningsih	2013a).	
In	addition,	it	was	alleged	that	he	had	used	his	several	marriages	to	hide	his	wealth,	
most	sensationally	marrying	a	19	year	old	beauty	queen	when	he	was	48	and	
reportedly	giving	her	a	dowry	of	Rp.	15	billion	(Jong	2013b).	In	September	2013	
Susilo	was	sentenced	to	10	years’	imprisonment	and	a	Rp.	500	million	fine.	This	was	
less	than	the	prosecution’s	demand	that	he	be	imprisoned	for	18	years	and	that	he	be	
barred	from	participating	in	elections	both	as	a	voter	and	a	candidate,	thus	
disappointing	those	who	had	hoped	that	a	harsh	punishment	this	case	would	deter	
other	police	officers	from	corruption	(Suharman	2013).	However,	the	sentence	was	
																																																													
22	Once	the	KPK	arrests	a	suspect	the	case	is	legally	required	to	go	to	court	under	Law	No.	
30/2002	on	the	Commission	to	Eradicate	the	Crime	of	Corruption	(Republic	of	Indonesia	
2002).	
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subsequently	increased	to	18	years’	imprisonment,	a	Rp.	32	billion	fine	and	the	
removal	of	his	political	rights	when	Susilo	appealed	the	decision	in	the	Supreme	
Court	(Amelia	2013b).	
	
The	case	of	Gayus	
In	July	2009,	30	year	old	tax	office	bureaucrat	Gayus	Tambunan	made	national	
headlines	as	evidence	mounted	that	he	had	engaged	in	embezzlement	and	money	
laundering	on	behalf	of	large	Indonesian	corporations	(Jakarta	Post	2012a;	McLeod	
2011b:	7;	Ranfurlie	2011).	The	scandal	highlighted	problems	in	several	state	
institutions	including	the	tax	office,	police	force,	judiciary	and	immigration	office.	It	
also	illustrated	that	generational	change	would	not	solve	corruption	problems.	As	the	
case	unfolded,	Gayus	threatened	to	implicate	many	more	tax	officials,	thereby	
focusing	attention	upon	the	poor	performance	of	the	tax	office	and	the	difficulties	of	
cleaning	up	bureaucratic	institutions	with	significant	opportunities	to	engage	in	
corruption,	often	referred	to	as	basah	(literally	‘wet’)	departments	or	directories	
(Baird	and	Wihardja	2010:	144).	
	
Gayus	was	initially	accused	of	money	laundering	when	he	was	found	to	have	over	
USD	3	million	in	his	bank	account	in	2009	(Kimura	2012;	McLeod	2011b).	He	was	
charged	but	acquitted	by	the	Tangerang	District	Court	in	March	2010	(McLeod	
2011b:	8).	Gayus	was	again	arrested	on	31	March	2010	at	a	hotel	in	Singapore	and	
brought	back	to	Indonesia	after	Susno	Duadji,	of	cicak	vs	buaya	fame,	claimed	that	
Gayus	had	paid	two	police	officers	to	broker	his	acquittal	(Antara	News	2010;	Baird	
and	Wihardja	2010:	145;	Kimura	2012:	187).	Gayus	subsequently	admitted	that	he	
had	accepted	bribes	from	a	number	of	large	companies,	including	some	belonging	to	
Aburizal	Bakrie,	political	hopeful	and	former	chairperson	of	the	Indonesian	
conglomerate	the	Bakrie	Group	(McLeod	2011b;	Saragih	2010).	At	the	same	time,	he	
was	indicted	for	obstructing	justice	by	bribing	judges	to	obtain	an	acquittal	in	his	
previous	court	case,	though	in	the	end	he	was	not	charged	with	bribing	the	police	
officers.	In	January	2011,	the	South	Jakarta	District	Court	found	him	guilty	of	
accepting	bribes,	sentencing	him	to	seven	years	in	prison	and	a	Rp.	300	million	fine,	
which	was	deemed	controversial	for	its	leniency.23	
	
																																																													
23	Onlookers	at	the	trial	were	said	to	have	booed	and	yelled	at	the	judges	in	disappointment	at	
the	light	sentence	(Ramadhan	2011).	
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The	most	sensational	aspect	of	the	case	emerged	in	September	2010	when	Gayus	was	
photographed	at	a	Bali	tennis	tournament	while	he	was	supposed	to	be	in	police	
detention	in	Jakarta	(McLeod	2011b).	Widely	published	in	the	media,	the	
photographs	led	to	revelations	that,	having	bribed	his	jailers,	Gayus	had	travelled	
domestically	and	internationally—	including	to	Singapore,	Kuala	Lumpur	and	
Macao—on	a	false	passport	while	awaiting	the	outcome	of	his	second	judicial	appeal	
(Kimura	2012:	187).24	In	March	2012,	he	was	tried	again	by	the	Anti‐Corruption	
Court	for	accepting	bribes,	money	laundering	and	bribing	police	officers	(Firdaus	
2012).	Having	amassed	approximately	28	years	of	cumulative	prison	time	and	
additional	fines,	Gayus	lodged	an	appeal	in	August	2013.	The	Supreme	Court	upheld	
the	decisions	of	the	various	courts.	Furthermore,	since	the	sentences	were	handed	
down	by	different	courts,	his	overall	sentence	could	not	be	commuted	and	he	was	
required	to	serve	all	his	prison	terms	consecutively	rather	than	concurrently	
(Natahadibrata	2013).	
	
The	travellers’	cheque	scandal	
The	Travellers’	Cheque	scandal	caught	public	attention	not	only	because	of	the	
flamboyant	characters	involved,	but	also	because	it	exposed	a	pervasive	culture	of	
bribery	in	parliament.	At	the	centre	of	the	incident	was	Nunun	Nurbaeti,	wife	of	a	PKS	
politician,	who	was	accused	of	distributing	approximately	Rp.	20.65	billion	in	
travellers’	cheques	to	members	of	the	DPR‐RI	Commission	XI,	who	were	responsible	
for	electing	the	nation’s	Reserve	Bank	leadership.25	In	return,	they	were	asked	to	
appoint	Miranda	Goeltom	as	deputy	chairperson	of	the	Bank	of	Indonesia.	While	the	
bribes	were	said	to	have	been	paid	in	2004,	the	case	only	came	to	the	attention	of	the	
public	in	2009	when	the	KPK	publicly	identified	four	parliamentarians	as	suspects	in	
the	case.26	By	March	2010,	39	parliamentarians	from	PDIP,	PPP	and	Golkar	had	been	
charged	for	accepting	bribes	from	Nurbaeti	(Rayda	2010).27		
	
Nurbaeti	absconded	once	her	status	as	a	suspect	was	publicized,	claiming	that	she	
was	suffering	from	memory	lapses	that	required	specialist	treatment	in	Singapore.	
																																																													
24	He	was	later	sentenced	to	an	additional	two	years’	imprisonment	for	using	a	false	passport	
(Kimura	2012:	187).	
25	Within	the	DPR‐RI	there	are	11	commissions	responsible	for	managing	parliamentary	
business	in	relation	to	various	aspects	of	the	state’s	affairs.	Commission	XI	is	responsible	for	
matters	relating	to	finance,	development	planning	and	banking.	For	further	details	see	DPR‐RI	
(2014b).	
26	These	suspects	were	identified	as	lawmakers	Dhudie	Makmum	Murod	from	PDIP,	Endin	AJ	
Soefihara	from	PPP,	as	well	as	former	lawmakers	Hamka	Yandhu	from	the	Golkar	Party	and	
Udju	Juhaeri	from	the	police	and	military	faction	(Jakarta	Globe	2009).	
27	This	number	was	revised	to	24	in	September	2010	(Hapsari	2010).	
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She	was	recognized	while	out	shopping	in	Bangkok	and	was	extradited	to	Indonesia	
in	December	2011.	The	media	focused	on	the	life	of	luxury	she	led	while	hiding	from	
Indonesian	authorities	(Kramer	2013:	66).28	Even	with	the	resolution	of	the	case—
most	of	the	politicians	accused	were	tried	and	found	guilty,	while	Goeltom	received	a	
three‐year	prison	sentence	and	Nurbaeti	received	two	and	a	half	years—it	remains	
unclear	who	funded	the	bribes	and	what	interests	they	served.	Goeltom	has	
maintained	her	innocence,	asserting	that	she	had	no	connection	with	the	bribes	paid	
for	her	appointment	and	did	not	know	where	the	money	came	from	(Pramudatama	
2012).	
	
The	Travellers’	Cheque	scandal,	involving	parties	from	both	the	ruling	coalition	and	
the	opposition,	highlighted	the	institutionalized	nature	of	corruption	within	the	DPR‐
RI.	The	case	was	used	strategically	by	those	not	involved	to	discredit	those	who	were.	
This	proved	a	useful	tactic	for	the	Democratic	Party	which	had	a	number	of	members	
implicated	in	other	corruption	cases	at	the	time.	Marzuki	Alie,	leader	of	the	DPR‐RI	
and	Democratic	Party	member,	urged	all	parliamentarians	suspected	of	accepting	
bribes	to	resign,	stating	that	it	was	hypocritical	of	them	to	demand	others	accused	of	
corruption	to	step	down	before	trial	when	they	would	not	do	so	themselves	
(Munawwaroh	2010).	In	March	2010,	leading	up	to	trials	of	the	accused	politicians,	
Megawati,	leader	of	the	PDIP—one	of	the	parties	involved—defended	her	party’s	
members,	stating	that	all	defendants	are	innocent	until	proven	guilty	and	deriding	the	
politicization	of	corruption	cases	(Simatupang	2010).	In	addition	to	the	fantastical	
nature	of	Nurbaeti’s	capture	and	the	intrigue	surrounding	who	had	supplied	the	
travellers’	cheques,	this	politicking	saw	the	scandal	draw	even	more	attention	to	the	
culture	of	corruption	in	parliament.	
	
Corruption	in	the	Directorate	General	of	Customs	and	Excise	
In	October	2013,	the	media	reported	the	arrest	of	a	prominent	customs	official,	the	
Sub‐Director	for	the	Export	Directorate,	Heru	Sulastyono,	who	was	accused	of	
accepting	bribes	and	money	laundering.	Heru	had	allegedly	received	Rp.	11	billion	in	
return	for	assisting	companies	to	evade	paying	tax	between	2005	and	2007	(Perdani	
2013b;	Tempo	2013b).	Investigations	later	revealed	transactions	into	his	personal	
bank	account	totalling	over	Rp.	60	billion	between	2009	and	2011,	and	that	he	owned	
five	houses	(Perdani	2013a).	The	revelations	led	to	claims	by	ICW	that	acute	levels	of	
																																																													
28	For	example,	an	article	in	the	Jakarta	Globe	(2011a)	described	Nurbaeti	as	having	been	on	a	
‘nine‐month	shopping	spree	in	Singapore	and	Thailand’	while	an	article	in	Tempo	(Septian	
2011)	highlighted	her	lavish	accommodation	while	in	Bangkok.	
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corruption	afflicted	the	office	on	the	basis	that	Heru	could	not	possibly	have	acted	
alone.	Furthermore,	the	bribes	were	supposedly	paid	via	insurance	policies,	not	cash,	
representing	a	new,	less	visible	means	for	disbursing	money	to	officials	(Muhyiddin	
2013).		
	
Senior	figures	in	the	Directorate	General	of	Customs	and	Excise	denied	allegations	of	
a	culture	of	corruption,	arguing	that	they	had	themselves	detected	and	suspended	
several	officers	for	accepting	bribes	from	importers.	They	cited	the	reforms	
undertaken	by	former	Minister	for	Finance,	Sri	Mulyani—including	the	re‐assignment	
of	officers	to	break‐up	patronage	networks	and	a	salary	increase—as	evidence	that	
the	directorate	was	serious	about	eradicating	corruption.29	Senior	Customs	officials	
also	noted	that	in	2012,	84	officials	had	received	sanctions	for	ethical	and	disciplinary	
violations,	while	in	2013,	41	officials	had	been	punished	(Perdani	2013a).	In	February	
2014,	the	dossier	for	Sulastyono’s	case	was	officially	handed	over	to	the	Attorney‐
General’s	Office	for	prosecution	(Jakarta	Post	2014c).	Sulastoyono	was	prosecuted,	
found	guilty	of	accepting	bribes,	money	laundering	and	embezzlement,	sentenced	to	
6.5	years	imprisonment	and	a	Rp.	200	million	fine,	as	well	as	being	ordered	to	return	
the	money	he	embezzled	from	the	state	(Kurniawan	2014).	
	
Corruption	in	local	government	
Local	governments	were	now	responsible	for	larger	budgets	than	they	had	been	in	
the	past,	exacerbating	corruption	and	collusion	at	the	subnational	level.30	Several	
local	government	corruption	cases	attracted	public	attention	and	had	implications	for	
the	KPK	and	other	national	bodies.	One	such	case	was	the	Social	Aid	(Bantuan	Sosial,	
Bansos)	scandal	in	the	Bandung	administrative	region	in	West	Java	from	2012.	The	
Bansos	scheme,	which	provided	goods	and/or	direct	cash	transfers	to	citizens	in	
need,	was	already	notorious	for	its	vulnerability	to	embezzlement.	In	2012,	the	KPK	
charged	seven	members	of	the	Bandung	local	council	with	corruption,	citing	
cumulative	losses	to	the	state	of	over	Rp.	66.5	billion.	The	case,	which	was	tried	in	a	
regional	anti‐corruption	court,	gained	notoriety	when	those	convicted	were	only	
sentenced	to	one	year	imprisonment	and	a	Rp.	50	million	fine	(Yulianti	2012).	The	
prosecutors	had	demanded	sentences	of	three	to	four	years	and	the	punishments	
																																																													
29	See	Evan	(2012)	for	an	outline	of	these	salary	increases.	
30	This	reflected	one	of	the	major	criticisms	levelled	at	government	decentralization:	that	
corruption,	too,	had	been	decentralized	(Hadiz	2004;	Pepinsky	2008:	238‐239;	von	Luebke	
2009).	
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were	perceived	to	be	too	lenient,	given	that	preceding	cases	involving	far	smaller	
amounts	of	money	had	attracted	harsher	sentences	(Hardi	2012;	Yulianti	2012).		
	
Even	after	the	trial	had	concluded,	the	case	continued	to	attract	attention,	feeding	into	
debates	about	the	success	of	the	decentralization	of	the	anti‐corruption	court.	Prior	to	
the	establishment	of	regional	Anti‐Corruption	Courts	in	Indonesian	provincial	
capitals,	the	single	court	in	Jakarta	had	a	100	per	cent	conviction	rate	and	the	length	
of	sentences	was	increasing,	in	line	with	broad	demand	for	harsher	punishments	for	
corruption	(Butt	2011a:	381).	But	with	the	decentralization	of	the	courts	came	higher	
rates	of	acquittal	and	perceived	lighter	sentences.	In	March	2013,	the	KPK	arrested	a	
deputy	chief	judge	in	Bandung,	on	corruption	charges	related	to	the	case.	The	judge	
was	accused	of	accepting	a	bribe	in	return	for	handing	down	lighter	sentences	in	the	
face	of	overwhelming	evidence	against	the	accused	(Antara	News	2013a).	In	April	
2013,	one	of	the	suspects	found	guilty	of	corruption	admitted	to	bribing	the	judge,	
spurring	the	KPK	to	continue	with	the	case	(Setuningsih	2013d).	The	KPK	made	more	
subsequent	arrests,	including	of	Bandung’s	acting	head	of	regional	assets	and	
financial	oversight	and	the	secretary	of	the	Bandung	local	administration.	Finally,	the	
mayor	of	Bandung	himself	was	arrested	in	August	2013	(Alfiyah	and	Suharman	2013;	
Amelia	2013d).	When	he	was	finally	convicted	for	embezzling	part	of	the	Bansos	
budget	in	April	2014,	he	was	sentenced	to	ten	years’	imprisonment	(Yulianti	2014),	a	
significant	increase	on	the	punishment	handed	down	to	his	colleagues	the	previous	
year.	The	case	also	led	to	questions	surrounding	the	integrity	of	regional	branches	of	
the	Anti‐Corruption	Court,	which	had	been	accused	of	‘failing’	due	to	low	conviction	
rates	(Butt	2012).31		
	
The	fall	of	the	Democrats	
The	most	damaging	corruption	scandals	for	political	parties	were	those	involving	
their	own	parliamentarians.	As	elected	representatives,	DPR‐RI	members	are	
entrusted	with	pursuing	the	public	interests	and	protecting	citizens.	Their	
involvement	in	corruption,	not	unexpectedly,	provoked	widespread	public	
																																																													
31	Dick	and	Butt	(2013:	21‐22)	argue	that	the	lower	conviction	rates	by	regional	Anti‐
Corruption	Courts	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	their	integrity	has	been	compromised,	
asserting	that	the	100	per	cent	conviction	rate	of	the	Jakarta	Anti‐Corruption	Court	suggested	
that	the	courts	had	been	‘forgoing	the	presumption	of	innocence’	and	that	‘given	the	deep	
abhorrence	that	most	Indonesian	citizens	feel	towards	corruption	within	their	institutions	of	
government,	it	might	also	be	argued	that	Anti‐Corruption	Court	judges	–	particularly	the	ad	
hoc	judges	who	have	been	employed	as	part	of	efforts	to	maintain	the	integrity	of	the	Anti‐
Corruption	Courts	–	feel	under	undue	pressure	to	convict	in	corruption	cases	lest	they	be	
labelled	anti‐reformist’.	
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dissatisfaction	not	just	with	the	parliament	but	with	the	government	overall.	
Furthermore,	with	parties	jockeying	for	influence	within	the	parliament,	these	
scandals	played	into	broader	power	struggles	between	parties.	Opposition	parties,	for	
example,	could	use	the	corruption	scandals	as	evidence	of	the	ruling	parties’	
untrustworthiness.	Yudhoyono,	in	particular,	was	called	to	account	for	the	actions	of	
several	Democratic	Party	members	who	were	accused	of	corruption,	with	critics	
arguing	that	the	prevalence	of	corruption	within	the	party	reflected	weak	leadership	
and	even	personal	moral	bankruptcy	on	the	part	of	the	President.32	
	
The	Democratic	Party	suffered	a	significant	decline	in	popularity	in	the	2009—2014	
period,	in	some	part	due	to	the	corruption	scandals	embroiling	its	members.	The	
party	had	emphasized	their	anti‐corruption	credentials	during	its	2009	electoral	
campaign.	It	had,	for	example,	run	a	television	campaign	entitled	‘say	no	to	
corruption’	(katakan	tidak	pada	korupsi),	in	which	high‐profile	party	candidates	
sternly	rejected	corrupt	practices	in	parliament.	Two	years	later,	a	number	of	high‐
profile	members	were	implicated	in	several	corruption	scandals.	Given	the	
Democratic	Party’s	prior	use	of	an	anti‐corruption	symbol,	it	was	particularly	
susceptible	to	criticism	and	disappointment	when	its	own	representatives	were	
exposed	as	being	no	less	corrupt	than	those	of	other	parties	(Aspinall	2010;	Mietzner	
2009).33	
	
In	April	2011,	Muhammad	Nazaruddin,	a	33	year‐old	legislator	and	national	treasurer	
for	the	Democratic	Party,	was	accused	of	accepting	bribes	in	relation	to	the	
construction	of	an	athletes’	village	in	South	Sumatra,	as	part	of	the	2011	Southeast	
Asian	Games	(SEA	Games).	The	case	came	to	be	known	as	the	Wisma	Atlet	(Athletes’	
guesthouse)	scandal	and	was	one	of	the	most	reported	corruption	scandals	of	that	
year,	notably	salacious	because	Nazaruddin	fled	the	country	and	was	pursued	in	an	
international	manhunt	by	the	KPK	and	was	arrested	in	Colombia	in	August	2011	
(Fealy	2011:	341;	Mahi	and	Nazara	2012:	9).	In	April	2012,	he	was	sentenced	to	four	
years	and	10	months	imprisonment	for	accepting	Rp.	4.6	billion	in	return	for	rigging	
construction	tenders	for	the	village	(Parlina	and	Aritonang	2012).	The	ruling	
																																																													
32	For	example,	to	mark	International	Anti‐Corruption	Day	on	9	December	2013,	ICW	
published	a	document	detailing	the	roles	of	figures	close	to	the	President,	including	his	wife,	in	
a	number	of	corrupt	dealings,	implying	that	Yudhoyono	must	have	had	some	knowledge	of	
them.	While	the	President’s	office	denied	accusations,	the	document	received	national	media	
coverage	(Jong	2013a).	
33	See	Mietzner	(2014a)	for	a	preliminary	discussion	of	the	results	of	the	2014	elections	and	
the	decline	in	support	for	the	Democratic	Party.	
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prompted	outrage	among	anti‐corruption	campaigners	for	its	leniency	given	that	the	
prosecution	had	demanded	a	seven	year	sentence	(Parlina	and	Aritonang	2012).	
Though	the	verdict	said	nothing	to	link	the	bribe	to	the	party	more	broadly,	
Nazaruddin	did	implicate	several	colleagues	during	his	trial,	claiming	they	were	also	
involved	in	a	high‐level	web	of	corruption	(Fealy	2013:	105;	Mahi	and	Nazara	2012:	
9;	Parlina	and	Aritonang	2012).		
	
Nazaruddin’s	accusations	were	damaging	because	he	and	many	of	the	other	
Democratic	Party	suspects	were	young	recruits	who	had	been	heralded	as	a	new	
generation	of	clean	politicians.	Nazaruddin’s	accusations	had	serious	repercussions	
for	particular	party	colleagues,	including	Angelina	Sondakh,	who	was	found	guilty	of	
accepting	Rp.	2.5	billion	in	bribes	in	return	for	awarding	SEA	Games	construction	
contracts	to	specific	bidders	(Rastika	2013).	In	January	2013	she	was	sentenced	to	
4.5	years	imprisonment	and	fined	Rp.	500	million.	Dubbed	‘Angie’	by	the	press,	she	
was	a	former	beauty	queen	and	a	star	recruit	for	the	Democratic	Party	in	2009.	Her	
case	was	closely	followed	by	Indonesia’s	media,	with	some	coverage	resembling	that	
given	to	celebrities	by	the	paparazzi	(Kramer	2013).	Angelina’s	case	attracted	
renewed	interest	in	November	2013	when,	on	appeal,	the	Supreme	Court	increased	
her	sentence	to	12	years	and	her	fine	to	Rp.	27.4	billion,	the	original	punishment	
sought	by	prosecutors.	The	increase	was	significant	because	in	several	other	cases	
Tipikor	judges	had	been	condemned	for	handing	down	light	sentences	for	those	
found	guilty	of	corruption.	The	harsher	Supreme	Court	sentence	was	possibly	a	
response	to	public	demands	that	those	guilty	of	corruption	face	tougher	punishment.	
	
Also	indicted,	though	in	a	different	sports‐related	case,	was	Andi	Mallarangeng,	then	
Minister	for	Sports.	Mallarangeng	resigned	from	his	position	in	December	2012	in	
response	to	accusations	that	he	had	abused	his	ministerial	power	in	the	tendering	of	
construction	works	for	the	Hambalang	sporting	complex,	a	sports	facility	for	elite	
athletes	on	the	outskirts	of	Bogor,	resulting	in	state	losses	of	Rp.	463.3	million	
(Rahman	and	Mahmudah	2013).	He	was	accused	of	accepting	Rp.	4	billion	and	USD	
550,000	(cash)	in	bribes	in	exchange	for	awarding	tenders	to	specific	construction	
companies	and	he	was	eventually	arrested	by	the	KPK	in	October	2013.	He	was	
convicted	of	abuse	of	authority	in	July	2014	and	sentenced	to	four	years	in	prison	and	
fined	Rp.	200	million	(Maharani	2014b).		
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Even	more	damaging	for	the	Democratic	Party	was	the	indictment	of	its	Chairman,	
Anas	Urbaningrum,	for	using	money	earned	illicitly	from	the	Hambalang	project	and	
other	government	schemes	to	fund	his	2010	campaign	to	become	party	leader	(Mahi	
and	Nazara	2012:	9).	Because	of	his	position,	his	implication	in	the	scandal	inferred	
that	corruption	schemes	pervaded	the	upper	echelons	of	the	party.	Yudhoyono	
rejected	this	suggestion,	proclaiming	corruption	to	be	the	exception	rather	than	the	
rule.	Nevertheless,	the	scandal	fuelled	the	declining	popularity	of	the	Democratic	
Party	(Fealy	2013:	105).34	The	downfall	of	Urbaningrum	prompted	a	panic	within	the	
party,	resulting	in	Yudhoyono’s	election	to	the	chairmanship	in	2013	in	an	attempt	to	
restore	confidence	in	the	party’s	leadership	(Nehru	2013:	141).	However,	this	move	
indicated	that	the	Democratic	Party	lacked	a	suitable	next	generation	of	leaders	and	
was	overly	reliant	upon	Yudhoyono	as	its	figurehead	(Cochrane	2013b).	
Urbaningrum	was	eventually	convicted	for	his	role	in	the	Hambalang	scandal	and	for	
money	laundering	in	September	2014.	He	was	sentenced	to	prison	for	eight	years	and	
fined	Rp.	300	million.	In	their	verdict,	the	Tipikor	judges	appeared	to	reflect	popular	
sentiment,	stating	that	he	had	failed	to	set	a	good	example	as	both	a	public	official	and	
party	chairman	and	‘failed	to	support	the	spirit	of	society	in	fighting	graft’	(Jakarta	
Post	2014a).	
	
The	fall	of	PKS	
At	the	beginning	of	2013,	the	clean	image	that	the	PKS	spent	years	fostering	was	
threatened	by	the	so‐called	Beefgate	scandal.35	PKS	chairperson	and	legislator,	Luthfi	
Hasan	Ishaaq	and	Ahmad	Fathanah,	were	accused	of	accepting	bribes	from	a	beef	
import	company,	PT	Indonguna,	in	return	for	increasing	their	beef	import	quota.36	
The	KPK	arrested	Ahmad	Fathanah	in	a	five‐star	hotel	room	in	Jakarta	on	29	January	
2013.	The	case	became	a	sensation	when	it	was	revealed	that	he	had	been	caught	
sharing	a	room	with	a	naked	college	student,	with	whom	he	had	sexual	relations	
(Subkhan	2013).	He	was	also	in	possession	of	a	suitcase	containing	Rp.	1	billion	
(Cochrane	2013a),	which	was	allegedly	a	payment	for	Luthfi	from	PT	Indoguna	
executives,	received	by	Fathanah.	Luthfi	and	Fathanah	were	later	charged	with	
accepting	bribes	and	money	laundering	in	March	2013.	
	
																																																													
34	Growing	public	concern	about	the	party’s	integrity	was	supported	by	WikiLeaks	cables	
published	in	2012,	suggesting	that	Yudhoyono	had	personally	intervened	to	influence	judges	
and	prosecutors	to	protect	officials	close	to	him	(Kingsbury	2012:	19).	
35	As	part	of	Yudhoyono’s	Rainbow	Coalition,	Suswono,	a	member	of	PKS	had	been	appointed	
the	Minister	for	Agriculture.	Suswono	was	not	implicated	in	the	scandal.	
36	For	a	detailed	recount	of	this	case	and	the	implications	for	PKS	see	Kramer	(2014a).	
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Media	scrutiny	intensified	as	more	details	of	the	case	became	public,	painting	an	
increasingly	negative	picture	of	certain	party	members	and	the	party	as	a	whole.	PKS	
rallied	support	from	its	cadres,	alluding	to	a	conspiracy	against	the	party	and	
contending	that	political	interests	seeking	to	damage	the	reputation	of	PKS	were	at	
play.37	The	party	launched	a	counter	attack	upon	the	KPK,	claiming	that	the	anti‐
corruption	agency	had	lost	its	independence	and	was	the	puppet	of	PKS’	political	
rivals.	The	KPK	attempted	to	seize	five	cars	belonging	to	Luthfi	from	the	party	in	May	
2013,	claiming	that	they	may	have	been	purchased	with	proceeds	from	corruption.	
PKS	officials	refused	to	hand	over	the	vehicles,	instead	lodging	a	police	complaint	
against	the	KPK,	claiming	that	KPK	officials	had	abused	their	power,	entered	PKS	
premises	by	force	and	failed	to	produce	a	warrant	for	the	seizure	of	the	cars	(Perdani	
and	Aritonang	2013;	Saragih	2013b).	
	
The	attacks	on	the	well‐respected	KPK	took	a	toll	on	the	party’s	image	but	the	illegal	
import	quota	deal	was	later	overshadowed	by	an	increased	focus	upon	the	private	life	
of	Fathanah,	who	was	eventually	linked	to	over	45	women.	It	was	alleged	that	
Fathanah	had	given	these	women	expensive	gifts,	in	some	cases	possibly	in	return	for	
intimate	relations,	despite	already	having	two	wives.	The	Indonesian	media	focused	
on	who	these	different	women	were,	what	their	exact	relationship	to	Fathanah	was	
and	what	they	did	in	return	for	these	gifts.	There	was	also	speculation	that	these	
women	could	themselves	be	tried	for	money	laundering	though	this	did	not	eventuate	
(Aprianto	et	al.	2013;	Jakarta	Post	2013a).	Furthermore	in	December	2012,	during	
the	course	of	the	investigation,	it	was	revealed	that	Luthfi	had	gotten	married	for	a	
third	time	to	a	high	school	student.	Many	Indonesians	were	critical	of	the	relationship	
between	the	52	year	old	and	the	teenager,	further	damaging	the	politician’s	
reputation	(Ucu	2013).	
	
The	charges	of	corruption	and	money	laundering	levelled	against	Luthfi	and	Fathanah	
were	sufficient	to	damage	the	relatively	clean	reputation	of	the	PKS,	but	the	media	
focus	on	their	relationships	with	various	women	presented	an	even	graver	challenge	
to	the	party’s	standing.	The	party,	with	its	solid	Islamic	values,	and	conservative	
views	on	women	wearing	short	skirts	and	public	displays	of	affection,	now	found	
itself	firmly	linked	to	two	high‐profile	men	whose	private	lives	did	not	seem	to	fit	
within	the	PKS’	moral	framework	(Cochrane	2013a).	PKS’	attempts	to	lay	the	blame	
																																																													
37	On	1	February	2013	it	was	reported	that	PKS’	DPR‐RI	leader	suggested	that	PKS	may	have	
been	framed	by	other	parties	because	of	its	strong	anti‐corruption	stance	(Alford	2013a).	
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on	‘beautiful	women’	tempting	Islamic	politicians	to	tarnish	their	reputations	gained	
little	public	sympathy	(Suara	Pembaruan	2013;	Sukoyo	2013b).	The	negative	
publicity	was	reflected	in	numerous	surveys	that	predicted	PKS	would	do	poorly	in	
the	2014	national	election	(Damarjati	2013;	Ruslan	2013).		
	
After	a	highly	publicized	trial,	Fathanah	was	found	guilty	of	corruption	on	4	
November	2013	for	receiving	grants	and	incentives	on	behalf	of	Luthfi.	The	Jakarta	
Anti‐Corruption	Court	sentenced	Fathanah	to	14	years	in	prison	and	fined	him	Rp.	1	
billion	or	an	additional	six	months	in	prison	(Jakarta	Globe	2013).	Once	this	verdict	
was	passed,	Luthfi	attempted	to	shift	the	blame	to	Fathanah.	Luthfi’s	trial	began	after	
Fathanah’s	and	during	questioning	Luthfi	claimed	that	Fathanah,	a	long‐time	friend	
since	they	studied	together	in	Saudi	Arabia	in	the	1980s,	had	deceived	him	and	used	
his	name	to	make	unsavoury	deals	without	his	consent.	He	claimed	that	he	had,	as	his	
friend,	attempted	to	protect	him	(Jakarta	Post	2013b).	The	defence	plea	fell	on	deaf	
ears	and	Luthfi	was	sentenced	to	16	years’	imprisonment	on	9	December	2013.	He	
was	also	fined	Rp.	1	billion	or	an	additional	year	in	prison.	Luthfi	immediately	
claimed	that	he	would	appeal	the	sentence.	In	the	meantime,	PKS	had	distanced	itself	
from	Luthfi,	stating	that	it	planned	to	focus	on	the	upcoming	elections	and	would	not	
seek	to	intervene	or	influence	the	case	in	any	way,	hoping	to	recover	before	national	
polling	in	April	2014.38	
	
Corruption	in	the	Constitutional	Court	
One	of	the	most	sensational	scandals	revealed	between	2009	and	2014	was	the	arrest	
and	conviction	of	Akil	Mochtar,	the	Chief	Justice	of	Indonesia’s	Constitutional	Court,	
for	accepting	bribes.39	The	Mochtar	scandal	dominated	the	national	headlines	in	early	
October	2013	when	rumours	began	circulating	that	the	KPK	had	been	investigating	
him.	He	was	charged	with	receiving	almost	Rp.	4	billion	for	favourable	rulings	in	
disputes	over	the	district	elections	of	Gunung	Mas,	in	Central	Kalimantan,	and	Lebak	
in	the	province	of	Banten.	Later,	he	was	tried	for	accepting	bribes	to	fix	11	electoral	
rulings	(Setuningsih	and	Cahyadi	2014).	He	was	also	charged	with	money	laundering	
via	his	wife’s	company	(Amelia	2013c).	To	make	matters	worse,	marijuana	and	
methamphetamines	were	found	during	a	search	of	his	office,	requiring	him	to	
																																																													
38	The	PKS	vote	decreased	from	7.88	per	cent	of	the	popular	vote	in	2009	to	6.79	per	cent	in	
2014,	though	this	was	a	better	result	than	expected	(Fealy	2014;	Kramer	2014a).	
39	The	Constitutional	Court	was	formed	under	article	24C	of	the	Indonesian	Constitutional	
amendments	passed	in	2001.	It	rules	on	matters	related	to	the	Constitution,	the	power	of	state	
institutions,	the	dissolution	of	political	parties	and	disputes	over	electoral	outcomes.	For	
further	details	see	Mahkamah	Konstitusi	(2014).	
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undergo	DNA	and	drug	testing	(Primandari	2013).	While	urine	tests	found	no	traces	
of	drug	use,	he	was	charged	with	drug	possession.40	Although	National	Narcotics	
Agency	(Badan	Narkotika	Nasional,	BNN)	stated	in	February	2014	that	it	would	not	
seek	prison	time	for	the	offence	(Jakarta	Globe	2014a),	Mochtar’s	credibility	had	
already	been	further	damaged.	Finally,	Mochtar	was	sentenced	to	life	imprisonment	
for	receiving	Rp.	57.78	billion	in	bribes	and	laundering	Rp.	160	billion	during	his	
tenure	as	a	Constitutional	Court	judge	(Alford	2014).	
	
The	case	provoked	particularly	visceral	outcry	because	the	Constitutional	Court	had	
developed	a	reputation	for	being	clean	since	its	inception	in	2003—and	so,	unlike	
other	more	established	judicial	institutions,	was	widely	respected	by	the	Indonesian	
public.	The	Court’s	previous	Chief	Judge,	Mahfud	MD,	was	renowned	for	his	hard‐line	
stance	against	corruption.41	The	scandal	was	also	unexpected	because	Mochtar	had	
promoted	himself	as	an	anti‐corruption	crusader,	at	one	point	stating	that	those	
guilty	of	corruption	should	have	a	finger	cut	off	(MacLaren	2013).	Yudhoyono	
released	a	public	statement	almost	immediately	after	the	arrest,	expressing	shock	and	
dismay	that	the	court	had	been	compromised	(Prihandoko	2013).	This	case	was	also	
damaging	for	the	President	because	one	of	his	explicitly	stated	aims	during	his	second	
term	was	to	combat	the	‘judicial	mafia’	(Suara	Pembaruan	2011).42	With	revelations	
that	corruption	had	infected	even	the	Constitutional	Court,	Yudhoyono	was	again	
derided	for	failing	to	curb	the	judicial	corruption.43		
	
The	case	was	also	damaging	for	Golkar.	Not	only	had	Mochtar	represented	the	party	
in	parliament,	but	several	Golkar	officials	were	implicated	in	the	bribery	cases.	In	
March	2014,	Chairun	Nisa,	a	Golkar	parliamentarian	from	Central	Kalimantan,	
received	a	four	year	prison	sentence	and	a	Rp.	100	million	fine	for	brokering	the	
																																																													
40	BNN	confirmed	the	charges	in	January	2014,	saying	that	although	Mochtar’s	drug	tests	had	
proven	negative	they	had	found	several	witnesses	to	testify	that	the	former	judge	had	used	
narcotics	in	the	past	(Maharani	2014a).	
41	For	example,	Mahfud	had	stated	in	the	past	that	the	death	penalty	was	suitable	in	some	
corruption	cases	and	once	floated	the	idea	of	a	‘zoo’	for	corruption	perpetrators	in	which	
members	of	the	public	could	go	and	jeer	at	the	criminals	(Jakarta	Globe	2011b).	
42	A	taskforce	was	established	in	December	2009	to	take	on	the	judicial	mafia,	but	was	widely	
criticised	and	its	mandate	was	not	renewed	when	it	ended	in	December	2011.	For	an	
extensive	discussion	of	the	judicial	mafia	in	Indonesia	see	Butt	and	Lindsay	(2011).	
43	The	surprise	generated	by	the	scandal	echoed	through	international	media	reporting.	The	
Australian	asserted	that	‘Akil	Mochtar’s	arrest	has	raised	anger	about	high‐level	corruption	to	
a	new	pitch	and	the	court's	founding	chief	justice	[Jimly	Asshidique]	has	called	for	the	death	
sentence’(Alford	2013b).	The	Economist,	(2013)	meanwhile,	reported	that:	‘it	is	thoroughly	
depressing	that	this	new	institution	is	now	being	accused	of	the	same	bad	behaviour	as	the	old	
ones’,	especially	given	that	it	had	‘won	respect	for	its	impartial	rulings’.		
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bribery	deal	between	Golkar	members	and	Mochtar	(Setuningsih	2014a;	Wanto	
2013).	As	the	investigations	continued,	Banten’s	Governor,	Ratu	Atut	Chosiyah,	also	
made	headlines	as	her	younger	brother	was	linked	to	the	bribery	case	(Firdaus	
2013).44	Atut	herself	was	tried	in	August	2014	for	allegedly	paying	Mochtar	Rp.	1	
billion	to	secure	a	Golkar	victory	in	the	regency	of	Lebak	when	Golkar	appealed	the	
electoral	results	in	the	Constitutional	Court	(Rikang	2014).	Although	prosecutors	
sought	a	ten	year	prison	sentence	for	Atut,	she	was	only	sentenced	to	four	years’	
imprisonment	and	a	Rp.	200	million	fine.	Public	outrage	at	the	light	sentence	was	
widespread,	especially	across	social	media,	where	‘netizens’	complained	that	it	
undermined	the	deterrent	effect	that	a	harsher	punishment	would	have	otherwise	
achieved	(Soares	2014).	Mochtar’s	arrest	and	conviction	were	seen	as	a	gross	
betrayal	of	trust,	while	Atut’s	conviction	reflected	the	ongoing	use	of	bribery	to	fix	
political	outcomes,	demonstrating	that	corruption	still	reached	the	highest	echelons	
and	continued	to	undermine	democratic	processes.	
	
Public	opinion	
The	media	focus	on	corruption	cases	no	doubt	fuelled	public	resentment	towards	the	
government	between	2009	and	2014.	There	are	two	main	arguments	as	to	how	media	
reporting	influences	public	opinion:	audiences	may	interpret	the	increased	visibility	
of	corruption	investigations,	arrests	and	convictions	as	reflecting	positive	progress	in	
the	‘war’	on	corruption,	or	the	high	volume	of	corruption	reporting	may	simply	
reinforce	existing	perceptions	that	corruption	is	endemic	and	that	the	investigations	
and	convictions	merely	scratch	the	surface	of	this	endemic	problem.45	The	majority	of	
surveys,	opinion	columns	and	academic	literature	published	between	2009	and	2014	
suggest	that	many	Indonesian	citizens	were	disappointed	in	the	government’s	anti‐
corruption	efforts.	Being	linked	to	corruption	scandals	also	contributed	to	a	decline	in	
the	popularity	of	Yudhoyono	and	several	political	parties,	and	fostered	a	general	
distrust	of	several	state	institutions	such	as	the	judiciary,	the	police	and	the	DPR‐RI.	
																																																													
44	For	a	scholarly	analysis	of	Ratu	Atut	Chosiyah’s	family	dynasty	in	Banten	see	Gunn	(2014:	
52)	and	Hamid	(2014a).	In	October	2014	the	KPK	filed	an	appeal	against	the	five	year	prison	
sentence	and	Rp.	150	million	fine	handed	down	to	Atut’s	brother,	Tubagus	Chaeri	Wardana,	
for	bribing	Akil	Mochtar,	claiming	it	was	too	lenient	(Setuningsih	2014b).	
45	This	argument	is	progressed	by	Schmidt	(1993)	in	her	analysis	of	public	responses	to	media	
reporting	about	trade	unions.		
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Surveys	conducted	during	this	period	indicated	that	citizens	were	dissatisfied	with	
the	government	in	spite	of	the	increase	in	corruption	convictions.	46	Despite	growing	
conviction	numbers,	yearly	surveys	conducted	by	the	Indonesian	Survey	Group	
(Lembaga	Survei	Indonesia,	LSI)	showed	that	public	satisfaction	with	the	
government’s	anti‐corruption	endeavours	had	declined.	47	In	2008	a	survey	revealed	a	
77	per	cent	approval	rate	for	the	government’s	work	on	combating	corruption.	By	
2011	this	number	had	fallen	to	44	per	cent	(Lembaga	Survei	Indonesia	2012).	A	
number	of	surveys	undertaken	in	2012	and	2013	also	reflected	the	depth	of	public	
discontent	with	the	government’s	anti‐corruption	progress,	especially	highlighting	
disappointment	with	Yudhoyono	and	parliament	(Table	3.2).48		
	 	
																																																													
46	A	number	of	institutions	were	engaged	in	public	surveys	of	this	nature	from	2013‐2014.	14	
of	the	main	institutions	were:	Biro	Pusat	Statistik,	Centre	for	Strategic	and	International	
Studies,	Indonesia	(CSIS),	Founding	Father	House	(FFH),	Indonesian	Network	Election	Survey	
(INES),	Lembaga	Survei	Indonesia	(LSI),	Lembaga	Survei	Nasional	(LSN),	Lingkaran	Survei	
Indonesia,	Political	Weather	Station,	Pusat	Data	Bersatu,	Saiful	Mujani	Research	and	
Consulting	(SMRC),	Soegeng	Sarjadi	School	of	Government	(SSSG),	SPACE,	Transparency	
International	Indonesia	(TII)	and	Universitas	Gadjah	Mada	Pusat	Kajian	Anti‐Korupsi	(UGM	
PUKAT).	Numerous	informal	conversations	with	staff	in	political	party	head	offices	suggest	
that	it	is	difficult	to	determine	the	reliability	of	survey	data	collected	in	Indonesia,	primarily	
because	political	parties	sometimes	commission	surveys	to	suit	their	own	agendas.	A	common	
modus	operandi	for	political	parties	who	wish	to	receive	favourable	media	coverage	is	to	
commission	a	survey	with	favourable	outcomes,	which	is	then	released	to	the	press	as	an	
independent	study.	Nevertheless,	there	is	an	evident	trend	across	the	surveys,	supported	by	
media	reports,	illustrating	that	the	Indonesian	public	continued	to	view	the	government	as	
corrupt	during	this	period.		
47	In	2013,	the	KPK	released	data	showing	that	it	had	secured	59	convictions	for	corruption	in	
that	year,	up	from	50	convictions	in	2012	and	39	convictions	in	2011	but	lower	than	the	65	
convictions	it	secured	in	2010.	In	2014	KPK	reported	58	corruption	convictions.	When	
compared	to	earlier	figures	from	2004	(4	convictions),	2005	(23	convictions),	2006	(29	
convictions)	and	2007	(27	convictions),	the	number	of	convictions	has	increased	significantly	
(KPK	2014).	
48	It	should	be	noted	the	surveys	are	used	here	merely	as	an	indication	of	public	sentiment.	
Survey	institutions	in	Indonesia	are	sometimes	known	to	be	partisan,	or	even	paid	by	political	
parties/candidates	to	conduct	surveys	that	have	beneficial	results	for	them.	Therefore,	this	
thesis	avoids	reading	too	much	into	the	specific	statistics	and	instead	highlights	commonly	
identified	trends	in	public	sentiment	by	looking	at	a	range	of	surveys	by	different	survey	
institutes.	
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Table	3.2.	Surveys	from	July	2012‐	2013	addressing	corruption	issues	in	Indonesia49	
Released	 Institution	 Findings	
Jul	2012	 CSIS	 77%	of respondents	believe	the	majority	of	government	
officials	are	corrupt.50	
Jan	2013	 Biro	Pusat	Statistik	 On	average,	respondents	rate	corruption	in	the	
Indonesian	government	as	3.5	out	of	5	(with	5	being	very	
corrupt,	0	meaning	no	corruption).51	
Jul	2013	 Lingkaran	Survei	
Indonesia	
52%	of	those	surveyed	say	they	do	not	trust	politicians.52		
Sep	2013	 Indonesian	Network	
Election	Survey	
86%	of	respondents	believe	that	all	political	parties	are	
corrupt.53	
Oct	2013	 Lembaga	Survei	
Nasional	
55.9%	of	respondents	believe	corruption	eradication	is	
the	most	important	issue	facing	the	government	(the	
highest	ranking	issue	in	the	survey).	55.4%	of	
respondents	believed	that	the	state	of	the	nation	had	not	
improved	during	Yudhoyono’s	second	term	and	25.9%	
believed	it	had	gotten	worse.54		
Dec	2013	 Indikator	 41.5%	of	respondents	believe	that	political	parties	are	
the	primary	group	responsible	for	preventing	money	
politics.55	
Dec	2013	 Transparency	
International	
Corruption	Perceptions	Index	finds	that	national	
parliamentarians	are	perceived	as	the	most	corrupt	
figures	in	Indonesia.56	
	
Polling	from	a	range	of	organizations	predicted	that	the	Democratic	Party	would	
concede	its	parliamentary	majority	in	2014,	while	several	polls	also	suggested	that	
PKS	would	fail	to	win	enough	votes	to	meet	the	parliamentary	threshold	required	to	
																																																													
49	From	the	end	of	2013,	surveys	began	to	focus	much	more	on	the	popularity	of	parties	and	
potential	presidential	candidates.	This	study	found	no	surveys	conducted	between	January	
and	April	2014	that	asked	general	questions	about	the	existing	government’s	anti‐corruption	
efforts.	
50	As	reported	by	Detik.com	(Dhurandara	2012).	
51	As	reported	in	the	Wall	Street	Journal	(Ismar	and	Husna	2013).	
52	As	reported	in	Republika	(Rini	2013).	
53	As	reported	in	Kompas	(Gatra	2013).	
54	Survey	results	posted	to	the	website	of	Lembaga	Survei	Nasional	(2013).	
55	As	reported	in	Tempo	(Purnomo	2013).	
56	As	reported	in	the	Jakarta	Globe	(Setuningsih	2013b).	
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take	up	seats	at	all	(see	Appendix	1).57	The	most	popular	presidential	candidates	also	
came	from	two	opposition	parties:	Jokowi	from	PDIP	and	Prabowo	from	Gerindra.		
Most	survey	predictions	for	the	Democratic	Party	accurately	predicted	that	it	would	
poll	far	below	its	2009	achievement.		With	the	Democratic	Party	losing	over	half	their	
seats	and	PDIP	underperforming,	several	other	parties	did	better	than	expected,	
particularly	Islamic	parties	(Fealy	2014)	(see	Table	3.3).		
	
Table	3.3.	Outcome	of	the	national	legislative	elections,	2014.	
Party	 %	of	popular	
vote	
+/‐	change	in	
popular	vote	
from	2009	
No.	of	seats	in	
parliament	
+/‐	no.	of	
seats	from	
2009	
PDIP	 18.95	 +4.92	 109	 +15	
Golkar	 14.75	 +0.30	 91	 ‐15	
Gerindra	 11.81	 +7.35	 73	 +47	
Democratic	
Party	 10.19	 ‐10.66	 61	 ‐87	
PKB	 9.04	 +4.10	 47	 +19	
PAN	 7.59	 +1.58	 49	 +3	
PKS	 6.79	 ‐1.09	 40	 ‐17	
Nasdem	 6.72	 —	 35	 —	
PPP	 6.53	 +1.21	 39	 +1	
Hanura	 5.26	 +1.49	 16	 ‐1	
Source:	Komisi	Pemilihan	Umum	(2014a).	
	
Growing	discontent	with	political	parties	was	also	illustrated	by	growing	reluctance	
to	associate	with	them	(Fealy	2011:	340).58	Surveys	conducted	in	2011	by	LSI	found	
that	only	20	per	cent	of	respondents	considered	themselves	to	‘belong’	to	a	party,	
compared	to	86	per	cent	in	1999	(Lembaga	Survei	Indonesia	2011).	The	SPACE	
survey,	conducted	in	July	2013,	found	that	43	per	cent	of	those	surveyed	were	not	
planning	to	vote	at	all.	It	also	suggested	that,	nine	months	ahead	of	the	election,	a	
large	proportion	of	citizens	felt	no	party	loyalty,	were	open	to	voting	differently	in	
2014	than	they	had	in	2009	and/or	were	not	planning	to	participate	in	the	election.59	
																																																													
57	The	Democratic	Party	and	PKS,	were	consistently	shown	to	have	lost	support	after	2009,	
indicative	of	an	overall	decline	in	their	popularity.	
58	Slater	(2004:	88)	argues	that	this	trend	existed	before	the	2004	elections,	in	which	‘voters	
felt	less	beholden	to	the	dictates	of	party	machines’.	
59	Golput,	the	act	of	not	casting	a	valid	vote,	was	discussed	in	the	Introduction	of	the	thesis.	
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The	Saiful	Mujani	Research	Center	poll	in	March	2014	is	telling	in	that	47.7	per	cent	of	
respondents	did	not	nominate	a	preferred	party.	The	decline	of	party	loyalty—
although	a	phenomenon	that	existed	prior	to	2014—represented	a	stark	contrast	to	
the	aliran	alignments	prominent	during	the	Old	and	New	Orders.60	While	it	is	
impossible	to	identify	a	single	reason	for	this	lack	of	party	loyalty,	or	indeed	political	
engagement	more	broadly,	the	apparent	prevalence	of	corruption	in	the	government,	
across	all	bodies,	certainly	bred	cynicism	amongst	voters.	
	
How	successful	were	emerging	parties	in	the	2014	national	legislative	elections?	
None	of	the	emerging	parties	performed	as	well	as	they	had	hoped.	Gerindra	became	
one	of	the	‘big	three	parties’,	but	failed	to	reach	its	electoral	target.61	Gaining	11.81	
per	cent	of	the	popular	vote,	which	was	13.04	per	cent	of	parliamentary	seats,	
Gerindra	improved	upon	its	2009	result.	However,	the	party	fell	short	of	its	aim	to	
garner	20	per	cent	of	parliamentary	seats	so	it	could	nominate	Prabowo	as	a	
presidential	candidate	without	needing	to	form	a	coalition.	Hanura	and	Nasdem,	
which	had	also	aimed	to	become	one	of	the	‘big	three’	parties,	received	5.26	per	cent	
and	6.72	per	cent	of	the	votes	respectively.	Yet,	while	these	parties	also	had	not	done	
as	well	as	they	wished,	the	results	ensured	that	they	remained	important	players	in	
the	presidential	elections.	Both	parties	had	the	ability	to	make	a	significant	
contribution	to	the	coalition	for	the	presidential	candidate	they	opted	to	support.	In	
the	end,	both	Nasdem	and	Hanura	chose	to	back	PDIP’s	candidates,	Jokowi	and	Jusuf	
Kalla,	whereas	Gerindra	negotiated	with	other	parties	to	form	a	coalition	to	nominate	
Prabowo	and	his	running	mate,	Hatta	Rajasa,	from	PAN.62		
	
	 	
																																																													
60	Aliran	was	discussed	in	Chapter	Two.	
61	The	results	of	the	2014	national	legislative	elections	proved	difficult	to	predict.	PDIP	was	
the	clear	favourite	to	win	by	a	wide	margin,	especially	after	it	announced	that	it	would	
nominate	Jokowi,	rather	than	Megawati,	as	its	presidential	candidate.	PDIP	hoped	that	it	
would	benefit	from	the	‘Jokowi	effect’	(Kwok	2014;	McRae	2014;	Simanjuntak	2013;	Witoelar	
2014),	but	while	Jokowi	went	on	to	narrowly	win	the	presidential	race,	his	nomination	did	
little	to	enhance	support	for	PDIP	during	the	legislative	election.		
62	Two	major	coalitions	were	formed	for	the	presidential	election.	PDIP	led	one	coalition,	
supported	by	PKB,	Nasdem	and	Hanura,	nominating	Jokowi	and	Jusuf	Kalla	for	president	and	
vice‐president	(respectively).	The	rival	coalition	was	led	by	Gerindra	and	backed	by	Golkar,	
the	Democratic	Party,	PAN,	PPP	and	PKS.	This	coalition	nominated	Prabowo	for	president	and	
Hatta	Rajasa,	leader	of	PAN,	as	his	running	mate.	The	difficulty	in	negotiating	coalitions	
highlights	the	advantages	to	be	gained	in	meeting	the	presidential	threshold.	
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Conclusion	
The	2014	legislative	elections	heralded	a	change	in	fortune	for	a	number	of	
Indonesia’s	national	political	parties.	PDIP,	which	had	previously	been	in	opposition,	
was	the	favourite	to	win	a	majority.	Even	though	it	fell	short	of	expectations,	it	still	
won	more	DPR‐RI	seats	than	any	other	party	(Hamid	2014b;	Tomsa	2014a).63	The	
main	casualty	was	the	ruling	Democratic	Party,	which	lost	87	seats	and	its	dominance	
in	parliament.	PKS,	which	gained	a	significant	number	of	votes	in	2009,	became	the	
only	Islamic	party	to	lose	seats.64	The	decline	in	popularity	for	both	the	Democratic	
Party	and	PKS	appeared	to	be	closely	tied	to	numerous	corruption	scandals,	which	
undermined	the	parties’	anti‐corruption	credentials	in	the	lead	up	to	the	election.65		
	
This	chapter	has	provided	a	brief	overview	of	some	of	the	corruption	scandals	that	
emerged	between	2009	and	2014,	highlighting	that	corruption	continued	to	be	a	
prominent	political	concern.	Despite	Yudhoyono’s	electoral	promises	that	he	and	the	
Democratic	Party	would	condemn	corruption,	emerging	scandals	undermined	his	
political	image	and	led	to	a	significant	decrease	in	support	for	the	party	in	the	2014	
election.	The	hypocrisy	of	those	in	government	was	compounded	by	attacks	on	the	
much‐loved	KPK,	leading	many	citizens	to	believe	that	many	in	government	were	
more	interested	in	protecting	themselves	rather	than	eradicating	corruption.	Surveys	
also	indicated	that	the	Indonesian	public	was	growing	weary	of	the	political	elite	and	
political	parties	in	general,	reflected	by	the	falling	association	with	political	parties	
																																																													
63	PDIP	officially	gained	18.95	per	cent	of	votes,	which	was	far	less	than	its	target	of	27.02	per	
cent	(Sadikin	2014).	The	result	was	surprising	to	many	observers.	For	example,	prominent	
Indonesia	political	analyst	Wimar	Witoelar	(2014)	stated	‘I	was	wrong.	The	media	was	wrong.	
The	polls	were	wrong	…	Predictions	that	PDIP	would	capture	35	per	cent	or	more	in	the	
legislative	elections	proved	to	be	grossly	illusory	as	they	got	less	than	20	per	cent,	just	a	few	
more	percentage	points	more	than	Golkar,	Gerindra	and	even	the	Democrat	Party.’		
64	PKS	did,	however,	do	better	than	anticipated.	It	gained	6.79	per	cent	of	the	vote	in	2014	in	
the	face	of	predictions	that	it	may	not	even	pass	the	parliamentary	threshold	of	3.5	per	cent	
(Fealy	2014;	Kramer	2014a).	
65	While	survey	results	in	Indonesia	cannot	always	be	taken	at	face	value,	the	overwhelming	
trend	reflected	declining	support	for	the	Democratic	Party.	In	a	March	2013	survey,	the	
National	Survey	Institute	(Lembaga	Survei	Nasional,	LSN)	found	that	40.4	per	cent	of	
respondents	saw	the	Democratic	Party	as	the	most	corrupt	party	in	Indonesia.	Its	electability	
also	fell,	with	only	4.3	per	cent	of	respondents	selecting	them	as	their	preferred	party	(Ledysia	
2013).	A	survey	published	by	Transparency	International	Indonesia	in	April	2013	found	the	
Democratic	Party	to	be	the	least	transparent	party	in	parliament	in	relation	to	its	funding	and	
party	budget	(along	with	Golkar	and	PKS	who	were	also	defined	as	‘not	transparent’)	(BBC	
Indonesia	2013).	Polling	by	the	United	Data	Centre	(Pusat	Data	Bersatu,	PDB)	released	in	July	
2013	found	that	only	9.4	per	cent	would	vote	for	the	Democratic	Party,	compared	to	26.43	per	
cent	of	votes	attained	in	2009.	An	Indikator	survey	report	released	on	4	April	2014	found	only	
7.2	per	cent	of	those	surveyed	planned	to	vote	for	the	Democratic	Party	(Indikator	2014).	The	
Democratic	Party	actually	gained	10.19	per	cent	of	the	official	vote	(Pemilu	2014),	slightly	
higher	than	most	predictions.	
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and	the	rise	of	‘non‐elite’	presidential	candidate,	Jokowi.	Furthermore,	the	perception	
that	politicians	were	more	interested	in	maintaining	the	status	quo	than	combating	
corruption	led	to	growing	discontent	with	old	guard	elites	and	presented	
opportunities	for	emerging	parties.		
	
Part	of	the	‘project	of	newness’	adopted	by	emerging	parties	was	to	position	
themselves	as	the	antithesis	to	the	existing	political	elites.	With	Yudhoyono’s	
perceived	lack	of	progress	in	combating	corruption	and	a	declining	trust	in	the	
parliament,	emerging	parties	were	presented	with	a	clear	and	convenient	platform	
upon	which	to	both	criticize	the	government	and	depict	themselves	as	clean	and	
staunchly	anti‐corruption,	in	contrast	to	those	in	power.	Gerindra	and	Hanura	were	
able	to	capitalize	on	the	gains	they	made	in	the	2009	national	legislative	election	
(Sukma	2009:	320).	By	opting	to	remain	in	opposition	rather	than	join	Yudhoyono’s	
Rainbow	Coalition	between	2009	and	2014,	Gerindra	and	Hanura	were	able	to	
distance	themselves	from	the	failings	of	the	Yudhoyono	administration.	Nasdem,	too,	
capitalized	on	the	ongoing	dissatisfaction	with	the	incumbent	government.	Although	
it	was	a	new	party,	Nasdem	campaigned	on	the	slogan	of	being	a	‘Movement	for	
Change’	(Gerakan	Perubahan),	adopting	oppositional	rhetoric	which	positioned	
themselves	against	those	in	power.	Projecting	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	was	one	
means	for	new	parties	to	emphasize	the	difference	between	them	and	rivals.	In	
articulating	their	staunch	support	for	anti‐corruption	measures	and	stressing	the	
absence	of	national	level	corruption	cases	within	their	own	parties,	these	parties	
attempted	to	present	themselves	as	broader	forces	of	change	and	righteousness.
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Chapter	Four	
Emerging	parties	and	campaigning	on	
corruption	
	
In	the	lead‐up	to	the	2014	legislative	election,	the	central	committee	of	emerging	
parties	decided	what	symbols	would	be	a	campaign	focus	and	facilitated	their	
transmission	across	the	country	via	print	media,	television	and	the	internet.	Party	
leaders,	particularly	presidential	candidates,	had	a	prominent	role	in	constructing	
and	disseminating	this	symbol	as	they	toured	the	country	in	the	lead‐up	to	the	
election.	With	the	prevalence	of	figure‐driven	politics	in	Indonesia,	much	attention	
was	given	to	what	party	leaders	said	while	electioneering.	Official	statements	were	
also	made	by	party	spokespeople,	depending	on	their	position	and	expertise.	
Whoever	the	speaker,	these	public	announcements	were	intended	to	reflect	party	
ideals	as	a	whole.	
	
In	tracing	how	emerging	parties	developed	their	anti‐corruption	symbol	nationally,	
this	chapter	first	investigates	the	rationale	for	selecting	anti‐corruption	as	a	core	
political	symbol,	drawing	upon	interviews	with	senior	party	officials	regarding	their	
use	of	anti‐corruption	ideas	in	their	campaigns.	It	then	examines	the	mechanisms	
used	by	the	parties	to	develop	an	anti‐corruption	symbol,	looking	particularly	at	the	
nation‐wide	strategies	that	were	conceptualized	and	funded	from	the	central	party	
office.	Organizing	these	campaigns	from	Jakarta,	these	approaches	focused	heavily	on	
non‐relational	diffusion	of	party	rhetoric,	namely	via	party	publications	and	the	
media	coverage	of	statements	by	party	leaders.	While	it	is	impossible	to	know	how	
parties’	use	of	anti‐corruption	symbolism	affected	voting	outcomes,	electoral	results	
fell	short	of	party	aspirations,	even	though	all	the	emerging	parties	were	able	to	pass	
the	parliamentary	electoral	threshold,	suggesting	that	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	was	
not	the	panacea	that	parties	had	hoped	for.	In	exploring	the	integration	of	this	symbol	
into	nation‐wide	party	campaigns,	this	chapter	lays	the	foundation	for	a	close	
discussion	of	the	engagement	of	the	central	party	with	campaigns	of	individual	
candidates	and	the	impact	this	had	for	the	development	and	use	of	anti‐corruption	
symbols	overall.	
	
	
114	
	
The	anti‐corruption	strategy	
Parties’	rationale	for	adopting	anti‐corruption	symbols	in	the	2014	national	
legislative	election	campaign	is	important	given	the	widespread	acknowledgement	
that	these	symbols	had	backfired	for	the	Democratic	Party	and	PKS.	In	spite	of	this,	
parties	still	judged	corruption	to	be	a	key	concern	for	voters—sometimes	referred	to	
as	a	‘vote‐getter’	issue.	The	public	sought	a	party	that	would	bring	about	fundamental	
changes	to	the	way	government	worked	and	a	strong	anti‐corruption	symbol	was	
intended	to	promote	this	good	(new	party)	versus	bad	(old	parties)	dichotomy.	
Emerging	parties	also	identified	this	realm	as	one	of	competitive	advantage,	as	they	
themselves	had	never	suffered	from	any	major	corruption	scandals	and	could	
therefore	criticize	other	parties	from	a	position	of	relative	virtue.	Another	
rationalization	espoused	by	some	party	officials	was	that	a	powerful	anti‐corruption	
message	would	discourage	‘non‐genuine’	candidates	from	joining	the	party.	This,	they	
argued,	would	ensure	the	longevity	of	the	party’s	clean	image,	in	terms	of	being	free	
of	corruption	and	a	host	of	other	undesirable	activities,	such	as	illicit	drug	taking	and	
infidelity.	Emerging	parties	were	acutely	aware	of	the	dangers	of	being	seen	as	
hypocritical.	Having	seen	the	public	relations	damage	caused	by	corrupt	members,	
parties	hoped	to	minimize	future	risks	by	deterring	candidates	that	they	believed	
could	jeopardize	the	party’s	image.	Each	party	claimed	they	had	strict	procedures	for	
selecting	party	candidates,	including	psychological	testing	and	background	checks	for	
drug	use	and	‘suspicious’	earnings.	Party	officials	in	both	Gerindra	and	Hanura	
contended	that	their	leaderships	were	extremely	unforgiving	of	corruption,	having	
made	several	party	decrees	demanding	that	any	member	not	fully	committed	to	the	
party	should	leave	immediately.1	
	
According	to	several	Hanura	party	officials,	being	‘clean’	was	an	iconic	part	of	
Hanura’s	image,	so	that	when	people	thought	of	corruption‐free	parties,	they	
immediately	thought	of	Hanura.2	One	Hanura	official	acknowledged	that	Hanura	
might	not	be	100	per	cent	clean,	but	added	that	its	members	were	well	aware	of	the	
consequences	of	tarring	the	party	name,	including	expulsion,	quite	apart	from	
damage	to	their	personal	reputation.	This	official	was,	therefore,	confident	that	the	
																																																													
1	Interview	with	Hanura	official,	24	October	2012;	interview	with	Gerindra	party	
parliamentary	aide,	February	4	2013;	interview	with	Gerindra	parliamentary	representative,	
9	March	2013.	
2	This	point	was	brought	up	several	times	in	official	interviews	with	at	least	four	different	
party	members,	as	well	as	during	off‐the‐record	conversations.	An	impression	emerged	that	
this	argument	had	been	generated	by	central	party	members	and	that	party	cadres	were	
instructed	to	advance	it	in	discussions	with	outsiders.	
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party	was,	in	fact,	cleaner	than	its	rivals.3	Hanura	leader,	Wiranto,	asserted	that	
advocating	for	anti‐corruption	measures,	such	as	increased	transparency	and	the	
swift	resolution	of	corruption	cases	that	have	dragged	on	for	years,	were	popular	
with	citizens.4	Wiranto	also	contended	that	in	Indonesia	corruption	is	related	to	
issues	of	justice—that	ordinary	people	desperately	want	to	see	those	who	are	corrupt	
punished	for	their	crimes.	He	argued	that	the	Indonesian	people	wanted	a	leader	who	
would	act	with	‘firmness’	(ketegasan)	in	the	face	of	corruption;	a	strong	leader	who	
could	appropriately	punish	those	profiting	at	the	expense	of	the	nation.	In	fact,	
Wiranto	had	such	faith	in	the	power	of	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	to	attract	votes	that	
he	pushed	for	it	to	be	included	in	Hanura’s	branding,	against	the	advice	of	his	chief	
media	advisor.5	
	
Standing	firm	against	corruption	was	also	identified	as	a	party	symbol	by	several	
Gerindra	leaders,	with	one	official	asserting	that	people	were	attracted	to	Gerindra	
because	they	saw	it	as	the	party	that	would	fight	corruption	without	mercy.6	He	
believed	that	campaigning	on	this	issue	would	not	backfire	for	Gerindra	because	it	
had	consistently	rejected	corruption	since	the	party	was	formed.7	Several	Gerindra	
members	also	asserted	that	its	actions	in	parliament	supported	the	party’s	rhetorical	
anti‐corruption	symbol,	so	that	it	could	legitimately	bill	itself	as	‘clean’	without	fear	of	
backlash.	Gerindra	leader,	Prabowo	Subianto,	was	adamant	that	he	was	a	fearless	
anti‐corruption	campaigner	and	would	rid	the	government	of	such	evils.	Prabowo’s	
use	of	anti‐corruption	symbolism	was	observed	by	Mietzner	(2014:	114)	who	stated	
he	‘presented	himself	as	a	classic	populist	strongman,	lambasting	the	weakness	and	
corruption	of	Indonesia’s	political	class.’	
																																																													
3	Interview	with	Hanura	official,	24	October	2012.	
4	Interview	with	Wiranto,	24	October	2013.	
5	One	Hanura	media	advisor	said	that	Wiranto	had	insisted	on	making	anti‐corruption	ideas	a	
central	focus	of	the	campaign	and	he	believed	that	this	was	primarily	out	of	personal	
conviction	rather	than	strategic	benefit.	Initially,	Wiranto	had	been	advised	to	promote	social	
welfare	and	addressing	inequality	as	the	party’s	chief	political	symbols,	on	the	grounds	that	
they	had	broader	appeal	and	were	less	prone	to	cynicism	than	anti‐corruption.	The	media	
advisor	believed	that	talking	about	corruption	could	be	dangerous	and	that	more	
advantageous	campaign	symbols	existed	(interview	with	Hanura	media	advisor,	17	February	
2013).	This	scenario,	in	which	the	client	(the	party/politician)	overrules	the	media	specialist	
is	identified	by	Bowler	and	Farrell	(1992b:	4)	as	one	of	the	types	of	structural	relationships	
observed	during	campaigns.	They	argue	that,	in	general,	most	relationships	between	the	
‘client’	and	the	‘media	people’	will	fall	somewhere	between	two	extremes:	devolving	power	
and	authority	for	marketing	entirely	to	media	professionals	or	the	client	dominating	the	
media	team,	dictating	to	them	what	they	should	do.	Bowler	and	Farrell	(1992a:	226)	also	
assert	that	studies	across	a	number	of	countries	demonstrate	that	parties	and/or	candidates	
are	often	reluctant	to	give	up	control	of	campaigns	to	consultants.	
6	Interview	with	Gerindra	party	parliamentary	aide,	4	February	2013.	
7	Interview	with	Gerindra	parliamentary	representative,	9	March	2013.		
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Nasdem	officials	did	not	overtly	identify	using	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	as	a	vote‐
getter	for	their	party;	however,	they	recognized	the	appeal	of	a	party	that	could	be	
trusted	to	fight	the	problem.8	All	parties	emphasized	the	importance	of	publicly	
denouncing	corruption	in	all	its	forms,	deeming	that	the	public	demanded	it.	Nasdem	
officials	acknowledged	that	their	anti‐corruption	rhetoric	was	not	as	intensive	as	that	
of	Hanura	or	Gerindra.	One	official	claimed	that,	as	the	newest	party,	‘We	don’t	need	
to	talk	about	it	too	much	because	it	is	expected	we	will	say	we	are	anti‐corruption	…	
the	proof	lies	more	in	our	actions	so	far	rather	than	words’.9	However,	Nasdem	
certainly	did	not	refrain	from	using	it	as	a	political	symbol.	Throughout	its	campaign,	
Nasdem	continued	to	draw	attention	to	government	failures	in	combating	corruption,	
particularly	pressuring	the	government	to	resolve	on‐going	corruption	cases	such	as	
Centurygate.10	By	maintaining	this	pressure,	the	official	contended	that	‘Nasdem	will	
show	itself	to	be	a	better	alternative	to	the	rest	[of	the	parties]’.	In	asserting	their	
clean	status,	Nasdem	officials	also	capitalized	on	its	status	as	a	new	party.	For	
example,	another	party	member	stated	that	if	aspiring	politicians	merely	wanted	a	
seat	in	parliament	for	money‐making	purposes	then	they	would	join	a	bigger	party	
because	emerging	parties	generally	remained	underdogs.11	In	line	with	this,	another	
Nasdem	official	also	claimed	that	the	party	was	‘pure’,	asserting	that	its	members	
were	dedicated	to	real	reform	rather	than	just	seeking	self‐gratification.	Whether	
these	justifications	were	genuine	or	a	white‐wash	was	difficult	to	discern;	however,	
their	repetition	of	these	assertions	illustrated	entrenched	discourse	within	emerging	
parties—that	upholding	a	clean	image	was	paramount.	
	
While	the	rationale	for	these	parties	to	promote	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	was	based	
on	subjective	opinions	and	steeped	in	political	rhetoric,	it	was	apparent	that	parties	
used	anti‐corruption	as	a	symbol	in	the	2014	legislative	campaign	because	the	party	
elite	believed	it	would	win	them	votes;	parties	wanted	to	be	associated	with	being	
clean.	Ostensibly,	each	party	was	confident	in	its	ability	to	carry	through	with	their	
electoral	promises	and	be	a	force	of	change.	Parties	were	conscious	of	the	dangers	of	
portraying	themselves	as	anti‐corruption	campaigners,	however,	whether	they	could	
maintain	this	image	following	the	election	was	seemingly	a	matter	for	the	future.	
They	pronounced	that	they	would	not	suffer	the	same	fate	as	other	parties,	not	only	
																																																													
8	Interview	with	Nasdem	party	official,	11	April	2013.	
9	Interview	with	Nasdem	party	official,	11	April	2013.	
10	Frequent	public	statements	ensured	that	major	corruption	cases	remained	in	the	public	eye,	
something	one	official	identified	as	being	crucial	because	‘people	forget	the	crimes	of	political	
parties	too	quickly’	(interview	with	Nasdem	candidate,	25	May	2013).	
11	Interview	with	Nasdem	official,	16	May	2013.	
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because	their	members	knew	that	corruption	was	illegal,	but	because	it	would	be	a	
serious	betrayal	of	party	values.		
	
Creating	and	mobilizing	the	symbol	
Chapter	One	identified	a	number	of	concepts	that	help	in	understanding	how	political	
parties	develop	a	symbol,	including	the	notions	of	morality,	issue	ownership	and	
narrative	development.	By	portraying	corruption	as	a	moral	issue,	parties	are	able	to	
cast	themselves	in	the	role	of	the	‘good’	(as	opposed	to	rival	parties	who	are	tainted	
and	therefore	‘evil’).	The	ongoing	use	of	rhetoric	develops	a	narrative	which	parties	
hope	will	convince	the	public	of	their	genuine	commitment	to	anti‐corruption,	
eventually	leading	to	issue	ownership.	Another	way	to	obtain	issue	ownership	might	
be	simply	by	being	untainted	by	a	problem	(Petrocik	1996:	827).	In	the	case	of	
corruption,	emerging	parties	have	the	advantage	of	a	short,	(relatively)	untarnished	
history	in	which	they	have	not	faced	a	corruption	scandal.12	Coming	to	‘own’	the	issue	
of	anti‐corruption	and	creating	a	symbol	which	is	synonymous	with	the	party	itself	is,	
in	this	instance,	facilitated	by	their	short	history.	However,	they	must	still	project	an	
anti‐corruption	symbol	that	overshadows	that	of	rivals,	especially	since	they	are	
competing	with	other	emerging	parties	with	similarly	short	histories.		
	
The	promotion	of	this	anti‐corruption	symbol	is	needed	so	that	the	voting	public	
connects	the	party	with	this	particular	issue.13	Having	conceptualized	how	the	party	
wished	to	present	themselves	to	the	public,	Hanura,	Gerindra	and	Nasdem	relayed	
their	anti‐corruption	symbol	through	a	number	of	non‐relational	mechanisms.	Parties	
hired	media	and	public	relations	specialists	and	teams	to	develop	and	coordinate	the	
promotion	of	the	party	image,	using	both	paid	advertising	and	the	media.	Social	
media	was	also	used	in	campaigning,	with	parties	promoting	themselves	via	websites	
such	as	Facebook,	Twitter	and	YouTube	in	order	to	appeal	to	Indonesia’s	more	
internet‐savvy	voters.	The	multi‐channel	approach	was	adopted	to	broaden	the	reach	
of	party	symbols,	as	media	advisors	understood	that	such	an	approach	was	important	
to	maximizing	the	impact	of	message	diffusion	to	the	public.	
	
																																																													
12	Party	reputations	were	‘relatively’	untarnished	because,	as	discussed	later	in	this	chapter,	
some	minor	cases	did	come	to	light	before	the	election.		
13	It	is	also	necessary	to	manage	party	symbols	by	ensuring	that	members	maintain	a	united	
voice,	in	line	with	the	priorities	established	by	central	party	representatives.	While	the	central	
committee	may	be	able	to	manage	the	symbol	creation	at	the	national	level,	this	is	much	more	
difficult	to	control	at	the	local	level,	as	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	Five.	
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Party	publications	
Party	publications	include	materials	such	as	the	party	manifesto,	mission	statement	
and	pamphlets	that	promote	the	party	and	its	objectives.	Early	documents	such	as	the	
manifesto	are	intended	to	establish	the	aims	of	the	party	and	the	premise	for	the	
party’s	formation,	while	later	documents	supplement	and/or	provide	further	
clarification	of	these	original	publications.	In	their	official	documents,	Hanura,	
Gerindra	and	Nasdem	all	highlighted	the	failings	of	the	current	government	in	
hyperbolic	and	emotive	terms,	with	the	apparent	aim	of	galvanising	mistrust	and	
consequently	promoting	support	for	the	alternative	they	offered.	The	rhetoric	used	is	
intended	to	justify	the	creation	of	a	new	party	and	outline,	at	least	in	theory,	how	this	
party	differs	from	existing	parties.	
	
Hanura’s	party	doctrine	booklet	(2009a)	asserts	that	Indonesia	was	full	of	leaders	
who	had	‘forgotten	themselves’	and	‘shamelessly	exploit	their	positions’.	These	
officials	had	‘lost	their	conscience’,	fuelling	‘a	culture	of	theft,	collusion	and	corruption	
which	had	led	to	gross	social	suffering’.	The	repeated	use	of	the	term	‘conscience’	is	
intended	to	evoke	concepts	of	morality	in	the	audience.	To	be	compelled	by	your	
‘conscience’,	as	defined	by	Hanura	(2008),	is	to	be	driven	by	honesty,	truth,	goodness	
and	a	belief	in	God.	Hanura’s	manifesto	contends	that	without	conscience	there	is	no	
hope	for	improvement.	Therefore,	as	Hanura	is	the	party	driven	by	conscience,	
citizens	wanting	to	see	a	just	and	moral	government	should	vote	for	it.	Hanura’s	
publications	also	emphasized	anti‐corruption	symbolism	by	referring	to	ideas	such	as	
being	clean,	honest,	transparent	and	accountable.	For	example,	the	first	point	(out	of	
eight)	in	Hanura’s	mission	statement	(2010:	9)	is	the	‘creation	of	a	government	that	is	
clean	...	to	serve	a	democratic	state	that	is	transparent	and	accountable’.	Moreover,	
according	to	point	seven	in	Hanura’s	handbook,	the	party	is	committed	to	‘the	total	
eradication	of	corruption	to	facilitate	the	creation	of	an	advanced,	independent	and	
prestigious	nation’	(Hanura	2008:	15).		
	
Gerindra’s	documents	framed	the	party	as	a	crusader	for	change,	depicting	the	
political	scene	as	a	battle	fought	in	the	national	interest.	The	language	employed	by	
Gerindra	was	very	much	that	of	a	call	to	arms,	vowing	to	fight	for	prosperity	and	
justice	in	all	spheres	of	Indonesian	life	(Gerindra	2012c).	According	to	Gerindra’s	
‘manifesto	of	struggle’,	Indonesia	has	been	battling	poverty	since	independence	but	
could	not	overcome	it	due	to	an	unjust	political	system	populated	by	weak	and	
corrupt	officials	(Gerindra	2012b).	It	was	time	to	‘stand	firm	to	achieve	justice’	by	
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giving	Gerindra	the	opportunity	to	lead	a	fair,	prosperous	and	harmonious	Indonesia	
(2012b:	5).	The	idea	that	Gerindra	was	fulfilling	a	calling	was	elaborated	upon	in	The	
History	of	Gerindra	(2012d),	which	stated	that	the	party	was	inspired	by	Edmund	
Burke	(famously	quoted	as	saying	‘The	only	thing	necessary	for	the	triumph	[of	evil]	
is	for	good	men	to	do	nothing’).	In	pamphlets	distributed	at	Gerindra	rallies	in	the	
lead‐up	to	voting	during	April	2014,	‘building	a	government	that	is	free	from	
corruption,	strong,	firm	and	effective’	was	identified	as	one	of	the	party’s	core	
electoral	promises.	The	pamphlet	ended	with	‘If	not	us,	then	who?	If	not	now,	then	
when?’	Such	rhetorical	questions	implied	that	Gerindra	was	the	only	party	capable	of	
improving	Indonesia’s	record	against	corruption.		
	
In	its	political	manifesto,	Gerindra	specifically	addressed	corruption	as	a	legal	issue,	
asserting	that	while	the	laws	were	adequate	they	were	inconsistently	applied	by	the	
judiciary.	The	punishments	for	those	involved	in	corruption,	collusion	and	nepotism	
(korupsi,	kolusi	dan	nepostisme,	KKN)	must	be	harsher	if	they	are	to	act	as	an	effective	
deterrent	(Gerindra	2012b:	33).	This	stance	is	reiterated	in	Gerindra’s	official	
regulations,	which	state	that	one	of	Gerindra’s	responsibilities	is	to	influence	and	
oversee	the	creation	of	an	‘honest,	clean	and	dignified	[government],	that	is	also	free	
of	corruption,	misappropriation	and	misuse	of	political	power’	(Gerindra	2012a:	7).	
The	document	claims	that	the	party	would	address	corruption	by	strengthening	law	
enforcement	and	the	bureaucratic	system,	asserting	also	that	its	members	had	a	
unique	‘identity’	which	meant	they	‘will	never	cheat,	steal	or	corruptly	use	money	
from	the	Party,	let	alone	money	from	the	people	or	the	state’	(Gerindra	2012a:	31).	
Gerindra	also	published	its	own	newspaper	from	April	2011	to	November	2013,	
Gema	Indonesia	Raya,	featuring	articles	by	Prabowo	and	other	senior	figures	about	
party	ideology	and	activities,	including	a	focus	on	Gerindra’s	anti‐corruption	stance.	
While	the	newspaper	had	a	limited	readership	outside	of	the	party,	it	provided	a	
written	record	of	party	discourse	which	could	be	used	by	commentators	and	
journalists.	
	
In	the	year	leading	up	to	the	election,	Gema	Indonesia	Raya	provided	a	dedicated	
mouthpiece	for	the	party,	featuring	repeated	references	to	Gerindra’s	status	as	a	clean	
party	committed	to	combating	corruption.	For	example,	in	the	June	2013	edition,	
Prabowo	wrote	a	front	cover	opinion	piece	titled	‘We	want	to	win	by	being	clean’,	in	
which	he	stated	that	‘we	want	to	win	by	being	clean,	honest,	transparent	and	
legitimate	[emphasis	in	original]’	(Subianto	2013).	In	the	same	edition,	the	
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newspaper	also	featured	an	article	written	by	one	of	the	party’s	communication	
advisors	about	Beefgate,	describing	the	arrest	of	PKS	president	Luthfi	Hasan	Ishaaq	
as	‘a	new	chapter	in	Indonesia’s	fight	against	corruption’	that	demonstrated	how	
political	elites	were	now	becoming	KPK	targets,	as	well	they	should	(Nasution	2013c).	
The	same	communication	advisor	also	wrote	in	the	October	2013	edition	that	the	
Presidential	Palace	was	home	to	an	elite	‘mafia’	(Nasution	2013b).	In	the	November	
2013	edition	he	argued	that	Yudhoyono	must	have	known	about	the	scandal	because	
it	seemed	to	involve	so	many	Democratic	Party	members	and	that	the	President	
should	be	investigated	for	involvement	in	Centurygate	following	the	end	of	his	term	
(Nasution	2013a).		
	
While	Nasdem’s	references	to	an	anti‐corruption	agenda	in	official	publications	were	
less	overt	than	those	of	Hanura	or	Gerindra,	the	discourse	remained	an	important	
facet	of	the	party’s	identity.	Party	documentation	outlines	that	the	‘restoration’	of	
Indonesia	is	a	process	that	requires	both	a	structural	and	moral	adjustment	of	
government,	but	also	a	moral	adjustment	of	those	in	politics,	to	overcome	their	
‘materialistic	and	hedonistic	nature’,	to	instead	prioritize	public	welfare	over	
personal	desires	(Nasdem	2011b:	19).	In	point	17	of	its	platform	outline,	one	of	the	
party’s	stated	goals	was	to	create	a	clean	and	professional	bureaucracy	that	works	
only	in	the	interest	of	the	people.	In	line	with	this	goal,	according	to	the	party	
handbook	(Nasdem	2011a),	all	party	cadres	are	required	to	sign	a	contract	stating	
that	they	will	not	undertake	any	corruption	or	other	immoral	activities.	Nasdem’s	
branding	also	attempted	to	frame	the	party	as	anti‐elite	and	pro‐people	(pro‐rakyat).	
Its	manifesto	stated	that	party	members	‘reject	a	democracy	that	is	a	mere	circulation	
of	power	amongst	elites	who	are	not	leaders	of	quality	or	worthy	of	the	position’	
(Nasdem	2011a:	3).	This	reference	to	the	negative	influence	of	elites	in	Indonesia’s	
government	intended	to	appeal	to	alienated	‘ordinary	citizens’	who	viewed	politics	as	
the	domain	of	the	rich.	In	Nasdem’s	nationalist	narrative,	the	poor	had	been	
marginalized	for	too	long	because	those	in	charge	failed	to	fulfil	the	ideals	of	
Indonesian	nationalism	based	on	Pancasila.	The	party	referred	to	itself	as	a	
movement	for	‘restoration’	(restorasi)	and	‘change’	(perubahan),	aimed	at	changing	
the	mental	and	moral	attitudes	of	the	government	in	order	to	build	an	honest	and	
productive	society	based	on	integrity	(Nasdem	2011b:	21).	In	depicting	itself	as	true	
nationalists,	Nasdem	positioned	itself	as	having	a	moral	authority	over	the	current	
government	leaders,	who	were,	by	implication,	not	true	nationalists.		
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The	prevalence	of	anti‐corruption	sentiment	within	these	official	documents	
illustrates	how	parties	attempted	to	sell	themselves	as	preferable	alternatives	to	the	
existing	parties.	These	documents,	in	a	sense,	form	the	basis	for	much	of	the	rhetoric	
used	in	symbol‐building.	In	identifying	goals	such	as	a	being	‘clean’	and	condemning	
the	‘exploitation’	of	Indonesia	by	some	within	the	government,	emerging	parties	
aimed	to	align	themselves	with	readily‐acceptable	principles.	Parties	did,	however,	
recognize	that	most	voters	would	not	read	their	manifestos,	let	alone	conduct	in‐
depth	research	into	their	‘vision	and	mission’.	This	meant	that	parties	had	to	find	
other	ways	to	appeal	to	the	masses,	for	example,	establishing	a	positive	public	profile	
for	senior	party	figures	to	not	only	promote,	but	indeed	exemplify,	the	core	symbols	
of	the	party.	
	
Party	leaders	
Party	leaders	play	an	integral	role	in	establishing	the	image	of	a	party	and	embodying	
the	symbols	that	it	wishes	to	present.	Harrop	(1990:	279)	contends	that	leaders’	
words	and	actions	are	important	in	the	creation	and	promotion	of	party	symbols	
because	voters	like	to	put	a	human	face	to	a	party.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	One,	the	
image	of	party	leaders	is	crucial	and	their	credibility	rests	on	a	close	alignment	
between	personal	and	party	image	(Capelos	2010;	Druckman	et	al.	2004;	Harrop	
1990).	In	the	lead‐up	to	the	general	elections,	selected	members	of	the	party	
leadership,	particularly	the	presidential	candidates	(or	senior	party	figures	in	the	
case	of	Nasdem)	toured	the	country	giving	speeches	at	political	rallies	to	promote	
their	respective	parties.	These	rallies,	often	populated	by	paid	attendees	(Pepinsky	
2014;	Simandjuntak	2012:	101),	were	more	a	spectacle	than	anything	else—a	show	
of	strength	to	the	public	rather	than	a	true	reflection	of	popularity.	Still,	knowing	that	
these	orations	were	an	opportunity	to	publicize	the	party	and	given	the	high	
likelihood	of	media	coverage,	party	leaders	used	these	opportunities	to	further	
establish	an	anti‐corruption	image.		
	
Leaders	of	emerging	parties	had	already	begun	to	align	their	parties	to	an	anti‐
corruption	symbol	well	before	the	official	campaign	period.	Wiranto,	Prabowo	and	
Surya	Paloh	all	published	books	in	the	years	leading	up	to	the	2014	election	that	were	
designed	to	build	their	image	as	agents	of	change.	For	example,	Paloh’s	book	Mari	
Bung	Rebut	Kembali	(2012)	was	a	compilation	of	‘inspirational’	speeches	by	Paloh	
invoking	the	revolutionary	and	patriotic	spirit	of	former	president	Sukarno.	In	2013,	
Prabowo	also	published	a	book	in	a	similar	vein,	entitled	Surat	Untuk	Sahabat	(Letter	
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to	a	Friend),	arguing	that	Indonesia	needed	to	work	harder	to	achieve	the	dreams	of	
the	nation’s	founding	fathers.	Wiranto	also	authored	a	number	of	books,	including	
Meretas	Jalan	Baru	Ekonomi	Indonesia	(Paving	a	New	Road	for	Indonesia’s	Economy)	
and	Meluruskan	Jalan	Demokrasi	(Straightening	the	Road	to	Democracy),	presenting	
his	vision	for	the	country’s	future	(Wiranto	2009b;c).	
	
In	the	2014	election	campaigns,	leaders	from	each	emerging	party	cultivated	media	
relations	in	order	to	broadcast	their	message	via	press	coverage.	At	the	same	time,	
parties	organized	public	appearances	and	ran	advertising	campaigns	that	
prominently	featured	images	of	the	party	leader(s).	Wiranto,	Hanura’s	presidential	
candidate,	and	media	tycoon	Hary	Tanoesoedibjo	(often	referred	to	as	‘Hary	Tanoe’),	
the	vice‐presidential	candidate,	were	frequently	quoted	in	the	media	discussing	
issues	of	corruption.	Similarly,	Prabowo	spoke	repeatedly	about	the	need	for	
corruption	eradication,	using	his	media	to	promote	not	only	himself,	but	also	the	
party’s	anti‐corruption	symbol.	Nasdem,	which	did	not	have	a	presidential	candidate,	
nevertheless	also	sold	its	anti‐corruption	symbol	through	senior	party	figures	
including	Surya	Paloh	and	party	chair,	Patrice	Rio	Capella.	
	
Gerindra’s	Prabowo	was	also	consistently	vocal	in	his	stance	against	corruption	in	
election	campaigning	leading	up	to	the	2014	national	elections.	In	March	2013,	he	
observed	that	‘the	levels	of	corruption	[in	Indonesia]	are	insane’	and	much	of	the	
national	budget	went	missing	every	year.	These	leaks	(bocoran),	he	said,	were	the	
result	of	a	poorly	run	government	that	needed	to	improve	its	transparency	and	
accountability	(Kompas	2013b).	During	his	Independence	Day	address	in	August	
2013,	Prabowo	accused	the	Yudhoyono	government	of	being	full	of	corrupt	people	
who	were	being	caught	‘one	by	one’	by	the	KPK	for	their	crimes	(Riadi	2013).	Indeed,	
so	strong	was	his	proclaimed	commitment	to	fighting	corruption	that	he	was	willing	
to	die	for	the	cause	(Tribunnews	2013b).	A	2014	poll	released	by	Indonesia	Survey	
Center	(ICS)	found	Prabowo’s	‘competence’	and	‘bravery’	concerning	corruption	were	
identified	as	major	contributors	to	his	popularity	(Alfiyah	2014).	The	poll’s	credibility	
aside,	Prabowo	latched	onto	its	findings	in	his	campaign	rhetoric.14	Later,	in	March	
																																																													
14	A	number	of	surveys	were	conducted	in	the	lead‐up	to	the	election,	done	by	competing	
survey	institutes	wishing	to	predict	the	electoral	outcome.	The	veracity	and	neutrality	of	
survey	institutes	came	into	questions	during	this	time,	particularly	due	to	the	fact	that	pre‐
election	survey	results	were	vastly	different	from	the	actual	outcome.	This	was	most	evident	
in	the	failure	of	PDIP	to	gain	over	20	per	cent	of	votes	when	it	had	polled	so	well	in	the	lead‐up	
to	voting.	This	might	be	explained	on	the	basis	that	some	of	these	institutes	are	privately	
owned	and	survey	results	play	a	role	in	shaping	public	opinion	(not	just	vice	versa).	Plus,	
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2014,	Prabowo	declared	that	any	Gerindra	member	accused	of	corruption	was	a	
‘bastard’	and	that,	while	he	could	not	be	certain	that	every	member	of	Gerindra	was	
clean,	he	was	sure	he	would	have	no	trouble	dismissing	them	if	they	were	found	to	be	
corrupt	(Asril	2014a).	
	
Billing	their	candidates	as	leaders	of	the	future,	Nasdem	contended	that	its	
parliamentary	candidates	would	be	‘forward	thinking,	free	from	any	legal	and	
corruption	charges,	and	pro‐the	people’	(BeritaTV	Indo	2012).	Nasdem	chairperson,	
Patrice	Rio	Capella,	claimed	the	party	had	been	formed	by	concerned	citizens	in	
response	to	decreasing	public	regard	for	politicians	and	therefore	had	a	responsibility	
to	offer	better	leadership	(Republika	2013).15	Nasdem	leadership	also	criticized	
President	Yudhoyono’s	inability	to	control	parliamentarians	from	his	own	party.	For	
example,	in	June	2013	Surya	Paloh	accused	the	government	of	shirking	its	anti‐
corruption	responsibilities,	arguing	that	the	continued	presence	of	corrupt	party	
members	indicated	a	party	leadership	that	was	‘half‐hearted’	in	their	commitment	to	
fighting	corruption	(Gustaman	2013).	In	another	public	statement	in	June	2013,	Paloh	
stated	that	Nasdem	would	accept	responsibility	for	any	corruption	involving	its	party	
members,	which	he	did	not	believe	would	be	a	problem	because	Nasdem	candidates	
were	clean	(Badudu	2013;	Nasdem	2014a;c).16	
	
Hanura’s	presidential	team	candidates,	Wiranto	and	Hary	Tanoe,	used	similar	
rhetoric	during	their	orations.	During	a	speech	in	Bali,	March	2013,	Wiranto	stressed	
that	Hanura	was	a	party	of	justice,	including	‘justice	against	corruptors’	and	against	
all	those	who	caused	suffering	to	the	people.	Wiranto	also	repeatedly	called	for	more	
severe	punishments	to	be	imposed	for	corruption,	saying	those	found	guilty	should	
not	only	be	stripped	of	all	assets,	but	also	face	the	death	penalty.17	Demanding	the	
death	penalty	for	corruption	not	only	emphasized	that	Hanura	was	clean	itself	and	
had	nothing	to	fear	from	harsher	penalties	for	corruption,	but	also	demonstrated	that	
it	was	so	committed	that	it	was	prepared	to	support	the	drastic	measure	of	capital	
																																																																																																																																																																									
some	survey	institutes	were	associated	with	specific	candidates.	For	an	individual	account	of	
the	difficulties	in	relying	on	samples	and	polls,	see	Salim	(2014).		
15	This	statement	was	made	in	response	to	survey	results	revealing	that	over	52	per	cent	of	
people	did	not	think	that	politicians	set	a	good	example	of	ethics	and	morality.	
16	In	order	to	discourage	candidates	from	spending	their	own	money	or	amassing	debt,	
Nasdem	agreed	to	fund	several	individual	campaigns.	The	party	claimed	it	had	billions	of	
rupiah	set	aside	to	assist	candidates,	claiming	this	would	boost	campaign	accountability	
(Badudu	2013).	
17	For	examples	of	references	to	the	death	penalty	for	corruption	in	Wiranto’s	speeches,	see	
Berita	Satu	(2014a);	SoloposTV	(2014).	
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punishment.	Though	he	did	not	advocate	for	the	death	penalty,	Hary	Tanoe	also	
emphasized	the	negative	impact	of	corruption	in	Indonesia.	In	his	July	2013	
nomination	acceptance	speech	he	stated	that	he	had	been	driven	to	enter	politics	
because	of	all	the	concerns	he	had	for	the	country.	He	lamented	that	‘the	problems	of	
corruption,	rule	of	law,	education	and	many	other	social	problems’	had	prevented	
Indonesia	from	reaching	its	full	potential	(Tanoesoedibjo	2013).18	As	the	election	
approached,	Hary	Tanoe	emphasized	the	need	to	eradicate	corruption,	saying	that	
Indonesia	‘has	many	issues	to	face,	including	the	problem	of	unresolved	corruption	
cases’	and	that	‘when	we	get	rid	of	all	corruption	cases	this	country	will	have	a	strong	
economy	that	is	able	to	help	all	Indonesians’	(Hidayat	2014).		
	
The	prevalence	of	anti‐corruption	rhetoric	meant	that	when	corruption	accusations	
arose,	party	leadership	were	forced	to	act.	For	example,	in	March	2014,	Wiranto	was	
forced	to	announce	that	Bambang	Soeharto,	a	senior	party	official	in	Lombok	and	
chairman	of	Hanura’s	election	board,	had	stepped	down	in	the	lead‐up	to	the	
elections	following	allegations	by	the	KPK	that	he	had	bribed	members	of	the	
Attorney‐General’s	office	and	judges	in	return	for	a	favourable	court	ruling	in	a	land	
ownership	case	in	which	he	had	apparently	lodged	false	ownership	documents	(Lubis	
2013;	Manggiasih	2013).	While	a	potential	blow	to	the	party’s	image,	this	statement	
was	also	an	opportunity	to	demonstrate	Hanura’s	zero‐tolerance	policy	against	
corruption	within	its	ranks.	In	announcing	the	dismissal,	Wiranto	stressed	that	since	
Hanura	‘has	always	been	committed	to	being	clean’,	he	had	no	choice	but	to	dismiss	
Soeharto	while	awaiting	the	outcome	of	criminal	investigations	against	him	(Berita	
Satu	2013a).	While	the	public	announcement	was	embarrassing	for	the	party,	it	was	
not	the	public	relations	disaster	it	could	have	been,	with	the	dismissal	framed	as	
evidence	that	the	party	would	root	out	corruption	throughout	Indonesia,	starting	
from	within	its	own	ranks.		
	
Parties	in	the	media	
Emerging	parties,	like	others,	believed	that	extensive	media	coverage	was	essential	
for	their	campaigns	and	they	were	determined	to	use	all	the	promotional	
opportunities	available	to	them.	Media	coverage	allowed	emerging	parties	to	
comment	on	current	events	as	they	broke	and	to	reinforce	their	symbol(s)	
throughout	the	campaign.	As	both	Hanura	and	Nasdem	had	media	barons	in	key	
																																																													
18	In	another	example,	on	1	October	2013,	the	Jakarta	Globe	newspaper	ran	a	feature	article	
entitled	‘Hary	Tanoe	as	Corruption	Fighter’	(Bastian	2013),	profiling	him	following	a	
presentation	he	made	at	the	Singaporean	Chamber	of	Commerce	in	Jakarta.	
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leadership	positions,	they	were	afforded	extraordinary	opportunities	for	media	
coverage	in	the	lead‐up	to	the	2014	elections.	Concerns	arose	that	these	media	
owners	would	encourage	partisan	coverage	by	their	media	outlets.	It	was	extremely	
difficult	to	regulate	partisan	news	coverage	given	that,	arguably,	this	was	not	a	breach	
of	the	law.19	As	such,	in	February	2013	President	Yudhoyono	appealed	to	the	media	to	
self‐regulate	and	maintain	balanced	and	fair	reporting	on	parties	in	the	lead‐up	to	the	
2014	election	(Perdani	2013c).	Paloh	rejected	accusations	that	Nasdem	had	flaunted	
campaign	regulations	by	using	its	Metro	TV	connection	to	campaign	before	the	official	
period	(Iman	2014).	Hary	Tanoe	pledged	that	Hanura	would	not	breach	any	electoral	
campaign	regulations	(Berita	Satu	2013b).20	While	Gerindra	had	no	ties	to	any	
specific	news	outlet,	it	reportedly	had	a	campaign	budget	of	some	Rp.	300	billion	and	
spent	significant	amounts	on	media	advertising.21		
	
Having	privileged	access	to	media	outlets	did	not	mean	that	party	promotion	was	
unfettered.	Under	the	KPU’s	2013	regulations	on	party	advertising	during	elections	
campaigns,	political	commercials	and	open	meetings	were	allowed	between	16	March	
2014	and	5	April	2014	but	parties	were	prohibited	from	using	mass	media,	print	or	
electronic,	for	campaign	purposes	before	15	March	2014.22	This	did	not	prevent	news	
reporting	on	activities	or	public	statements	from	political	parties	during	this	period.23	
In	addition,	throughout	2013,	many	parties	aired	commercials	designed	to	familiarize	
the	public	with	particular	party	members,	especially	presidential	candidates.	While	
these	advertisements	violated	the	spirit	of	the	KPU	regulations	they	did	not	
technically	breach	them.		
	
																																																													
19	McCargo	(2012:	207‐211),	in	a	broad	study	of	the	connection	between	media	and	politics	in	
Asia	(though	focused	on	Thailand),	asserts	that	the	relationship	between	the	two	is	often	
murky	and	media	ownership	tends	to	promote	partisan	reporting.	
20	Hanura’s	vice‐presidential	candidate,	Hary	Tanoe,	is	the	owner	of	the	MNC	media	group	and	
RCTI	television	station,	while	Nasdem	leader,	Suryo	Paloh,	owns	Media	Indonesia	newspaper	
and	Metro	TV.	
21	This	budget	figure	was	the	official	amount	reported	by	Gerindra	in	their	mandatory	
reporting	to	the	KPU.	However,	there	was	much	speculation	that	most	parties	spent	far	more	
on	their	campaigns	than	reported.	Didik	Supriyanto,	from	the	NGO	Election	House	for	
Democracy	(Rumah	Pemilu	untuk	Demokrasi,	Perludem)	suspected	that	Gerindra’s	actual	
spending	was	much	higher	than	its	reported	political	funding	of	Rp.	300	billion	(Afrianti	and	
Dewi	2013).	
22	A	copy	of	Law	No.	01/2013	on	Guidelines	for	the	Implementation	of	Election	Campaigns	by	
Members	for	the	DPR‐RI,	DPD	and	DPRD	can	be	found	at	the	KPU	website	(Komisi	Pemilihan	
Umum	2013).	
23	Surya	Paloh	even	claimed	that	gagging	media	coverage	and	restricting	advertising	violated	
freedom	of	the	press	(Rochmanuddin	2014).	
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Party	rhetoric	in	the	media,	both	before	and	during	the	official	campaign	period,	
clearly	drew	upon	anti‐corruption	discourse,	with	new	parties	seeking	to	draw	media	
attention	to	the	poor	performance	of	the	government.	In	the	lead‐up	to	the	election,	
Hanura	made	several	public	statements	about	the	government’s	failure	to	prosecute	
officials	over	the	Bank	Century	corruption	scandal,	calling	for	an	investigation	into	
the	involvement	of	Boediono,	Indonesia’s	then	Vice‐President.	Hanura	spokespersons	
accused	the	government	of	a	cover‐up.24	At	the	same	time,	Hanura	promoted	polls	
conducted	in	October	2012	and	March	2013	that	named	them	as	the	‘cleanest’	party	
in	Indonesia,	having	never	been	implicated	in	any	corruption	case.25	This	framing	
clearly	sought	to	portray	the	government	as	‘bad’	and	Hanura	as	clean	and	therefore	
‘good’.	In	another	example,	Wiranto	declared	to	Republika	newspaper	that	Indonesia	
was	in	dire	need	of	new	leadership	that	was	trustworthy,	clean	and	corruption‐free—
noting	that,	if	called	upon,	he	was	ready	for	the	job	(Sudiaman	2013).	Later	in	the	
campaign,	Wiranto	highlighted	more	recent	surveys	which	again	named	Hanura	as	
the	nation’s	cleanest	party.	He	reinforced	Hanura’s	‘clean’	status	with	the	public	
statement:	‘Hanura	is	free	of	corruption;	can	other	parties	claim	the	same?’	
(Kuswandi	2013).		
	
Hanura	used	its	media	profile	to	draw	attention	explicitly	to	its	anti‐corruption	stance	
several	times	in	the	campaign.	First,	revelations	that	parliamentarians	convicted	of	
corruption	could	still	receive	state	pensions	spurred	an	angry	response	from	Hanura.	
It	became	a	media	headline,	with	several	reports	published	critical	of	the	Yudhoyono	
administration’s	reluctance	to	amend	legislation	in	order	to	strip	corrupt	politicians	
of	parliamentary	benefits	(Kurniawan	2013;	Sihaloho	2013b;	Yulika	2013).	In	
November	2013,	Hanura’s	parliamentary	faction	head	declared	that	any	
parliamentarian	found	guilty	of	corruption	should	lose	all	their	entitlements,	
including	their	pension	and	access	to	government	facilities,	no	matter	what	party	they	
were	from	(Hanura	2013a).	The	statement	coincided	with	investigations	into	the	
corrupt	dealings	of	Democratic	Party	legislator	Andi	Mallarangeng,	who	was	detained	
a	month	earlier.	Second,	Hanura	also	provoked	debates	surrounding	the	KPK’s	arrest	
																																																													
24	Hanura	released	a	public	statement	on	its	website	on	30	November	2012	entitled	‘KPK	
confirms	2	new	suspects	in	the	Century	case’.	In	this	article	a	Hanura	spokesperson	
condemned	the	KPK	for	taking	so	long	to	name	these	suspects	when	their	involvement	had	
been	known	since	2010.	The	spokesperson	also	claimed	that	these	two	men	may	be	taking	the	
fall	for	their	superiors,	including	Vice‐President	Boediono,	who	are	being	protected	by	the	
current	leadership	(Hanura	2012).		
25	Polling	by	the	National	Survey	Institute	in	October	2012	found	Hanura	to	be	the	least	
corrupt	party	in	the	DPR	(Fadly	2012;	Giyanto	2012).	A	similar	survey	in	March	2013	by	the	
same	company	found	that	Hanura	had	maintained	this	standing	(Ferri	2013;	Khaddaf	2013).	
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of	Chief	Justice	of	the	Constitutional	Court,	Akil	Mochtar,	in	October	2013.26	In	a	
statement	to	the	media	in	October	2013,	Hanura	Deputy	Secretary‐General	for	Law	
and	Human	Rights,	Kristiawanto,	lambasted	other	political	parties	as	‘ambitious	for	
power	and	money’	and	supporting	corruption	in	the	judiciary	(Wijaya	2013).	He	
urged	the	government	to	cooperate	with	the	KPK	to	accelerate	the	investigation	so	
that	the	perpetrator	would	have	less	opportunity	to	hide	evidence	of	their	
wrongdoing.	Third,	during	the	official	campaign	period	Wiranto	and	Hary	Tanoe	
repeatedly	highlighted	the	delayed	implementation	of	infrastructure	projects	due	to	
corruption,	blaming	the	lack	of	development	for	ongoing	poverty	(Bramantyo	2014;	
Dzulkarnaen	2014).	Finally,	in	March	2014,	Hary	Tanoe	also	stated	that	Indonesian	
‘regulations	for	budget	management	need	to	be	clear	and	transparent	…	and	with	
clean,	firm	leadership,	corruption	can	be	ended’	(Waskita	2014),	implying	that	the	
current	government	was	either	not	clean	or	committed	enough	to	combat	corruption	
effectively.	
	
While	Gerindra	itself	did	not	have	direct	links	to	any	national	media	outlets,	its	
campaign	team	focused	on	getting	party	coverage	via	media	reports	of	statements	by	
senior	figures.	Sensational	statements	and	accusations	were	particularly	useful	in	
attracting	general	media	attention.	For	example,	Gerindra	accused	President	
Yudhoyono	of	hiding	his	own	involvement	in	Centurygate	and	using	his	position	to	
protect	members	of	his	cabinet	from	corruption	investigations.27	In	March	2013,	for	
example,	a	Gerindra	spokesperson	claimed	that	Yudhoyono	had	deliberately	shifted	
the	Minister	of	Finance,	Agus	Martowardojo,	to	the	position	of	Governor	of	the	Bank	
of	Indonesia	in	an	attempt	to	shield	him	from	the	Hambalang	investigation	(Gerindra	
2013a;	Malau	2013).28	As	the	election	campaign	intensified,	Gerindra	media	
statements	became	increasingly	belligerent	towards	the	Yudhoyono	administration.	
Early	on,	in	December	2012,	Prabowo	claimed	that	his	party	was	the	only	choice	for	
citizens	who	wanted	a	leader	free	from	corruption	(Ratya	2012),	while	another	
Gerindra	official	explained	that	Gerindra	would	gain	more	votes	than	the	Democratic	
Party	in	the	2014	election	because	of	its	reputation	for	being	clean.29	Later,	Gerindra’s	
attacks	against	the	government	became	even	more	vociferous.	For	example,	in	June	
																																																													
26	Details	of	the	Akil	Mochtar	case	can	be	found	in	Chapter	Three.		
27	The	Hambalang	scandal	was	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.	
28	It	is	unclear	from	Gerindra’s	statements	exactly	how	this	move	would	‘shield’	him,	but	the	
implication	appeared	to	be	that	if	he	was	no	longer	Minister	for	Finance	he	would	come	under	
less	scrutiny.	
29	Spokesperson	and	Gerindra	parliamentary	member	Martin	Hutabarat,	quoted	in	Vivanews,	
20	February	2013	(Kusumadewi	and	Yulika	2013).	
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2013,	Prabowo	attacked	Yudhoyono	and	his	administration	in	a	statement,	urging	
citizens	not	to	elect	another	‘thief’	as	president	in	2014	(Gerindra	2013b).	Following	
Yudhoyono’s	National	Day	address	on	17	August	2013,	a	Gerindra	spokesperson	
criticized	the	president	for	failing	to	prioritize	anti‐corruption	efforts,	despite	it	being	
one	of	Indonesia’s	major	political	challenges.	His	comments	suggested	that	
Yudhoyono	did	not	mention	corruption	either	because	he	did	not	feel	it	was	
important	or	because	members	of	his	party	were	being	investigated,	whereas	
Gerindra’s	platform	clearly	prioritized	corruption	eradication	(Tribunnews	2013a).		
	
Gerindra	also	seized	on	survey	results	that	reflected	positively	on	the	party,	using	
them	to	support	assertions	of	the	party’s	superiority	over	rivals.	For	example,	in	
January	2014,	it	promoted	the	Indonesian	Survey	Centre’s	findings,	which	indicated	
Gerindra	party	cadres	were	considered	‘relatively	clean	of	corruption	cases’	and	that	
Prabowo	was	the	potential	presidential	candidate	with	the	‘highest	competency	for	
eradicating	corruption’	(Alfiyah	2014).	These	results	were	published	by	several	
media	outlets	including	reputable	online	news	website	Tempo.co.id.30	Gerindra	also	
used	the	media	to	promote	internal	policies	that	fostered	an	anti‐corruption	symbol.	
It	publicized	its	policy	of	prohibiting	Gerindra	parliamentarians	from	undertaking	
overseas	study	tours.	The	party	argued	that	these	trips	were	merely	junkets	and	a	
waste	of	government	funding.	In	December	2013,	Prabowo	contended	that	Gerindra	
was	the	only	party	with	such	a	policy,	claiming	it	had	saved	the	government	around	
Rp.	26	billion	(Fitrat	2013).31	Prabowo	also	made	headlines	in	November	2013	when	
he	condemned	the	planned	renovations	of	the	national	parliament	building,	claiming	
that	they	were	merely	an	opportunity	for	skimming	money	from	the	state	(Waskita	
2013b).	The	building	companies	awarded	the	tender,	PT	Adhi	Karya	and	PT	DGI	
(Duta	Graha	Indah),	were	also	implicated	in	the	Hambalang	scandal,	linking	the	
renovation	project	to	disgraced	Democratic	Party	politicians	such	as	Nazaruddin,	who	
was	already	in	prison	for	corruption.		
		
Nasdem	also	attempted	to	keep	Centurygate	in	the	spotlight,	determined	to	maintain	
public	interest	in	the	unresolved	case.32	In	another	example,	Nasdem	launched	a	
																																																													
30	The	story	was	also	reported	by	Berita	Satu	(2014b),	Pos	Kota	(2014)	and	Republika	(2014)	
amongst	others.	
31	Other	party	members	have	made	similar	statements,	see	(Harian	Metro	2013;	Paparazie	
2013;	Prihandoko	2014).	
32	For	example,	in	March	2013,	the	media	reported	that	Nasdem	was	lobbying	the	KPK	to	
question	former	finance	minister,	Sri	Mulyani,	about	the	Bank	Century	bailout,	even	though	
she	had	already	relocated	to	Washington	D.C.	to	become	Managing	Director	at	the	World	Bank	
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media	campaign	in	December	2013	to	encourage	citizen	oversight	of	polling	booths	
and	vote‐counting	in	order	to	decrease	the	likelihood	of	money	politics	in	the	
legislative	elections.	Arguing	that	smaller	parties	were	disadvantaged	in	elections	
because	larger	parties	had	more	money	and	influence,	Nasdem	leaders	called	on	
voters	to	ensure	there	were	impartial	witnesses	at	each	polling	station	(Media	
Indonesia	2013;	Novaria	2013).	Soon	after	the	launch	of	its	vote‐monitoring	appeal,	
Nasdem	also	highlighted	a	report	from	the	government’s	Centre	for	Financial	
Transaction	Reports	and	Analysis	(Pusat	Pelaporan	dan	Analisis	Transaksi	Keuangan,	
PPATK),	which	found	an	increase	in	‘suspicious	transactions’	by	political	parties	in	
the	year	leading	up	to	the	election,	urging	that	they	be	fully	investigated	(Nasdem	
2014f).	In	these	appeals,	Nasdem	capitalized	on	its	status	as	a	political	underdog,	
threatened	by	the	treachery	of	larger,	more	established	parties.	In	arguing	that	more	
independent	oversight	was	needed,	Nasdem	also	portrayed	itself	as	trustworthy	and	
clean:	it	had	nothing	to	hide	from	the	public,	so	the	more	witnesses	and	investigations	
the	better.	
		
Parties’	Online	Presence	
As	Howard	(2003:	213‐214)	argues,	technological	innovation	has	radically	altered	
power	relations	in	politics	as	campaigns	can	be	less	expensive	while	simultaneously	
more	reflexive,	operating	with	fewer	barriers	to	entry.	As	opposed	to	‘modern’	forms	
of	campaigning	which	rely	upon	the	news	media,	campaigning	in	its	‘postmodern’	
form	uses	the	internet	as	its	primary	means	of	political	communication	to	voters.33	
Digital	media	facilitates	a	new	way	for	both	the	production	and	consumption	of	
political	information	(Howard	2005:	154).	Although	generally	a	medium	for	
mobilizing	existing	supporters	rather	than	persuading	undecided	voters	(Vaccari	
2008:	649),	Indonesian	party	websites	provide	information	about	what	the	party	
stands	for,	with	most	sites	containing	electronic	copies	of	key	documents,	such	as	the	
party	manifesto	and	‘vision	and	mission’.	Party	websites	also	enable	the	real‐time	
dissemination	of	public	statements.	
	
All	the	political	parties	studied	in	this	thesis	had	an	official	website,	established	well	
before	the	2014	election.	However,	the	frequency	of	postings	and	statements	
																																																																																																																																																																									
(Rimanews	2013).	Nasdem	also	partnered	with	Lily	Wahid,	daughter	of	former	President	
Abdurrahman	Wahid,	to	submit	documents	to	the	KPK	that,	they	claimed,	shed	light	on	
Centurygate	(Irianto	2013).	However,	the	content	of	these	documents	was	never	made	public.	
33	For	a	more	in‐depth	description	of	what	constitutes	premodern,	modern	and	postmodern	
political	campaigns,	see	Howard	(2003).		
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increased	dramatically	in	the	months	leading	up	to	polling	day,	particularly	during	
the	official	campaign	period	when	there	were	more	rallies	and	events	to	cover.34	
Although	not	as	reflexive	as	social	media,	official	websites	provided	a	forum	for	
disseminating	party	messages	in	two	main	forms.	First,	parties	circulated	report‐style	
pieces	on	survey	results	or	party	activities,	for	example	the	turnout	at	a	particular	
rally,	or	news	of	a	party	branch	undertaking	charitable	work.35	These	stories	
inevitably	portrayed	the	party	in	a	positive	light.		
	
Second,	party	websites	published	several	opinion	pieces.	Some	of	these	were	written	
anonymously,	appearing	as	a	generic	party	statement.	Not	only	did	parties	mount	
politically	strategic	attacks	on	rivals	and	corruption	in	general,	they	also	used	their	
websites	to	restate	their	own	commitment	to	the	issue.	For	example,	in	February	
2014,	Nasdem	posted	an	article	entitled	‘Nasdem	urges	a	return	to	the	fight	against	
KKN’,	insisting	that	Nasdem	members	make	the	fight	against	corruption	a	priority	in	
their	lives,	just	as	Nasdem	had	committed	to	do	in	government	(Nasdem	2014b).	On	
30	March	2014,	Hanura	posted	an	article	naming	itself	as	the	‘cleanest	and	most	anti‐
corruption	party’	in	the	legislative	elections	(Hanura	2014b).	Gerindra,	too,	
continually	reiterated	its	anti‐corruption	stance	on	its	webpage.	For	instance,	in	
February	2014	it	claimed	that	‘fully	supporting	the	KPK,	Gerindra	instructs	
candidates	to	refuse	the	use	of	all	forms	of	inducements	(gratifikasi)’	stating	that	
Gerindra	believes	a	corruption‐free	election	will	be	‘a	win	for	all	Indonesians’	
(Gerindra	2014a).	Even	if	the	audience	for	these	statements	was	limited	to	those	
already	inclined	to	support	the	party,	the	websites	were	a	showcase	for	key	political	
symbols,	allowing	citizens	to	easily	gain	a	sense	of	party	priorities.		
	
Website	articles	also	reinforced	and	justified	criticism	of	political	rivals.	For	example,	
Gerindra’s	official	website	posted	commentary	on	the	corruption	investigations	into	
Atut,	who	was	investigated	for	large‐scale	corruption	along	with	several	members	of	
her	family.	In	addition,	every	Gerindra	post	on	the	topic	of	corruption	was	followed	
by	a	short	summary	of	Gerindra’s	own	commitment	to	corruption.	The	summary	
																																																													
34	Based	on	author	observations,	Gerindra	seemed	the	most	prolific	publisher	of	website	
content,	sometimes	posting	up	to	6	times	per	day	on	its	website	in	the	months	leading	up	to	
the	election.		
35	For	example,	on	14	January	2014	an	article	was	posted	on	Hanura.com	entitled	Wiranto	
bantu	korban	banjir	di	Purworejo	(‘Wiranto	assists	flood	victims	in	Purworejo’)(Hanura	
2014a);	Nasdem	published	Nasdem	Pekalongan	Bantu	Korban	Banjir	(Nasdem	in	Pekalongan	
Helps	Flood	Victims’)	on	23	January	2014	(Nasdem	2014d).	Also	publicizing	their	flood	
assistance,	Gerindra	posted	Prabowo	Bantu	Korban	Banjir	Soppeng	(‘Prabowo	assists	Flood	
Victims	in	Soppeng’)	on	28	January	2014	(Gerindra	2014f).	
	
131	
	
reads:	‘Gerindra	is	a	political	party	that	has	the	vision	of	becoming	the	party	that	
brings	prosperity	to	the	people,	social	justice,	and	order	based	on	nationalism	and	
religion	while	preserving	the	Unitary	State	of	Indonesia…	Gerindra	is	the	only	
political	party	with	a	clear	and	structured	program	enshrined	in	the	6	point	action	
plan	for	the	Transformation	of	the	Nation.	Amongst	the	numerous	awards	received	by	
Gerindra	are	awards	from	Transparency	International	Indonesia	and	ICW	as	the	party	
with	the	best	financial	transparency’.36	In	one	post,	Fadli	Zon,	Deputy	Leader	of	
Gerindra,	demanded	that	Atut	resign	immediately	and	allow	a	new	governor	to	be	
appointed	for	Banten.	Zon	criticized	existing	legislation,	which	allowed	a	governor	to	
continue	to	rule	even	if	indicted	on	corruption	charges	(Gerindra	2014c).37	Gerindra	
also	posted	an	opinion	piece	on	the	Hambalang	scandal,	condemning	Anas	
Urbaningrum,	former	Chairman	of	the	Democratic	Party,	for	failing	to	attend	a	
hearing	called	by	the	KPK.	In	the	statement,	Zon	stressed	Gerindra’s	unconditional	
support	for	the	KPK,	while	contending	that	a	failure	to	cooperate	with	the	KPK	set	a	
poor	example	for	other	politicians	(Gerindra	2014b).	In	another	example,	on	12	
March	2014	the	party	issued	an	opinion	piece	asserting	that	voters	needed	to	‘punish’	
corrupt	political	parties	by	refusing	to	vote	for	them	in	the	election	(Gerindra	2014d).	
	
Nasdem	similarly	used	its	official	website	to	draw	attention	to	the	corrupt	behaviour	
of	its	political	rivals.	For	example,	in	January	2014	it	argued	that	three	‘stars’	of	the	
Democratic	Party’s	anti‐corruption	advertisements	had	been	dishonest,	referring	to	
the	now	infamous	‘say	no	to	corruption’	political	advertising	campaign	from	2009	
(Nasdem	2014e).38	The	story	quoted	an	expert	in	political	communication	from	the	
University	of	Indonesia,	Tjipta	Lesmana,	who	stated	that	the	advertisement	reflected	
inconsistencies	between	the	rhetoric	and	actions	of	the	Democratic	Party,	while	also	
warning	that	the	party	was	likely	to	suffer	political	backlash	in	the	election	because	of	
this	hypocrisy.	Nasdem	also	published	articles	on	corruption	cases	involving	Anas,	
Akil	and	Luthfi.	Although	these	articles	were	opinion	pieces,	they	were	usually	framed	
as	a	media	article	reporting	facts,	unlike	those	on	the	Gerindra	website.	In	cases	
where	opinion	was	included,	Nasdem	tended	to	quote	outsiders	rather	than	members	
of	its	own	party.	In	continuing	to	publicize	these	corruption	cases,	Nasdem	focused	
																																																													
36	An	example	can	be	seen	at	Gerindra	(2014b).	
37Zon	noted	that	government	officials	are	only	technically	required	to	resign	once	found	guilty	
by	the	judiciary.		
38	This	advertisement	was	screened	nationwide	during	the	Democratic	Party’s	2009	legislative	
campaign.	It	featured	rising	stars	of	the	party,	as	well	as	Yudhoyono,	filmed	saying	‘no’	to	
corruption.	
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public	attention	on	the	large	number	of	scandals	linked	to	the	Yudhoyono	
government.		
	
While	some	emerging	parties	had	privileged	access	to	traditional	media	outlets,	the	
internet	and	social	media	played	an	important	role	in	election	campaigning.39	Offering	
instant	and	unrestricted	access	to	official	party	statements,	as	well	as	those	made	by	
individuals,	social	media—in	particular	Twitter	and	Facebook—was	a	means	of	
communicating	directly	with	voters	via	non‐relational	channels.40	These	new	
technologies,	to	some	extent,	reduced	the	importance	of	personal	social	relationships,	
as	well	as	on‐the‐ground	campaigning	by	party	members,	because	messages	could	
diffuse	directly	from	the	party	elite	to	voters	without	the	need	for	an	intermediary.	Of	
course,	more	traditional	forms	of	campaigning	continued	to	exist	as	electioneering	in	
rural	and	regional	areas	still	relied	on	television	and	the	print	media,	as	well	as	even	
more	traditional	campaign	techniques,	such	as	posters,	pamphlets	and	‘whistlestop	
tours’,	especially	when	the	internet	was	unavailable	or	unreliable.		
	
Social	media	was	an	important	component	of	the	campaigns,	particularly	in	reaching	
out	to	upper	and	middle	class	voters	who	were	technologically	savvy.41	It	allowed	
parties	to	develop	an	online	‘track	record’	of	their	anti‐corruption	rhetoric,	
reinforcing	their	efforts	in	other	spheres	and	building	and	entrenching	their	use	of	
anti‐corruption	as	a	political	symbol.	This	was	particularly	important	for	emerging	
																																																													
39	While	there	is	little	in	the	way	of	published	academic	studies	on	the	impact	of	social	media	
in	the	Indonesian	election,	there	is	much	anecdotal	evidence	showing	it	played	a	key	role.	
Indonesia	is	one	of	social	media’s	largest	markets.	According	to	figures	released	by	Twitter	in	
June	2014,	there	are	approximately	20	million	active	Twitter	users	in	Indonesia	(Lukman	
2014).	Indonesia	is	also	the	fourth	largest	country	for	Facebook	use,	with	around	60.5	million	
registered	users	according	to	a	survey	by	research	firm	eMarketer	(Ross	2014).	For	some	
examples	of	commentary	on	the	importance	of	social	media	during	Indonesia’s	elections,	see	
Belot	(2013)	and	Hearne	(2014).	
40	Much	of	the	social	media	presence	was	also	fragmented	because	several	candidates	had	
their	own	Facebook	and	Twitter	accounts.	Enli	and	Skogerbø	(2013)	argue	that	Facebook	and	
Twitter	are,	by	their	nature,	an	individual‐focused	arena,	and	therefore	are	more	useful	for	
personalized	campaigning,	particularly	given	that	even	though	candidates	represent	
particular	parties,	they	essentially	campaign	for	themselves.	However,	during	the	presidential	
elections,	the	social	media	presence	was	much	more	coherent,	with	the	campaign	messages	
clearly	emanating	from	the	central	office.	For	more	academic	studies	on	the	role	of	social	
media	in	elections,	see	Bennett	et	al.	(2008);	Howard	(2003);	and	Howard	(2005).	
41	In	a	study	on	the	use	of	social	media	for	the	2014	elections	in	Indonesia,	Yuliatiningtyas	
(2014)	found	that	although	television	and	newspaper	advertising	were	still	the	most	popular	
campaign	strategies,	the	use	of	social	media	did	have	significant	results.	This	is	supported	by	
research	from	other	countries.	For	example	Bean	(2011:	27),	researching	the	use	of	internet	
for	political	engagement	in	Australia,	found	that	a	significant	amount	of	voters	gained	
information	from	the	internet.	In	Norway,	Enli	and	Skogerbø	(2013)	assert	that	the	use	of	
social‐media	led	to	increasingly	personalized	campaign	strategies	and	higher	individual	
profiles	of	candidates.	
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parties	with	little	history	of	anti‐corruption	activism	to	draw	upon	in	constructing	
their	symbols.	Parties	hoped	that	consistent	online	posts	discussing	the	party’s	anti‐
corruption	stance	would	help	them	to	‘own’	the	issue.	Gerindra,	which	was	
acknowledged	as	having	one	of	the	more	tech‐savvy	campaigns	during	the	election,	
was	at	the	forefront	of	this	strategy	(Asia	Calling	2013).	Gerindra	had	an	entire	office	
dedicated	to	the	party’s	social	media	marketing,	responding	to	messages	and	
tactically	uploading	pictures,	statements	and	media	links	that	portrayed	the	party	in	a	
positive	light.42	To	a	lesser	extent,	Hanura	and	Nasdem	also	used	the	internet	to	
promote	themselves	and	their	anti‐corruption	ideas.	
	
Social	media	formats	such	as	Twitter,	Facebook	and	YouTube	were	another	popular	
means	for	communicating	information	to	voters.	Often	echoing	or	linking	to	website	
posts,	these	fora	gave	parties	the	opportunity	to	provide	real‐time	information	to	
voters	and	responses	to	questions	and	criticisms.	Each	of	the	three	political	parties	
had	a	professional	communications	team	responsible	for	updating	social	media	
content.	These	teams	controlled	the	official	party	accounts,	as	well	as	those	of	the	
main	leaders.	For	example,	in	Hanura,	Wiranto	would	sometimes	contact	the	
communications	team	to	put	up	a	certain	message,	but	oftentimes	the	team	would	
post	updates	on	his	behalf,	following	the	directions	of	the	campaign	manager.	Links	to	
television	interviews	and	positive	media	articles	dominated,	but	the	team	also	posted	
messages	of	gratitude	to	citizens	for	their	support	and	generic	statements	about	the	
political	priorities	of	the	party.43		
	
Gerindra	was	the	most	popular	and	prolific	across	social	media,	amassing	over	3	
million	‘likes’	on	its	official	Facebook	site	and	over	180,000	‘followers’	on	its	official	
Twitter	handle.44	The	party	posted	regularly	in	the	lead‐up	to	the	legislative	elections,	
linking	to	articles	about	Gerindra	and	displaying	photos	of	its	leaders	in	action.45	The	
Twitter	account	also	provided	one	of	the	only	up‐to‐date	sources	of	information	
regarding	when	and	where	political	rallies	would	be	held.46	Similarly,	Nasdem’s	
Twitter	account,	with	over	25,000	followers,	linked	to	news	articles	about	the	party,	
																																																													
42	Interview	with	Gerindra	party	official,	28	May	2013.	
43	Interview	with	Hanura	media	advisor,	17	February	2013.	
44	These	figures	were	correct	as	of	2	May	2014.	
45	Gerindra’s	social	media	activity	increased	after	the	legislative	election	as	Prabowo	launched	
his	presidential	campaign.		
46	The	author	used	Twitter	to	keep	track	of	the	rallies	organised	by	the	DPP	during	the	official	
campaign	period.		
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as	well	as	providing	details	of	rallies.47	While	it	did	have	a	presence	on	Facebook,	this	
was	mostly	a	forum	for	users	to	post	opinions	about	Nasdem	rather	than	a	medium	
for	propagating	information.	Activity	on	the	page	increased	during	the	presidential	
campaign,	in	which	Nasdem	ultimately	backed	Jokowi‐Jusuf	Kalla.48	Hanura	also	had	
active	Facebook	and	Twitter	accounts,	with	over	500,000	and	11,000	followers	
respectively,	though	they	were	not	updated	as	often	as	those	of	Gerindra	and	Nasdem.	
Hanura’s	online	activity	also	intensified	in	the	weeks	leading	up	to	9	April	2014	but	
dropped	off	after	the	official	electoral	results	were	announced.		
	
Emerging	parties	also	made	use	of	YouTube	to	post	videos	relating	to	their	
campaigns.	YouTube	effectively	provided	a	free‐of‐charge	online	depository	for	open‐
access	advertising	material.	Clips	posted	by	the	parties	during	the	legislative	election	
campaign	aimed	to	portray	a	positive	party	image	overall,	unlike	video	clips	posted	in	
the	lead‐up	to	the	presidential	elections,	which	had	a	clear	focus	on	candidates.	One	
example	of	the	use	of	viral	video	campaigning	was	Gerindra’s	‘Mas	Garuda’	series,	
which	featured	a	super‐hero	like	figure	dressed	in	an	eagle	mask	addressing	various	
political	issues	including	corruption	and	‘vote	selling’	(voters	accepting	bribes	from	
candidates).49	The	official	Gerindra	YouTube	channel	contained	a	variety	of	other	
videos	on	the	topic	of	corruption.	These	included	titles	such	as	‘Prabowo:	what	will	
happen	if	we	allow	corruption	to	continue?’	(GerindraTV	2013b),	‘Prabowo’s	
struggle:	an	Indonesia	free	from	corruption’	(GerindraTV	2013a)	and	‘Prabowo:	At	
this	time	the	government	system	is	weak,	inefficient	and	corrupt’	(GerindraTV	
2013c).	Hanura’s	official	YouTube	channel	operates	under	the	name	‘Wiranto	
Channel’.	While	Hanura’s	channel	had	fewer	videos	than	that	of	Gerindra,	it	featured	
similar	clips	emphasizing	Hanura’s	commitment	to	being	clean.	For	example,	it	posted	
a	nine	minute	illustrated	video	entitled	‘Your	Conscience	Eradicates	Corruption’	
(Hanura	2013b),	explaining	the	link	between	corruption	and	the	other	social	ills	
facing	Indonesia.50	
	
																																																													
47	These	figures	were	correct	as	of	2	May	2014.	
48	Nasdem	was	quick	to	declare	their	‘unconditional’	support	for	the	presidential	candidate	
Jokowi	and	his	running	mate,	Jusuf	Kalla,	releasing	an	official	statement	on	14	May	2014	
(Hutasoit	2014).	Hanura	followed,	declaring	their	backing	for	the	pair	on	17	May	2014	
(Ruqoyah	and	Ansyari	2014).	
49	The	full	range	of	videos	can	be	found	at	the	Mas	Garuda	YouTube	channel:	
https://www.youtube.com/user/MasGaruda.	
50	Nasdem	did	not	have	an	active,	party‐run	channel	on	YouTube;	however,	advertisements	
and	speeches	by	party	leaders	were	posted	by	individual	Nasdem	members	and	district	offices	
and	were,	therefore,	available	online.	Media	outlets	also	posted	some	interviews	and	news	
stories	featuring	Nasdem	leaders,	such	as	Surya	Paloh	and	Patrice	Rio	Capella.	
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Conclusion	
Emerging	parties	acknowledged	the	risks	of	using	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	in	their	
election	campaigns	but	chose	to	do	so	anyway.	While	they	identified	these	symbols	as	
vote‐getters	that	were	popular	with	voters,	the	lack	of	hesitation	in	adopting	them	
suggests	that	parties	only	superficially	considered	these	risks,	judging	that	anti‐
corruption	symbols	would	backfire	only	if	the	party	later	became	embroiled	in	a	
corruption	scandal.	Underscoring	the	need	to	remain	clean	and	ensure	that	party	
members	did	nothing	to	jeopardize	the	party’s	reputation,	these	parties	simply	
threatened	to	expel	anyone	accused	of	corruption	and	hoped	that	their	members	
would	uphold	party	values.		
	
Assessing	this	strategy	in	terms	of	the	benefits	of	using	salient	issues,	emerging	
parties	need	do	nothing	to	promote	the	importance	of	corruption	as	a	serious	political	
concern.	Given	the	ongoing	attention	corruption	scandals	received	between	2009	and	
2014,	as	well	as	its	long	political	history	since	colonial	times,	emerging	parties	did	not	
need	to	convince	voters	that	corruption	was	bad,	or	even	that	it	was	prevalent—both	
were	obvious	to	citizens.	As	corruption	was	already	a	stock	political	plot,	issue	
priming,	which	can	be	difficult	and	time	consuming,	was	simply	not	required.	What	
parties	did	need	to	do	was	convince	voters	that	they	were	the	most	committed	to	
addressing	corruption	in	Indonesia,	more	so	than	all	other	political	rivals.	As	such,	
parties	had	to	construct	a	narrative	that	cast	them	in	a	positive	light	while	vilifying	
other	parties.	
	
To	this	end,	emerging	parties	used	non‐relational	channels	to	highlight	corruption	
cases	and	the	failings	of	the	government,	hoping	to	demonstrate	that	current	political	
elites	were	insincere	in	their	anti‐corruption	promises.	Moreover,	new	parties	
developed	their	own	anti‐corruption	symbol	through	master	narratives	around	
corruption	issues.	Through	this	narrative,	parties	could	capitalize	on	the	moral	
discontent	of	voters	and	cast	the	problem	as	one	of	good	versus	evil.	Having	already	
outlined	the	failings	of	older	parties	and	the	need	for	change	in	their	party	
manifestos,	other	party	publications	reinforced	the	rhetoric	of	emerging	parties	of	
being	cleaner	and	more	committed	to	building	a	better	country,	free	from	corruption.	
During	the	election	campaign,	these	messages	were	augmented	and	further	marketed	
through	coverage	of	party	leaders	in	the	media	as	well	as	through	more	traditional	
articles	and	advertising	formats.	The	2014	election	campaign	also	saw	a	rise	in	the	
	
136	
	
use	of	online	communication	to	reach	out	to	voters,	appealing	particularly	to	middle	
and	upper	class	voters	with	ready	access	to	the	internet.	
	
In	spite	of	these	campaign	efforts,	emerging	parties	did	not	achieve	their	stated	
electoral	goals	and	it	may	appear	that	the	campaigns	simply	failed	to	inspire	the	
public	support	that	emerging	parties	had	hoped	for.	This	failure,	however,	cannot	be	
put	down	to	the	failure	of	non‐relational	campaigning.	While	these	campaigns	were	
costly	and	intended	to	sway	voters	across	the	country,	they	were	far	from	the	only	
input	received	by	voters.	While	campaigns	at	the	national	level	were	designed	to	
construct	the	anti‐corruption	symbol,	this	remained	difficult	to	reconcile	with	the	
experiences	of	voters	in	towns	and	villages	across	the	archipelago.	In	order	to	
understand	the	latter,	it	is	necessary	to	consider	how	party	symbols	were	sold	to	
voters	within	the	multi‐scalar	framework	in	which	campaigns	operated.	An	
examination	of	how	parties	campaigned	nationally	can	only	answer	questions	about	
what	the	parties	did,	not	how	voters	responded	to	party	attempts	to	own	the	issue	of	
anti‐corruption.	As	expensive	or	expansive	as	these	national	political	campaigns	
were,	the	influence	of	individual	candidates	remained	paramount	in	legislative	
elections	in	Indonesia.	The	next	chapter	explores	three	case	studies	of	individual	
candidates	from	each	of	the	emerging	parties	and	examines	how	they	personally	
interpreted	and	presented	the	anti‐corruption	symbol	that	their	parties	were	so	
desperate	to	own.	
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Chapter	Five	
Candidates	on	the	campaign	trail	
	
While	political	parties	undertake	national	campaigns	to	attract	support,	individual	
candidates	still	play	an	integral	role	in	campaigning,	both	for	themselves	and	their	
parties.	Most	candidates	still	campaign	in	person	at	the	local	level,	hoping	to	use	
relational	channels	to	win	votes,	rather	than	simply	relying	on	the	popularity	of	the	
party	to	ensure	their	success.	Relying	on	party	reputation	is	insufficient,	not	least	
because	the	open	party	list	system	means	that	the	party	candidate	that	garners	the	
most	personal	votes	will	win	office.1	Under	this	system,	the	importance	of	individual	
campaigns	is	paramount,	as	candidates	compete	not	only	against	those	from	other	
parties,	but	also	against	other	candidates	from	their	own	party.2	Given	that	the	
elections	for	the	national,	provincial	and	district	parliaments,	and	the	DPD,	occur	
concurrently,	voters	are	exposed	to	the	names	and	faces	of	hundreds	of	political	
hopefuls,	placing	candidates	under	additional	pressure	to	stand	out	from	the	crowd.3	
Furthermore,	Aspinall	(2014a:	96‐97)	argues	that	the	introduction	of	the	open	party	
list	system	has	led	to	an	increase	in	money	politics	as	voters	become	more	pragmatic	
in	assessing	candidates‐	assessing	them	on	their	ability	to	deliver	cash	or	goods	
rather	than	their	political	ideals.		
	
This	chapter	draws	on	close	studies	of	three	emerging	party	candidates,	representing	
Hanura,	Gerindra	and	Nasdem	respectively.4	All	were	candidates	for	the	DPR‐RI	and	
																																																													
1	As	noted	in	the	Introduction,	in	the	past,	political	parties	ranked	and	numbered	their	
candidates	and	votes	were	allocated	according	to	a	candidate’s	place	on	the	party	list.	From	
2004,	voters	could	opt	to	vote	for	a	particular	individual	and	there	may	be	up	to	ten	
candidates	from	any	given	party	contesting	a	particular	electorate,	corresponding	with	the	
number	of	seats	available	to	be	won	(Sherlock	2004).		
2	The	influence	of	the	party	list	system	can	also	be	seen	in	the	shift	of	allegiance	from	trade	
union	candidates	to	party	candidates	in	elections	(Caraway	et	al.	2014).	Previously,	candidates	
with	strong	union	links	were	recruited	by	political	parties	as	‘vote‐getters’	and	placed	below	
party	cadres	in	order	to	boost	the	party’s	overall	vote.	Some	union	candidates	suspected	that	
in	the	2009	election	party	officials	bribed	electoral	officers	to	reallocate	votes	intended	for	
them	to	candidates	higher	on	the	party	list.	For	further	discussion	of	this	relationship,	see	
Caraway	and	Ford	(2014).	
3	Mietzner	(2013:	121)	touches	on	this	issue	in	his	discussion	of	the	need	for	national	
candidates	to	have	good	relations	with	district	branches	in	order	to	better	compete	against	
rivals	in	elections.	However,	while	the	point	is	widely	accepted,	the	influence	of	the	open	party	
list	voting	system	upon	intra‐party	competition	in	Indonesia	is	as	yet	understudied.	
4	Information	was	gathered	via	interviews	and	participant	observation	conducted	from	2013–
2014.	As	discussed	in	the	Introduction,	this	participant	observation	was	‘moderate’.	I	
attempted	to	balance	my	roles	as	an	outsider	(I	did	not	join	any	political	party	or	offer	support	
in	any	form	to	a	party	or	its	campaign)	and	insider	(I	travelled,	ate,	socialized	with,	and	stayed	
in	the	same	accommodation	as	my	subjects	while	in	the	field,	which	allowed	me	to	develop	a	
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were	the	first‐ranked	candidates	on	the	party	list	in	their	electorate,	but	differed	in	
terms	of	gender	and	experience.	The	Hanura	candidate	observed	in	East	Java	was	
female,	while	the	other	two	candidates,	in	South	Sulawesi	and	North	Sumatra,	were	
male.	The	Gerindra	candidate	in	North	Sumatra	was	an	incumbent	while	the	other	
two	were	not.	The	South	Sulawesi	Nasdem	candidate	was	a	former	DPR‐RI	
parliamentarian	who	resigned	in	2013	after	changing	parties.5		
	
In	the	2014	legislative	elections,	these	candidates	were	influenced	to	different	extents	
by	the	nature	of	their	relationships	with	central,	provincial	and	local	party	
committees.6	Nominations	for	the	DPR‐RI	candidates	were	registered	and	approved	
by	the	central	committee,	which	also	determined	the	candidate’s	ranking	on	the	party	
list.	However,	on	the	ground,	candidates	campaigned	alongside	fellow	parliamentary	
hopefuls	from	the	national,	provincial	and	district	levels	of	legislature.	This	provided	
scope	for	both	cooperation	and	further	contestation.	Furthermore,	a	candidate’s	
relationship	with	the	central	committee	affected	the	resources	they	received.	
Although	the	case	studies	presented	here	are	all	based	on	the	experiences	of	first‐
ranked	candidates	with	close	ties	to	the	central	office	in	Jakarta—both	the	Nasdem	
and	Gerindra	candidates	were	involved	in	their	parties’	central	committees,	while	the	
Hanura	candidate	had	long	worked	in	the	accounts	department	of	the	party’s	central	
office—they	received	different	levels	of	central	support.	
	
Candidates	faced	many	decisions	in	operating	their	own	campaigns.	With	the	
autonomy	to	decide	how	much	money	they	spent,	who	they	employed	and	how	they	
campaigned,	they	were	able	to	draw	upon	symbols	chosen	by	the	central	committee,	
create	their	own	symbols,	or,	if	they	decided	that	campaign	symbols	and	rhetoric	
were	not	useful,	they	could	instead	choose	to	bribe	voters.	Candidates	could	even	opt	
to	mobilize	anti‐corruption	symbolism	and	pay	for	votes	if	they	wished	(Aspinall	
																																																																																																																																																																									
level	of	trust	with	them	as	the	campaigns	progressed).	Throughout	this	chapter	I	have	
referenced	the	specific	date	of	interviews	where	relevant,	but	not	where	comments	have	been	
made	that	applied	to	the	campaign	in	general.	In	these	cases	I	have	indicated	whether	the	
comment	was	made	at	the	outset,	during	the	middle,	or	towards	the	end	of	the	campaign	in	
order	to	provide	relevant	context	for	statements.	
5	DPR‐RI	members	are	voted	in	as	party	representatives.	As	such,	if	a	member	opts	to	leave	
their	party,	they	must	also	resign	from	their	position	as	a	member	of	parliament.	
6	Interaction	between	DPR‐RI	candidates	and	the	provincial	branch	office	was	least	evident.	
While	candidates	knew	the	provincial	party	leadership,	none	were	campaigning	in	provincial	
capital	areas	and	therefore	they	did	not	cooperate	or	coordinate	closely	with	local	leaders.	
However,	these	national	candidates	did	have	individual	relationships	with	specific	provincial	
candidates	with	whom	they	campaigned	in	tandem.	
	
139	
	
2014b;	Muhajir	Forthcoming).7	The	extent	to	which	the	individual	candidates	studied	
here	used	anti‐corruption	symbols	depended	mainly	on	how	they	wished	to	present	
themselves	to	the	public,	which	in	turn	was	largely	dictated	by	their	own	history	and	
ideals	and	those	of	their	target	audience.	Each	candidate	stressed	in	initial	interviews	
the	importance	of	combating	corruption	and	a	total	rejection	of	money	politics	and	
vote‐buying.	By	following	the	progression	of	the	three	campaigns	from	their	
commencement	during	the	first	half	of	2013	through	to	the	election	on	9	April	2014,	I	
was	able	to	compare	how	candidates	were	influenced	by	external	factors.8	The	
candidates	responded	differently	to	the	pressures	placed	on	them	by	their	parties	and	
voters:	the	Hanura	candidate	seemingly	acquiesced	to	demands	for	goods	and	money	
and	began	to	downplay	anti‐corruption	symbols,	the	Nasdem	candidate	became	even	
more	fervent	in	his	anti‐corruption	and	anti‐vote‐buying	rhetoric,	while	the	Gerindra	
candidate	maintained	a	steady	course	in	his	use	of	anti‐corruption	symbols.		
	
Hanura,	East	Java	
When	I	first	met	the	Hanura	candidate	in	October	2012,	she	was	in	the	planning	
stages	of	her	bid	for	party	nomination.9	As	the	daughter	of	a	previous	member	of	the	
MPR	selected	by	former	President	Suharto,	she	had	worked	for	the	party	since	its	
inception,	having	known	and	respected	the	party	founder,	Wiranto,	for	some	time.	As	
she	explained	it,	her	father	had	been	in	the	military	at	the	same	time	as	Wiranto	and	
they	were	friends,	and	this	was	how	she	met	him.	Her	initial	motivation	for	joining	
the	party	was	her	support	for	Wiranto’s	presidential	bid.	She	described	Wiranto	as	
‘patient	and	wise’,	and	believed	he	could	lead	Indonesia	‘back	onto	the	track	of	
Reformasi’.	Her	support	for	Wiranto’s	presidential	bid	was,	therefore,	an	important	
motivation	for	becoming	a	Hanura	candidate,	rather	than	a	particular	affinity	with	the	
party’s	ideology	or	platform.	Her	impetus	for	running	for	office	also	stemmed	from	
her	family	history—she	had	observed	and	admired	her	father’s	work	when	he	was	a	
																																																													
7	For	example,	during	a	presentation	on	vote‐buying	in	Indonesia,	Aspinall	(2014b)	relayed	an	
anecdote	about	a	PAN	candidate	in	Rembang,	Central	Java,	who	sent	out	two	sets	of	envelopes	
to	voters.	He	distributed	12,000	envelopes	to	middle	class	voters	with	an	anti‐corruption	
message	enclosed	and	15,000	envelopes	to	other	voters	with	money	inside.	In	another	
example,	Muhajir	(Forthcoming:	203‐204)	discusses	the	campaign	of	some	PKS	candidates	in	
South	Kalimantan,	describing	that	while	candidates	made	a	show	of	refusing	to	buy	votes,	
there	were	suspicions	that	some	candidates	did	so	in	spite	of	this	rhetoric.	
8	See	the	Introduction	for	the	definition	of	‘campaign	period’	adopted	in	this	study.	
9	Hanura	opened	nominations	for	candidates	at	the	national	(DPR‐RI),	provincial	(DPRD	I)	and	
district	(DPRD	II)	levels	in	November	2012,	with	final	candidate	lists	submitted	to	the	KPU	in	
March	2013.	The	KPU	was	then	responsible	for	ensuring	that	candidates	met	all	the	necessary	
eligibility	criteria	for	participation	in	the	2014	election.	The	confirmed	list	of	approved	
candidates	was	released	by	the	KPU	in	May	2013.	
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parliamentarian.	The	candidate	did,	however,	highlight	a	number	of	issues	that	she	
supported	that	were	part	of	Hanura’s	image‐building,	including	its	stance	against	
corruption.	She	stated	that	Wiranto	had	identified	anti‐corruption	as	a	party	priority,	
both	for	maintaining	Hanura’s	integrity	and	in	presenting	itself	as	an	alternative	to	
the	current	leadership,	which	Hanura	claimed	was	thoroughly	corrupt.10	
	
At	the	outset	of	the	campaign,	the	Hanura	candidate	made	it	clear	that	she	believed	
that	being	‘clean’	was	very	important	for	the	party’s	campaign.	She	contended	that	
the	fundamental	aim	of	the	fight	against	corruption	was	to	improve	the	lives	of	
ordinary	people	and	that	eradicating	corruption	would	also	alleviate	poverty	in	
Indonesia.	The	candidate	acknowledged	that	it	was	crucial	that	Hanura	maintain	its	
anti‐corruption	reputation	because	this	differentiated	it	from	the	other	parties.	For	
her,	the	anti‐corruption	symbol	provided	a	point	of	difference,	and	the	party	would	be	
at	risk	if	this	symbol	was	co‐opted	by	candidates	who	then	engaged	in	corruption	and	
bribery	to	win	seats.	Because	anti‐corruption	symbolism	gave	the	party	a	crucial	
advantage,	ensuring	that	Hanura’s	reputation	was	upheld	by	party	members	and	
political	aspirants	was	a	party	priority.	The	Hanura	candidate	was	adamant	that	she	
was	against	buying	votes	and	using	bribes.11		
	
However,	while	the	candidate	felt	that	combating	corruption	was	both	a	party	
priority	and	useful	for	her	own	campaign,	she	was	apprehensive	about	explicitly	
using	the	term	‘anti‐corruption’.	During	my	first	site	visit	to	her	electorate	in	March	
2013,	she	discussed	concerns	about	the	terminology	used	in	her	campaign	materials	
at	some	length.	Some	of	her	campaign	team	were	worried	about	using	the	term	‘anti‐
corruption’,	and	suggested	that	the	candidate	instead	use	the	word	‘clean’—the	term	
used	in	the	party’s	official	slogan.	Presenting	herself	as	‘clean’,	rather	than	as	being	
‘anti‐corruption’,	was	preferable	as	it	was	seen	as	a	more	encompassing	term.	It	could	
refer	to	a	number	of	her	characteristics,	such	as	coming	from	a	modest	background,	
being	honest	and	hard‐working.	The	candidate	and	the	team	agreed	that	the	term	
																																																													
10	This	statement	was	reiterated	in	a	number	of	public	presentations	made	by	Wiranto.	For	
example,	in	his	initial	speeches	presented	in	early	2013,	there	were	repeated	references	to	
Hanura	being	the	‘cleanest’	party	in	Indonesia	(2013a;	2013b).	This	claim	was	framed	as	
legitimizing	Hanura’s	claim	to	power,	centring	on	its	distinction	from	the	current	leadership,	
which	it	claimed	was	corrupt	and	untrustworthy—a	claim	that	Wiranto	felt	Hanura	could	
afford	to	make	given	that	it	remained	in	opposition	throughout	the	2009‐2014	term	and	had	
no	parliamentarians	accused	of	corruption	during	this	period.	
11	It	was	possible	to	speculate,	though,	that	she	took	this	stance	because	she	felt	she	had	less	
funding	to	draw	on	than	several	of	her	competitors.	Even	if	she	had	wanted	to	flout	party	
symbols	and	give	money	for	votes,	she	simply	could	not	compete	with	wealthier	candidates.	
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‘anti‐corruption’	had	been	tainted	by	its	use	in	the	2009	election,	when	the	
Democratic	Party	used	‘say	no	to	corruption!’	as	its	national	campaign	slogan.	The	
Hanura	candidate	wanted	to	avoid	any	parallels	between	the	two	campaigns,	given	
the	subsequent	fate	of	the	Democrats.		
	
During	the	early	stages	of	campaign	planning,	the	Hanura	candidate	often	talked	of	
her	intention	to	conduct	a	clean	campaign,	regardless	of	these	debates	over	
terminology	and	the	identified	risks	of	using	such	symbolism.	She	had	run	for	office	in	
2009	and	therefore	knew	that	she	lacked	the	capital	to	effectively	use	vote‐buying	to	
win	office.	The	candidate	also	felt	that	vote‐buying	was	not	only	expensive,	but	had	an	
uncertain	return.	There	was	no	means	for	ensuring	that	people	actually	voted	as	they	
said	they	would	and	no	recourse	if	voters	took	the	money	but	voted	for	someone	else.	
Instead,	she	planned	to	focus	upon	building	a	positive	image	as	someone	committed	
to	public	welfare	while	supplementing	her	campaign	rhetoric	with	‘charitable	works’,	
such	as	purchasing	new	equipment	for	the	community	mosque,	donating	to	local	
schools,	and	bankrolling	entertainment	events.12	In	addition	to	giving	money	to	such	
causes,	the	candidate	often	subsidized	the	costs	of	food,	tea,	cigarettes	and	transport	
for	villagers	who	had	travelled	to	attend	meetings	(which	the	candidate	often	
referred	to	by	the	Arabic‐derived	term	silaturrahmi,	meaning	group	discussions	that	
are	intended	to	build	fraternity	or	affection	for	a	person	or	an	idea).	Payments	were	
sometimes	in	kind,	and	sometimes	in	small	amounts	of	cash	that	(at	least	in	theory)	
compensated	people	for	their	time	and	effort	in	attending.	
	
The	Hanura	candidate	did	not	consider	small	gifts	and	other	gratuities	to	be	a	form	of	
money	politics.13	These	gifts	were	secondary	to	her	main	aim	of	generating	support	
by	meeting	voters	personally,	and	her	primary	campaign	strategy	revolved	around	
village	visits.	While	time	consuming,	this	approach	circumvented	the	ban	on	mass	
rallies	outside	the	official	campaign	period.	The	Hanura	candidate	stated	that	she	was	
following	Jokowi’s	strategy	of	blusukan,	which	involved	walking	through	villages	and	
																																																													
12	Observation	of	conversations	between	the	Hanura	candidate,	her	staff	and	other	party	
members	showed	that	this	candidate	had	purchased	new	sound	systems	for	local	mosques,	
refurbished	the	washing	area	at	local	mosques,	provided	female	students	at	a	local	Islamic	
boarding	school	(pesantren)	with	new	headscarves,	ran	colouring‐in	competitions	at	local	
primary	schools	with	small	cash	prizes	for	winners,	purchased	new	percussion	instruments	
for	a	local	martial	arts	group	and	funded	a	shadow	puppet	(wayang)	performance.	
13	Aspinall	(2014a:	104)	found	that	there	were	a	number	of	commonly	distributed	gifts	during	
campaigns,	ranging	from	tokens	bearing	the	party	logo	and	the	candidate’s	picture,	religious	
gifts	such	as	prayer	mats	or	headscarves	to	basic	foodstuffs,	which	were	commonly	delivered	
by	the	candidate’s	campaign	team	rather	than	the	candidates	themselves.		
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talking	to	people	in	their	own	environments,	and	had	proven	popular	during	his	
tenure	as	both	mayor	of	Solo	and	governor	of	Jakarta.	The	Hanura	candidate	argued	
that,	as	many	Javanese	villagers	still	did	not	use	Twitter	or	Facebook,	campaigning	
through	social	media	was	better	directed	towards	urban	voters.	Even	television	and	
print	media	campaigns,	she	contended,	were	not	guaranteed	to	reach	many	of	the	
rural	constituents	and	so	could	be	a	waste	of	money.	She	therefore	opted	to	visit	her	
potential	constituents	where	she	could	present	herself,	answer	questions	and	hand	
out	trinkets,	t‐shirts	or	food.		
	
These	visits,	which	were	usually	set	up	in	advance	by	her	campaign	team	(often	
referred	to	in	Indonesia	as	tim	sukses),	varied	in	nature.14	Sometimes	they	were	brief	
and	confined	to	meetings	with	village	leaders	and	other	times	they	were	gatherings	
attended	by	up	to	50	people.	The	Hanura	candidate	would	usually	introduce	herself,	
highlight	her	links	to	the	area	and	the	fact	that	she	had	family	there,	and	discuss	her	
educational	background	(she	held	a	Master’s	Degree	and	taught	at	a	university	in	
Jakarta).	She	also	attempted	to	engage	with	villagers	in	order	to	discover	their	
‘aspirations’	(aspirasi),	hoping	to	build	trust	with	villagers	by	seeming	interested	in	
and	empathetic	towards	their	problems.	This	strategy	met	with	different	degrees	of	
success.	Sometimes	there	was	dialogue	between	the	candidate	and	the	attendees,	but	
on	other	occasions	attendees	were	unresponsive.	She	was	sometimes	met	with	
requests	for	money	or	services	to	the	village.	She	was	disappointed	by	these	
experiences.	On	other	occasions	she	suspected	that	the	unresponsiveness	was	due	to	
the	fact	that	the	village	had	already	been	‘bought’	by	another	candidate	and	was	
irritated	with	her	campaign	team	for	setting	up	a	pointless	meeting.	
	
In	spite	of	her	frustrations,	the	Hanura	candidate	continued	to	visit	villages	and	meet	
with	voters	in	these	forum‐style	events.	Sometimes	she	went	to	five	villages	in	one	
day,	focusing	particularly	on	those	in	more	remote	areas	that	were	unlikely	to	have	
been	visited	by	other	parliamentary	hopefuls.	Her	personal	philosophy	was	based	on	
an	old	Indonesian	saying:	‘If	you	don’t	know	them,	you	can’t	love	them’.	In	my	earliest	
interview	with	her,	she	argued	that	a	political	party	could	not	expect	support	without	
being	trusted,	or	having	a	‘mandate’	(amanat)	from	voters.	Talking	to	people	in	
person	was,	to	her	mind,	the	best	way	to	build	this	trust.	She	also	identified	this	as	a	
point	of	difference	between	Hanura	and	other	parties—Hanura	candidates	were	
																																																													
14	‘Tim	sukses’	has	also	been	translated	literally	as	‘campaign	team’	in	the	work	of	scholars	
such	as	Aspinall	(2014c:	546)	and	Mietzner	(2013).	
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willing	to	go	to	villages	and	engage	with	ordinary	voters,	unlike	officials	from	other	
parties	who	were	too	‘arrogant’	(sombong)	to	do	so.		
	
The	Hanura	candidate	focused	particularly	on	gaining	access	to	communities	through	
two	women’s	groups:	the	Family	Welfare	Development	(Pembinaan	Kesejahteraan	
Keluarga,	PKK),	a	locally	based	mothers’	association	which	was	established	during	the	
Suharto	period	and	usually	run	by	the	wife	of	the	village	head,15	and	Jemaah	Talil,	an	
Islamic	devotional	group	where	women	gather	to	sing/recite	passages	from	the	
Qur’an.	She	concentrated	on	women	for	two	reasons.	First,	the	candidate	believed	
that	women	often	feel	ignored	by	parliamentary	candidates	and,	therefore,	were	
more	likely	to	value	someone	showing	an	interest	in	their	concerns.	Second,	the	
candidate	said	that	she	sometimes	found	men	irritating	and	condescending.	During	
her	meetings	with	women’s	groups,	she	would	emphasize	‘women’s	spirit’	(semangat	
perempuan)	as	a	reason	for	voting	for	her,	arguing	that	women	understand	each	
other’s	problems	and	a	female	candidate	was	more	likely	to	sympathize	with	their	
priorities.	
	
In	the	early	stages	of	campaigning,	the	Hanura	candidate	used	meetings	with	citizens	
to	express	Hanura’s	party	line	on	corruption	and	vote‐buying—namely,	that	asking	
for	money	promotes	‘low‐quality	leadership’	(pemimpin	yang	kurang	berkualitas).	
This	argument	was	based	on	two	contentions.	First,	if	a	candidate	has	paid	money	to	
gain	their	position	then	they	will	have	spent	large	amounts	of	money	during	the	
campaign,	which	will	then	need	to	be	recouped	once	in	office.	Second,	if	a	candidate	
has	paid	voters	for	their	position	then	they	have	no	responsibility	to	voters	once	
elected	because	voters	have	already	been	compensated.	This	idea	was	advanced	to	
discourage	citizens	from	asking	for	or	expecting	money	in	return	for	votes.	It	also	
echoed	arguments	used	by	the	party’s	central	leadership,	playing	upon	the	party’s	
clean	reputation	and	its	purported	desire	to	remain	free	from	corruption.	She	also	
used	this	argument	to	emphasize	their	loyalty	to	voters—the	fact	that	she	did	not	
offer	money	was	a	demonstration	of	her	long‐term	commitment	because	she	intended	
to	deliver	benefits	to	citizens	by	doing	a	good	job	as	a	parliamentarian.16		
	
																																																													
15	For	more	on	the	history	and	work	of	PKK,	see	Marcoes	(2002).	
16	For	example,	she	had	declared	to	a	number	of	villagers	during	different	meetings	that	‘You	
shouldn’t	sell	yourselves	so	cheaply’	and	had	suggested	that	they	deserved	‘more	than	Rp.	
20,000	or	Rp.	50,000	for	your	votes’.	
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The	candidate	chose	to	adopt	Hanura’s	official	slogan—clean,	caring,	decisive	(bersih,	
peduli,	tegas)—as	her	own	slogan	during	the	campaign.	This	was	significant,	because	
Hanura	candidates	were	given	autonomy	in	designing	all	aspects	of	their	campaigns,	
including	all	their	publicity	materials.	There	was	no	directive	from	the	central	party	
office	requiring	the	use	of	a	particular	slogan	or	format.	As	such,	candidates	had	
control	over	the	image	they	wished	to	portray.	This	particular	candidate	gave	a	
number	of	reasons	for	choosing	to	directly	align	herself	with	national	party	symbols.	
First,	she	believed	that	in	using	the	official	party	slogan	and	pictures	of	Wiranto	on	
some	of	her	more	prominent	advertisements	(such	as	large	billboards);	she	was	
aligning	herself	as	closely	as	possible	with	the	values	of	the	party	and	the	figure	of	
Wiranto	himself.	She	saw	this	as	being	a	major	draw‐card,	explaining	that	one	of	the	
main	reasons	why	people	would	choose	Hanura	was	because	they	supported	
Wiranto’s	presidential	bid.	Second,	as	a	candidate	who	was	neither	independently	
wealthy	nor	wishing	to	go	into	debt,	she	felt	the	argument	that	buying	votes	
promoted	a	poor	level	of	parliamentary	representation	was	one	she	could	use	to	her	
advantage.	Third,	she	also	mentioned	that	it	was	a	claim	that	could	be	supported,	
citing	a	survey	undertaken	in	March	2013	that	named	Hanura	the	cleanest	political	
party	in	Indonesia.17	
	
Despite	her	initial	rejection	of	vote‐buying	as	a	strategy,	the	Hanura	candidate	came	
under	increasing	pressure	to	pay	cash	to	villagers	in	return	for	their	votes	as	the	
election	neared.	This	pressure	came	chiefly	from	members	of	her	campaign	team.	
Responding	to	internal	polling	done	in	the	second	half	of	2013	that	suggested	she	
would	not	secure	sufficient	votes	for	election,	some	within	her	campaign	team	urged	
the	use	of	cash	payments,	especially	to	village	heads	or	respected	figures	(tokoh)	who	
could	promise	a	number	of	votes	in	return	for	the	money.18	Many	members	of	her	
campaign	team	who	had	worked	on	various	other	elections,	either	the	national	
election	in	2009	or	other	local	elections,	argued	that	money	was	the	only	way	to	
secure	votes	in	the	area.	Because	vote‐buying	was	such	a	prominent	strategy	in	East	
Java,	some	team	members	were	concerned	that	if	she	refused	to	offer	cash	then	she	
had	no	chance	of	success	as	it	was	assumed	that	several	rival	candidates	would	do	so.	
																																																													
17	See	Chapter	Three	for	survey	details.		
18	People	capable	of	rallying	votes	are	sometimes	referred	to	as	‘brokers’.	The	campaign	team	
is	usually	comprised	of	at	least	some	vote	brokers,	people	of	influence	who	claim	to	be	able	to	
persuade	others	to	vote	for	a	particular	candidate.	The	phenomenon	of	using	brokers	was	
widespread	in	2014	and	brokers	wielded	significant	influence	over	campaigns	and	their	
successful	outcomes	(Aspinall	2014c).	
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As	one	team	member	put	it,	‘It	helps	if	people	like	you…	But	it’s	hard	[to	win]	if	
someone	else	is	offering	them	money’.		
	
These	suggestions	concerned	the	Hanura	candidate,	who	was	torn	between	her	desire	
to	maintain	her	principles	and	keep	her	campaign	budget	to	a	minimum	and	how	best	
to	win.	To	further	complicate	matters,	not	all	campaign	team	members	agreed	that	
using	cash	was	a	good	idea.	Most	had	no	moral	objections	to	vote‐buying;	rather,	they	
did	not	believe	it	would	be	an	effective	strategy	for	her.	They	also	reasoned	that	she	
lacked	the	local	ties	needed	to	win	using	money,	as	she	was	an	outsider	from	Jakarta.	
In	short,	even	if	she	chose	to	engage	in	vote‐buying,	she	could	not	be	certain	that	
those	she	paid	would	actually	vote	for	her.	Moreover,	she	had	already	told	voters	
during	meetings	that	asking	for	money	reflected	poorly	on	them	and	would	lead	to	
the	election	of	leaders	who	did	not	really	care	about	their	needs.	These	discussions	
highlighted	a	tension	within	her	campaign	that	worsened	as	the	election	drew	nearer.	
	
While	the	Hanura	candidate	focused	her	energy	on	blusukan,	she	also	adopted	other	
common	campaign	strategies.	In	August	2013,	a	few	months	into	campaigning,	a	
posko—akin	to	a	campaign	office	where	citizens	can	come	and	talk	to	the	candidate	or	
their	team—was	set	up.	Mass	rallies	were	used	later	during	the	official	campaign	
period.	Later	that	year,	she	purchased	space	in	some	local	media	outlets	and	
organized	to	have	positive	biographical	pieces	about	her	published.19	The	candidate	
lacked	connections	within	the	local	media	and	found	that	rival	candidates,	even	
within	her	own	party,	had	made	deals	with	certain	media	outlets	that	made	it	difficult	
for	her	to	advertise	in	them.	Consequently,	the	media	outlets	she	paid	were	small	and	
had	low	circulations.	At	the	beginning	of	2014,	the	Hanura	candidate	also	set	up	
Facebook	and	Twitter	accounts.	Though	she	had	previously	stated	that	she	was	wary	
of	using	social	media	in	her	campaign,	she	now	said	that	candidates	had	been	
encouraged	by	the	central	office	to	make	use	of	the	internet,	particularly	since	many	
services	were	free.	The	Hanura	candidate	was	not	especially	technologically	savvy,	so	
most	of	the	Facebook	updates,	tweets	and	photos	posted	were	handled	by	her	staff.		
	
There	were	some	occasions	when	the	Hanura	candidate	was	quizzed	directly	by	
audience	members	about	her	own	dedication	to	remaining	corruption‐free.	On	one	
																																																													
19	These	were	funded	by	the	party.	Though	she	had	been	reluctant	to	pay	for	media	stories	
about	herself,	she	had	received	money	from	the	central	office	specifically	to	do	so.	However,	
this	particular	strategy	was	not	overly	successful.	While	one	article	went	to	print,	another	did	
not,	being	purchased	in	a	magazine	that	subsequently	went	bankrupt	before	the	election.	
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such	occasion,	she	was	told	never	to	become	like	Angelina	Sondakh,	a	politician	who	
became	infamous	for	her	involvement	in	corruption	and	eventually	imprisoned,	an	
admonition	she	readily	agreed	to.	Other	times,	villagers	requested	payments	or	
favours,	implying	they	were	necessary	for	her	to	win	their	votes.	Veiled	requests	for	a	
‘contribution’	(kontribusi)	to	the	village	were	not	unusual	and	early	in	her	campaign	
the	Hanura	candidate	would	try	to	explain	why	she	could	not	provide	anything.	
She	argued	that	this	could	be	seen	as	a	type	of	vote‐buying	and	even	if	she	could	
afford	it,	it	would	still	be	wrong.	For	example,	during	one	meeting	in	March	2014	she	
was	asked	to	contribute	money	to	a	PKK	to	start	a	new	training	program.	She	refused,	
saying	that	unfortunately	she	could	not	do	this	because	she	was	afraid	people	would	
think	she	was	buying	their	votes.	Later	she	expressed	annoyance	at	the	request	as	she	
believed	that	the	village	was	fairly	well	off	and	the	women	did	not	really	need	training	
and	were	just	fishing	for	money.	On	yet	another	occasion,	she	was	asked	what	her	
contribution	to	the	village	would	be.20	The	candidate	responded	by	asserting	that	
candidates	who	spend	lots	of	money	on	their	campaigns	and	have	to	get	loans	will	
have	to	resort	to	corruption	to	pay	their	debts	because	the	salaries	of	
parliamentarians	are	not	that	big.	This	statement	was	initially	welcomed	by	the	
women’s	group	being	addressed,	but	the	discussion	changed	course	when	a	different	
woman	asked	if	the	candidate	might	consider	donating	money	so	they	could	purchase	
new	uniforms.	This	request	was	deflected	with	the	rationale	that	she	was	a	clean,	
simple	candidate	who	did	not	have	lots	of	money	like	some	of	her	rivals	and	she	could	
not	afford	to	contribute	much	money.	Furthermore,	she	argued	that	if	she	bought	
uniforms	for	one	group,	she	would	have	to	buy	them	for	all	groups.	In	making	this	
statement,	she	used	the	opportunity	to	highlight	the	fact	that	she	was	not	a	corrupt	
candidate,	and	also	that	she	had	a	sense	of	fairness.	However,	after	leaving	the	
meeting,	she	expressed	irritation	at	the	request	and	said	that	she	felt	that	the	women	
would	not	vote	for	her	because	they	had	not	received	anything	from	her.		
	
After	campaigning	for	several	months,	the	candidate	had	become	cynical	about	the	
motives	of	voters.	Having	been	repeatedly	asked	for	contributions,	both	subtly	and	
overtly,	the	candidate	began	to	express	a	sense	of	hopelessness	about	her	campaign	
towards	the	end	of	2013.	She	believed	that	presenting	herself	as	a	clean	and	honest	
candidate	was	not	appealing	to	voters	because	they	were	more	interested	in	the	
material	benefits	offered	by	candidates.	Subsequently,	the	Hanura	candidate	referred	
																																																													
20	The	candidate	adopted	a	chiding	tone	during	this	interaction	on	6	June	2013	but	agreed	to	
contribute	Rp.	500,000	to	the	local	mosque.	
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to	the	topic	of	corruption	less	and	less	frequently.	If	she	was	asked	about	it	by	a	
villager	she	would	methodically	rehash	Hanura’s	‘tagline’	(which	was	also	her	own)	of	
being	‘clean,	caring	and	decisive’.	However,	even	when	given	the	opportunity	to	talk	
in	more	depth	about	being	‘clean’,	the	candidate	did	not	choose	to	focus	on	this	
symbol.	The	explanation	she	gave	in	villages	about	being	‘clean’	was	as	
straightforward	as	saying:	‘our	party	wants	honest	candidates	and	won’t	tolerate	
members	who	are	not	honest	…	that	like	to	“play	games”	(main‐main)’.	In	a	different	
village	she	explained	being	‘clean’	as	meaning	‘we	don’t	have	candidates	who	are	…	
like	that	(seperti	gitu)’,	but	provided	no	elaboration.21	Her	discussion	of	the	party	and	
its	stance	against	corruption	became	increasingly	vague	as	her	interest	in	promoting	
herself	as	being	aligned	with	Hanura’s	anti‐corruption	symbol	diminished.	
	
As	the	election	approached,	the	Hanura	candidate’s	references	to	corruption	
diminished	significantly.	By	the	time	of	the	official	campaign	period,	she	had	
developed	a	formulaic	approach	to	meetings	that	often	involved	a	similar,	rehearsed	
introduction	which	included	no	mention	of	any	anti‐corruption	stance,	either	as	an	
individual	or	from	a	party	perspective.	Even	in	discussing	Hanura,	her	focus	was	upon	
the	party’s	leader	rather	than	its	goals	or	policies.	By	this	stage,	the	Hanura	candidate	
felt	that	rhetoric	would	not	persuade	voters	and	the	most	important	aspect	of	her	
meetings	was	providing	instructions	on	how	to	vote,	including	where	her	name	was	
on	the	ballot	paper	and	how	to	avoid	casting	an	invalid	vote.	She	even	developed	a	tip	
to	help	voters	remember	her.	Since	she	was	the	first‐ranked	candidate	for	Hanura,	
she	suggested	that	voters	think	of	the	shape	of	a	nail,	which	Indonesian	voters	use	to	
pierce	their	ballot	papers,	as	resembling	a	number	‘1’	to	remind	them	that	she	was	
the	‘number	1’	candidate.		
	
While	her	focus	on	anti‐corruption	symbols	diminished	over	the	course	of	the	
campaign,	the	candidate’s	strategic	donations	to	mosques,	school	and	arts	groups,	as	
well	as	funding	village	works,	increased.	The	Hanura	candidate	became	less	
concerned	about	upholding	a	‘clean’	symbol	and	increased	contributions,	even	though	
she	was	uncomfortable	about	them.	Usually,	members	of	her	campaign	team	would	
scout	areas	to	find	institutions	or	schools	that	could	benefit	from	additional	funds	and	
then	negotiate	with	the	leaders	of	the	areas	to	arrange	a	donation	in	return	for	
electoral	support.	Alternatively,	they	would	approach	local	figures	and	ask	them	how	
																																																													
21	These	comments	were	both	made	on	the	same	day	(11	March	2014)	when	the	candidate	
visited	four	different	villages.	
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the	candidate	could	help	the	village—that	is,	to	what	purpose	could	she	donate	
money.22	The	candidate’s	discomfort	with	these	transactions	reflected	the	fact	that	
she	saw	this	as	a	grey	area	and	was	worried	about	how	her	actions	would	be	
perceived	by	onlookers.	While	donations	could	be	justified	as	acts	of	charity,	if	they	
were	given	with	the	intention	to	influence	voting,	then	this	was,	technically,	illegal.	
	
The	candidate	was	wary	of	her	budget	limitations,	and	sought	to	strategically	donate	
for	maximum	return.	A	big	budget,	she	asserted,	provided	a	distinct	advantage	when	
campaigning	because	it	could	fund	several	different	projects	and	if	one	group	did	not	
vote	for	you,	other	groups	would.	She	could	not	afford	donations	that	did	not	result	in	
votes.	One	donation	made	by	the	Hanura	candidate	was	to	a	local	traditional	martial	
arts	(pencak	silat)	group	who	performed	at	public	events.	The	rationale	behind	this	
donation	was	that	it	would	give	her	ties	to	the	group,	enabling	her	to	ask	them	to	
perform	at	her	functions	when	the	official	campaign	period	began.	However,	other	
donations	appeared	to	be	less	successful.	She	made	a	substantial	donation	to	an	
Islamic	boarding	school	(pesantren).	However,	during	a	later	meeting	with	the	
school’s	leader,	the	Hanura	candidate	was	disappointed	to	find	that	the	school	and	
village	were	flying	banners	and	flags	from	another	political	party.	The	preacher	
explained	that	the	village	chief	had	a	family	member	competing	in	the	election	and	
there	was	nothing	he	could	do	about	the	banners.	After	the	meeting,	the	candidate	
expressed	her	frustration	that	her	donation	appeared	not	to	have	garnered	the	
influence	she	had	hoped	for	and	worried	that	she	had	wasted	her	campaign	funds.	On	
another	occasion,	the	Hanura	candidate	agreed	to	use	her	own	money	to	finance	the	
provision	of	a	new	piping	system	for	a	village	in	return	for	their	support.	At	the	time,	
the	candidate	justified	the	upfront	donation	as	a	good	strategy	because	people	were	
used	to	unfulfilled	promises	from	politicians.		
	
Another	common	campaign	strategy	was	to	team	up	with	other	candidates	from	the	
same	party	who	were	competing	at	other	parliamentary	levels.	This	is	often	referred	
to	using	the	English	word	‘tandem’,	meaning	to	campaign	together,	sometimes	with	
names	appearing	on	the	same	posters	or	banners,	and	sharing	the	cost	of	rallies.	In	
this	East	Java	electorate,	there	had	been	much	in‐fighting	between	local	candidates,	
precipitated	by	contested	nominations	and	rankings	on	the	party	list.	The	Hanura	
candidate	herself	had	displaced	a	sitting	parliamentarian,	who	was	moved	to	another	
																																																													
22	The	language	used	when	discussing	this	topic	was	euphemistic.	No	one	ever	referred	to	this	
process	as	‘vote‐buying’.	The	payments	were	always	referred	to	vaguely	as	‘contributions’	or	
‘donations’	(donasi).	
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electorate.	This	had	caused	consternation	and	factionalism,	as	the	incumbent	had	
several	family	members	in	the	party	who	disagreed	with	the	party	list	rankings.	This	
friction	alienated	the	candidate	from	some	factions	within	the	party.	However,	as	the	
election	date	drew	closer	it	became	evident	that	Hanura	was	polling	poorly	and	that	
cooperation	was	needed	if	the	party	was	to	win	any	seats	at	all.	This	prompted	the	
Hanura	candidate	to	reach	out	to	candidates	at	the	DPRD	II	(district)	level.	She	
already	had	some	tandem	agreements	with	other	candidates	in	place,	but	they	were	
lowly	ranked	and	poorly	funded.	The	candidate	needed	to	find	a	more	lucrative	
tandem	arrangement	through	which	to	better	promote	herself	during	the	crucial	last	
weeks	of	campaigning.	She	entered	into	an	arrangement	with	an	incumbent	who	
came	from	a	wealthy	family	and	had	a	high	profile	in	her	district.	Through	this	
arrangement	she	was	able	to	piggyback	on	a	better‐funded	campaign,	but	was	also	
expected	to	contribute	more	money	than	she	would	normally	spend.	The	events	of	
her	tandem	partners	were	much	more	lavish	than	her	own	events	had	been,	and	she	
was	obliged	to	contribute	to	the	cost	of	marching	bands,	dancers,	singers	and	other	
entertainment,	as	well	as	the	usual	payments	to	attendees	for	food	and	travel	costs.	
She	was	also	required	to	purchase	several	motorcycles	and	a	refrigerator	requested	
as	‘door	prizes’	at	their	shared	rallies.		
	
As	the	campaign	drew	to	a	close,	the	Hanura	candidate	admitted	that	her	strategies	
had	changed	over	time	and	that	her	emphasis	on	being	clean	had	diminished.	She	
gave	several	reasons	for	this.	First,	she	had	found	that	corruption	was	an	
uncomfortable	issue	to	discuss	publicly	(nggak	enak	dibahas).	Everybody	knew	what	
corruption	was	and	there	was	no	point	in	bringing	it	up—people	could	see	that	she	
was	not	corrupt	simply	because	she	did	not	seek	to	buy	their	votes.	Second,	it	was	an	
awkward	subject	because	she	believed	most	people	actually	did	want	to	be	bribed.	
She	feared	alienating	them	by	talking	about	anti‐corruption	issues	or	money	politics,	
making	them	feel	guilty	and	her	unpopular.	Third,	people	thought	all	politicians	were	
corrupt	in	some	way	and	found	it	hard	to	believe	that	candidates	genuinely	cared	
about	fighting	corruption.	In	other	words,	she	believed	that	talking	about	corruption	
alienated	voters	and	made	her	seem	like	a	hypocrite.	As	a	consequence,	anti‐
corruption	symbolism	became	something	of	a	defensive	tool	for	the	Hanura	
candidate;	a	discourse	used	to	counter	requests	for	money	or	goods	that	she	was	not	
willing	to	give.	She	lamented	in	an	observation	that	underscored	the	cynicism	with	
which	many	view	the	electoral	process,	‘even	a	blind	person	here	can	still	read	
money’.		
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Ultimately,	the	Hanura	candidate	pulled	back	from	using	anti‐corruption	symbolism	
in	her	campaign	because	she	felt	that	voters	did	not	really	connect	with	the	issue.	
During	a	post‐election	interview	in	April	2014,	she	observed	that:	‘anti‐corruption	
doesn’t	mean	anything	to	those	people	...	they	don’t	care’.	She	added	that	parties	tried	
their	best	to	avoid	being	corrupt,	but	it	was	just	an	‘intellectual	exercise’	because	
there	is	a	market	for	votes	and	voters	demand	money.	Expectations	of	being	paid	in	
exchange	for	votes	were	too	strong	in	East	Java	and	too	hard	to	fight.	Contemplating	
her	experiences,	the	Hanura	candidate	described	the	campaign	as	‘unfair’	(nggak	fair)	
and	‘a	mess’	(kacau)	because	it	was	all	about	‘playing	games’	(main‐mainan):		
	
Every	election	is	like	a	party	(pesta).	People	want	a	present.	The	people	who	
take	the	money,	they	aren’t	taking	any	risks	…	who’s	going	to	arrest	them?	It’s	
the	people	who	give	the	money	who	get	blamed	…	the	candidates.	
	
She	thought	Indonesia	was	not	ready	for	a	clean	election,	since	even	some	of	her	own	
staff	urged	her	to	buy	votes	on	the	eve	of	the	election	(ngebom).23	Reflecting	on	her	
loss,	the	Hanura	candidate	opined	that	her	electorate	did	not	support	clean	
candidates	and	that	the	election	had	reinforced	money	politics.	Commenting	on	the	
issue	in	general	terms,	she	observed:	
	 	
In	newspapers	there	are	always	comments	about	elites	paying	[for	votes],	but	
they	are	quiet	about	the	other	side	of	the	story.	No	one	ever	writes	about	what	
people	demand	from	candidates.	But	it’s	the	truth	…	why	would	anybody	pay	
[for	votes]	if	they	didn’t	have	to?	
	
The	experience	was	a	bitter	one	for	the	candidate.	She	felt	forced	to	go	against	her	
own	values	in	the	campaign	and	was	still	unsuccessful	in	her	bid	for	parliament.	Her	
cynicism	towards	the	electoral	process	underscored	her	overall	frustration	that	vote‐
buying	still	played	a	crucial	role	in	the	election,	and	that	candidates	with	large	coffers	
had	a	distinct	advantage.	
	
																																																													
23	One	of	the	candidate’s	staff	reported	that	they	had	been	asked	to	withdraw	Rp.	200	million	
on	8	April	2014	(the	day	before	the	election)	and	distribute	it	to	members	of	the	candidate’s	
campaign	team	(personal	communication,	Hanura	campaign	team	staffer,	8	March	2014).	This	
suggests	that	the	candidate	may	have	reneged	on	her	resolve	not	to	buy	votes	with	cash.	
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Nasdem,	South	Sulawesi	
My	first	meeting	with	the	Nasdem	candidate	took	place	in	May	2013.	As	noted	earlier,	
he	had	joined	Nasdem	earlier	that	year	after	resigning	from	parliament,	where	he	had	
represented	a	different	political	party.	The	candidate	felt	he	needed	to	explain	this	
move	because	allegations	of	politicians	switching	parties	because	they	think	it	will	
improve	their	chance	of	success	are	common	in	Indonesia	and	he	did	not	want	to	be	
accused	of	acting	out	of	self‐interest.	Such	moves	are	often	criticized	as	being	self‐
serving	and	devoid	of	ideological	conviction.	He	stressed	that	the	decision	had	been	
very	difficult	but	he	felt	his	previous	party	had	not	supported	his	stance	on	a	number	
of	issues.	In	joining	Nasdem,	the	candidate	sought	to	return	to	parliament	with	a	
party	that	he	believed	was	more	committed	to	improving	the	country	and	a	
leadership	that	was	more	genuine	in	its	intentions.	Nasdem’s	stated	pledge	to	change	
the	lot	of	ordinary	Indonesians	was	something	the	candidate	both	related	to	and	
believed	in.	While	he	knew	he	would	be	criticized	for	defecting,	he	felt	it	was	a	risk	
worth	taking.	The	candidate’s	explanation	for	joining	Nasdem	was	indicative	of	the	
discourse	and	symbolism	he	would	use	throughout	his	campaign.	
	
The	Nasdem	candidate	was	a	senior	party	official	and	a	member	of	the	central	party	
committee	responsible	for	overseeing	the	nation‐wide	electoral	campaign.	While	
Nasdem	had	made	use	of	anti‐corruption	symbols,	the	party’s	national	campaign	
focused	more	upon	broader	themes	of	change	(perubahan)	and	restoration	
(restorasi),	playing	to	the	party’s	newness.24	However,	the	candidate	strongly	
supported	anti‐corruption	issues	as	a	key	plank	of	the	party’s	platform.	This	fit	well	
with	his	own	background	as	an	activist.	Having	been	involved	in	the	protests	against	
Suharto	in	1998	and	having	worked	as	a	journalist,	he	decided	that	being	an	activist	
was	not	enough	and	resolved	to	try	to	change	the	system	from	within.	His	speeches	
during	rallies	drew	on	this	narrative.	Nasdem	was	committed	to	change,	just	as	he	
was,	and	he	was	convinced	it	would	support	his	efforts	to	fight	corruption	if	elected.		
	
Throughout	his	campaign,	the	candidate	leveraged	his	past	to	justify	his	use	of	anti‐
corruption	symbols.	According	to	his	narrative,	he	was	unlike	other	candidates,	who	
were	primarily	interested	in	being	elected	for	their	own	personal	profit,	whether	
money	or	prestige.	In	speeches	to	voters,	he	repeatedly	discussed	his	experience	in	
the	DPR‐RI,	claiming	that	he	had	left	his	former	party	because,	amongst	other	
																																																													
24	As	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	Nasdem’s	advertising	billed	the	party	as	a	movement	
to	restore	the	spirit	of	the	1945	constitution	in	Indonesia.	
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reasons,	he	did	not	want	to	betray	the	people.	He	had	felt	like	a	traitor	for	accepting	
the	salary	and	perks	of	parliamentary	office	while	not	being	able	to	fight	for	what	he	
believed	in.	Referring	to	himself	satirically	as	‘stupid’	for	leaving	the	large,	secure	
salary	and	lifestyle	of	a	DPR‐RI	member,	he	said	he	would	rather	resign	than	be	part	
of	‘a	dirty	place	…	full	of	corruptors	and	traitors’.	In	doing	so,	he	positioned	his	
actions	as	evidence	of	his	commitment	to	the	people:	he	was	so	disgusted	by	the	
behaviour	and	priorities	of	other	parliamentarians	that	he	simply	could	not	be	one	of	
them,	even	if	it	was	a	comfortable	job.	By	contrast,	he	argued	that	Nasdem	was	
different	and	its	members	would	do	their	utmost	to	work	for	the	people	rather	than	
for	personal	gain.	
	
The	Nasdem	candidate	also	mobilized	anti‐corruption	symbolism	in	stressing	his	
commitment	to	agitating	for	the	resolution	of	the	Bank	Century	case,	using	this	
commitment	both	as	proof	of	his	track	record	against	corruption	and	as	a	future	
promise.25	The	candidate	had,	during	his	time	in	the	DPR‐RI,	crusaded	to	have	the	
Bank	Century	case	investigated	further,	working	to	keep	it	in	the	media	spotlight	and	
finding	new	evidence	relating	to	the	case,	which	he	presented	to	the	KPK.26	His	
campaign	rhetoric	and	paraphernalia	drew	heavily	upon	his	involvement	in	the	
investigations,	including	in	his	campaign	slogan.	In	demonstrating	a	prior	
commitment	to	fighting	corruption,	for	which	he	had	made	sacrifices,	he	believed	he	
would	have	an	advantage	over	competitors	who	lacked	experience	or	evidence	of	
ongoing	engagement	in	anti‐corruption	efforts.	He	also	hoped	his	dedication	to	the	
case	would	make	him	seem	trustworthy.	He	conceded	that	anti‐corruption	symbols	
might	not	appeal	to	most	voters	because	money	politics	was	still	very	influential	in	
South	Sulawesi.	But,	he	argued,	those	not	swayed	by	financial	benefit	would	be	more	
inclined	to	vote	for	somebody	like	him,	who	had	proven	his	commitment.	He	was	
targeting	these	people	with	his	campaigning.	
	
																																																													
25	Nasdem’s	focus	on	this	particular	corruption	case	was	discussed	in	Chapter	Four.	
26	This	new	evidence	was	given	to	him	by	an	unnamed	source,	but	it	was	he	who	officially	
presented	it	to	the	KPK.	Its	contents	were	never	revealed,	but	the	candidate	maintained	that	
the	documents	would	help	the	KPK	to	prosecute	those	involved	in	Centurygate.	It	is	possible	
that	this	was	more	a	media	stunt	than	the	submission	of	beneficial	evidence	for	the	
investigation.	
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Because	the	candidate’s	campaign	symbols	drew	so	heavily	on	his	personal	history,	
he	rarely	discussed	other	aspects	of	Nasdem’s	platform	in	his	public	appearances.27	
When	he	did	discuss	the	party	more	broadly,	he	drew	parallels	between	its	status	as	
an	emerging	party,	and	its	need	to	be	‘brave’	and	‘unyielding’	in	its	approach	to	policy.	
He	used	the	example	of	‘attacks’	against	the	KPK—by	DPR‐RI	members	who	wished	
to	curtail	its	authority,	particularly	limiting	its	surveillance	powers—and	asserted	
that	Nasdem	was	not	afraid	to	vigorously	oppose	such	moves.	In	the	candidate’s	view,	
Nasdem	could	not	ignore	corruption,	and	making	it	a	core	election	issue	was	both	
strategic	and	necessary.	He	argued	that	because	Nasdem	was	a	new	party,	its	
candidates	had	to	work	harder	to	convince	voters	not	only	that	they	were	serious	
about	fighting	corruption,	but	also	that	they	were	more	serious	than	candidates	from	
other	parties.	
	
In	many	ways,	the	candidate’s	use	of	anti‐corruption	symbols	was	more	prominent	
than	the	party’s.	He	spoke	often	about	the	negative	impact	of	corruption	in	his	
speeches,	reflecting	his	personal	opinion	that	was	the	single	biggest	threat	to	
Indonesian	democracy.	The	Nasdem	candidate’s	campaign	rhetoric	was	much	more	
individualized	than	that	of	the	Hanura	candidate,	portraying	himself	as	a	change.28	
The	need	to	present	Nasdem	(and,	by	extension,	himself)	as	even	more	
uncompromisingly	against	corruption	that	other	emerging	party	rivals,	Hanura	and	
Gerindra,	was	also	something	that	he	considered	when	determining	how	to	present	
himself:		
	
We	have	to	learn	from	Hanura	and	Gerindra	in	parliament	…	they	have	no	
corruption	cases	against	them	and	we	can	learn	from	that	…	[But]	as	the	
newest	party,	we	have	to	aim	higher	[than	Hanura	and	Gerindra],	be	more	
thorough	and	more	disciplined	about	it	…	if	we	breach	it	even	once,	we’ll	be	
finished.	I	think	other	parties	have	already	felt	the	effect	of	that.	
	
																																																													
27	For	example,	Nasdem’s	slogan	in	the	2014	election	was	‘the	restoration	of	Indonesia’	
(restorasi	Indonesia),	claiming	that	the	DPR‐RI	had	become	too	powerful	and	calling	for	a	
return	to	the	1945	constitution.	This	included	advocating	for	stronger	executive	powers,	
giving	the	president	control	over	the	police	and	dispensing	with	direct	elections	at	the	district	
and	town	level.	While	this	was	part	of	the	party’s	central	platform,	front	and	centre	in	party	
advertising	and	on	the	Nasdem	website,	these	aspects	of	party	policy	were	never	mentioned	
during	any	of	the	campaign	activities	I	witnessed.	
28	In	contrast	to	the	Hanura	candidate,	the	Nasdem	candidate	rarely	spoke	about	the	leader	of	
Nasdem,	Surya	Paloh,	or	made	any	mention	of	the	party’s	presidential	aspirations,	relying	
much	more	on	selling	his	own	persona.	
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Besides	acknowledging	that	any	corruptions	scandals	within	the	party	would	be	
dangerous,	the	Nasdem	candidate	also	asserted	that	Nasdem	was	stricter	than	most	
other	parties	in	trying	to	ensure	candidates	did	not	violate	party	rules	or	the	law.29	In	
the	candidate’s	opinion,	any	party	member	accused	of	corruption	should	be	
immediately	expelled	and	only	be	reinstated	if	their	name	was	cleared.30	Even	if	there	
were	subsequent	indications	of	their	innocence,	the	party	could	not	afford	to	be	
undermined	by	any	suspicion.	The	Nasdem	candidate	explained	that	as	a	new	party,	
these	mechanisms	for	dealing	with	corruption	allegations	had	not	been	tested,	but	he	
was	in	favour	of	being	strict	and	‘merciless’	(tanpa	ampun).	
	
While	the	funding	he	received	from	Nasdem	to	conduct	his	campaign	covered	most	of	
his	costs,	the	candidate	generally	aimed	to	minimize	spending,	and	to	avoid	using	his	
own	funds.	His	former	career	as	a	journalist	gave	him	access	to	local	media,	which	he	
used	to	build	a	positive	image	of	himself,	Nasdem	and	its	other	candidates.	Coming	
from	Nasdem,	he	also	had	direct	access	to	national	and	local	media	outlets	owned	by	
Surya	Paloh.	During	the	official	campaign	period	he	was	followed	by	a	television	crew	
from	Metro	TV,	who	recorded	footage	and	reports	for	broadcast	on	local	television.	
He	also	participated	in	televised	debates,	which	helped	him	to	further	cement	his	
media	profile.	In	addition,	he	campaigned	via	Facebook	and	Twitter,	tweeting	daily	
(often	more	than	once)	and	answering	questions	posed	by	his	followers.	His	
Facebook	page	was	less	active,	but	staff	would	upload	photos	from	his	campaigning	
activities	every	few	days.31	
	
Like	other	candidates,	the	Nasdem	candidate	also	made	strategic	donations,	most	
commonly	to	local	mosques.	He	claimed	that	he	would	not	make	payments	to	
individuals	(even	for	a	charitable	cause)	or	to	village	projects,	because	it	was	too	easy	
for	individuals	to	embezzle	the	funds.	Fearing	that	he	might	be	perceived	as	engaging	
in	money	politics,	he	diligently	checked	receipts	for	services	and	goods	(though	he	
acknowledged	that	these	were	easily	forged).	Gift‐giving	was	also	a	sensitive	issue	for	
																																																													
29	The	selection	of	candidates,	according	to	a	Nasdem	member,	carefully	considered	the	
background	of	potential	candidates,	claiming	that	some	had	been	rejected	because	the	party	
could	not	ascertain	exactly	how	they	had	gained	their	wealth	(interview	with	Nasdem	central	
committee	member,	23	May	2013).	
30	Party	rules	were,	in	fact,	more	flexible,	with	members	accused	of	corruption	being	given	the	
opportunity	to	present	their	case	to	an	internal	committee	that	decided,	along	with	the	party	
executive,	whether	the	member	should	be	suspended	or	expelled.	
31	The	Nasdem	candidate’s	Facebook	page	actually	became	much	more	active	in	the	lead‐up	to	
the	presidential	election,	in	which	Nasdem	opted	to	publicly	back	Jokowi	and	Jusuf	Kalla	for	
president	and	vice‐president.	
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the	candidate,	who	did	take	part	in	the	usual	campaign	activities	of	giving	out	t‐shirts	
and	other	memorabilia,	providing	food	and	organizing	events,	including	a	traditional	
Javanese	puppet	performance	for	Javanese	migrants	in	his	electorate,	and	a	soccer	
clinic	for	young	boys	in	his	hometown.		
	
The	Nasdem	candidate	undertook	these	activities	reluctantly,	and	when	asked	why	he	
did	so,	he	responded	that	it	was	expected	and	that	he	would	not	like	to	lose	because	
of	a	‘trivial	thing	like	not	giving	away	t‐shirts’.	To	his	mind,	the	campaign	should	focus	
on	demonstrating	his	commitment	to	improving	the	lot	of	ordinary	people.	In	one	
address	to	a	local	party	branch	office,	he	became	irate	because	he	felt	that	his	
campaign	staff	were	failing	to	‘sell’	him	to	local	voters.	He	was	annoyed	to	see	
members	of	his	campaign	team	simply	giving	out	t‐shirts	and	walking	away.	This	did	
not	meet	his	expectations	that	they	would	use	their	interaction	with	voters	to	
promote	his	policies	and	ideas.	In	the	same	meeting,	the	Nasdem	candidate	reiterated	
that	money	politics	was	completely	against	his	ethos	and	urged	his	staff	to	report	any	
suspicious	behaviour	on	the	part	of	other	Nasdem	candidates	so	that	he	could	have	
them	dismissed	from	the	party.	He	also	asked	that	details	of	violations	by	candidates	
from	rival	parties	be	conveyed	to	the	national	Election	Supervisory	Board	(Badan	
Pengawas	Pemilu,	Bawaslu).		
	
The	Nasdem	candidate’s	use	of	meetings,	and	later	rallies,	followed	a	typical	
campaign	trajectory.	However,	due	to	his	seniority	in	the	party,	he	was	forced	to	
divide	his	time	between	local	campaigning	and	national	level	commitments.	The	
candidate	therefore	relied	greatly	on	local	staff	members	and	his	campaign	team	to	
campaign	on	his	behalf.	Like	the	Hanura	candidate,	he	believed	that	the	optimal	
campaign	strategy	was	to	meet	and	converse	with	voters	directly,	even	though	it	was	
time‐consuming.	The	sizes	of	the	meetings	varied,	usually	between	15	and	50	people,	
and	were	relaxed:	he	wanted	to	avoid	lavish,	formal	events	in	order	to	promote	his	
image	as	‘one	of	the	people’.	He	also	explained	that	he	preferred	non‐formal	settings	
because	they	made	it	easier	for	him	to	‘connect’	with	voters.	The	Nasdem	candidate	
met	with	voters	in	mosques,	at	people’s	houses	or	at	his	own	posko.		
	
In	contrast	to	the	Hanura	candidate,	whose	use	of	anti‐corruption	symbolism	waned	
over	time,	the	Nasdem	candidate’s	personal	pledge	to	continue	to	fight	corruption	
gained	increased	visibility	during	the	official	campaign	period.	His	views	on	
corruption	did	not	need	to	be	solicited	through	questions	from	the	audience;	he	
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invariably	shared	them	without	prompting.	At	meetings	with	voters,	the	candidate	
presented	his	ideas	on	government	and	encouraged	audience	members	to	share	their	
concerns	and	aspirations	with	him.	Because	he	was	a	known	anti‐corruption	
campaigner,	instances	of	alleged	local	corruption	were	sometimes	raised	during	these	
meetings.	For	example,	one	villager	complained	that	the	village	chief	had	made	a	deal	
with	a	private	company	to	set	up	an	irrigation	system	for	crops.	In	return,	villagers	
had	to	give	15	per	cent	of	their	crops	(or	cash	equivalent)	to	the	company,	and	they	
were	required	to	buy	all	their	fertilizer	from	it.	The	company	was	owned	by	a	local	
district	parliamentarian,	who	was	exploiting	the	villagers	by	marking	up	the	cost	of	
fertilizer.	The	Nasdem	candidate	responded	passionately	to	this	story,	saying	that	it	
was	clearly	a	case	of	rent‐seeking.	He	encouraged	the	villagers	to	share	the	story	with	
neighbours	and	friends	to	prevent	the	owner	from	gaining	re‐election	and	also	to	
document	the	case	so	that	he	could	report	the	village	head	to	the	authorities.	His	
response	was	received	positively	by	villagers,	who	were	pleased	that	someone	in	
power	would	take	the	time	to	listen	to	their	complaints	and	lobby	on	their	behalf.	
	
As	this	example	suggests,	the	Nasdem	candidate	was	certainly	not	afraid	to	condemn	
(perceived)	money	politics	when	he	saw	it.	On	one	occasion	in	July	2013,	meeting	his	
team	members	in	a	five‐star	hotel	in	Makassar,	he	discovered	that	a	rival	from	
another	party	was	hosting	a	‘workshop’	for	district	heads	(bupati)	at	the	conference	
centre	of	the	hotel.	This	rival	candidate	had	paid	for	district	heads	from	all	over	his	
electorate	to	come	to	Makassar,	accommodating	them	in	the	hotel.	When	the	Nasdem	
candidate	discovered	this,	he	was	outraged	and	expressed	his	frustration	to	some	of	
his	team	members.	He	claimed	that	the	lavish	trip	was	clearly	an	attempt	to	win	
favour	with	the	bupati	and	that	if	the	meeting	was	just	to	discuss	local	issues	then	
there	was	no	need	to	hold	it	in	such	an	expensive	hotel.	At	one	point,	he	recognized	
some	of	the	bupati	and	confronted	them	in	the	hotel	lobby.	He	told	them,	in	full	public	
view,	that	he	hoped	they	were	ashamed	to	be	accepting	favours	from	a	man	who	
wanted	to	use	them	to	get	votes.	He	urged	them	to	think	about	the	villagers	and	what	
was	best	for	them,	not	who	would	give	the	most	nights	in	a	fancy	hotel.	The	
confrontation	was	awkward	and	the	targeted	bupatis	did	not	defend	themselves	
against	his	accusations.	He	told	them	that	if	they	sold	themselves	for	money	they	
risked	losing	their	dignity,	and	were	traitors	to	the	nation.	
	
Once	the	official	campaign	period	began,	the	Nasdem	candidate	focused	on	attending	
large	rallies—both	his	own	and	those	of	other	Nasdem	contenders—at	which	he	
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introduced	and	endorsed	other	candidates.	Though	he	claimed	not	to	enjoy	them,	he	
felt	that	they	were	more	effective	for	broadcasting	his	messages	because	of	the	larger	
audiences,	often	in	the	thousands,	which	they	attracted.	As	a	member	of	the	central	
party	committee	and	the	party’s	first‐ranked	candidate,	he	received	significant	
funding	from	the	central	committee	and	did	not	enter	into	tandem	arrangements	with	
any	provincial	or	district	level	candidates.	He	did,	however,	attend	a	number	of	
different	rallies	in	order	to	promote	the	party.32		
	
Like	the	Hanura	candidate,	though,	the	Nasdem	candidate	became	increasingly	
cynical	about	the	election	as	the	campaign	progressed.	His	disillusionment	was	clear	
when	I	interviewed	him	after	the	electoral	quick	count	results	became	available.	
While	he	was	successful,	he	received	fewer	votes	than	polling	had	suggested	in	the	
week	leading	up	to	the	election.	Being	a	local—a	‘son	of	the	region’	(putera	daerah)—
he	was	disappointed	that	he	did	not	receive	more	votes	in	his	own	‘backyard’	
(kampung	halaman).	His	disappointing	result	was	not,	he	felt,	a	reflection	on	his	
efforts,	but	rather	the	fact	that	vote‐buying	remained	the	norm,	making	it	difficult	for	
honest	candidates	to	succeed.	He	blamed	his	poor	numbers	on	the	use	of	money	
politics	by	his	rivals,	claiming	that	‘the	winner	of	the	election	was	money	and	basic	
goods’.	He	claimed	that	the	bribery	had	been	‘brutal’,	much	worse	than	in	the	
previous	election,	and	reflected	the	other	candidates’	lack	of	morals.	After	the	
elections	there	were	several	reports	in	the	media	of	candidates	complaining	about	the	
use	of	vote‐buying	and	money	politics.	For	example,	it	was	argued	that	women	
candidates	were	disadvantaged	by	money	politics	and	this	was	why	they	performed	
poorly	in	the	election	(Syafari	2014).	In	Bandung,	hundreds	of	candidates	registered	
dissatisfactions	with	the	vote	count,	suspicious	of	the	election	oversight	committee	
(Rizal	2014).33	
	
Upset	by	the	extent	of	money	politics	in	the	province,	the	candidate	formed	a	coalition	
with	other	candidates	in	South	Sulawesi	who	shared	his	concerns.	Coalition	members	
from	a	range	of	parties	were	united	in	their	disappointment	at	the	influence	of	money	
on	the	election.	They	were	particularly	disheartened	by	the	fact	that	their	attempts	to	
run	clean	campaigns	had	been	undermined	by	unscrupulous	rivals.	The	coalition	
received	some	media	coverage	in	the	period	after	the	winners	were	announced	but	
																																																													
32	For	example,	at	a	rally	on	19	March	2014,	the	Nasdem	candidate	gave	a	speech	ending	with:	
‘Vote	for	any	of	these	people,	they	are	all	good,	but	don’t	forget	to	choose	Nasdem!’	
33	For	further	examples	of	candidates	reported	in	the	media	for	money	politics	and	vote‐
buying	see,	JPNN	(2014),	Khosir	(2014)	and	Syahni	(2014).		
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otherwise	did	not	gain	much	traction.	Accusations	of	vote‐buying	and	money	politics	
were	commonplace	and	complaints,	even	when	reported	to	the	electoral	commission,	
rarely	ended	in	prosecution.	Accusations	that	electoral	processes	had	been	unfair	
were	regarded	as	justified,	but	even	so,	the	concerns	were	not	taken	up	by	the	KPU.	
	
Gerindra,	North	Sumatra		
The	Gerindra	candidate	had	been	in	parliament	for	over	25	years,	having	first	been	
elected	in	1987	as	a	member	of	Golkar.	In	our	first	meeting	in	April	2013,	he	
recounted	his	decision	to	join	Gerindra	in	the	lead‐up	to	the	2009	national	legislative	
election,	the	party’s	first.	In	deciding	to	shift	party	allegiance,	the	candidate	
highlighted	his	interest	in	promoting	economic	equality	within	Indonesia,	particularly	
assisting	the	50	per	cent	of	Indonesians	working	in	the	agricultural	sector.	As	his	
interest	in	agricultural	policy	grew,	he	became	involved	in	the	Indonesian	Farmer’s	
Association	(Himpunan	Kerukunan	Tani	Indonesia,	HKTI),	led	by	Prabowo	
Subianto.34	After	discussions	with	the	Gerindra	leadership,	he	decided	to	represent	
the	party	in	the	2009	elections.	The	candidate	asserted	that	he	had	moved	to	Gerindra	
because	the	party	was	better	aligned	with	his	priorities,	not	because	of	ill‐feeling	
towards	Golkar.		
	
In	our	first	interview,	the	candidate	asserted	corruption	was	tied	to	broader	
problems	of	inequality	in	Indonesia	and	was	therefore	one	of	the	most	important	
challenges	facing	the	country.	This	was	why	Gerindra	was	firm	in	its	commitment	to	
combating	corruption.	In	terms	of	its	symbolism,	the	candidate	argued	that	Gerindra’s	
image	had	become	synonymous	with	fighting	corruption	and	that	it	was	widely	
recognized	as	the	cleanest	party	in	Indonesia.	The	public,	he	said,	appreciated	that	
consistency:		
	
Gerindra	has	taken	a	leading	position	in	eradicating	corruption.	That’s	what	
we	hope	will	differentiate	us	from	other	parties	…	Like	the	seriousness	with	
which	we	defend	the	KPK	…	that	increases	our	value	[to	people]	…	now	
Gerindra	is	seen	as	one	of	the	cleanest	parties	because	we	don’t	have	any	
cadres	involved	in	corruption.	
	
The	candidate	contended	that	every	person	who	joined	the	party	was	obliged	to	
uphold	these	values,	without	exception.	The	fact	that	Gerindra	had	never	had	any	
																																																													
34	For	more	history	of	the	HKTI,	see	Hadiwinata	(2003:	126).	
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members	arrested	for	corruption	reminded	people	that	this	was	a	party	intent	on	
remaining	clean.	Members	accused	of	corruption	would	receive	no	protection	from	
the	party,	and	faced	immediate	expulsion	(though	if	absolved	by	the	courts	they	could	
return).	Fortunately,	according	to	the	candidate,	Gerindra	had	yet	to	find	itself	in	this	
position.	
	
The	candidate	admitted	that	this	election	would	not	be	as	easy	to	win	as	previous	
elections	because	there	was	increasing	cynicism	towards	parliamentarians,	driven	by	
prevailing	stereotypes	that	all	were	corrupt	and	self‐serving.	He	claimed	that	even	he	
had	been	accused	of	corruption,	not	because	there	was	evidence	against	him	but	
because	people	refused	to	believe	that	there	were	any	clean	parliamentarians,	but	he	
conceded	that	voters	had	a	right	to	feel	angry	about	the	high	levels	of	corruption	in	
the	national	parliament.	The	lack	of	trust	generated	by	these	stereotypes	led	the	
Gerindra	candidate	to	draw	heavily	on	his	ethnic	ties	within	the	Batak	community.	As	
a	respected	Batak	elder,	he	hoped	that	ancestral	ties	would	give	him	an	advantage	
over	other	candidates.	During	speeches	to	audiences	from	related	family	groups,	he	
would	make	reference	to	their	common	ancestors	(sama	nenek)	to	encourage	
support.	He	also	appealed	to	religious	ties.	Being	Christian,	the	candidate	opted	to	
concentrate	his	campaign	activity	in	majority	Christian	areas,	arguing	that	it	was	
unlikely	that	Muslims	would	vote	for	a	Christian	candidate,	regardless	of	their	views	
on	other	issues.	He	also	noted	that	votes	could	never	be	taken	for	granted,	and	he	
would	need	to	focus	particularly	on	areas	that	had	supported	him	previously,	but	that	
he	had	not	managed	to	assist	through	development	or	infrastructure	projects	during	
his	past	term.	
	
The	campaign	strategy	of	the	Gerindra	candidate	differed	from	the	Nasdem	and	
Hanura	candidates	for	a	number	of	reasons.	First,	as	an	incumbent,	the	Gerindra	
candidate	could	draw	upon	his	previous	election	results.	Due	to	the	large	size	of	his	
electorate,	it	was	impossible	to	campaign	across	the	entire	area.	Thus	he	chose	to	
focus	on	areas	where	he	had	polled	well	in	the	past	and	he	was	most	likely	to	win.	The	
candidate	believed	that	if	you	preserved	a	‘good	reputation’	(nama	yang	baik)	
throughout	a	parliamentary	term—which	he	felt	he	had—people	would	probably	
vote	for	you	again.	His	campaign	strategy	was	thus	to	reclaim	previous	votes	rather	
than	to	seek	out	new	supporters.	Second,	the	candidate	could	draw	upon	a	trusted	
network	of	people	who	had	assisted	him	in	previous	campaigns,	allowing	him	to	be	
more	hands‐off	than	the	other	two	candidates.	This	was	a	practical	necessity	because	
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he	lived	and	worked	in	Jakarta.	His	modus	operandi	was	to	meet	with	power	
brokers—usually	influential	party	or	ethnic	group	figures	and	businessmen	with	
whom	he	had	worked	in	the	past—and	request	their	assistance.	They,	in	turn,	would	
rally	votes	on	his	behalf.	These	meetings	were	often	familiar,	resembling	a	get‐
together	between	old	friends,	and	revolved	mostly	around	how	the	vote	collecting	
was	progressing	and	whether	any	additional	goods	(such	as	t‐shirts	or	business	
cards)	or	money	to	pay	for	events	were	required.	They	also	discussed	whether	there	
were	any	local	issues	the	candidate	should	be	aware	of,	especially	whether	his	rivals	
were	campaigning	in	the	area	and	whether	they	presented	a	threat.	In	the	meetings,	
combating	corruption	was	not	discussed.	The	candidate	did	not	feel	that	he	needed	to	
talk	to	his	campaign	team	about	the	party	or	its	platform	because	they	were	already	
willing	to	champion	him.	He	argued	these	people	wanted	to	help	him	because	they	
‘know	my	name,	know	my	work	…	know	I	am	a	good	person’.		
	
Third,	the	candidate’s	history	in	parliament	helped	him	attract	the	attention	of	
journalists.	Being	a	senior	party	member,	he	was	often	contacted	by	the	media,	
especially	local	outlets,	for	comment	on	political	issues,	subject	to	a	tacit	agreement	
that	the	papers	would	paint	him	in	a	good	light.	He	also	had	good	relations	with	
certain	journalists	to	whom	he	gave	money	in	return	for	favourable	news	stories.	
This,	he	explained,	was	a	payment	for	a	service	in	recognition	that	journalists	
received	low	salaries	and	therefore	needed	additional	income.	The	candidate	had	
Facebook	and	Twitter	accounts	but	these	were	managed	by	one	of	his	assistants.	He	
admitted	that	he	was	not	very	good	with	technology,	but	understood	that	Gerindra	
expected	candidates	to	make	use	of	social	media.	However,	he	did	not	think	that	
social	media	was	particularly	beneficial,	believing	that	it	was	more	useful	to	new	
candidates	who	were	trying	to	build	their	profile,	but	not	someone	like	himself	who	
was	already	a	familiar	face.	
	
In	his	speeches,	the	Gerindra	candidate	also	emphasized	some	of	the	small‐scale	
efforts	that	Gerindra	was	making,	without	support	or	endorsement	from	other	
parties,	to	reduce	corruption	within	the	national	parliament.	One	oft‐repeated	
example	was	Gerindra’s	ban	on	legislators	taking	part	in	overseas	study	tours.	The	
candidate	argued	that	this	was	an	unnecessary	expense	which	did	little	to	benefit	the	
country;	for	him	they	were	a	form	of	corruption	and	an	excuse	for	parliamentarians	
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to	go	on	holiday.35	While	even	some	other	members	of	Gerindra	had	asked	if	Prabowo	
might	make	some	exceptions	to	this	ban,	the	candidate	was	unwavering	in	his	
support	for	it.	In	presenting	this	stance	to	his	audience,	he	framed	the	issue	in	
comparative	terms,	suggesting	that	because	other	parties	did	not	care	enough	to	ask	
their	members	to	refrain	from	participating	in	these	‘unnecessary’	study	tours,	they	
were	morally	bankrupt	and	uninterested	in	saving	the	government	money.	
	
Another	achievement	the	candidate	promoted	was	Gerindra’s	public	rejection	of	
plans	to	renovate	the	parliament	building	in	Jakarta.	The	party	contended	that	the	
project	was	merely	a	money‐making	opportunity	for	the	ruling	Democratic	Party.	In	
several	speeches,	the	candidate	outlined	his	view	about	the	proposed	renovations	
and	their	budget	of	Rp.	1.8	trillion.	He	alleged	that	the	project	budget	had	been	
marked	up,	and	stated	that	the	company	awarded	the	project	tender	was	linked	to	
Nazaruddin.36	He	said	that	he	suspected	that	the	mark‐up	was	a	means	for	the	
Democratic	Party	to	channel	funding	into	its	campaign	coffers.	He	also	noted	that	
Gerindra	had	consulted	with	the	bureaucrats	tasked	with	building	management	and	
maintenance,	who	had	estimated	that	the	cost	of	the	proposed	renovations	was	Rp.	
700	billion—less	than	half	of	the	allocated	budget.	The	project	was	slated	to	go	ahead	
in	spite	of	Gerindra’s	opposition,	but	it	was	halted	at	the	last	minute	due	to	the	arrest	
of	the	construction	company’s	director	on	an	unrelated	corruption	charge.	The	
candidate	referred	to	this	arrest	as	an	‘intervention	from	God’,	allowing	protest	to	
mount	until	the	renovation	plans	were	finally	abandoned.		
	
The	candidate	used	these	examples	to	illustrate	his	commitment	to	the	transparent	
and	responsible	use	of	public	funds.	His	speeches	linked	Gerindra’s	overall	anti‐
corruption	symbolism	to	his	own	visible	efforts	to	fight	corruption,	which	he	then	
compared	to	the	record	of	other	parties,	which	had	many	seats	in	the	parliament	but	
had	achieved	nothing.	With	a	small	number	of	seats	in	the	national	legislature	(26	
seats),	Gerindra	was	not	in	a	position	to	drive	changes	to	the	law,	budget,	or	policy.	
Nevertheless,	the	party	was	doing	what	it	could	to	improve	the	government.	These	
small‐scale	achievements	were	presented	not	only	as	concrete	evidence	of	the	party’s	
anti‐corruption	stance,	but	also	as	an	indication	of	what	could	be	expected	if	the	party	
gained	power.	In	his	speeches,	the	candidate	repeatedly	underscored	the	fact	that	
																																																													
35	For	example,	in	a	speech	on	13	July	2013	he	stated	that:	‘Flying	overseas	is	a	big	waste	of	the	
people’s	money…	They	[parliamentarians]	fly	Business	Class,	they	get	per	diems,	they	stay	in	
expensive	hotels.	Gerindra	has	saved	the	government	over	Rp.	40	billion	over	the	past	four	
years	because	we	refuse	to	go	[on	these	trips]’.	
36	The	Nazaruddin	case	was	discussed	in	Chapter	Three.	
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even	with	its	small	representation	in	parliament,	Gerindra	strived	to	be	honest	(jujur)	
and	support	anti‐corruption	measures	in	any	way	it	could.	
	
The	candidate	emphasized	his	own	‘track	record’	(rekam	jejak)	to	promote	himself	as	
a	symbol	of	anti‐corruption.	While	in	parliament	he	had	been	vocal	in	the	press,	for	
example,	speaking	in	defence	of	the	KPK	and	against	perceived	government	efforts	to	
undermine	it.	He	was	frequently	interviewed	by	journalists	about	this,	which	further	
fostered	his	anti‐corruption	reputation.	The	candidate	believed	he	was	obliged	to	
highlight	corruption	issues	in	the	government	and	to	demonstrate,	through	the	
media,	that	Gerindra	was	staunchly	against	corruption.	While	he	commented	on	a	
range	of	issues,	corruption	cases	were	a	priority	for	him.	He	also	believed	that	the	
media	now	sought	him	out	for	comments	because	they	knew	that	he	would	have	an	
opinion	on	the	various	corruption	scandals	faced	by	the	government.	At	the	same	
time,	he	admitted	that	a	member	of	a	small	opposition	party	would	find	it	difficult	to	
make	large‐scale	changes.	Indeed,	he	presented	this	as	another	reason	to	vote	for	
Gerindra:	if	Gerindra	could	increase	its	parliamentary	presence,	it	could	implement	
government‐wide	strategies	to	combat	corruption	more	easily.	
	
In	order	to	further	establish	his	anti‐corruption	image,	the	candidate	distributed	
booklets	at	his	meetings	and	rallies.	The	booklet	bore	the	slogan	‘corruption	breeds	
poverty,	fight	corruption	for	a	prosperous	society’	(Korupsi	akar	kemiskinan;	Berantas	
korupsi,	rakyat	sejahtera)	and	included	36	pages	of	media	articles	in	which	the	
candidate	had	discussed	a	range	of	issues,	most	prominently	corruption.	Some	
articles	included	in	the	booklet	were	entitled:	‘[Name]	chooses	the	lonely	road	
amongst	the	“cowboys”	at	Senayan’,	‘[Name]:	Consistent	in	eradicating	corruption’,	‘A	
new	parliament	building	is	not	what	the	people	want’	and	‘Gerindra	is	prepared	to	
protect	the	KPK	from	threats	to	dissolve	it’.	All	the	articles	firmly	aligned	the	
candidate	with	anti‐corruption	symbolism,	which	supported	Gerindra’s	hard‐line	
anti‐corruption	rhetoric.	
	
During	the	official	campaign	period	the	candidate’s	speeches	continued	to	emphasize	
the	importance	of	trust	between	voters	and	leadership,	drawing	a	link	between	the	
need	for	tough	reforms	and	firm	(tegas)	leadership	in	order	to	re‐establish	public	
faith	in	the	parliament.	This	presented	an	opportunity	for	the	candidate	to	focus	on	
some	of	the	advantages	of	Prabowo’s	leadership,	which	he	described	as	‘strong’	and	
having	‘proven	integrity’.	He	presented	Prabowo	as	the	only	leader	committed	
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enough	to	eradicate	corruption,	something	which	he	had	promised	since	founding	
Gerindra	in	2008.	The	candidate	contrasted	this	with	other	leaders	who	had	not	made	
corruption	a	priority.	He	also	referred	to	Prabowo’s	main	rival	for	the	presidency,	
Jokowi,	as	‘untrustworthy’,	especially	because	he	had	betrayed	Prabowo	by	electing	
to	run	for	President.37	In	contrast,	the	candidate	portrayed	Prabowo	as	a	trustworthy	
leader	who	had	clearly	stated	his	platform	to	the	public	and	intended	to	follow	
through	with	it.	To	some	extent	he	was	also	pragmatic	in	his	campaigning,	admitting	
that	he	sometimes	said	things	that	were	untrue	in	order	to	appeal	to	voters.	For	
example,	at	one	rally	he	stated	that	Gerindra	was	staunchly	against	polygamy	and	that	
no	man	who	was	a	party	member	was	permitted	to	have	more	than	one	wife,	
expecting	this	would	be	well‐received	by	his	female	and/or	Christian	audience.38	He	
later	conceded	that	Gerindra	had	neither	policies	against	polygamy	nor	any	party	
rules	about	it	for	members,	admitting	that	he	made	the	statement	to	increase	his	
popularity.	
	
While	earning	trust	was	important,	the	Gerindra	candidate	also	acknowledged	that	
money	was	crucial	in	political	campaigns.	He	was	open	about	this	fact,	stating	that	his	
own	campaign	had	cost	him	around	Rp.	3.5	billion.	This,	he	acknowledged,	was	a	
significant	sum,	though	much	less	than	a	newcomer	would	need	to	spend.	He	did	not	
need	to	worry	about	branding	as	much	as	other	candidates,	because	he	had	already	
had	a	long	and	successful	career	in	politics	without	any	hint	of	scandal.	He	also	said	
that	while	around	Rp.	1	billion	of	his	campaign	funds	came	from	his	own	pocket,	the	
remainder	was	provided	by	the	party	or	donated.	Donations,	the	candidate	stated,	
mostly	came	from	businesspeople	with	whom	he	was	on	good	terms.	While	he	
accepted	that	some	people	may	see	this	as	buying	influence,	he	argued	that	he	had	
never	done	anything	illegal	in	return	for	these	donations.	He	gave	an	example	of	a	
donor	who	had	faced	court	and	was	asked	for	money	by	the	judge	in	order	to	rule	in	
his	favour.	The	candidate	claimed	that	when	the	businessman	had	asked	him	to	
intervene	so	that	he	could	have	a	fair	trial	without	having	to	pay,	the	candidate	rang	a	
friend	of	his	in	the	judiciary	on	the	businessman’s	behalf	and	requested	he	ask	the	
judge	to	rescind	his	request	for	a	bribe.	In	the	end,	the	donor	did	not	have	to	pay	a	
																																																													
37	This	accusation	of	betrayal	was	based	on	the	fact	that	Prabowo	had	supported	Jokowi’s	
mayoral	candidacy	in	Jakarta	during	2012	and	contributed	significantly	to	his	campaign,	and	
the	alleged	breach	of	the	Batu	Tulis	Pact	(Pakta	Batu	Tulis)	in	which	Megawati,	chairperson	of	
PDIP,	had	allegedly	promised	in	writing	to	support	Prabowo’s	presidential	bid	in	2014.	
38	The	debate	over	whether	to	legalize	polygamy	in	Indonesia	is	controversial,	with	
proponents	on	both	sides.	For	more	information	about	the	history	of	this	debate	see	Butt	
(1999).	
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bribe	and	the	judge	still	ruled	in	his	favour.	The	candidate	also	claimed	that	he	had	
been	asked	to	mediate	in	land	disputes	involving	people	who	had	backed	his	
campaign,	but	asserted	that	he	had	never	been	corrupt.39	
	
According	to	the	candidate,	the	availability	of	funds	played	a	key	role	in	campaigns	
because	it	determined	the	feasibility	of	different	campaign	strategies.	Rallies	and	
meetings	were	costly.	A	single	rally	with	just	500	attendees	could	cost	up	to	Rp.	35	
million	including	rental	costs	for	equipment,	food,	t‐shirts,	entertainment	and	
‘transportation	money’	(uang	transpor)	for	the	audience.40	The	candidate	found	these	
expenses	irritating,	but	accepted	them	as	an	integral	part	of	Indonesia’s	‘campaign	
culture’	(budaya	kampanye).	Like	the	Hanura	candidate,	he	also	lamented	that	even	
after	this	expenditure	there	was	no	guarantee	that	people	would	vote	for	him.	He	
estimated	that	for	every	rally	held,	a	candidate	might	expect	40	per	cent	of	the	
audience	to	vote	for	her/him.	For	this	reason,	candidates	had	to	hold	as	many	rallies	
as	they	could	afford	in	order	to	be	assured	of	winning	the	number	of	votes	they	
needed.		
	
The	candidate	was	not	opposed	to	individual	payments	to	people	at	rallies,	stressing	
that	such	payments	were	not	bribes,	but	rather	reimbursements	for	the	costs	of	
attending.	It	was	important	that	people	were	not	left	out‐of‐pocket.	Moreover,	he	said	
that	if	attendees	did	not	receive	a	payment	they	would	be	disappointed,	because	they	
expected	to	be	compensated.	Without	a	small	payment,	the	rally	could	do	more	harm	
than	good,	because	the	attendees	could	end	up	disgruntled.	The	candidate	contrasted	
such	payments,	which	he	described	as	tokens	of	appreciation,	with	‘money	politics’,	
which	usually	involved	much	larger	sums	of	money	and	was	improper.	When	asked	
what	he	deemed	‘a	large	amount	of	money’	he	replied	that	he	would	not	give	more	
than	Rp.	10,000	to	any	individual,	and	that	the	amount	would	depend	on	where	
people	had	travelled	from.	If	they	lived	near	the	rally	site	he	said	he	would	not	give	
them	any	money,	but	would	provide	food	and	drinks.	These	moral	qualms	aside,	the	
candidate’s	rationale	was	also	pragmatic.	Because	he	was	a	national	parliamentary	
candidate,	distributing	large	amounts	of	cash	across	his	electorate	would	have	been	
																																																													
39	The	use	of	political	campaign	donations	to	buy	influence	is	not	uncommon	in	Indonesia,	
especially	since	individual	candidates	often	have	to	source	their	own	funds.	Both	the	Hanura	
and	Gerindra	candidates	acknowledged	that	campaign	donations	often	held	implicit	
expectations	of	political	favours	if	they	won.	However,	both	also	denied	that	they	would	accept	
such	donations	if	they	believed	the	donor	would	ask	for	something	illegal	as	they	would	prefer	
to	stay	clean	rather	than	have	the	money.	
40	The	candidate	said	he	distributed	over	80,000	t‐shirts	during	the	campaign.		
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prohibitively	expensive,	claiming	that	even	giving	Rp.	10,000	to	rally	attendees,	in	
spite	of	it	being	a	small	amount	of	money,	added	up	to	a	significant	expense.41		
In	addition	to	expenditure	on	rallies,	the	Gerindra	candidate,	like	other	candidates	
described	here,	made	donations	to	local	causes	and	groups	in	order	to	curry	favour	
with	voters.	He	said	that	these	payments	demonstrated	his	generosity	and	helped	to	
ensure	that	people	did	not	forget	him.	Many	of	his	donations	were	given	through	
church	communities.	He	supported	local	Christian	youth	groups	and	parishes	and,	in	
turn,	many	youth	group	members	volunteered	to	be	part	of	his	campaign	team.	When	
asked	about	contributing	to	local	development	projects,	the	candidate	said	that	he	
rarely	did	this	unless	he	was	approached	by	a	friend	and	could	trust	that	funds	would	
be	spent	appropriately.	Also,	as	an	incumbent,	he	had	access	to	parliamentary	funds	
such	as	‘Social	Assistance’	(Bantuan	Sosial,	Bansos)	and	‘Aspiration	Funds’	(Dana	
Aspirasi),	which	he	could	channel	towards	village	level	infrastructure	and	social	
development,	and	therefore	did	not	need	to	fund	such	projects	himself.	He	had	no	
qualms	about	taking	credit	for	these	projects,	even	though	they	were	fully	funded	by	
the	government.	
	
He	also	acknowledged	that,	since	his	staff	organized	the	events,	it	was	sometimes	
difficult	to	say	exactly	what	happened	to	all	the	money	he	provided	to	cover	expenses.	
For	example,	he	did	not	personally	select	where	the	food	was	bought,	so	he	conceded	
it	was	possible	his	staff	might	channel	money	for	this	purpose	strategically	in	order	to	
get	votes,	but	as	long	as	the	event	ran	smoothly,	this	was	not	a	problem	for	him.	In	
essence,	delegating	planning,	procurement	and	payment	responsibilities	to	his	
campaign	team	allowed	him	to	be	more	blasé	about	how	campaign	funds	were	spent,	
so	long	as	the	events	were	successful.	
	
The	Gerindra	candidate	was	certainly	the	most	experienced	and	relaxed	candidate	of	
the	three.	However,	while	he	was	a	frontrunner	for	re‐election	and	seemed	confident	
of	retaining	his	seat,	the	candidate	still	expressed	frustration	at	the	expectations	of	
his	party,	especially	in	the	lead‐up	to	voting.	He	said	that	he	had	been	told	by	
Gerindra’s	central	committee	that	he	must	win	at	least	150,000	votes	in	North	
Sumatra.	When	he	complained	this	would	be	extremely	difficult,	the	central	
																																																													
41	While	following	the	Gerindra	campaign	in	North	Sumatra	I	witnessed	several	exchanges	of	
money	in	return	for	attending	rallies.	While	the	Gerindra	candidate	seemed	to	be	exempt	from	
having	to	find	‘supporters’	to	attend	his	rallies	(possibly	because	of	his	status),	other	Gerindra	
candidates	(running	for	all	levels	of	parliament)	who	were	not	so	highly	ranked	were	given	
quotas	of	how	many	people	they	had	to	find	to	attend.	Payments	witnessed	for	attendance	at	
another	candidate’s	rally	in	Medan	ranged	between	Rp.	20,000	and	Rp.	30,000.	
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committee’s	response	was	that	he	should	‘do	what	is	necessary’	to	get	the	votes,	even	
if	he	had	to	buy	them.	While	this	clearly	went	against	the	party’s	own	anti‐corruption	
rhetoric,	the	candidate	was	not	morally	outraged	at	the	request	itself,	arguing	that	
entrenched	election	practices	were	unfortunate	but	difficult	to	ignore.	While	the	new	
quotas	put	him	under	considerable	stress,	he	was	confident	of	winning	without	
buying	votes	because	of	the	relationships	he	had	fostered	over	time	with	his	
constituents.	He	gave	an	example	of	helping	resolve	land	disputes	in	the	early	2000s,	
when	he	was	asked	by	some	local	people	to	call	the	police	and	the	judges	to	explain	
their	situation.	These	people,	he	said,	were	now	part	of	his	campaign	team	and	he	
could	rely	on	them	because	he	had	helped	them	in	the	past.	He	also	built	relations	
with	people	in	communities	by	using	their	services	during	campaigns	(such	as	
purchasing	food	or	paying	local	youths	to	put	up	posters).	His	strategies	paid	off	as	he	
was	re‐elected	for	another	term.	
	
The	candidates	from	Hanura	and	Nasdem	both	argued	that	accepting	payment	in	
return	for	votes	was	immoral	and	would	lead	to	poor	leadership.	By	contrast,	the	
Gerindra	candidate	acknowledged	that	it	was	normal	for	candidates,	especially	
newcomers,	to	buy	their	way	into	parliament,	either	through	lavish	campaigns	and/or	
vote‐buying.	In	one	discussion,	the	Gerindra	candidate	gave	an	example	of	an	
acquaintance	from	a	party	that	was	unlikely	to	pass	the	parliamentary	threshold,	and	
said	that	he	was	amazed	at	his	campaign	spending	because	he	believed	he	was	
wasting	his	money.	Out	of	concern	for	this	person	he	said	he	rang	and	advised	him	to	
stop	‘wasting’	his	money.	He	also	joked	that	the	period	following	election	campaigns	
was	a	good	time	to	buy	land	because	so	many	candidates	went	into	debt	as	a	result	of	
campaign	spending.	While	this	candidate	did	want	to	uphold	his	anti‐corruption	
image	and	did	not	condone	vote‐buying,	his	primary	argument	against	it	was	based	
on	practicality	rather	than	morality;	it	was	expensive,	could	not	guarantee	him	votes	
and	was	potentially	a	waste	of	money.		
	
Intra‐party	relationships	
All	three	candidates	tracked	in	this	study	were	party	staff.	The	Gerindra	and	Nasdem	
candidates	were	in	their	respective	central	party	committees,	while	the	Hanura	
candidate	had	worked	for	the	party	since	its	inception.	Of	the	three,	the	Hanura	
candidate	was	the	most	removed	from	the	central	party	committee	as	she	was	the	
only	one	who	was	not	part	of	the	decision‐making	team	that	developed	national	
campaign	strategies.	For	other	candidates,	who	were	not	pre‐existing	party	members,	
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some	training	was	available	to	brief	them	on	the	basics	of	the	party	platform.	While	
there	was	an	‘induction’	program	designed	to	introduce	new	recruits	to	the	party’s	
vision	and	mission,	this	was	seemingly	done	on	an	ad‐hoc	basis,	if	at	all.	Regular	party	
meetings	were	held	in	key	party	offices,	usually	in	larger	towns,	but	these	were	more	
geared	towards	planning	strategy	rather	than	educating	new	recruits.	Party	members	
reported	that	the	frequency	of	these	meetings	was	usually	driven	by	the	branch	
leader—if	they	were	organized	and	committed	then	there	would	be	regular	meetings.	
However,	this	was	not	always	the	case	and	some	branch	leaders	were	lax	in	calling	
such	meetings.	Most	candidates	had	little	interaction	with	the	local	branch	office	
beyond	this,	let	alone	the	central	party	committee.	
	
The	three	case	studies	exhibited	different	dynamics	between	the	candidate	and	the	
central	office.	The	Hanura	candidate	received	funding	from	the	central	office	in	mid‐
2013.	As	the	party’s	first‐ranked	candidate,	she	was	given	funding	to	lease	billboards,	
print	posters	and	banners,	rent	a	posko	and	hire	a	team	of	office	staff.	This	funding	
was	insufficient	to	cover	most	of	the	donations	and	small‐scale	projects	that	she	
offered	to	voters	in	order	to	secure	support.	Towards	the	end	of	the	campaign,	the	
candidate	was	spending	her	own	money	to	pay	for	rallies,	prizes	and	travel.	Similarly,	
the	Gerindra	candidate	received	some	initial	funding	but	was	expected	to	finance	the	
majority	of	his	campaign	costs.	Being	an	incumbent,	he	had	access	to	government	
funds	which	he	could	direct	strategically	to	please	his	existing	support	base.	While	he	
did	draw	upon	some	personal	funds,	he	acknowledged	that	he	had	a	significant	
advantage	as	an	incumbent	because	he	could	take	credit	for	government	development	
projects.	The	Nasdem	candidate	received	much	more	funding	from	the	central	party	
office	than	the	other	candidates.	He	did	pay	some	donation	costs	out	of	his	own	
pocket,	but	other	expenses	were	met	by	the	party.	As	one	of	the	party’s	most	
prominent	candidates,	with	a	high	potential	for	success,	the	party	invested	
substantially	in	his	campaign,	with	much	of	the	funds	spent	on	rallies	during	the	
official	campaign	period	which	he	shared	with	other	candidates	from	the	provincial	
and	district	levels.	This	was	in	line	with	Nasdem’s	pledge	to	support	candidates	with	
funding	of	Rp.	5‐10	billion	in	each	electorate	(Badudu	2013).42		
	
																																																													
42	As	noted	in	Chapter	Four,	Nasdem	had	undertaken	to	fund	candidates’	campaigns	in	an	
effort	to	discourage	corruption.	The	rationale	was	that	if	a	candidate	did	not	have	to	spend	
their	own	money	throughout	the	campaign	(which	can	be	very	costly)	then	they	would	be	less	
likely	to	need	to	recoup	their	spending	through	corruption	while	in	parliament	if	they	were	
successful	in	the	election.		
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National	candidates’	interaction	with	local	level	party	offices	also	depended	upon	
their	personal	relationship	with	local	branch	leaders.	For	the	Gerindra	and	Nasdem	
candidates,	who	were	both	natives	of	their	electorates	and	senior	party	members,	the	
local	branches	provided	integral	logistic	support	during	campaigns,	such	as	putting	
up	banners	and	organizing	rallies.	The	Nasdem	candidate,	in	particular,	drew	heavily	
upon	local	cadres	to	campaign	on	his	behalf,	also	wanting	them	to	approach	people	in	
public	and	discuss	with	them	the	benefits	of	voting	for	the	candidate	and	Nasdem.	In	
the	case	of	Hanura,	the	relationship	between	the	local	branches	and	the	candidate	
were	initially	strained	because	she	had	taken	the	position	of	another	Hanura	member	
who	had	strong	local	support.	She	received	little	support	from	local	cadres	for	most	of	
her	campaign.	Additionally,	while	the	offices	of	other	candidates	were	staffed	by	party	
cadres,	the	Hanura	candidate	was	forced	to	hire	contract	staff	for	the	duration	of	the	
campaign.	This	reflected	the	fact	that	she	was	not	a	local	to	the	area	and	could	not	
draw	upon	family	or	close	party	ties	for	support.	
	
National	candidates	sometimes	agreed	to	share	costs	with	others	in	the	party	who	
were	vying	for	positions	in	provincial	or	local	parliament.	This	meant	organizing	joint	
election	activities	and	sometimes	even	printing	banners	with	the	candidates	together,	
hoping	to	reduce	their	own	expenditure.	Although	tandem	arrangements	were	
generally	informal,	they	provided	a	means	for	candidates	within	the	same	party	to	
work	together,	which	did	not	usually	occur	between	candidates	competing	for	seats	
at	the	same	level	of	government.	While	the	arrangements	were	primarily	financial	
ones,	there	was	scope	for	intra‐party	influence	through	these	cooperative	efforts.	
Tandem	arrangements	could	bolster	anti‐corruption	symbolism	if	the	candidates’	
rhetoric	was	in	alignment,	but	it	could	also	undermine	such	a	symbol	if	rhetoric	was	
inconsistent.	For	example,	if	one	member	of	the	tandem	partnership	decided	they	
would	give	people	money	in	exchange	for	votes,	the	others	within	the	partnership	
might	be	pressured	to	contribute.	Moreover,	if	one	member	in	the	tandem	
arrangement	did	buy	votes,	citizens	may	assume	that	all	the	associated	candidates	
would	follow	the	same	strategy.	If	candidates	had	previously	attempted	to	project	an	
anti‐corruption	symbol,	vote‐buying	by	tandem	partners	could	weaken	it.		
	
The	primary	concern	of	the	central	party	committee	was	to	maximize	votes.	Targets	
were	identified	for	each	electorate,	nominally	based	on	the	party’s	history	in	the	area	
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and	the	estimated	number	of	votes	needed	to	win	a	seat.43	While	the	central	party	
funded	and	approved	marketing	which	it	hoped	would	positively	influence	voters,	
they	also	placed	significant	expectations	on	candidates.	Yet,	despite	the	dependence	
parties	have	on	candidate	success,	in	the	three	case	studies	observed	there	was	very	
little	oversight	over	campaign	activities	at	the	local	level.	All	candidates	chose	their	
own	slogans,	designed	their	own	campaign	materials	and	selected	their	own	meeting	
and	rally	sites.	There	was	no	formal	approval	process	or	oversight	for	any	of	these	
activities.44	Candidates	could	decide	how	closely	they	wished	to	align	with	party	
symbols	as	there	was	no	requirement	for	them	to	be	included	in	the	campaign	
publicity	material,	or	systems	to	enforce	uniformity	of	symbols	amongst	candidates.	
Monitoring	was	further	constrained	by	the	sheer	number	of	candidates	competing	in	
the	national	election.	Even	if	parties	wanted	to	ensure	uniformity	of	symbols,	or	
monitor	the	use	of	vote‐buying	across	the	campaigns	of	candidates,	it	would	be	
difficult	given	that	there	were	around	180,000	candidates	across	four	levels	of	
government	competing	for	19,699	positions	in	2014	(Aspinall	2014a:	97;	Iqbal	2014).	
While	cooperation	could	be	beneficial	for	both	candidates	and	parties	as	a	whole,	the	
scalar	dimensions	of	campaigning	in	Indonesia	made	it	difficult	to	coordinate	across	
national	and	individual	campaigns.		
	
Conclusion	
These	case	studies	present	an	empirical	basis	to	investigate	how	anti‐corruption	
symbolism	is	employed	in	the	conceptualization	and	execution	of	a	campaign	strategy	
at	the	local	level,	discussing	the	relational	transference	of	the	anti‐corruption	symbol	
(or	lack	thereof)	from	the	centre	to	the	masses,	via	the	conduit	of	individual	
candidates.	Candidates	could	draw	from	the	national	level	party	symbols	created	at	
the	centre;	however,	there	was	no	compulsion	for	them	to	do	so.	Anti‐corruption	
symbols	were	used,	to	varying	degrees,	by	all	three	national	legislative	candidates.	
The	candidates	had	differences	in	terms	of	past	experiences,	standing	within	the	
community	and	the	party.	Each	campaign	was	conducted	in	a	unique	political	
																																																													
43	The	means	through	which	this	target	was	determined	varied	across	the	candidates.	While	
the	Nasdem	candidate	did	his	own	calculations,	created	his	own	target	and	reported	this	back	
to	the	central	party	committee,	both	the	Gerindra	and	Hanura	candidates	were	dictated	
numbers	by	the	party	separate	to	their	own	calculations.	As	identified	in	Chapter	Five,	the	
Gerindra	candidate	was	annoyed	at	the	high	expectations	placed	on	him	by	his	party,	
concerned	that	they	were	unrealistic	without	resorting	to	bribery.	The	Hanura	candidate	was	
also	considerably	anxious	about	her	targets,	especially	when	it	became	apparent	later	in	the	
campaign	that	she	was	not	on	track	to	achieve	them.	
44	This	was	evidenced	by	the	wide	variety	of	posters	and	banners	amongst	candidates	from	
the	same	party	during	the	election	period.	There	was	little	consistency	because	there	was	no	
external	impetus	to	adopt	party	symbols.	
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environment	and	the	candidates’	own	backgrounds	saw	them	respond	to	election	
demands	differently.	These	distinctions	played	into	the	narratives	used	to	construct	
the	anti‐corruption	symbols.		
	
The	way	candidates	used	symbols	was	not	static—the	symbol	was	promoted	when	
candidates	deemed	it	beneficial	and	downplayed	when	it	was	considered	unhelpful.	
Although	corruption	was	identified	as	a	primary	election	symbol	nation‐wide,	
candidates	found	that	talking	about	fighting	corruption	did	not	always	elicit	the	
desired	response	amongst	citizens.	Voters	who	rejected	the	anti‐corruption	symbols,	
for	whatever	reason,	sent	a	message	to	the	candidates	about	its	lack	of	value.	
Candidates	adapted	their	campaign	strategies	in	different	ways	to	manage	these	
responses.	The	Hanura	candidate	eventually	stopped	using	such	symbols	altogether,	
claiming	they	were	counterproductive	while	the	Nasdem	candidate	increased	the	
intensity	of	his	anti‐corruption	symbol	and	the	Gerindra	candidate	maintained	a	
steady	approach	to	constructing	his	symbol,	drawing	upon	his	years	of	election	
experience.	On	the	other	hand,	candidates	also	recognized	the	limitations	of	using	
money	politics,	which	could	be	costly	but	unable	to	guarantee	victory.	Faced	with	this	
dilemma,	it	was	the	personal	ideals	of	the	candidate	that	eventually	determined	what	
campaign	approach	they	would	take.	
	
Even	an	adamant	self‐identification	as	‘clean’	or	‘anti‐corruption’	did	not	prevent	the	
candidates	from	using	money	to	influence	voters.	Candidates	often	expressed	a	
narrow	definition	of	electoral	corruption,	which	was	usually	described	as	the	
exchange	of	cash	for	votes,	or	bribing	electoral	officials	to	manipulate	results	in	their	
favour.	But	while	giving	cash	to	individuals	in	return	for	votes	was	deplorable,	other	
types	of	contributions,	although	sometimes	given	reluctantly,	were	accepted	as	a	
normal	aspect	of	political	campaigning.	Though	acknowledging	that	such	campaign	
norms	were	expensive	and	not	ideal,	they	did	not	necessarily	consider	giving	out	
money	or	goods	as	money	politics	per	se.	For	example,	donating	to	village	funds,	
religious	institutions	or	paying	citizens	‘transport	money’	as	reimbursement	for	
attending	rallies	were	acceptable	and	standard	campaign	practices,	rather	than	
immoral	or	corrupt	behaviour.	After	the	election	was	over,	candidates	expressed	
different	opinions	regarding	the	use	of	money	in	elections.	While	the	Hanura	and	
Nasdem	candidates	vocally	begrudged	it	and	blamed	it	for	their	unsatisfactory	
results,	the	Gerindra	candidate	stoically	described	it	as	just	another	part	of	elections	
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in	Indonesia.	His	sympathies	lay	with	new	candidates	who	did	not	have	the	benefit	of	
incumbency	and	access	to	government	funds	to	influence	voters.	
	
Parties	had	a	vested	interest	in	the	success	of	their	candidates,	but	they	performed	
minimal	oversight	of	their	campaigns.	While	candidates	had	to	account	for	their	
spending	with	receipts,	many	transactions	occurred	‘off	the	books’	and	in	reality	
parties	did	little	to	prevent	this	practice.	Outwardly,	parties	took	a	strong	stance	
against	corruption	and	money	politics,	but	in	reality	the	definitions	were	unclear,	and	
in	some	cases	the	message	given	to	candidates	contradicted	the	symbol.	Candidates	
came	under	pressure	to	engage	in	vote‐buying	from	the	central	party	committee,	
which	set	ambitious	vote	quotas	for	candidates,	and	suggestions	from	campaign	
teams	that	without	vote‐buying	they	risked	defeat.	
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Chapter	Six	
A	successful	strategy?	
	
The	three	case	studies	outlined	in	Chapter	Five	provide	a	basis	for	exploring	how	
anti‐corruption	symbols	were	imagined	and	mobilized	by	individual	candidates	in	the	
2014	legislative	elections.	Considered	in	the	context	of	broader	national	campaigns,	
the	employment	of	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	by	candidates	reveals	both	the	
influence	of	local	context	and	the	nature	of	intra‐party	relations,	uncovering	tensions	
between	party	structure	and	individual	agency.	Focusing	on	the	consistencies	and	
inconsistencies	in	how	anti‐corruption	symbols	were	imagined	and	deployed	by	
different	emerging	parties,	and	the	results	they	garnered,	allows	us	to	interrogate	the	
link	between	national	and	local	symbols,	and	electoral	outcomes.	The	coordination	
(or	lack	thereof)	that	exists	within	campaigns,	in	turn,	helps	to	explain	why	this	
campaign	strategy	is	so	flawed.	
	
While	the	national	level	election	campaigns	were	intended	as	an	all‐encompassing	
reflection	of	party	values	and,	subsequently,	the	values	of	its	members,	local	
candidates	had	the	autonomy	to	decide	whether	they	wished	to	mobilize	the	same	
symbols	as	those	in	the	national	campaign.	Even	when	candidates	did	adopt	the	same	
symbols—as	was	the	case	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent	for	the	three	case	study	
candidates—they	adapted	them	to	suit	their	local	context	and	imbued	them	with	their	
own	principles.	Some	candidates,	especially	those	with	positions	in	their	party’s	
central	committee,	felt	pressure	to	uphold	party	symbols,	but,	in	reality,	there	was	
little	done	by	party	officials	to	ensure	that	candidates	maintained	the	party	line	or	
refrained	from	using	money	politics.1	Parties	did	not	force	their	symbols	upon	
candidates	and,	therefore,	whether	a	candidate	‘stuck	to	their	guns’	and	maintained	
an	anti‐corruption	symbol	was	the	results	of	personal	judgement.	
	
Justifying	the	use	of	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	
Opposition	parties	around	the	world	often	use	anti‐corruption	symbols	to	promote	
themselves	and	challenge	rivals	and	Indonesia	is	no	exception.	Viewed	as	moral	
																																																													
1	This	thesis	does	not	seek	to	go	into	detail	about	the	opinions	or	rationalizations	for	
corruption	and	vote‐buying	from	the	voter	perspective.	While	the	field	work	conducted	casts	
some	light	on	possible	theories	as	to	why	many	voters	in	the	particular	districts	covered	by	
this	research	wish	to	be	paid	(either	in	cash	or	in	goods/services)	by	parliamentary	
candidates,	it	was	not	the	focus	of	the	research.	While	there	are	few	in‐depth	academic	studies	
on	this	topic,	Wahid	(Forthcoming)	provides	some	insight.	
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resources,	parties	see	the	fight	against	corruption	as	a	universally	appealing	issue	
aligned	with	broader	ideals	such	as	trust,	honesty	and	helping	ordinary	citizens.	
Deciding	to	vocally	oppose	corruption,	parties	draw	upon	moral	arguments	to	
portray	themselves	as	bastions	of	all	that	is	good,	while	hoping	to	create	a	symbol	
that	is	an	effective	vote‐getter.	Establishing	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	not	only	
presents	emerging	parties	in	a	positive	light;	it	also	frames	existing	parties	as	villains	
within	a	black‐and‐white	discourse	that	ignores	the	complexities	and	nuances	of	
entrenched	political	corruption.	The	simplification	of	the	problem	is	evident	as	
election	campaigns	usually	seek	to	assign	blame	rather	than	propose	meaningful	
solutions.	Presented	crudely	as	a	stock	political	plot,	the	complexity	of	the	problem	is	
dissolved	and	rhetoric	can	be	simplified.	An	anti‐corruption	symbol	also	represents	a	
competitive	advantage	for	emerging	parties	that	have	yet	to	suffer	from	any	
significant	corruption	scandals.	The	parties’	lack	of	history,	in	some	cases	a	
disadvantage,	can	be	leveraged	to	promote	the	party	as	a	clean	and,	therefore,	
preferable	alternative	to	those	in	power.2		
	
Emerging	parties	were	eager	to	portray	themselves	as	political	saviours,	and	one	way	
to	do	this	was	to	embark	on	a	‘project	of	newness’.	Downplaying	the	party’s	lack	of	
past	achievements	and	arguing	that	change,	in	itself,	is	a	desirable	political	outcome,	a	
project	of	newness	emphasizes	what	new	parties	are	not—most	particularly	that	they	
are	not	responsible	for	the	current	state	of	government	affairs.3	Anti‐corruption	
symbols	fit	well	with	the	project	of	newness,	especially	as	new	parties	can	portray	
themselves	in	opposition	to	the	status	quo,	relying	on	the	assessment	that	nothing	
could	be	worse	than	the	incumbent	government	returning	to	power.	Campaigns	
contributed	to	this	project	by	painting	old	parties	as	failures	and	new	parties	as	
much‐needed	change.	This	was	most	explicitly	illustrated	through	Nasdem’s	
campaign	slogan,	‘Gerakan	Perubahan´	(Movement	for	Change),	although	other	
emerging	parties	used	similar	themes	in	their	rhetoric.	However,	simply	being	newer	
than	other	parties	was	not	enough,	particularly	for	individual	candidates	who	were	
competing	against	several	rivals	
	
Hanura,	Gerindra	and	Nasdem	all	branded	the	incumbent	government	as	being	
corrupt	in	their	2014	national	election	campaigns.	This	was	not	surprising	given	the	
																																																													
2	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	emerging	parties	studied	had	no	candidates	or	members	with	
‘questionable’	pasts,	but	in	general	they	did	not	have	members	who	had	been	involved	in	
gross	misconduct	or	misuse	of	public	office	for	personal	benefit.	
3	While	the	campaign	language	of	emerging	parties	cast	older	rivals	in	a	bad	light,	there	was	
almost	no	antagonism	amongst	the	three	new	parties	themselves.	
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number	of	scandals	publicized	between	2009	and	2014.4	Opinion	surveys	in	the	lead‐
up	to	the	election	suggested	that	Indonesian	voters	felt	that	many	Democratic	Party	
members	had	had	no	intention	of	‘saying	no	to	corruption’,	despite	the	party’s	
campaign	to	that	effect.	Concentrating	public	attention	on	corruption	was	an	easy	
way	for	new	parties	to	fuel	disdain	for	the	political	elites	in	power.	Although	not	all	
the	scandals	involved	the	cabinet	or	parliament—there	were	numerous	corruption	
cases	that	affected	the	judiciary,	the	police	and	the	bureaucracy—the	pervasiveness	
of	corruption	made	the	government	seem	all	the	more	hypocritical.	By	attempting	to	
keep	corruption	cases	in	the	public	eye,	emerging	parties	become	moral	
entrepreneurs,	hoping	to	capitalize	on	the	perceived	flaws	of	the	incumbent	
leadership,	whilst	maintaining	a	level	of	moral	panic	in	order	to	convert	anti‐
government	sentiment	into	support	for	their	parties.	
	
Salient	and	primed	
The	salience	of	anti‐corruption	issues	in	the	2014	election	campaign	was	undeniable.	
The	history	of	corruption	as	a	political	concern	meant	that	the	public	were	already	
aware	of	the	seriousness	of	the	problem.	With	issue	salience	already	established,	
parties	and	candidates	could	position	themselves	within	the	dominant	discourses	
explaining	why	corruption	was	so	prevalent.	Past	attempts	to	link	corruption	to	elite	
greed	and	disregard	for	the	good	of	the	nation	fostered	a	sense	of	moral	panic	and	
outrage	around	corruption	issues.	Parties	could	position	themselves	positively	by	
exploiting	this	panic,	hoping	to	provoke	an	emotional	connection	with	voters	who	
were	frustrated	by	corrupt	government	practices.5	They	seized	upon	narratives	
holding	that	corruption	impeded	national	and	social	development	and	was	driven	by	
selfish	materialism.	Whether	these	narratives	reflected	reality	was	irrelevant.	The	
question	was	the	extent	to	which	they	could	build	upon	this	salience	with	their	own	
declarations	in	order	to	better	align	themselves	with	an	anti‐corruption	symbol.	
	
Priming	is	intended	to	convince	voters	‘to	give	more	weight	to	those	areas	when	
assessing	candidates’	(Druckman	et	al.	2004:	1180).	Although	anti‐corruption	was	
already	a	salient	electoral	issue,	emerging	parties	used	their	national	campaigns	to	
further	highlight	the	concern,	priming	voters	using	extensive	media	coverage	and	
public	statements	by	party	leaders.	In	doing	so,	they	aimed	to	set	the	agenda	for	the	
election,	reinforcing	to	the	public	that	corruption	was	a	critical	national	issue.	Parties	
																																																													
4	As	discussed	in	Chapter	Three.	
5	This	idea	is	drawn	from	Becker	(1973:	2),	who	asserts	that	parties	seek	to	engender	a	sense	
of	communitas	with	voters	who	identify	with	the	morals	promoted	by	the	party.	
	
176	
	
also	needed	to	convince	the	public	that	they	were	best	placed	to	lead	the	fight	against	
corruption.6	However,	while	history	may	have	primed	corruption	to	be	of	grave	
concern	to	voters,	emerging	parties	still	had	to	exploit	the	issue	effectively	in	order	to	
benefit	from	salience	and	priming.		
	
With	only	a	short	history	and	some	small‐scale	anti‐corruption	efforts	(generally	
commensurate	with	their	existing	political	influence),	the	emerging	parties’	success	in	
owning	the	issue	came	primarily	from	their	claims	of	not	having	been	corrupt	rather	
than	claims	about	what	they	have	achieved.	Ownership	gained	under	such	
circumstances	is	‘leased’	rather	than	entrenched	and	is	generally	precarious,	
requiring	effective	rhetoric	in	the	absence	of	concrete	examples	to	convince	voters	of	
a	genuine	commitment	to	fighting	corruption,	particularly	if	parties	have	a	long‐term	
plan	to	establish	more	stable	issue	ownership.	
	
The	art	of	persuasion	
Edelman’s	(1964;1971)	early	work	on	political	symbolism	allows	for	the	
conceptualization	of	anti‐corruption	issues	as	a	tool	for	persuasion	rather	than	a	
party	platform	or	even	a	rudimentary	basis	for	policy.	In	the	2014	elections,	emerging	
parties	believed	a	successful	anti‐corruption	symbol	would	act	as	a	reflection	of	the	
moral	credibility	of	the	party	and	its	candidates.	Building	moral	credibility	relies	on	
bridging	the	gap	between	the	symbolic	(dramatic)	and	the	authentic,	convincing	the	
public	that	there	is	a	direct	correlation	between	the	rhetoric	used	and	the	values	held	
by	parties	and	candidates.	In	Indonesia,	this	alignment	was	challenged	by	pre‐existing	
public	cynicism,	as	past	experience	has	repeatedly	shown	that	politicians	often	say	
one	thing	but	do	another.7	In	this	sense,	attempts	to	establish	an	anti‐corruption	
symbol	were	treacherous	because	parties	who	had	used	the	symbol	in	the	past	had	
since	been	cast	as	hypocrites.8		
	
Without	a	long‐standing	track	record	in	fighting	corruption,	emerging	parties	were	
left	to	convince	voters	of	their	anti‐corruption	credentials	using	language	and	
dramatism.	The	Aristotelian	definition	of	successful	rhetoric—consisting	of	ethos,	
																																																													
6	As	discussed	in	Chapter	Three,	corruption	was	widely	identified	as	a	key	political	concern	in	
Indonesia	through	a	number	of	public	surveys	conducted	in	the	lead	up	to	the	2014	election.		
7	As	evidenced	by	the	political	corruption	scandals	of	the	Democratic	Party	and	PKS	discussed	
in	Chapter	Three.	
8	The	Hanura	candidate	articulated	this	explicitly	when	she	admitted	that	her	use	of	anti‐
corruption	symbols	was	influenced	by	its	co‐option	in	the	2009	campaigns	of	the	Democratic	
Party	and	PKS.	
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pathos	and	logos—allows	us	to	assess	the	quality	of	anti‐corruption	symbols	in	the	
Indonesian	context.9	If	emerging	parties	were	to	effectively	confront	the	public	
disappointment	fostered	by	the	previous	regime,	they	needed	to	craft	rhetoric	that	
was	morally	credible,	supported	by	evidence	and	able	to	arouse	sympathy	from	the	
audience.	However,	while	ethos	and	pathos	were	often	drawn	upon	to	establish	an	
anti‐corruption	symbol,	both	by	the	parties	as	a	whole	and	individual	candidates,	
logos	was	often	more	difficult	to	demonstrate.	
	
Emerging	parties	relied	on	their	newness	and	the	relative	absence	of	scandal	in	their	
short	histories	to	establish	ethos.	When	scandals	had	erupted,	such	as	the	Bambang	
Soeharto	case	faced	by	Hanura,	the	leadership	was	quick	to	condemn	the	perpetrator	
and	maintain	that	this	individual	act	was	not	a	reflection	the	party’s	culture.10	
Individual	candidates	played	on	their	clean	reputations	to	prove	their	personal	ethos,	
but	also,	where	possible,	focused	on	establishing	ethos	through	their	connections	to	
the	area,	especially	highlighting	their	kinship	and/or	religious	ties.	In	doing	this,	
candidates	hoped	to	win	the	trust	of	voters	as	they	were	a	putera	daerah	(‘local	son’)	
who	was	more	committed	to	representing	their	fellow	locals	than	candidates	from	
other	areas.	For	the	Hanura	candidate,	who	lacked	strong	familial	ties	to	her	
electorate	in	East	Java,	establishing	credibility	was	especially	difficult.11		
	
Pathos	played	a	central	role	in	the	campaigns	of	the	two	successful	candidates	from	
Gerindra	and	Nasdem,	both	of	whom	were	engaging	public	speakers.	As	a	highly	
emotive	issue,	speaking	about	the	evils	of	corruption	compellingly	and	pledging	to	
fight	it	was	certain	to	rouse	public	interest,	if	not	support.	Conversely,	even	though	
the	Hanura	candidate	could	legitimately	promote	herself	as	untainted	by	corruption,	
she	lacked	the	charisma	of	the	other	candidates	observed	in	this	study.12	She	shied	
away	from	speaking	to	large	audiences	of	men,	and	even	when	talking	to	groups	of	
women	her	orations	were	generally	short	and	perfunctory.	Moreover,	as	mentioned,	
she	was	uncomfortable	speaking	openly	about	corruption,	claiming	that	it	was	an	
																																																													
9	These	are:	to	have	moral	‘worthiness’	or	credibility	(ethos),	proof	to	support	argument	
(logos)	and	be	able	to	arouse	feelings	in	the	audience	(pathos).	These	concepts	were	discussed	
in	Chapter	One.	
10	The	Bambang	Soeharto	case	was	discussed	in	Chapter	Four.	
11	The	Hanura	candidate	complained	that	her	efforts	to	demonstrate	that	she	would	be	a	clean	
and	committed	representative	were	often	met	with	requests	for	a	contribution,	even	though	
she	had	hoped	that	this	rhetoric	would	dissuade	people	from	asking	for	goods	or	money.	
12	This	assertion	is	based	on	the	researcher’s	own	experiences	with	the	three	different	
candidates.	
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unsavoury	issue	that	made	her	audiences	feel	uncomfortable,	and	so	was	less	clear	in	
publicly	articulating	her	views	on	corruption	other	than	to	assert	that	she	opposed	it.	
	
While	demonstrating	logos	seemed	the	most	difficult	aspect	of	rhetoric	construction	
for	parties	as	a	whole,	the	ability	of	individual	candidates	to	establish	it	depended	on	
their	past	experience.	In	particular,	the	Gerindra	and	Nasdem	candidates	made	much	
of	their	personal	commitment	to	fighting	corruption,	using	stories	of	their	past	anti‐
corruption	endeavours.	The	Gerindra	candidate	talked	about	his	efforts	as	a	
parliamentarian;	that	he	had	fully	supported	and	implemented	the	ban	on	
international	travel	by	Gerindra	legislators	at	public	expense	and	rallied	against	
unnecessary	renovations	to	the	national	parliamentary	building,	which	he	believed	
were	part	of	a	plot	intended	to	channel	funds	to	the	Democratic	Party.	The	Nasdem	
candidate	underscored	his	past	as	an	activist	and	his	previous	resignation	from	the	
DPR‐RI,	contending	that	he	had	been	disgusted	by	the	immoral	and	corrupt	behaviour	
of	his	peers,	and	now	wished	to	return	in	order	to	expose	their	venality.	While	both	
asserted	that	their	parties	were	committed	to	eradicating	corruption,	it	was	difficult	
to	present	concrete	examples	of	impactful	anti‐corruption	measures	undertaken	
because	the	parties	had	never	been	in	a	position	to	meaningfully	influence	anti‐
corruption	efforts.	It	was	also	strategic	to	highlight	their	own	track	record	as	should	
their	party	suffer	from	a	major	corruption	scandal	in	the	future,	they	could	maintain	
their	anti‐corruption	symbol	because	they	based	it	mostly	upon	personal	
achievement	instead	of	party	rhetoric.	
	
In	the	early	stages	of	the	campaign	these	candidates	claimed	a	strong	association	with	
their	party’s	ideals,	including	in	combating	corruption.	However,	the	framing	of	these	
symbols	was	driven	more	by	the	individual’s	own	priorities	rather	than	those	of	the	
party.	For	example,	while	Hanura	publications	criticized	the	deep	entrenchment	of	
corruption	at	the	elite	level	and	Wiranto	had	argued	for	the	death	penalty	for	those	
found	guilty	of	corruption,	the	Hanura	candidate	did	not	mention	any	political	
corruption	scandals	or	speak	about	punishment	for	corruption	during	her	campaign.	
Conversely,	the	Nasdem	candidate’s	anti‐corruption	symbol	was	more	pronounced	
than	that	of	his	party.	His	campaign	centred	on	his	commitment	to	fighting	
corruption,	both	in	Centurygate	and	against	the	‘traitors’	in	parliament.	Nasdem	party	
rhetoric	was	much	more	general,	emphasizing	nationalism	and	the	party’s	
commitment	to	addressing	all	of	Indonesia’s	problems,	one	of	which	was	corruption.	
The	Gerindra	candidate’s	anti‐corruption	symbol	was	the	most	closely	aligned	with	
	
179	
	
that	of	his	party:	his	status	as	a	senior	party	member	and	incumbent	meant	that	he	
could	influence	party	policy	and	its	national	campaign.	At	the	same	time,	there	did	not	
appear	to	be	any	additional	compulsion	for	him	to	follow	the	party	line	and,	like	other	
candidates,	he	was	free	to	campaign	in	whatever	way	he	saw	fit.	It	was	clear,	too,	that	
each	candidate	presented	the	symbol	in	a	way	that	underscored	their	personal	
achievements	and	promises,	rather	than	those	of	the	party	as	a	whole.	
	
In	addition,	while	all	candidates	stated	at	the	outset	of	the	campaigns	that	they	were	
opposed	to	corruption,	some	were	cautious	about	the	use	of	this	rhetoric,	
acknowledging	that	it	had	been	co‐opted	in	the	past.	The	historical	context	of	the	
symbol	meant	that	it	would	be	difficult	to	convince	voters	that	the	dramatism	
surrounding	the	use	of	anti‐corruption	rhetoric	was	a	true	reflection	of	the	
candidate’s	authentic	self.	In	this	respect,	the	parties’	clean	image	was	helpful	to	
candidates	and	allowed	them	to	speak	about	corruption	from	a	position	of	authority,	
but	was	not	the	sole	basis	for	their	personal	anti‐corruption	symbols.	As	candidates	
were	competing	against	a	host	of	rivals,	both	from	other	parties	and	their	own,	the	
methods	of	persuasion	they	chose	were	of	paramount	importance.	Voter	support	was	
fuelled	by	two	means:	using	the	most	convincing	rhetoric	or	by	offering	material	
rewards.	Given	the	difficulties	in	convincingly	establishing	anti‐corruption	symbols	in	
the	face	of	voter	scepticism,	it	is	unsurprising	that	candidates	did	not	rely	solely	on	
rhetoric	to	win	them	votes.		
	
Appealing	campaign	symbols	presented	a	competitive	edge,	especially	in	cases	where	
numerous	candidates	offered	comparable	material	rewards	to	voters.13	For	
candidates	who	lacked	deep	pockets,	anti‐corruption	symbols	were	also	a	mechanism	
for	justifying	the	absence	of	sizeable	material	rewards.	This	was	particularly	visible	in	
the	Hanura	campaign.	When	asked	whether	she	could	provide	a	contribution,	the	
candidate	deflected	requests	with	responses	that	identified	such	contributions	as	
illegal	and	that	candidates	willing	to	make	them	would	not	serve	voters’	interests.	
Ultimately,	though,	all	three	candidates	used	both	symbols	and	material	rewards	to	
lure	voters,	hoping	the	dual	strategy	would	secure	victory.	The	scope	of	material	
rewards	was	determined	by	the	candidates’	campaign	budget.	The	decision	of	
whether	to	provide	material	rewards	was	also	linked	to	the	candidate’s	relationship	
																																																													
13	Aspinall	(2014b)	suggests	that	in	the	event	that	several	candidates	distributed	money	or	
goods	for	votes,	voters	tended	to	select	the	candidate	that	they	personally	liked	the	best.	
	
180	
	
with	party	networks	(local	branches)	and	tandem	agreements	with	other	candidates,	
which	affected	their	capacity	to	maximize	the	geographic	scope	of	their	campaign.		
	
Even	though	Law	No.	10/2008	on	the	General	Election	of	Members	for	the	DPR,	DPD	
and	DPRD	forbids	the	use	of	any	incentives	to	gain	votes,	the	fact	that	this	behaviour	
has	become	common	campaign	practice	meant	that	candidates	had	to	decide	how	to	
confront	the	challenges	this	poses.	In	the	case	studies	observed,	candidates	walked	a	
line	between	acceptable	and	illicit	practices	and	where	this	line	fell	was	mostly	
determined	by	their	own	concept	of	moral	behaviour.	Material	rewards	were,	in	fact,	
an	indispensable	aspect	of	election	campaigning.	More	important,	though,	was	how	
the	candidates	themselves	justified	their	use	in	terms	of	their	own	self‐identification	
as	being	clean	and	their	definitions	of	money	politics	and	vote‐buying.	Material	
contributions	were	always	framed	as	a	gift	and	the	cognitive	dissonance	was	
addressed	by	rationalizing	contributions	as	both	normal	and	permissible.	Sociological	
definitions	of	corruption	played	a	crucial	role	in	facilitating	this	rationalization	as	
ideas	of	what	was	normal	and	acceptable	were	used	to	justify	actions	that,	strictly	
speaking,	were	illegal.	The	candidates	themselves	seemed	to	oscillate	between	
acceptance	and	frustration	that	the	boundaries	of	normal	behaviour	and	illegal	
behaviour	were	not	one	and	the	same.	As	the	campaigns	wore	on	and	there	was	
increasing	pressure	to	engage	in	money	politics	to	secure	votes,	all	the	candidates	
became	increasingly	annoyed	but	also	responded	differently	to	the	pressure.	
	
Candidates	matter	
As	Aspinall	(2014a:	101)	contends,	voters	are	more	influenced	by	individual	
candidates	than	the	parties	they	represent.	Logically,	then,	the	campaign	strategies	
they	adopt	at	the	local	level	are	more	important	than	those	adopted	at	a	national	level	
by	the	parties	they	represent.	The	decision	by	individuals	to	adopt	an	anti‐corruption	
symbol	for	their	personal	campaigns	rests	on	two	factors—whether	the	candidates	
believes	the	symbol	will	draw	support	(narrative	preference)	and	whether	it	fits	with	
their	own	moral	priorities.	Having	great	autonomy	in	planning	and	executing	their	
own	election	campaigns,	the	symbols	chosen	by	candidates	needed	to	resonate	with	
their	own	set	of	values	and/or	be	seen	as	a	vote‐getter.	If	a	symbol	did	not	resonate,	
they	were	free	to	ignore	it.	In	other	words,	all	the	‘big	picture’	rationalizations	for	
using	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	may	or	may	not	have	convinced	candidates	to	adopt	
them.	
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Just	as	history	had	primed	the	electorate	to	scorn	corruption,	the	national	electoral	
campaign	primed	the	symbol	for	individual	candidates.	As	a	consequence	of	the	
symbiotic	relationship	between	parties	and	candidates—candidates	require	party	
nomination	in	order	to	run	for	office,	while	the	parties	need	to	win	seats	in	
parliament	to	gain	political	influence—the	image	of	candidates	was	necessarily	
affected,	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent,	by	the	overall	image	of	their	party.	In	theory,	
candidates	have	the	opportunity	to	capitalize	on	national	agenda‐setting,	relying	on	it	
to	fill	‘knowledge	gaps’	(Geys	and	Vermeir	2014).	In	the	absence	of	information	about	
a	particular	candidate,	voters	draw	on	‘party	cues’,	judging	them	on	the	reputation	of	
the	party	that	they	represent.	In	practice,	some	candidates	recognized	that	their	
parties	had	already	developed	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	and	capitalized	on	this	by	
adopting	it	as	a	personal	symbol	as	well.	However,	while	party	image	can	play	a	role	
in	determining	voter	decisions,	most	candidates	saw	national–level	campaigns	as	
‘secondary	to	their	own	efforts’	(Aspinall	2014a:	107).	
	
Amongst	candidates	who	opted	to	construct	an	anti‐corruption	symbol,	the	
conceptualization	of	the	issue	varied	leading	to	different	types	of	narratives	in	their	
election	campaigns.	They	could	‘mobilize’	voters	by	making	their	personal	ideological	
priorities	attractive	to	voters	or	‘chase’	them	by	crafting	rhetoric	in	line	with	what	
they	believed	the	public	wanted	to	hear	(Rohrschneider	2002:	368‐369).	The	Hanura	
candidate	was	clearly	chasing	votes,	illustrated	by	her	decision	to	stop	using	an	anti‐
corruption	symbol	when	she	felt	it	was	not	appealing	or	if	it	made	people	feel	
uncomfortable.	The	Gerindra	candidate,	while	using	a	very	different	type	of	rhetoric,	
also	appeared	to	be	chasing	votes.	While	he	touched	upon	the	importance	of	
combating	corruption	during	some	speeches,	his	focus	was	on	demonstrating	his	
commitment	to	the	problem.	He	assumed	that	people	wanted	parliamentarians	that	
would	fight	corruption	and	believed	he	had	to	prove	that	he	was	the	contender	for	
this	job.	Party	policies	were	generally	only	mentioned	when	they	supported	his	
personal	symbol.	By	contrast,	the	Nasdem	candidate	tried	to	mobilize	votes.	He	spoke	
of	corruption	as	a	terrible	evil	throughout	the	campaign,	ramping	up	his	rhetoric	as	
the	election	date	drew	closer.	He	openly	criticized	others,	in	spite	of	the	discomfort	
this	caused,	and	endeavoured	to	persuade	voters	of	the	importance	of	dealing	with	
what	he	believed	to	be	major	cases	of	corruption.	His	approach	relied	partly	on	
convincing	voters	that	having	clean	legislators	who	would	not	break	the	law,	rather	
than	the	‘traitors’	who	were	already	in	parliament,	was	crucial	to	their	own	interests.	
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The	relationship	between	candidates	and	their	parties’	national	leadership	played	
some	role	in	shaping	how	candidates	used	these	symbols.	All	the	candidates	in	this	
study	were	party	members	with	strong	links	to	the	central	committee,	if	not	members	
of	it	themselves.	As	senior	representatives	of	the	party,	they	felt	more	inclined	to	
adopt	a	party	symbol	as	their	own.	It	was	also	made	more	likely	by	the	fact	that	all	
three	of	these	candidates	had	been	party	members	prior	to	being	nominated	and	
were	the	first‐ranked	party	candidate	in	their	respective	electorates.	They	felt	the	
need	to	uphold	the	reputation	of	the	party	and	paint	it	in	the	most	positive	light	
possible.	In	addition,	as	spokespersons	for	their	parties,	the	Gerindra	and	Nasdem	
candidates	were	public	figures	and	it	would	reflect	poorly	on	them	if	they	ignored	
party	rhetoric.	The	Hanura	candidate	was	a	keen	supporter	of	Wiranto	and	thus	also	
had	an	allegiance	to	the	party	and	incentive	to	support	its	rhetoric.		
	
However,	ultimately,	the	decision	to	uphold	party	symbols	was	driven	more	by	the	
candidates’	desire	to	win	than	by	their	sense	of	party	loyalty.	And	while	all	three	
candidates	asserted	that	they	wished	to	appeal	to	voters	by	denouncing	corruption	
and	portraying	themselves	as	clean,	they	still	had	to	gauge	their	local	context	when	
deciding	how	best	to	rouse	support	(Figure	6.1).		
	
	
Figure	6.1	Influences	upon	candidates’	political	campaign	strategy	
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Local	context	was	particularly	influential	for	candidates	chasing	votes,	because	their	
strategy	depended	on	selecting	symbols	that	were	pertinent	to	voters.	Also	
important,	however,	was	their	ability	to	influence	voters	using	kinship	ties	and	
broker	networks.	Where	such	ties	were	strong,	the	use	of	symbols	was	more	
consistent	because	the	candidate	could,	on	at	least	some	level,	be	assured	of	some	
voter	sympathy	if	not	outright	support.	But	these	local	relationships	still	needed	to	be	
complemented	with	effective	campaigns,	especially	where	candidates	needed	to	
appeal	to	swing	voters	or	if	more	than	one	candidate	had	strong	local	ties	in	the	same	
electorate.	Theoretically,	the	most	effective	approach	would	include	a	coordinated	
use	of	symbols,	representing	the	party	as	a	united	force	committed	to	eradicating	
corruption	and	working	for	the	benefit	of	the	people.	However,	given	the	geographic	
distances	and	the	different	scales	across	which	election	campaigns	occur	in	Indonesia,	
ensuring	that	party	symbols	are	promoted	in	a	consistent	manner	is	more	easily	said	
than	done.	
	
Diffusion	of	symbols	
In	general,	political	campaigns	in	Indonesia	are	highly	individualized.	Even	in	nation‐
wide	party	campaigns	media	attention	is	often	focused	on	key	party	figures,	rather	
than	on	relaying	the	party’s	vision	and	mission	as	a	whole.	Similarly,	at	the	local	level	
candidates	tend	to	emphasize	their	individual	family	or	ethnic	links	and	personal	
history	rather	than	the	platform	of	their	party.	The	nature	of	election	campaigns	in	
Indonesia	is	such	that	it	generates	two	different	arenas	of	campaign	‘theatre’.14	The	
arenas	are	distinguished	by	who	organizes	the	campaigns	and	the	scope	of	the	
audience.	Aspinall	(2014a:	101)	identifies	these	distinct	arenas	in	his	discussion	of	
the	different	terminology	used	to	describe	political	campaigns	in	Indonesia,	namely	
the	‘air’	and	‘ground’	wars.	On	the	one	hand,	there	is	a	national‐level	campaign	led	by	
professional	media	personnel	in	conjunction	with	senior	party	officials,	targeting	
voters	across	the	entire	country.	On	the	other	hand,	there	are	individual	candidates	
looking	to	raise	their	profile	within	specific	electoral	districts.	The	sense	that	national	
campaigns	are	removed	from	those	of	individual	candidates	is	cultivated	by	the	
nature	of	their	target	audience	and	the	strategies	those	target	audiences	inspire.	
These	two	theatrical	arenas	necessarily	use	different	campaign	methods	to	sell	the	
anti‐corruption	symbol	to	voters	(see	Table	6.1).	National	campaigns	are	designed	to	
																																																													
14	The	term	is	drawn	from	Blackbourn	(1987)	and	Apter	(2006)	(discussed	in	Chapter	One),	
who	argue	that	politics	is	a	form	of	theatre	because	it	involves	the	instrumental	manipulation	
of	symbols	in	order	to	attain	power.	
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appeal	broadly	but	are	relatively	static.	At	the	local	level,	because	of	their	direct	
proximity	to	voters,	candidates	are	more	susceptible	to	citizen	scrutiny	and	requests.		
	
Table	6.1	Summary	of	different	types	of	diffusion	in	election	campaigns	
	
NATIONAL	 INDIVIDUAL	
Non‐relational	 Relational	 Mediated	
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
s	
 Media	advertising	
 Media	reports	
 Television	advertising	
 Official	website	
 Social	media	
 Mass	public	rallies	
 Grassroots	meetings	
 Public	rallies	
 Donations	and/or	
contributions	
	
 Campaign	team	
 Brokers	
 Contributions	and	
other	material	rewards	
Ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s	
 Centralized	
 Unidirectional,	top‐
down	diffusion	
	
	
 Multi‐directional	
diffusion;	candidates’	
campaigns	influenced	
from	above	and	below	
 Campaign	strategies	
may	include	the	use	of	
symbols	and	vote‐
buying	
 Draws	upon	existing	
social	networks	for	
support	
 Used	to	facilitate	the	
transfer	of	
goods/money	to	
influence	voters	
O
ut
co
m
es
	
 Less	scope	for	voters	to	
directly	influence	
strategy	
 Themes	of	the	
campaign	and	
strategies	relatively	
static	
 Voters	are	able	to	
personally	make	
demands	of	candidates	
 Candidates	pressured	
to	respond	to	voter	
requests	
 Candidates	may	adapt	
campaigns	in	response	
to	voter	feedback	
 Logistically	easier	for	
candidates	to	gather	
votes	
 Easier	for	money	and	
goods	to	change	hands		
	
	
Cross‐scalar	diffusion	provides	a	conceptual	framework	for	understanding	the	
communication	of	symbols	during	an	electoral	campaign.	National	level	campaigns	
occur	primarily	through	what	diffusion	theorists	describe	as	non‐relational	forms	
such	as	publications,	the	media,	the	Internet	and	billboards.	Concentrations	of	
funding,	advertising	resources	and	marketing	and	communications	expertise	were	
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found	in	the	central	party	office,	controlled	by	the	Central	Committee.	While	party	
leaders	toured	the	country	prior	to	the	election	to	appear	at	rallies,	these	events	could	
hardly	be	considered	relational	forms	of	diffusion	as	there	was	little	direct	contact	
between	the	party	leaders	and	attendees.	The	efficacy	of	these	rallies	is	also	debatable	
given	that	people	were	often	paid	to	attend.15	Political	communication	in	these	
national	campaigns	was	generally	characterized	by	a	unidirectional	flow	of	
propaganda.	In	the	non‐relational	diffusion	of	ideas,	scope	for	dynamism	and	
multidirectional	flows	is	inherently	limited	by	the	lack	of	direct	contact	with	voters	or	
feedback	from	them.16	Using	dogmatic	and	absolutist	slogans,	which	do	not	invite	a	
response	from	citizens,	parties	discouraged	meaningful	voter	engagement.17	
Furthermore,	marketing	and	public	relations	experts	were	based	in	Jakarta	and	were	
unlikely	to	go	out	of	their	way	to	elicit	input	or	criticism	from	those	outside	of	major	
urban	centres,	let	alone	incorporate	feedback	into	the	campaign	strategy.		
	
While	national	campaigns	relied	primarily	on	non‐relational	diffusion,	many	
candidates	chose	to	campaign	on	the	ground,	hoping	to	garner	support	via	relational	
electioneering.	As	noted	in	Chapter	One,	relational	diffusion	is	premised	on	the	notion	
that	ideas	are	spread	by	contact	between	people,	flowing	between	them	on	the	basis	
of	trust.	To	say	that	Indonesian	voters	are	generally	distrustful	of	political	parties	is	
reflective	of	the	country’s	political	reality	(Tomsa	2014b:	249)	so	candidates	hoped	to	
build	social	capital	with	voters	through	direct	engagement.	Inspired	by	the	popularity	
of	now‐President	Jokowi’s	blusukan	style	of	campaigning‐	getting	closer	to	voters	by	
visiting	them	in	their	villages‐	candidates	wanted	to	be	seen	to	be	listening	to	voters.	
Thus,	trust‐building	was	premised	on	the	idea	that	meeting	the	candidates	in	person	
would	increase	support.	As	the	Hanura	candidate	explained,	‘If	they	don’t	know	you,	
they	can’t	love	you.’	While	candidates	did	use	posters,	stickers	and	the	media,	they	
generally	felt	that	meetings	with	villagers	were	most	influential.	All	of	the	candidates	
studied	lived	in	Jakarta,	and	therefore	had	to	travel	to	their	electorates	to	campaign	in	
person.	Each	assessed	that	this	was	a	crucial	part	of	their	campaigns	and	made	time	
to	tour	their	local	electorate.	
																																																													
15	As	discussed	in	Chapter	Four,	rallies	are	often	populated	by	paid	attendees	(Pepinsky	2014;	
Simandjuntak	2012:	101).	
16	Fionna	(2014)	argues	that	the	prominent	media	campaign	tactics	adopted	by	parties	fail	to	
truly	influence	their	intended	audience,	with	survey	findings	suggesting	that	voters	do	not	
consider	television	advertising	and	the	use	of	banners	and	posters,	which	are	the	primary	
mode	of	electioneering,	to	be	effective.	
17	For	example,	one	of	Gerindra’s	primary	campaign	slogans	was:	‘Gerindra	Wins,	Prabowo	is	
President’	(Gerindra	Menang,	Prabowo	Presiden).	
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On	their	visits	to	neighbourhoods	and	villages,	candidates	could	not	simply	give	a	
stump	speech.	They	had	to	be	open	to	voter	comments	and	requests—or	at	least	give	
the	impression	of	being	open	to	them—	in	order	to	gain	their	confidence.	This	was	
especially	important	if	they	did	not	have	familial	ties	to	the	area	or	other	kinds	of	
social	networks.	This	direct	interaction	between	candidates	and	voters	facilitated	a	
more	multi‐directional	flow	of	ideas.	Moreover,	the	influence	of	voters	themselves	
became	more	cogent,	since	candidates	generally	wanted	to	secure	their	votes	in	
advance.18	Candidates	thus	felt	pressured	to	meet	their	requests.	This	could	be	
problematic	because	some	villages	made	demands	that	could	not	be	addressed	within	
the	limits	of	the	candidate’s	budget.	In	addition,	the	candidate	had	to	decide	how	to	
proceed,	knowing	that	while	vote‐buying	was	standard	practice	in	some	places,	it	was	
also	illegal.	Although	it	was	unlikely	that	they	would	be	prosecuted	for	bribing	voters,	
they	risked	being	labelled	a	hypocrite	for	projecting	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	while	
at	the	same	time	using	money	politics	to	gain	support.19		
	
Some	of	the	difficulties	in	establishing	trust	on	the	ground	could	be	mitigated	by	using	
a	mediated	approach.	Campaign	teams	are	a	key	component	in	the	‘ground	war’,	
because	they	allow	candidates	to	make	use	of	the	trust	and	influence	of	respected	
community	members	in	their	team	in	order	to	reach	a	wider	group	of	people.20	These	
teams	often	include	members	who	are	hired	specifically	because	of	their	pre‐existing	
influence	within	areas	of	the	electorate.	This	practice	is	a	form	of	mediated	diffusion,	
which	occurs	through	the	use	of	a	‘broker’	to	connect	people	who	would	not	
otherwise	know	each	other,	that	is,	the	candidate	and	the	voter	via	the	broker.	
Brokers	are	valuable	because	they	provide	insight	into	the	voter	patterns	of	a	
neighbourhood:		
	
																																																													
18	Research	by	Aspinall	(2014a:	101)	on	the	strategies	of	individual	candidate	campaigns	
supports	this	assertion.	He	proposes	that	voters	preferred	candidates	who	were	able	to	
connect	with	ordinary	people,	speak	to	them	in	their	own	vernacular,	were	willing	to	visit	
them	in	their	own	homes	and	were	gracious	rather	that	“arrogant”.	As	a	result,	many	
candidates	adopted	campaign	strategies	that	prioritized	grassroots	meetings	rather	than	
media	campaigns	and	large‐scale	party	rallies.	
19	Thornley	(2014),	in	an	opinion	piece	written	following	the	election,	contends	that	vote‐
buying	and	money	politics	was	a	malignant	feature	of	the	legislative	elections	and	that	the	
Electoral	Supervisory	Board	(Badan	Pengawas	Pemilu,	Bawaslu)	did	not	demonstrate	‘a	clear	
commitment	to	prevent	and	prosecute	cases	of	electoral	corruption’.	
20	This	practice	is	common	in	several	countries	across	the	world.	For	example,	Callahan	
(2005)	explores	vote‐buying	and	social	norms	in	Thailand;	Gonzalez	Ocantos	et	al.	(2014)	
conducted	a	study	on	vote‐buying	norms	from	a	range	of	countries	in	South	America;	and	
Wantchekon	(2003)	provides	insight	into	vote‐buying	and	clientelism	in	Benin.	
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Of	particular	value	are	people	who	live	in	the	same	neighbourhood	as	the	set	
of	voters	for	whose	actions	they	are	responsible.	It	is	much	easier	for	a	
neighbourhood	insider	to	know	whose	children	are	ill,	who	turned	out	in	the	
last	election	and	who	stayed	home,	whether	a	voter	turned	against	a	party,	or	
who	seems	to	have	defected	and	voted	for	an	opponent,	despite	having	
benefitted	from	party	largesse	(Stokes	et	al.	2013:	19).		
	
Most	brokers	have	positions	of	influence	and	use	political	connections	to	assist	
people	to	gain	votes	in	their	neighbourhoods	(Gonzalez	Ocantos	et	al.	2014).	Where	a	
decision	is	made	to	distribute	goods	or	cash	to	voters,	brokers	do	so	on	behalf	of	the	
candidate—the	rationale	being	that	the	broker’s	social	status	will	add	value	to	the	
gifts	while	also	insulating	the	candidate	from	allegations	of	wrongdoing.	
	
The	broker	system,	by	its	very	nature,	requires	candidates	to	deeply	trust	their	
campaign	teams	as	it	can	be	difficult	for	candidates	to	ensure	that	brokers	fulfil	their	
promises	and	that	voters	who	take	their	money	do	in	fact	vote	for	them	(Stokes	et	al.	
2013).21	Employing	brokers	is	risky.	They	may	betray	the	candidate	they	agreed	to	
help,	for	example,	by	taking	money	from	several	opposing	candidates	in	one	area	or	
siphoning	money	from	the	funds	they	have	been	given	to	distribute	to	voters	
(Aspinall	2014c).	The	use	of	brokers	varied	between	the	individual	candidates	
observed	in	this	study,	influenced	by	their	personal	circumstances—experience,	
background	and	party	status	all	mattered.	The	Hanura	candidate	was	most	reliant	on	
advice	from	her	campaign	team,	who	convinced	her	to	engage	in	vote‐buying	in	the	
late	stages	of	the	campaign,	even	though	she	had	claimed	from	the	outset	to	be	
staunchly	against	the	practice.	The	Gerindra	candidate	used	the	same	people	he	had	
used	in	previous	campaigns,	with	whom	he	felt	he	had	established	strong	trust	
relationships.	As	a	result,	he	was	not	concerned	about	being	betrayed.	The	Nasdem	
candidate	primarily	used	party	cadres	to	organize	his	campaign	and	did	not	express	
any	suspicions	about	people	on	his	team	misusing	money.		
	
The	separate	campaign	spheres,	associated	with	different	types	of	diffusion,	also	had	
distinct	purposes.	The	national	campaign,	which	was	intended	to	represent	the	party	
as	a	whole,	focused	on	building	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	that	would	not	only	prime	
the	issue	of	corruption	but	also	establish	a	strong	ownership	of	the	issue.	Non‐
																																																													
21	For	a	comprehensive	overview	of	the	use	of	brokers	in	the	2014	Indonesian	legislative	
election,	see	Aspinall	(2014c).	
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directional	diffusion,	however,	left	little	room	for	nuanced	discussion	and	tended	
towards	propaganda.	Meanwhile,	the	two‐way	communication	flow	between	the	
individual	candidate	and	the	voters	facilitated	by	relational	interactions	accounted	for	
less	cohesive	symbol	development	as	well	as	divergent	strategies.	On	the	one	hand	
there	was	a	desire	to	own	the	anti‐corruption	symbol	and	be	perceived	as	just,	
righteous	and	clean.	On	the	other	hand,	there	was	a	strong	temptation	to	respond	to	
voter	demands	for	money	and	goods	in	order	to	secure	votes,	but	giving	in	to	this	
demand	would	damage	the	anti‐corruption	symbol	and	paint	the	candidates	and	their	
parties	as	hypocrites.	
	
Mixed	messages	
Emerging	parties	sought	to	own	the	anti‐corruption	symbol	because	they	thought	it	
would	help	them	achieve	their	electoral	goals.	Gerindra	became	the	third‐largest	
party	in	parliament,	Hanura	improved	on	its	2009	results	and	Nasdem	attracted	more	
than	enough	votes	to	ensure	its	presence	in	parliament—yet	all	three	fell	short	of	
their	stated	targets.	While	many	factors	contributed	to	these	results,	including	over‐
ambitious	targets,	it	is	clear	that	their	campaign	strategies	did	not	deliver.	Using	
symbolism	was	one	campaign	strategy	among	many,	and	anti‐corruption	symbols	
were	one	of	many	symbols	adopted	by	the	parties.	But	the	evidence	presented	here	
suggests	that,	while	potentially	a	positive	campaign	tool,	the	parties’	anti‐corruption	
symbols	failed	to	inspire	mass	support.		
	
A	key	reason	for	this	was	the	disjuncture	between	the	national	and	local	arenas.	
Disparities	between	national	and	individual	rhetoric,	as	a	consequence	of	the	relative	
independence	of	the	two	campaign	arenas,	led	to	an	inconsistent	use	of	anti‐
corruption	symbols.	While	the	campaigns	operated	simultaneously	and	had	the	same	
ultimate	goal—to	maximize	public	support	for	the	party—coordination	across	scales	
was	neither	prioritized	nor	encouraged.	Moreover,	the	relationship	between	the	two	
arenas	depended	on	the	candidate’s	own	status	within	the	party.	As	noted	above,	
candidates	with	party	leadership	roles	at	the	national	level	tended	to	adopt	campaign	
symbols	that	matched	those	selected	by	the	party.	At	times,	also,	they	used	their	
position	to	steer	the	party’s	campaign	in	a	direction	that	served	their	own	interests.	
This	was	the	case	with	the	Nasdem	candidate,	whose	main	priorities	included	the	
resolution	of	the	Bank	Century	case,	who	was	able	to	make	this	part	of	the	national	
party	symbol.	For	the	most	part,	though,	individual	candidates	had	very	little	
influence	upon	the	campaign	strategies	developed	by	their	party’s	central	committee.		
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The	converse	proved	to	be	almost	equally	true.	Parties	relying	on	individual	
candidates	to	adopt	campaign	symbols	used	at	the	national	level	also	ignored	the	
possible	motivations	that	candidates	may	have	for	running	for	office.	While	some	
candidates	were	already	party	members,	staff	or	even	leaders,	many	more	were	
recent	recruits	with	little	grounding	in	the	party’s	‘vision	and	mission’,	or	people	who	
simply	wished	to	run	for	office	and	went	shopping	for	a	party	to	allow	them	to	do	
so.22	Because	the	number	of	party	members	wanting	to	run	for	office	often	fell	short	
of	the	number	of	seats	available	in	any	given	electorate,	parties	often	approved	
candidates	that	were	more	interested	in	winning	than	adhering	to	party	norms.23	
Recruiting	candidates	from	outside	the	party	was	even	encouraged,	as	many	parties	
charged	a	fee	in	return	for	their	backing,	providing	a	revenue‐raising	opportunity	
(Mietzner	2013:	85).	Furthermore,	parties	made	little	effort	to	ensure	that	candidates	
were	genuinely	committed	to	party	values—in	fact,	it	was	widely	accepted	that	most	
candidates	felt	little	obligation	to	their	party	after	the	election	(Mietzner	2013:	85).	In	
many	cases,	the	only	real	requirement	was	that	the	candidate	paid	the	party	
nomination	fee	and/or	that	they	were	vote‐getters	who	could	potentially	amass	votes	
through	their	popularity	or	connections.24		
	
Parties,	moreover,	had	no	institutional	means	for	ensuring	that	symbols	were	used	
consistently	or	that	candidates	ran	clean	campaigns.	Half‐hearted	attempts	to	
sanction	wrongdoing	fell	to	the	party’s	ethics	committee,	which	handled	complaints	
and	reports	of	electoral	misconduct	internally.	If	party	members	were	found	to	have	
bought	votes	or	otherwise	used	funds	illegally	during	the	campaign,	then	they	were	
(theoretically)	answerable	to	both	the	ethics	committee	and	the	law	governing	
election	campaigns.25	Given	the	enormous	number	of	candidates	and	the	limited	
resources	of	the	party,	it	was	not	surprising	that	the	ethics	committee	was	rarely	
																																																													
22	Tomsa	(2014b:	269‐270)	argues	that	this	had	led	to	the	phenomenon	of	‘party	shopping’,	in	
which	candidates	would	simply	switch	parties	so	that	they	could	attain	the	highest	party	
ranking	possible.	While	the	open	list	system	has	effectively	abolished	this	need,	many	
candidates	still	believe	that	a	first‐ranked	position	will	increase	their	likelihood	of	success.	
23	Parties	wanting	to	run	the	maximum	number	of	candidates,	believing	that	this	will	translate	
to	the	maximum	number	of	votes,	often	need	to	recruit	candidates	from	outside	the	party.	This	
was	particularly	the	case	with	sourcing	female	candidates,	with	parties	required	by	law	to	
have	at	least	30	per	cent	female	candidates	on	their	candidate	lists	(Shair‐Rosenfield	2012:	
579‐580).		
24	Caraway	et	al.	(2014)	contend	that	this	is	the	case	with	many	trade	union	leaders	who	are	
invited	to	become	candidates	for	parties.	Political	parties	assume	that	these	candidates	can	
rally	votes	from	the	members	of	their	union,	therefore	acting	as	a	‘vote‐getter’	for	the	party.	
25	The	only	corruption	case	to	affect	an	emerging	party	during	the	2014	campaigns	was	
Hanura’s	case	of	Bambang	Soeharto.	The	party’s	ethics	committee	ruled	to	suspend	Soeharto’s	
membership	until	the	case	was	resolved,	but	otherwise	there	were	no	reported	cases	of	the	
ethics	committees	dismissing	party	members	for	illicit	activity	during	the	campaign.	
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called	upon	during	the	campaign	period.	Moreover,	if	used,	these	mechanisms	had	the	
potential	to	draw	publicity	to	illegal	campaign	practices	within	the	party,	which	could	
damage	its	reputation.	Whether	compelled	by	lack	of	resources	or	lack	of	will,	the	
ethics	committee	could	also	simply	choose	to	ignore	complaints.	The	most	common	
accusations	of	money	politics	and	vote‐buying	were,	in	fact,	usually	lodged	via	
informal	channels	by	fellow	party	candidates.26	Sometimes	these	complaints	reflected	
disputes	surrounding	territory,	access	to	resources,	or	party‐list	candidate	rankings.	
Such	complaints	were	usually	expressed	to	branch	office	party	leaders	rather	than	
national	office	because	those	relationships	were	generally	stronger	and	local	party	
elites	were	more	attuned	to	the	campaign	activities	of	candidates.	However,	even	
when	such	complaints	were	made	from	within	the	party,	dismissals	were	
uncommon.27	The	lack	of	oversight	of	individual	candidates	leads	to	questions	about	
whether	the	parties	were	genuinely	committed	to	preventing	electoral	corruption.	As	
noted	earlier,	party	rhetoric	formulated	at	the	national	level	aimed	to	convince	people	
that	they	were	committed	to	maintaining	the	integrity	of	their	parties—that	is,	
ensuring	that	their	members	did	not	act	illegally—and	to	the	eradication	of	
corruption	more	broadly.	But	the	parties’	anti‐corruption	symbols	were	conveniently	
vague	on	the	use	of	money	politics	in	elections,	and	the	lack	of	effective	oversight	
mechanisms	implied	little	interest	in	policing	the	problem.		
	
With	almost	no	input	or	oversight	of	local	campaigns	by	the	parties’	central	
committees	after	the	candidates	had	been	selected,	it	was	ultimately	up	to	individuals	
as	to	whether	they	adopted	an	anti‐corruption	symbol,	how	they	constructed	that	
symbol,	what	rhetoric	they	used,	and	whether	they	sustained	the	symbol	throughout	
their	entire	campaign.	While	national	party	symbols	had	some	influence,	candidates	
																																																													
26	Party	members	could	report	back	to	the	local,	provincial	or	central	party	leader(s)	about	
perceived	breaches	by	other	party	candidates.	During	fieldwork	this	process	was	observed	
once	in	the	East	Java	electorate	where	a	DPRD	II	candidate	had	complained	about	the	tactics	of	
a	national	level	candidate,	who	was	also	a	well‐known	businessman,	accusing	him	of	spending	
vast	sums	of	money	to	buy	votes	in	particular	villages	with	which	the	DPRD	II	candidate	was	
connected.	The	accusations	were	common	knowledge	within	the	party	and	a	hot	topic	of	
conversation	for	several	weeks.	In	spite	of	this,	the	candidate	suffered	no	sanctions,	nor	was	
there	an	investigation	into	the	allegations.	The	Hanura	candidate	held	that	the	party	needed	
the	businessman’s	money	and	therefore	was	reluctant	to	dismiss	him.	
27	Some	effort	was	made	to	police	campaign	territory	to	avoid	overlapping	campaigns.	This	
was	observed	anecdotally	in	all	three	case	studies,	although	its	intensity	depended	on	how	
involved	individual	party	leaders	at	the	local	level	were	willing	to	become	in	the	disputes	
between	candidates	during	the	campaign.	Hamdi	(Forthcoming:	186)	describes	the	territorial	
divisions	between	candidates	in	Madiun,	East	Java,	noting	that	striving	for	territorial	
dominance	in	areas	of	influence	and	advantage	was	a	popular	election	strategy.	
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focused	on	promoting	a	personal	rhetoric	in	their	campaigns.28	The	distinction	
between	rhetoric	used	by	the	parties	and	individual	candidates	reflected	the	different	
arenas	in	which	they	operated.	A	further	explanation	for	the	disparity	between	
national	and	local	level	campaigns	was	that	the	symbols	identified	by	the	party	simply	
did	not	resonate	with	voters	in	particular	electorates.	Individual	candidates	who	
chose	to	prioritize	personal	encounters	with	voters	found	that	anti‐corruption	
discourse	could	be	unpersuasive.	For	those	campaigning	on	the	ground,	it	was	all	too	
evident	that	the	provision	of	material	rewards	remained	an	integral	part	of	electoral	
politics.	Candidates	commonly	distributed	election	paraphernalia	(such	as	t‐shirts	
and	stickers)	and	provided	food	and	entertainment	at	rallies	in	order	to	invoke	
backing	from	citizens.	But	that	was	often	not	enough:	voters	were	used	to	being	
offered	material	rewards	for	their	support	and	proved	in	many	cases	not	only	to	be	
comfortable	with	the	practice,	but	indeed	to	expect	it.		
	
Cognitive	dissonance	is	generated	between	the	voters’	perception	that	money	politics	
continues	to	be	the	modus	operandi	of	candidates	and	parties’	anti‐corruption	
rhetoric,	which	ultimately	undermines	the	anti‐corruption	symbol	itself.	Ethos	was	
lost,	as	it	is	difficult	to	establish	moral	credibility	within	a	system	that	seems	so	
thoroughly	corrupted.	All	three	candidates	complained	about	money	politics,	but	
even	they	had	to	carefully	consider	the	pros	and	cons	of	refusing	to	engage	in	it.	For	
example,	the	Hanura	candidate—who	did	not	have	the	same	local	connections	as	
other	candidates,	and	thus	found	it	more	difficult	to	win	over	people—believed	at	the	
outset	of	her	campaign	that	she	could	garner	support	through	an	anti‐corruption	
symbol	and	by	promoting	herself	as	clean	and	honest.	She	cautioned	villagers	against	
accepting	money	for	candidates,	as	vote‐buying	leads	to	poor	government	
representatives	that	will	not	protect	the	interests	of	ordinary	folk.	Citizens,	she	
argued,	should	select	the	person	who	is	most	committed	to	representing	their	
interests,	not	the	person	who	offers	the	most	money.	But,	in	the	end,	she	felt	that	this	
																																																													
28	The	tradition	of	figure‐centric	politics	continues	to	be	evident	today,	demonstrated	both	by	
the	national	party‐level	focus	on	promoting	(potential)	presidential	candidates	and	the	
individual‐centric	campaigns	of	the	candidates	themselves.	Alongside	campaigns	based	on	
symbols,	parties	also	attempted	to	appeal	to	voters	based	on	their	preferred	presidential	
candidate.	Some	parties,	including	Gerindra	and	Hanura,	identified	their	presidential	
nominees	from	the	outset.	In	the	same	vein,	PDIP	used	the	nomination	of	Jokowi	to	garner	
popular	support	amongst	voters,	hoping	that	people	would	vote	for	the	party	because	they	
wanted	Jokowi	to	become	the	next	president	(Kwok	2014).	The	so‐called	‘Jokowi	effect’	was	
expected	to	help	PDIP	gain	enough	votes	to	nominate	him	as	a	presidential	candidate	without	
having	to	form	a	coalition	with	other	parties.	PDIP	did	gain	more	parliamentary	seats	than	any	
other	party	in	the	election,	but	fell	short	of	expectations,	with	the	party	failing	to	obtain	over	
20	per	cent	of	votes	(Croft‐Cusworth	2014;	McRae	2014;	Mietzner	2014:	118).	
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approach	was	ineffective,	not	because	she	was	unsuccessful	in	creating	an	anti‐
corruption	symbol,	but	rather	because	voters	were	not	actually	interested	in	clean	
candidates.	Her	opinion	was	supported	by	an	Indikator	survey	released	in	December	
2013,	which	found	that	41.5	per	cent	of	those	surveyed	considered	vote‐buying	an	
‘acceptable	part	of	democracy’	while	only	4.3	per	cent	of	those	surveyed	said	they	
would	not	accept	any	form	of	payment	for	their	vote	(Halim	2013).29	
	
Ultimately,	all	three	candidates	felt	pressure	to	use	money	to	gain	influence.30	This	
put	them	in	a	difficult	position—knowing	that	the	party	symbol	contradicted	the	
election	norms	of	money	politics	and	vote‐buying	and	that	they	jeopardized	their	
chances	of	winning	if	they	refused	to	use	money	as	a	tool	of	persuasion	altogether.	
While	the	candidates	hoped	that	anti‐corruption	rhetoric	would	appeal	to	their	
constituents—both	because	it	was	part	of	their	own	moral	beliefs	and	vote‐buying	
was	prohibitively	expensive—in	reality,	they	did	not	find	this	to	be	the	case.	Research	
from	other	countries	suggests	at	least	two	factors	that	may	foster	such	a	situation.	
First,	as	Gonzalez	Ocantos	et	al.	(2014)	found	in	their	cross‐national	study	of	Latin	
American	states,	the	more	normal	vote‐buying	is,	the	less	stigmatized	people	who	do	
it	will	be.	People	rationalize	their	behaviour	to	avoid	cognitive	dissonance,	because	no	
one	likes	to	think	of	themselves	as	‘bad’.	Thus,	if	people	have	accepted	money	in	the	
past,	they	may	be	reluctant	to	buy	into	anti‐corruption	symbolism	because	it	will	
force	them	to	accept	that	they	have	been	‘bad’	in	the	past.	Second,	as	Balmas	and	
Sheafer	(2010:	208)	contend	in	relation	to	Israel,	the	more	salient	an	issue	is	to	the	
public	mind,	the	more	likely	it	is	to	be	a	criterion	for	candidate	evaluation.	It	seems	
that	corruption,	at	least	in	some	electorates,	was	simply	not	as	salient	an	issue	as	
candidates	had	expected.	As	a	consequence,	they	adopted	multifaceted	campaigns	
																																																													
29	This	study	did	not	seek	to	determine	why	the	electorate	continues	to	seek	material	rewards	
for	their	votes.	However,	the	case	studies	demonstrate	that	this	was	a	persistent	question	
faced	by	candidates.	A	number	of	academics	have	proposed	explanations	for	this	
phenomenon.	Goodpaster	(2002:	100)	argues	that	citizens	understand	that	their	opinions	are	
of	little	consequence	to	office‐holders	once	elected—a	sentiment	that	remains	true	today—
and	so	believe	that	candidates	are	accountable	to	their	constituents	only	during	their	bids	for	
(re)election.	Having	been	represented	by	parliamentarians	who	paid	little	attention	to	their	
needs	in	the	past,	voters	have	become	accustomed	to	judging	candidates	on	the	material	
benefits	they	offer	in	the	‘here	and	now’.	Voter	cynicism	towards	politicians	is	not	new:	
Aspinall	(2005a)	argues	that	it	was	common	early	on	in	the	Reformasi	period.	The	corruption	
scandals	during	Yudhoyono’s	second	term	did	little	to	quell	this	cynicism.	
30	This	is	supported	by	Mietzner	(2014:	119),	who	argues	that	the	2014	elections	
demonstrated	the	‘continued	importance	of	money	and	organized	machine	politics	in	post‐
Suharto	Indonesia’.	Research	by	McRae	(2013:	291)	also	found	that	the	cost	of	running	for	
office	can	be	‘prohibitively	expensive’,	with	parliamentarians	interviewed	estimating	that	they	
would	spend	around	USD100,000	on	their	re‐election	campaigns	for	2014.	
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that	integrated	anti‐corruption	symbolism	into	electoral	strategies	that	also	included	
the	use	of	vote	brokers	and	money	politics	in	order	to	influence	voters.	
In	order	to	rationalize	the	incongruence	of	combining	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	with	
money	politics	and	vote‐buying,	the	candidates	framed	their	use	of	money	as	
donations,	reimbursements,	or	culturally‐necessary	gifts—all	of	which	were	not	only	
normal	election	practice	but	are	widely	accepted.	They	openly	admitted	to	
strategically	using	donations	and	giving	gifts	in	order	to	persuade	voters,	but	
vigorously	denied	that	they	had	engaged	in	money	politics.	In	doing	so,	they	mediated	
the	underlying	cognitive	dissonance	they	experienced	by	narrowly	defining	money	
politics	and	vote‐buying	and	distinguishing	it	from	other	payments,	which,	although	
intended	to	persuade,	fall	outside	the	narrow	limits	of	the	definitions	they	adopted.	
This	also	allowed	the	candidates	to	maintain	that	they	were	‘clean’	in	spite	of	
distributing	money,	therefore,	retaining	their	anti‐corruption	symbol	and	sustaining	
its	link	to	broader	party	symbols.		
	
Conclusion	
Political	symbol	theory	allows	us	to	understand	that	the	intention	of	emerging	
parties’	use	of	anti‐corruption	symbols	was	to	influence	the	audience	and	gain	votes	
rather	than	necessarily	being	a	sincere	reflection	of	political	principles.	Successful	
alignment	with	a	particular	political	symbol	depends	upon	well‐constructed	rhetoric	
that	is	able	to	persuade	voters	that	the	symbols	put	forward	are	a	true	reflection	of	
authentic	goals.	While	both	the	national	campaigns	of	the	emerging	parties	and	the	
local	campaigns	of	those	parties’	individual	candidates	attempted	to	mobilize	an	anti‐
corruption	symbol,	neither	truly	achieved	ownership	of	the	symbol—let	alone	
coherence	across	scales.	The	deep	disconnect	between	the	anti‐corruption	symbol	
constructed	at	the	national	level	and	what	happened	on	the	ground	compromised	the	
symbol’s	integrity.	At	the	national	level,	parties	competed	to	be	seen	as	the	‘cleanest’	
and	the	most	firm	against	corruption.	Individual	candidates,	however,	found	that—
despite	the	apparent	traction	of	the	anti‐corruption	movement—money	still	talks.	
	
This	lack	of	cohesion	provides	a	prism	for	understanding	one	of	the	key	political	
paradoxes	of	Indonesia:	how	can	anti‐corruption	rhetoric	be	so	widespread	and	yet	
money	politics	and	vote‐buying	be	so	prolific?	The	simultaneous	existence	of	these	
phenomena	can	be	explained	at	least	in	part	by	the	lack	of	coherence	within	political	
parties	during	electoral	campaigns.	In	2014,	party	actors	in	the	national	arena	
constructed	symbols	with	little	input	from	the	voters,	identifying	corruption	as	a	
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popular	political	issue.	When	individual	candidates	invoked	these	symbols	in	their	
‘ground	wars’,	the	reaction	of	voters	demonstrated	that	the	assumed	salience	of	the	
issue	did	not	always	result	in	electoral	support.	The	candidates	examined	in	this	
study	truly	wanted	to	run	a	clean	campaign.	However,	they	faced	a	conflict	between	
morality	and	practicality.	Vote‐buying	is	a	risky	endeavour	with	uncertain	returns.	
But	while	paying	may	not	guarantee	a	win,	failure	to	distribute	material	rewards	
almost	certainly	guaranteed	a	loss.	Refusal	to	engage	in	money	politics	and	vote‐
buying	thus	meant	jeopardizing	their	electoral	fate.	
	
The	incongruity	between	what	happens	at	these	different	scales	demonstrates	the	
fragmented	nature	of	political	parties	more	broadly,	reflecting	that	they	are	not	a	
single,	coherent	entity,	but	a	collection	of	individuals	with	their	own	interests	and	
priorities.	The	successful	use	of	political	symbols	in	campaigns	depends,	to	some	
extent,	on	consistency	of	rhetoric	and	action.	While	already	primed,	an	anti‐
corruption	symbol	loses	all	persuasive	power	if	it	is	not	credible,	demonstrable	and	
convincingly	relayed.	As	political	parties	and	candidates	already	have	to	battle	voter	
perceptions	of	being	untrustworthy	and	corrupt,	the	lack	of	cohesion	in	political	
symbols—particularly	between	what	voters	hear	and	what	they	experience—
undermines	the	use	of	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	as	a	whole,	squandering	resources	
and	opportunities	to	truly	connect	with	voters	and	limiting	their	chances	of	success.
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Conclusion	
	
Several	studies	have	identified	the	important	role	of	political	campaigns	in	
determining	the	outcome	of	elections	(Dalton	2000:	923‐924;	Edelman	1988;	
Grofman	1985;	Kraus	and	Giles	1989;	Rosenberg	et	al.	1991;	Smith	2001;	Trilling	
1975).	Studying	the	selection,	development	and	mobilization	of	political	symbols	
during	election	campaigns	allows	us	to	better	understand	the	relationship	between	
rhetoric,	persuasion	and	political	outcomes.	A	close	analysis	of	emerging	parties’	
campaigns	in	the	lead‐up	to	Indonesia’s	2014	national	legislative	elections	provides	a	
basis	for	analysing	the	successes	and	failures	of	symbol	development	and	promotion	
both	by	the	parties	and	the	candidates	who	represented	them.	In	focusing	on	their	
use	of	anti‐corruption	symbols,	this	thesis	has	offered	an	explanation	for	why	these	
symbols	failed	to	help	parties	achieve	the	results	they	were	hoping	for.	
	
In	the	opening	chapters	of	this	thesis,	the	contextual	significance	of	corruption	as	a	
political	issue	and,	subsequently,	of	anti‐corruption	sentiment,	was	highlighted	
through	a	historical	account	of	the	use	and	manipulation	of	anti‐corruption	symbols	
since	Indonesian	independence.	Appreciating	how	anti‐corruption	symbols	have	been	
used	(and	abused)	by	politicians	in	the	past,	it	is	not	surprising	that	corruption	
remains	a	concern,	especially	given	the	frequency	and	seriousness	of	corruption	
scandals	in	the	period	preceding	the	2014	national	legislative	election.	A	recounting	
of	both	the	long‐term	and	more	recent	history	of	corruption,	and	attempts	to	foster	
an	anti‐corruption	symbol,	provides	the	context	both	for	why	these	symbols	were	so	
prominent	in	2014	and	why	their	projection	carried	certain	risks.	Emerging	parties,	
in	particular,	were	able	to	benefit	from	the	recent	corruption	scandals	faced	by	rivals,	
but	adopting	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	was	also	perilous	because	it	had	backfired	for	
other	parties,	namely	the	Democratic	Party	and	PKS,	in	the	very	recent	past,	and	this	
was	still	fresh	in	voters’	minds.	
	
Using	a	framework	of	analysis	drawn	from	insights	provided	by	theoretical	literature	
on	political	symbolism,	the	thesis	then	honed	in	on	the	two	basic	elements	of	election	
campaigns	identified	by	Norris	(2002):	the	messages	that	the	campaign	wishes	to	
communicate	and	the	channel(s)	of	communication	employed	to	relay	those	
messages.	The	framing	of	campaign	messages	was	described	using	the	lens	of	rhetoric	
and	dramatism	as	tools	of	persuasion,	while	channels	of	communication	were	
explored	using	pertinent	aspects	of	diffusion	theory.	In	analysing	the	qualitative	data	
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collected	related	to	these	two	elements,	this	study	also	assessed	the	impact	of	these	
messages	upon	target	audiences	and	the	feedback	loop	from	the	audience	back	to	the	
campaigning	organization.	
	
In	order	to	more	comprehensively	understand	how	anti‐corruption	symbols	were	
imagined	and	promoted	to	the	public,	symbol	use	was	studied	at	the	national	and	
local	levels.	The	nature	of	campaigns	at	these	scales	was	very	different,	especially	
with	regard	to	the	target	audience	and	the	type	of	diffusion	involved.	At	the	national	
level,	emerging	parties’	professional	public	relations	managers	created	homogenous	
campaigns	intended	to	establish	anti‐corruption	credentials	nationally.	Selling	the	
symbol	non‐relationally	to	voters,	the	parties	invoked	a	simplistic	anti‐corruption	
discourse	that	blamed	the	incumbent	government’s	lack	of	commitment	and	the	
greed	of	government	officials	for	the	ongoing	lack	of	progress	in	corruption	
eradication.	Perhaps	more	importantly,	the	centralized	decision‐making	that	
underpinned	these	nation‐wide	campaigns	was	far	removed	from	the	day‐to‐day	
campaign	activities	of	individual	candidates,	who	were	left	to	promote	themselves	
with	little	guidance	or	oversight.		
	
For	the	2014	election,	the	candidates	followed	in	this	study	could	choose	to	adopt	or	
ignore	their	party’s	anti‐corruption	symbol.	In	each	case,	the	extent	to	which	the	
symbol	was	harnessed	depended	heavily	on	the	candidate’s	personal	history	and	how	
useful	they	thought	the	symbol	would	be	in	attracting	support.	As	such,	their	personal	
choices,	beliefs	and	local‐level	experiences	shaped	their	campaigns	far	more	than	any	
national	party‐level	symbols	ever	could.	Local	context	was	also	extremely	important	
in	settling	on	a	campaign	strategy.	In	addition	to	factors	such	as	the	extent	to	which	
candidates	were	embedded	in	local	communities,	the	prevalence	of	money	politics	in	
those	communities	was	influential,	as	candidates	had	to	gauge	its	potential	effect	on	
their	chances	of	being	elected.	In	cases	where	the	use	of	money	politics	by	rivals	
posed	a	real	threat	to	electoral	success,	the	candidates—all	of	whom	had	stated	at	the	
outset	that	they	would	like	to	portray	themselves	as	clean	and	avoid	money	politics—
were	forced	to	decide	whether	they	would	maintain	an	anti‐corruption	symbol	or	not.		
	
This	finding	sheds	further	light	on	the	paradox	of	corruption	in	Indonesia:	although	it	
is	almost	universally	condemned	it	is	also	exceedingly	prevalent,	not	only	within	elite	
political	circles	but	also	within	voter	communities.	Money	politics	is	seen	as	par	for	
the	course,	not	least	by	voters,	many	of	whom	both	expect	and	embrace	it.	The	
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dilemma	faced	by	these	candidates,	who	chose	to	adopt	anti‐corruption	symbols	but	
were	then	confronted	by	the	demands	of	voters	that	contradicted	this	symbol,	was	
not	easily	resolved.	The	stereotype	of	Indonesian	candidates	as	wanting	to	win	at	any	
cost	was	challenged	through	this	considered	portrait	of	three	(aspiring)	politicians,	
both	in	terms	of	how	they	viewed	themselves	and	how	they	reconciled	their	choice	to	
use	anti‐corruption	symbols	with	the	realities	they	faced	during	their	campaigns.	
Candidates	are	commonly	assumed	to	be	‘corrupt’,	but	the	case	studies	presented	
here	demonstrate	that,	at	least	for	some,	the	decision	to	engage	in	money	politics	was	
not	taken	lightly.	The	illegal	practices	they	adopted	were	a	pragmatic,	yet	reluctant,	
response	to	local	context	and	their	interpretation	of	voter	demands,	rather	than	a	
pre‐meditated	strategy	for	victory.	
	
Diffusion	theory,	meanwhile,	provided	a	valuable	mechanism	for	understanding	the	
inconsistencies	that	occur	in	election	campaigns	explaining	this	paradox	in	terms	of	
the	disconnect	between	rhetoric	at	the	national	level	and	actions	at	the	local	level.	It	
also	reveals	the	inconsistencies	in	the	legal,	moral	and	sociological	definitions	of	
corruption	that	co‐exist	in	Indonesia.	Legal	definitions	of	corruption	are	routinely	
criticized	for	their	limitations	(Cheng	and	Zaum	2008;	Philp	2008)	while	moral	
interpretations	of	corruption	are	drawn	from	religion	and	culture,	also	making	them	
difficult	to	classify.	Sociological	definitions	of	corruption,	which	frame	behaviour	in	
terms	of	what	is	deemed	acceptable	or	unacceptable,	are	at	odds	with	both	the	legal	
and	stated	moral	views	of	corruption	held	by	candidates.	The	illegal	practices	they	
engaged	in,	such	as	giving	goods	and	cash	to	voters,	is	so	normalized	in	Indonesia	that	
candidates	could	re‐frame	them	as	being	acceptable	and	routine;	even	culturally	
appropriate.	The	lack	of	accord	between	the	three	facets	of	the	definition	undermines	
the	coherence	of	the	symbol	and,	therefore,	its	ethos.	Despite	all	the	resources	
candidates	put	into	constructing	a	symbol,	both	in	terms	of	finances	and	time,	the	
symbol	presented	is	fundamentally	flawed,	rendering	these	efforts	largely	fruitless.	
	
Theoretically,	this	thesis	speaks	to	the	literature	on	the	selection,	development	and	
broadcasting	of	political	symbols	in	election	campaigns	by	elucidating	the	
relationship	between	symbol	development,	mobilization	and	effectiveness.	In	doing	
so,	it	has	deepened	our	understanding	of	the	use	of	political	symbols	by	
demonstrating	that	symbols	present	both	an	opportunity	and	a	risk	to	those	who	
adopt	them.	Edelman’s	(1964;1977)	seminal	discussion	of	political	symbols	frames	
them	primarily	in	terms	of	their	persuasive	value	and	their	impact	on	public	
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acquiescence,	an	interpretation	that	has	continued	largely	unchallenged.	Marrying	
political	symbol	discourse	and	theories	of	persuasion	and	rhetoric,	this	thesis	has	
found	that	the	campaign	rhetoric	around	the	issue	of	corruption	was	not	cohesive,	
ultimately	undermining	the	value	of	the	anti‐corruption	symbol.	This	lack	of	cohesion	
placed	additional	weight	on	local	contexts	and	individual	strategies.	Candidates	
exploited	their	local	ties	or	used	money	politics,	rather	than	directing	their	efforts	to	
formulating	a	more	compelling	anti‐corruption	symbol	to	capture	the	imagination	of	
voters.	Party	anti‐corruption	symbols	were	undermined	by	others’	attempts—and	
even	those	of	the	candidates	themselves—to	win	voters	over	with	donations	or	
favours.	
	
This	thesis	also	extends	diffusion	theory	from	its	basis	in	social	movement	studies,	as	
developed	by	Givan	et	al.	(2010)	and	Tarrow	(2011),	to	understand	the	parameters	
and	constraints	of	election	campaigning	at	different	scales.	Applying	diffusion	theory	
to	campaign	strategies	and	classifying	them	as	non‐relational,	relational	and	
mediated,	allows	for	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	how	different	aspects	of	
campaigning	can	both	support	and	weaken	symbol	construction.	While	many	studies	
focus	either	on	the	actions	of	nation‐wide	campaigns	or	individual	candidates,	this	
thesis	combined	the	two	in	order	to	fully	explain	the	impact	of	intra‐party	relations	
on	campaign	messages.	The	application	of	diffusion	theory	in	this	way	illustrated	the	
importance	of	considering	election	campaigns	at	a	variety	of	scales	in	order	to	gain	a	
holistic	picture	of	how	symbols	are	used	and	why	they	fail	to	resonate.		
	
The	incongruence	between	national	and	individual	campaigns	described	in	this	study	
is	a	consequence	of	the	lack	of	coordination	across	scale,	confirming	the	critiques	of	
Sartori	(1976),	Deschouwer	(2003)	and	Fabre	(2011)	of	the	tendency	to	view	parties	
as	monolithic	entities.	In	observing	party	interactions	at	a	number	of	levels,	this	
thesis	further	develops	this	insight	by	highlighting	the	importance	not	only	of	parties’	
subunits	and	internal	systems,	but	of	individuals,	who	have	the	power	to	establish	
their	own	systems	amongst	voters	with	the	assistance	of	their	campaign	teams	and	
brokers.	Further	challenging	the	view	that	parties	are	unified	organizations,	this	
study	demonstrated	that	the	role	of	individual	candidates	is	paramount	in	elections.	
While	joining	a	party	was	necessary,	and	may	have	offered	candidates	a	brand	name	
to	rally	behind,	their	own	background	and	local	context—including	the	pervasiveness	
of	money	politics	at	the	grassroots	level,	which	constituted	a	nearly	insurmountable	
	
199	
	
obstacle	to	those	wishing	to	retain	a	clean	reputation—	remained	influential	in	
determining	their	popularity	with	voters.	
	
Given	that	political	symbols	are	constructed	for	the	purpose	of	acquiring	or	
maintaining	power,	their	success	or	failure	speaks	to	the	political	party’s	ability	to	
effectively	use	their	resources	to	influence	electoral	outcomes.	A	well‐chosen	and	
convincingly	portrayed	symbol	has	the	ability	to	sway	voters	and,	consequently,	
confer	power	on	a	particular	party	or	individual.	This	thesis	confirms	Keane’s	(1997)	
assertion	that	the	social	spaces	in	which	symbols	occur	play	a	crucial	role	in	
determining	their	influence.	Parties	and	candidates	assumed	that	anti‐corruption	
symbols	would	be	popular	because	they	were	primed	by	the	existing	political	context;	
however,	aligning	themselves	with	the	symbol	proved	not	only	difficult,	but	in	some	
cases	ineffective.	To	some	extent,	national	campaigns	could	afford	to	overlook	local	
context	because	of	their	emphasis	on	widespread,	non‐relational	dissemination	of	
their	campaign	symbol.	Yet	while	the	black‐and‐white	narrative	of	corruption	issues	
presented	in	these	campaigns	suggests	that	parties,	and	the	candidates	who	chose	to	
adopt	the	symbol,	viewed	corruption	as	a	moral	‘non‐negotiable’,	it	was,	in	fact,	a	
highly	malleable	concept	in	the	minds	of	voters.	Keane’s	argument	resonates	
particularly	at	this	local	level	because	the	success	of	symbols	was	determined	by	how	
well	they	were	received	by	individual	voters.	While	citizens	may	have	supported	anti‐
corruption	movements	against	those	in	the	upper	echelons	of	power—such	as	
criticizing	the	abuse	of	power	by	government	officials—they	did	not	necessarily	
associate	vote‐buying	or	money	politics	with	corruption,	despite	it	being	an	illegal	
exchange.	
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Appendices	
Appendix	1:	Surveys	from	January	2010‐	2014	addressing	the	popularity	of	
parties	and	the	President	
Released	 Institution	 Findings	
Jan	2010	 Lembaga	Survei	
Indonesia	
Yudhoyono	and	Vice‐President Boediono's	approval	rating	
down	from	85%	in	July	2009	to	70%	in	January	2010.1	
Dec	2010	 Lembaga	Survei	
Indonesia	
Yudhoyono's	approval	rating	at	63%.	Democratic	Party	the	
most	popular	party	with	21.4%	of	votes.2	
May	2011	 Lembaga	Survei	
Indonesia	
Yudhoyono's	approval	rating	at	56%.3
Jun	2011	 Lingkaran	Survei	
Indonesia	
Satisfaction	 with	 the	 Yudhoyono‐Boediono	 leadership	 at	
47.2%.4	
Sep	2011	 Lingkaran	Survei	
Indonesia	
Satisfaction	 with	 the	 Yudhoyono‐Boediono	 leadership	 at	
37.7%.5	
Jan	2012	 Lembaga	Survei	
Indonesia	
Only	10.5%	only	those	surveyed	plan	to	vote	for	the	
Democratic	party.6	
Feb	2012	 CSIS Survey	showed	no	party	had	a	clear	lead in	the	2014	
elections,	although	PDIP	was	slightly	in	front.7	
Jun	2012	 Lingkaran	Survei	
Indonesia	
Megawati	from	PDIP the	most	popular	candidate	for	
president	with	18.2%	of	the	vote.	No	candidate	from	the	
Democratic	Party	rated	in	the	survey.8	
July	2012	 CSIS 54%	of	those	surveyed	are	not	satisfied	with	Yudhoyono's	
performance	as	President.9	
Apr	2013	 CSIS 2.7%	of	respondents	plan	to	vote	for	PKS.10
Transparency	
International	
Indonesia	
Gerindra,	PAN	and	PDIP are	the	most	'transparent'	parties	
in	the	electoral	race	according	to	those	surveyed.11	
May	2013	 Lembaga	Survei	
Nasional	
3.8%	of	respondents	plan	to	vote	for	PKS.12
																																																													
1	As	reported	by	BBC	Indonesia	(BBC	Indonesia	2010).	
2	As	reported	in	Tempo	(Jusuf	2011).	
3	As	reported	in	Indonesia‐2014	(Indonesia‐2014	2012).		
4	As	reported	by	Detik.com	(Nugroho	2011).	
5	‘As	reported	by	Okezone	(Wirakusuma	2011).	
6	As	reported	in	Rakyat	Merdeka	(Dalimunthe	2012).	
7	As	reported	in	the	Jakarta	Post	(Dewi	2012).	
8	As	reported	in	Tempo	(Wijaya	2012).	
9	As	reported	by	Detik.com	(Dhurandara	2012).	
10	As	reported	in	Republika	(Ruslan	2013).	
11	As	reported	by	BBC	Indonesia	(BBC	Indonesia	2013).	
12	Survey	results	posted	to	the	website	of	Lembaga	Survei	Nasional	(2013).	
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Released	 Institution	 Findings	
Jul	2013	 SPACE	 43%	of	those	surveyed	plan	not	to	vote	(golput).	Golkar,	
PDIP	and	Gerindra	lead	the	parties	in	popularity.13	
Soegeng	Sarjadi	
School	of	
Governance	
In	party	polling, PDIP is	most	popular	with	13.6%	of	the	
vote,	while	the	Democratic	Party	has	fallen	to	10.3%	of	
votes.	Meanwhile	Islamic	parties	have	declined	in	
popularity	and	PKS	holds	only	1.88%	of	the	vote.14	
Jul	2013	 Lembaga	Survei	
Nasional	
Hanura	and	Gerindra	are	perceived	as	being	the	two	
cleanest	(bersih)	parties	in	the	election	race.15		
Sep	2013	 Indonesian	Network	
Election	Survey	
56.3%	of	respondents	are	not	satisfied	with	the	efforts	of	
Yudhoyono	and	Boediono.	90.2%	of	respondents	associate	
their	government	with	corruption	and	scandal.16	
Oct	2013	 Lingkaran	Survei	
Indonesia	
Jokowi	and	Prabowo	are	the	presidential	favourites	and	
the	three	most	popular	parties	are:	Golkar,	PDIP	and	the	
Democratic	Party.17	
Oct	2013	 Political	Weather	
Station	
Prabowo	is	the	favoured	presidential	candidate	with	
16.7%	of	respondents	saying	they	will	vote	for	him,	
followed	by	Megawati	(12.5%).18	
Nov	2013	 Lembaga	Survei	
Nasional	
Only	36.4%	of	voters	polled	who	voted	for	PKS	in	2009	
will	vote	for	the	party	again.19		
Dec	2013	 CSIS	 Jokowi	is the	most	popular	presidential	candidate	with	
34.7%	of	respondents	choosing	him,	followed	by	Prabowo	
with	10.7	%	of	surveyed	votes.20	
Dec	2013	 Soegeng	Sarjadi	
School	of	
Governance	
Analysed	30	opinion	polls	and	found	that	PDIP	was	the	
most	popular	party,	forecasting	17.4%	of	votes,	followed	
by	Golkar	with	17.01%	and	Gerindra	with	10.51%.21	
Feb	2014	 Lingkaran	Survei	
Indonesia	
Nasdem	and	PKS	may	not	pass	the	parliamentary	
threshold.	PKS	predicted	to	gain	3.12%	of	votes	while	
Nasdem	predicted	to	win	2.68%.22	
Feb	2014	 Lingkaran	Survei	
Indonesia	
Presidential	candidate	Jokowi	would	win,	receiving 22.3‐
35.6%	of	the	vote,	against	Prabowo	who	would	garner	
																																																													
13	As	published	in	Kompas	(Kompas	2013a).		
14	As	reported	by	Detik.com	(Damarjati	2013).	
15	As	reported	by	Detik.com	(Ledysia	2013).	
16	As	reported	in	Kompas	(Gatra	2013).	
17	As	reported	in	the	Jaakrta	Globe	(Sukoyo	2013a).	
18	As	reported	in	Tempo	(Anam	2013).	
19	As	reported	in	Merdeka	(Simanjuntak	2013).	
20	As	reported	in	Tempo	(Tempo	2013a).	
21	As	reported	in	the	Jakarta	Post	(Saragih	2013a).	
22	As	reported	by	Tribunnews.com	(Ihsanuddin	2014b).	
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Released	 Institution	 Findings	
12.6‐19.7%.23
Mar	2014	 Saiful	Mujani	
Research	Center	
PDIP	predicted	to	win	the	election	with	16.4%	of	votes,	
Golkar	second	with	15%.	However	47.7%	of	respondents	
decided	not	to	choose	a	party.	The	survey	also	predicted	
that	all	parties	would	proceed	to	parliament	except	the	
Crescent	and	Star	Party	(Partai	Bulan	Bintang,	PBB)	and	
the	Indonesian	Justice	and	Unity	Party	(Partai	Keadilan	
dan	Persatuan	Indonesia,	PKPI).24	
Apr	2014	 Roy	Morgan	
Research	
PDIP	expected	to	gain	37%	of	votes	and	Jokowi	the	clear	
presidential	favourite	with	45%	of	respondents	choosing	
him.25	
Apr	2014	 Pusat	Data	Bersatu	 Survey	found	Jokowi	to	be	the	preferred	presidential	
candidate.26		
	
	
	
	
																																																													
23	As	reported	in	the	Jakarta	Post	(Aritonang	2014).	
24	As	reported	in	the	Jakarta	Post	(Jakarta	Post	2014b)	and	Media	Indonesia	(Mustain	2014).	
25	As	reported	in	Kompas	(Ihsanuddin	2014c)	and	the	Jakarta	Globe	(Jakarta	Globe	2014b).	
26	As	reported	in	Kompas	(Ihsanuddin	2014a).	
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